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A critique of shareholder primacy under UK takeover law and the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule

dc.contributor.authorNyombi, Chrispasen
dc.date.accessioned2015-10-05T10:57:36Zen
dc.date.available2015-10-05T10:57:36Zen
dc.date.issued2015en
dc.identifier.citationNyombi, C. (2015) 'A critique of shareholder primacy under UK takeover law and the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule', International Journal of Law and Management, vol. 57 pp.235-264en
dc.identifier.issn1754-243Xen
dc.identifier.doi10.1108/IJLMA-12-2012-0042en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10547/579138en
dc.description.abstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the primacy afforded to shareholders during takeovers is justified under common law and policy. Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides a detailed assessment of the role play by the board neutrality rule and whether this is supported by takeover law and Company law. A review of case law and statutes is provided. The paper is largely analytical. Findings – The paper finds little justification for the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule. Originality/value – The paper adds to the growing body of research literature which has analysed the role played by the Board Neutrality Rule during takeovers.
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherEmeralden
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/IJLMA-12-2012-0042en
dc.subjectCompanies act 2006en
dc.subjectBoard Neutrality Ruleen
dc.subjectCadburyen
dc.subjectRule 21en
dc.subjecttakeoversen
dc.subjectTakeover code 2006en
dc.titleA critique of shareholder primacy under UK takeover law and the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Ruleen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.contributor.departmentUniversity of Essexen
dc.identifier.journalInternational Journal of Law and Managementen
html.description.abstractPurpose – The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the primacy afforded to shareholders during takeovers is justified under common law and policy. Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides a detailed assessment of the role play by the board neutrality rule and whether this is supported by takeover law and Company law. A review of case law and statutes is provided. The paper is largely analytical. Findings – The paper finds little justification for the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule. Originality/value – The paper adds to the growing body of research literature which has analysed the role played by the Board Neutrality Rule during takeovers.


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