A critique of shareholder primacy under UK takeover law and the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule
dc.contributor.author | Nyombi, Chrispas | en |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-10-05T10:57:36Z | en |
dc.date.available | 2015-10-05T10:57:36Z | en |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | en |
dc.identifier.citation | Nyombi, C. (2015) 'A critique of shareholder primacy under UK takeover law and the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule', International Journal of Law and Management, vol. 57 pp.235-264 | en |
dc.identifier.issn | 1754-243X | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1108/IJLMA-12-2012-0042 | en |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10547/579138 | en |
dc.description.abstract | Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the primacy afforded to shareholders during takeovers is justified under common law and policy. Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides a detailed assessment of the role play by the board neutrality rule and whether this is supported by takeover law and Company law. A review of case law and statutes is provided. The paper is largely analytical. Findings – The paper finds little justification for the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule. Originality/value – The paper adds to the growing body of research literature which has analysed the role played by the Board Neutrality Rule during takeovers. | |
dc.language.iso | en | en |
dc.publisher | Emerald | en |
dc.relation.url | http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/IJLMA-12-2012-0042 | en |
dc.subject | Companies act 2006 | en |
dc.subject | Board Neutrality Rule | en |
dc.subject | Cadbury | en |
dc.subject | Rule 21 | en |
dc.subject | takeovers | en |
dc.subject | Takeover code 2006 | en |
dc.title | A critique of shareholder primacy under UK takeover law and the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule | en |
dc.type | Article | en |
dc.contributor.department | University of Essex | en |
dc.identifier.journal | International Journal of Law and Management | en |
html.description.abstract | Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Board Neutrality Rule and the primacy afforded to shareholders during takeovers is justified under common law and policy. Design/methodology/approach – The paper provides a detailed assessment of the role play by the board neutrality rule and whether this is supported by takeover law and Company law. A review of case law and statutes is provided. The paper is largely analytical. Findings – The paper finds little justification for the continued imposition of the Board Neutrality Rule. Originality/value – The paper adds to the growing body of research literature which has analysed the role played by the Board Neutrality Rule during takeovers. |
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