

Preventing Organised Crime

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Abstract

This monograph describes research undertaken between 2015 and 2016 into factors precipitating involvement in organised crime in a conurbation in northern England. The research methodology consisted of six quantitative and qualitative elements. The researchers found that, while a small number of upper echelon Organised Crime Group (OCG) nominals lived in comparative opulence, most were located in low income, high crime neighbourhoods, in which there was a tradition of organised criminality and violence. Their families were characterised by high levels of domestic violence. The research revealed that a multiplicity of agencies had intervened with these families, often to little effect, and the monogram concludes with recommendations concerning how policing and non-policing agencies might work together more effectively to reduce both familial and criminal violence.

Key Words

Organised Crime, Violence, Multi-agency Working, Domestic Violence

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Introduction

The attempt to articulate the policing of organised crime with the work of other public and voluntary sector bodies is in line with the public sector reforms currently underway. It marks a recognition that in an era of dwindling public sector budgets all public and voluntary sector agencies need to explore the most cost-effective means of achieving their goals. This is the context for the present research and this is why the research focuses on how the actions of one police service in a northern conurbation might mesh more effectively with the efforts of agencies working with families with 'complex dependencies'. This research therefore aims to identify effective models of collaborative working to prevent involvement in organised crime

Methodology

The research methodology consisted of six elements:

1. A desk-based review of the relevant research on pathways into organised crime, organised crime careers and intervention with individuals and families associated with Organised Crime Groups (OCGs).
2. An analysis of the scale and nature of the problem of OCG involvement in the northern conurbation, utilising quantitative data held by the police.
3. A comparative study of the criminal career trajectories of OCG- and non-OCG-involved offenders in an area of the conurbation.
4. Qualitative interviews with a purposive sample of incarcerated OCG affiliates from the conurbation.
5. A review of relevant information held by public agencies that currently have, or have had, contact with families, one or more of whose members are associated with OCGs in the area, via attendance and participant observation at the Systems Thinking Workshops convened by the police in five areas within the conurbation. The researchers also undertook interviews with previous participants in workshops in five other areas in the conurbation in which the researchers had been unable to participate.

The principle aims of the Systems Thinking Workshops were to:

- I.) Explore the routes into organised crime and the system conditions that allow such involvement.
- II.) Identify early intervention opportunities to prevent involvement in, or promote desistance from, organised crime.

III.)Examine how public agencies can work together most effectively to prevent involvement or promote desistance from involvement in organised crime.

6. Key Informant Interviews with respondents who are 'key' in the sense that they can facilitate access to the extensive social networks to which they are 'gatekeepers' and provide unique understandings of aspects of their social milieu, by dint of the roles they play or have played within it, and illuminate the meanings of behaviour that the researcher may not understand. As such, these key informants who were senior members of relevant agencies and organisations in the police area were able to extend the researchers understanding of situations where he or she could not be a direct observer.

Organised Crime: Messages from the Research

There are many definitions of organised crime and the term is applied to a broad range of unrelated groupings and activities. The term can be used to refer to certain types of sophisticated criminal activities in illicit markets, but these can also be described as 'professional crime'. In reality these illicit markets range from large, hierarchical organisations like Mexican drug cartels or the Italian 'mafia', through relatively small, loosely connected, sometimes temporary, local networks, to adolescent street gangs. It is therefore difficult to arrive at a precise definition but for a comprehensive list of over 150 definitions of 'organised crime' see Klaus von Lampe's 2013 compilation. As Albanese (2000) has observed:

It appears that a definition of organised crime, based on a consensus of writers over the course of the past three decades, would read as follows: Organised crime is a continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illicit activities; its continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly control, and/or the corruption of public officials.

In this research we have adopted the definitions utilised by the Home Office in its *Local to Global: Reducing the Risk from Organised Crime* publication (Home Office, 2013):

Individuals, normally working with others, with the capacity and capability to commit serious crime on a continuing basis, which includes elements of planning, control and coordination, and benefits those involved. A significant proportion of organised criminals are motivated, principally, by the desire to make money. Others, such as the perpetrators of organised child sexual exploitation, have different motivations.

In its *Serious and Organised Crime Strategy* (Home Office, 2013), HM Government notes that:

Organised crime includes drug trafficking, human trafficking, and organised illegal immigration, high value fraud and other financial crimes, counterfeiting, organised acquisitive crime and cyber crime. The strategy also deals with serious crime which demands a national coordinated response, notably other fraud and child sexual exploitation.

In the northern conurbation, organised crime takes many different forms, including loan sharking, prostitution, child sexual exploitation, the production and distribution of counterfeit goods, the sale and distribution of stolen goods and protection rackets involving the domination of local pubs and entertainment venues; sometimes accompanied by intimidation of local residents and, of course, drug trafficking and drug dealing.

Indeed, the drugs trade in all its manifestations is the motor of much of the violence, burglary, robbery and vehicle crime in the region. Thus far however, it has not been possible to identify a clear link between the drug trafficking activities of OCGs and drug dealing street gangs. Project crime, in the form of high value robberies or the theft of expensive cars for export, perpetrated by local criminals, but also criminals from beyond the region, are another significant feature of the organised crime landscape in the conurbation.

Organised Crime and Organised Criminal Careers

At present our knowledge of careers in organised crime is limited. Most of what we know is derived from studies of the aetiology of child and adolescent offending and life-course studies of troubled and troublesome children and young people, like those undertaken by Sampson & Laub (1993, 2003).

However, the 'criminal careers' paradigm is based on longitudinal, prospective methods applied to general populations of children and families. Typically, research subjects are selected as children in a 'pre-crime' state, and then followed through their life-course in an attempt to establish which pre-crime 'risk factors' correlate with, and make it possible to predict, the nature and persistence of their subsequent criminal careers (Farrington, 2012). This research identifies two main career 'pathways'; 'adolescence time-limited' which characterises the bulk of offenders while 'lifecourse-persistent' pathways characterise a minority. Serious violent criminals tend to be located in the latter group. 'Late-onset' offending is rare but as research undertaken in the Netherlands and the UK indicates, 'late onset' offenders are more likely than other groups to be involved in organised crime (Kleemans E. & de Poot F., 2008, Kleemans E. & van de Bunt, H. 2008, van Koppen, et al, 2010).

Organised crime typically involves adults. Involvement may be the outcome of a 'lifecourse-persistent' criminal career or it may, as we have noted, begin in adulthood.

Kleemans and de Poot (2008) found that one in three organised crime 'nominals' had no involvement with the judicial system prior to the organised crime index case. On average, offenders were aged 27 when they first became involved with the judicial system and 37 at the time of the organised crime index case. Similarly, in their study of over 4000 offenders involved in offences which suggested some involvement in organised crime in the UK, primarily drug trafficking, Francis (et al, 2013) found that offenders who followed the more conventional pattern of offending, peaking in late teenage years before rapidly declining, made up less than one in five (18%) of their sample. The offences they committed required some specialist skill, significant resources, reliable contacts and organisational acumen. Unsurprisingly, therefore 'late onset' offenders, with relevant skills, often developed in legitimate business enterprises, were heavily represented. Kleemans and de Poot (2008) analysed the careers of 66 'nodal offenders', whom they describe as:

... main suspects who fulfilled an executive function in the criminal groups or criminal networks in the index cases. These offenders were, on average, 39 years old at the time of the index case, had 12 previous contacts with the criminal justice authorities and were, on average, 23 years old at the time of their first contact with these authorities.

However, also in this group were 30 'lifecourse-persistent' offenders whom Kleemans & de Poot refer to as 'local heroes' because they had strong local roots and social contacts which enabled them to become involved in a variety of legal and illegal activities. These 'local heroes' seldom wanted to extend their operations beyond their own region and they lacked the skills or expertise that would make them attractive to organised criminals from other regions or countries. Nonetheless, in some cases assets gained through local burglaries and robberies were used to negotiate the transition into organised crime. In some cases, the shift into narcotics saw a reduction in their 'judicial contact' since they were then involved in less detectable crime. Where they did come to official notice, it was usually as a result of violent crime or traffic violations.

Pathways into Organised Crime

The research suggests two, quite distinct, pathways into two different levels of organised crime. For 'late onset' OCG members life events, particularly those associated with debt and bankruptcy, often trigger involvement in organised crime (Kleemans and de Poot, 2008). 'Late onset' adult offenders with no appreciable previous criminal record tended to become involved when opportunities, particularly those which arose in their day-to-day work, presented themselves.

Adult 'starters' in organised crime often possessed specific skills, characteristically in the transport industry, import/export, customs, financial and legal advice, tax administration, law, foreign exchange, banking, and independent entrepreneurship. Contacts with other

suspects were often made through work but occupational contacts also coincided with social relations. In some cases the illegal activities were completely intertwined with their legitimate business activities. It seems that once embarked upon their illicit career paths, subjects would often involve family members and friends and, inasmuch as adults might recruit their children and partners, it was also the case that their grown-up children might involve their parents. Social ties and the concomitant transfer of knowledge and contacts tended to create a *social snowball effect* which meant that as subjects proceeded in their life of crime, their dependence on the resources of their initial contacts declined and they found their own criminal associations.

This challenges the traditional idea of recruitment and progression up the criminal career ladder as subjects prove they are able to handle the requirements of the job, although in some cases organised crime groups did set out to recruit individuals with specific skills and knowledge, but deliberate recruitment appears to be exceptional. In the conclusion to their report, Francis (et al, 2013) noted that:

The existence of a large group of offenders whose involvement in organised crime begins in adulthood, and often without a clear pattern of prior offending, is intriguing and one worth further investigation. Establishing to what extent these offenders were simply more adept at avoiding detection, or whether their involvement in organised criminality in later life was more opportunistic would be a central question to address.

Organised Crime and the Family

In the other group of OGC members are 'life-course-persistent' offenders many of whom were seriously violent teenagers. This pattern also emerges from our analysis of the quantitative data held by the police and the Case Control Study undertaken in one area of the conurbation. The findings from extensive longitudinal research into 'life-course persistent' offenders suggests that the familial pre-crime 'risk factors' to which these OGC members were subjected to in childhood are good predictors of adult criminality (Farrington et al, 2009).

Organised Crime and the Neighbourhood Effect

The police data also shows that these families, and their offending, tend to be concentrated in particular geographical areas and that their violence is likely to be both expressive (related to lifestyle) and instrumental (committed in furtherance of a criminal enterprise). This raises important questions about the impact of violence upon the families of OGC members and violent, localised, criminal (sub) cultures upon the children and adolescents who live in these neighbourhoods.

Certain notorious 'criminal families' in the area where our case-control study was undertaken, for example, appear to foster successive generations of new recruits who

sustain the criminal networks in their communities. These kinds of familial networks are deeply embedded in communities characterised by limited legitimate opportunity, alternative economies, unorthodox methods of informal social control and values which are often at odds with those of the mainstream. The criminologist Edwin Sutherland (1947) argued that individuals learn the motives, values, attitudes, and techniques favourable to criminality through association with those who already hold and practice them. His theory of *Differential Association* predicts that an individual will opt into criminality when the balance of definitions favourable to law-breaking exceeds those favourable to being a law-abiding citizen. Moreover, the earlier in life that this association begins, the greater the intensity of the association and the higher the status of those transmitting the motives, values, attitudes, and techniques, the stronger will be the subject's commitment to criminality. When these behaviours and attitudes are consistently rewarded within a particular social milieu, Sutherland argues, criminality is in effect normalised.

Pierre Bourdieu (1993) describes such milieu as *Social Fields* which, he says, are shaped by both the broad 'determining structures' of class, family, ethnicity, and education and local social, cultural, and economic imperatives. Prestige within a social field is ascribed to those who conform to its norms, values, and social mores. As Max Weber observes:

status honour is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from those who wish to belong to the circle.

(1958, p. 187)

Bourdieu suggests that one's position in a social field induces a set of motivations that are experienced as "*what should be done*". Thus, what Bourdieu calls the *social fate* of individuals is sealed in large part by the role demands, which they experience as a *chain of objective requirements* placed upon them. As one of Harding's respondents said of his involvement with a violent street gang in Lambeth:

You learn it just by hanging around. ... You know what you are supposed to do and not supposed to do really. Just like what you are allowed to do at school. They don't even need to explain it'.

(Harding, 2014)

This being so, in considering an intervention that would address the pressures towards criminal involvement in these neighbourhoods, one would need to consider the individual, the individual within the family, and the family and the individual within their social field.

Organised Crime and Street Gangs

One of the main differences between street gangs and OCGs has been that while many OCGs have been wholesalers, trafficking large quantities of illicit drugs, street gangs were essentially retailers dealing relatively small amounts 'on the street'. However, respondents interviewed in the recent independent evaluation of the government's *Ending Gang and Youth Violence* (EGYV) programme (Disley & Liddle, 2015) suggest that the dividing line between street gangs and OCGs is becoming increasingly blurred and that in two London boroughs, Barking & Dagenham and Greenwich, the street gangs have effectively evolved into OCGs, involved in both wholesale and retail illicit drug supply. Other respondents felt that in Manchester the success of the Manchester Multi Agency Gangs Strategy (MMAGS) and the Xcalibre police gangs team had meant that a few older gang affiliates had migrated to OCGs while in Birmingham a reduction in gang activity and territorial violence had paralleled an increase in wholesale drug dealing which, they suggested, reflected a similar trend. It appears that street gangs are now operating on a broader terrain. New alliances formed as a result of gang members being moved via *Safe & Secure* programmes or new relationships developed between members of different gangs from different parts of the country while they are in jail or Young Offenders Institution (YOI) are a key factor in 'cross-border collaboration' to distribute drugs. One respondent suggested that one of the results of this was a 'loosening of gang affiliations' to enable affiliates to conduct business more efficiently; which meant dealing with people from a multiplicity of gangs. The authors observe that because OCGs are less visible than street gangs and OCG members are less likely to be apprehended, it could be the case that an apparent reduction in gang activity is being paralleled by an escalation in OCG activity.

Research Findings

A Profile of Organised Crime Groups in the Conurbation

Nationally, policing agencies classify OCGs on an Organised Crime Group Map (OCGM). This matrix has two axes; *Criminal Impact* and *Criminal Capability*.

Criminal Impact, measured on a scale of 1 to 5, refers to both the value of the proceeds from criminal activity and the impact upon the victims.

Criminal Capability measured on a scale of A to C refers to the capacity of OCGs to organise and articulate networks, the most sophisticated of which link international, regional, and local OCG activity.

Three of the respondents interviewed in the OCG prisoner study undertaken as part of the present research were senior figures in high capability/high impact OCGs. At the other end of the scale are local OCGs characteristically composed of family members and their associates, involved in local drug distribution, loan sharking, protection rackets, or car 'ringing'. Thus OCGs can be ranked along a continuum which stretches from 1A, representing the greatest capability and the highest level of impact, to 5C; those OCGs with least criminal impact and lowest capability.

Data held by the police indicated that in February 2015 there were 198 active OCGs in the conurbation and a further 128 deemed to be no longer active. This suggests, as Hobbs and Dunningham (1998) have observed, that the organised crime landscape is changing and while dynastic, familial, and territorial groupings remain, exemplified by the Adams Family in London and the Noonans in Manchester, today local organised crime is:

... a mixed economy of embedded familial crime 'dynasties', virtual networks, as in the case in Child Sexual Exploitation (CSE) rings and 'project' crime; temporary collaborations between specialist professional criminals, in which the link between territorial control and market sovereignty is attenuated, as the neighbourhood is to some extent supplanted by the market as the major field of operation

(Hobbs & Dunningham, 1998)

OCGM data held by the police in the conurbation indicates that, in terms of *Criminal Capability*, 75% of currently active OCGs can be categorised at level 4 or below. The fact that 39% of this group score, a high A or a B on *Criminal Impact*, is accounted for by their use of, sometimes extreme, violence in pursuance of their nefarious activities. Data from different sources, including the prison interviews and the Systems Thinking Workshops, suggests that members of this group are disproportionately likely to be involved in domestic violence and that their children are at greater risk of physical harm within the

home. This is the group which one Workshop participant referred to as ‘disorganised criminals involved in organised crime’ and these OCG members tend to live in high crime, low income neighbourhoods where the lives of many OCG-involved families are, as one Key Informant observed, ‘chaotic’.

According to their classification on the OCG matrix, these groupings appear to be relatively fluid and unstable, while their members, although committing serious offences, make relatively little overall criminal impact. This grouping contains both discreet low level OCGs and the, often casual, ‘workforce’ of upper echelon organised crime; engaged in low skilled, usually violent activity (the ‘muscle’) in support of upper echelon groups. These OCGs and the ‘middle range’ group (OCGs ranked 4C to 3A) were most prevalent in the area of our Case Control Study.

These groups are likely to contain a preponderance of ‘early onset’, ‘lifetime persistent’ offenders and what Kleemans & Poot (2008) refer to as ‘local heroes’. These are people whose families will have had, sometimes extensive, contact with criminal justice, health and social welfare agencies although, as the Systems Thinking Workshops revealed, professionals from these latter agencies may not be aware of their criminal involvement or the potential threat that they might pose.

As the table below indicates most of the roles played within OCGs are associated with the trafficking, supply, and cultivation of illicit drugs. The cultivators, chemists, suppliers, and organisers comprise just over two thirds (70%) of the OCG ‘nominals’ known to the police in the conurbation. The ‘not known’ category, probably includes those involved in loan sharking, protection rackets, or car ringing but many of these may also play a role within the drugs business, protecting the drugs and enforcing drug debts. If we assume that much of the money laundered by OCG nominals is derived from drug sales we could add up to a further 4% to the total of drug-related OCG roles. It appears that the illicit drugs trade constitutes the ‘lion’s share’ of the organised crime problem in the conurbation, suggesting that any local drug strategy would need to target OCGs.

Table 1: Roles Played by OCG Nominals

Role	Percentage (%)
Supplier (Drugs)	43
Organiser	21
Not Known	17
Cash Consolidator/Collector	5
Burglar	4

Money Launderer	4
Chemist/Cultivator	2
Courier	1
Other Roles	3
Total	100

The Case Control Study

The purpose of the Case Control Study was to explore pathways into organised crime. The research team employed a ‘case-control’ research strategy wherein each OCG nominal in the chosen area was matched with a non-OCG offender from amongst the local population. In this way it was possible to establish the key differences between the criminal careers of OCG members who were similar in most other respects to their local non-OCG criminal peers. This method is used extensively in epidemiological studies in public health. All the ‘cases’ selected were currently active OCG ‘nominals’ in the area.

This analysis enabled the research team to produce a local ‘*organised crime map*’ which highlighted the characteristics of all the OCG nominals in the area. These nominals are recorded by the police as groups of associates and placed on the police OCG Tracker. The analysis revealed that many of the characteristics of the OCG case control cohort are more akin to those of the ‘local heroes’ identified by Kleemans and de Poot (2008) than the ‘late onset groups’ discussed above.

There were 50 active members of OCGs in the Tracker sample for the area, aged between 17 and 55. 92% of them were white and they were all prolific offenders, generating between them 1,452 lifetime offences to date, an average of 29.04 per offender (see Table 2 below). Their offences cover a wide range and include the most serious violent offences (HO Codes 1 to 5, including murder, attempted murder, manslaughter and conspiracy to murder).

Table 2: Offences Committed by OCG Nominals

Lifetime Offences	N	Percent
Serious violence	1452	6.61
Violence	1452	10.40
Sexual offences	1452	0.55

Burglary	1452	13.00
Robbery	1452	12.00
Handling	1452	31.00
Domestic abuse	1452	2.00
Guns used	1452	3.00
Alcohol influence	1452	3.00
Other	1452	27.00

Eighty six percent of the OCG sample received their first conviction as juveniles and might therefore be regarded as 'Lifetime Persistent' although their frequency of offending decreases in their 20s. However, this may well be attributable to them being incarcerated. The lower frequency of offending amongst the 22 to 29 age group, compared with those over 30, would suggest that this is the case and support the view that these are lifetime persistent offenders who, unlike their non-OCG counterparts, do not 'age-out' of criminal involvement.

A Comparison of OGC and Non-OGC 'Controls'

This analysis compares the criminal careers of members of OCGs in area of the conurbation with those of local non-OCG offenders on the basis of ethnicity, age, and age at first offence. The analysis aims to establish how the nature and frequency of their offending differs over time from that of the non-OGC comparison group. The analysis reveals that OCG members have a distinctive pattern of offending.

The OCG group are particularly prolific young offenders but as they grow-up they tend to specialise in instrumental violence in pursuance of various forms of acquisitive crime. Their non-OCG peers by contrast tend to specialise in non-violent property crime and 'expressive' violence associated with heavy drinking and substance abuse. OCG members are convicted less frequently in adulthood, although it is not clear whether this is because they specialise in forms of organised crime that are harder to detect, or whether, because their offending is more serious, they are incarcerated for longer periods.

As juveniles (below the age of 18 years) the OCG members offended much more frequently than their non-OCG contemporaries and were over three times as likely to be convicted of a 'violent' crime or a 'very serious' violent crime (including murder). They were also significantly more likely to be convicted for robbery, theft, dishonestly handling,

and fraud. Interestingly, given the relative profligacy of their offending, they were less likely to be convicted for an offence in which guns were used.

This higher frequency of offending continues into their early 20s and their rate of convictions for 'very serious' violent crime actually increases. They are however, considerably less likely than the non-OCG cohort to be convicted for offences involving domestic abuse. Given their known penchant for violence, however, this finding could be attributable to the fact that partners were unwilling to report these offences. Evidence from the Systems Thinking Workshops (see below) and data from Wilson and Klein's (2006) seven year study of offenders' involvement in domestic abuse tend to support this view.

As we have indicated, in their mid to late 20s OCG nominals appear to offend less frequently but they are still twice as likely to be convicted for robbery and over three times as likely to be convicted for 'very serious' violent crime than their non-OCG counterparts. An emerging characteristic, evident in their late 20s and 30s, is that OCG nominals are a lot less likely to be convicted for alcohol-related offences.

In their 30s OCG members appear to offend less frequently but, for reasons that are unclear, are almost certain to be convicted for firearms offences.

The main factor that singles out the OCG cohort is their involvement in 'serious' and 'very serious' violence. This violence, especially the 'very serious' violence starts at an unusually young age and continues over the life course. A substantial body of research identifies two different developmental trajectories for the emergence of youth violence, one characterized by the 'early onset' of violence and the other by 'late onset'. Children who commit their first serious violent act before puberty are in the early-onset group, and this violence is likely to persist into adulthood, whereas young people who do not become violent until adolescence, the late-onset group, are usually responding to pressures in their immediate environment and will tend to 'age out' of violent crime.

North American research indicates that between 20% and 45% of boys who are serious violent offenders by age 16 or 17 initiated their violence in childhood (D'Unger et al., 1998; Elliott et al., 1986; Huizinga et al., 1995; Nagin & Tremblay, 1999; Patterson & Yoerger, 1997; Stattin & Magnusson, 1996). A higher percentage of girls who were serious violent offenders by age 16 or 17 (45 to 69 percent) were violent in childhood. Most violent young offenders only begin their violent behaviour during adolescence and this suggests that it may be possible to identify serious violent offenders who persist into adulthood in early childhood (Lipsey & Derzon, 1998). Early onset violent offending is a strong predictor of 'lifetime persistent' violent offending and is closely associated with the following range of 'pre-crime' risk factors. Farrington (2012):

- Families characterised by high levels of conflict
- Early and persistent exposure to violence in the home
- Anti-social parents who are hostile to authority figures
- Parental and/or fraternal criminality
- Poor child-rearing practices
- Child abuse
- Large family size
- Early pregnancy
- Low socio-economic status
- Impulsiveness
- Low school attainment

These risk factors are often inter-related so that young single parents on low incomes experience high rates of depression which undermine their parenting capacity and impacts upon the behaviour of their children and their attainment in school. Similarly, living in a home where conflict is resolved through violence and attitudes to authority figures i.e. teachers, social workers and the police are hostile will suggest to the child that violence and hostility are a legitimate means of getting what they want.

In the OCG cohort on the police database, particular familial factors stand out and could well prove to be the most reliable predictors of future OCG involvement and involvement in violent crime in particular. The problem here is not neglect or abuse per se, but parental criminality, hostility to authority figures and exposure to violence in the home. The Cambridge Study of Delinquent Development (Farrington et al, 2009) found that having a convicted parent or elder sibling before a male child's 10th birthday was among the best predictors of offending up to the age of 32. At age 40, convictions were heavily concentrated amongst those for whom this was the case. While only 6% of the families in this study had this characteristic, they accounted for half of all convictions.

As we have noted, it appears that in the case of OCG members criminality is transmitted from generation to generation via a process of 'differential association' (Sutherland, 1947). These effects will be compounded by the child witnessing parental conflict, domestic violence and living through a fractious divorce or separation. If, as we have suggested, this is not simply a feature of individual households but a characteristic of family life in particular neighbourhoods characterised by a distinctive, 'oppositional' sub-culture, the child will grow up in a social environment which is supportive of anti-social, illegal and violent behaviour.

However, we should sound a note of caution here because risk factor analysis tends to over-predict involvement when it fails to consider the *processes or developmental pathways that intervene between risk factors and outcomes* (Boeck et al, 2006). In reality, subtle differences in initial conditions may, over time, produce remarkably different outcomes meaning that children initially deemed to be 'at risk' in similar ways

embark upon different criminal pathways while some 'high risk' children do not go on to offend at all. (Farrington 2012). This gives some cause for optimism because the proverbial 'difference that makes a difference' could be interventions from agencies, organisations, and individuals which offer different attitudes and aspirations and pathways for their achievement.

Interviews with Incarcerated OCG Members

Because the aim of the present research is to identify key points of intervention in the criminal careers of subjects involved in organised crime, it was decided that the analysis of quantitative data held by the police and the Case Control Study should be complemented by qualitative data gleaned from interviews with members of OCGs. Existing studies of organised crime careers are based largely on analyses of the case files of individuals and groups of offenders involved in 'transit crimes'; those offences which involve transporting illicit goods or people across national and international boundaries. These studies seldom involve qualitative interviews with members of OCGs because, as Geoffrey Pearson and Dick Hobbs (2001) have observed, it is difficult to gain access to, and elicit accurate information from, people who are actively engaged in the middle and upper echelons of organised crime in general and class A drug distribution in particular. They write:

The use of ethnographic methods is rarely feasible in the study of upper and middle level trafficking owing to the degrees of secrecy and security that are employed

(Pearson & Hobbs, 2001)

As a result, the few qualitative studies that do exist, mainly conducted in the USA with members of the Italian mafia, have tended to rely upon the testimony of convicted, and normally imprisoned, respondents.

Contact was made with prisons in which OCG members from the conurbation were inmates. Over 40 letters were sent to potential respondents. Ten replies were received, two of which explained that they were unable to participate in the research. One, because, 'being innocent', he felt that participation might suggest that he was in fact guilty, while the other said he feared that participation might suggest to other prisoners, on the high security wing where he was being held, that he was an informer. A further problem was that the remaining respondents had been dispersed to different prisons across the North West, the West and East Midlands, and East Anglia and information about the dates and times of the interviews had not always got through to those responsible for security at these prisons, meaning that the researchers were prevented from undertaking interviews. Eventually, with the help of the regional crime unit, the researchers were able to gain access to nine OCG nominals in four jails in the North West, one of whom (Respondent I) withdrew at the point of interview.

Table 3: Offences for which Respondents were Imprisoned

The Respondents		
Respondent A	45	Fraud
Respondent B	53	Drug Trafficking/Money Laundering
Respondent C	40	Drug Trafficking
Respondent D	61	Drug Trafficking
Respondent E	25	Drug Trafficking
Respondent F	27	Armed Robbery
Respondent G	31	Drug Trafficking
Respondent H	27	Drug Trafficking
Respondent I	25	Drug Trafficking

The research strategy of 'purposive sampling' was adopted partly because of the difficulty of finding respondents but largely because we were aware of the characteristics of the population to be researched and sampling for proportionality was not a concern. The main goal of purposive sampling is to focus on particular characteristics of a population that are of interest and which will best enable us to answer questions about them.

The researchers used a semi-structured interview schedule which, while pursuing the same themes in the same order with each respondent, was sufficiently open to allow new ideas to be introduced during the interview in response to what interviewees said, rather than relying only on concepts and questions defined in advance of the interview.

Themes Emerging from the Prison Interviews

While all of the respondents had been found guilty of involvement in organised crime, the roles they played, and the length of the sentences they were serving varied widely. What follows is a thematic analysis of the responses of the respondents involved in the research process.

Age of Involvement in Organised Crime

As we have noted, criminological research identifies two main criminal career pathways; 'adolescent time-limited' which characterises the bulk of offenders and 'lifecourse-persistent' which characterises a minority. However, given the relative youth of most respondents it was difficult to say whether or not they would be 'lifetime persistent' so we have referred to them here as 'early onset'. 'Late-onset' offending is rare but as research indicates, 'late-onset' offenders are more likely to be involved in organised crime and four of our respondents fell into this category (Farrington, 2012, Kirby & Penna, 2011, Kirby & Nailer 2013, Kleemans & de Poot 2008).

Early Onset Criminality

Respondent E was brought up on a notorious housing estate in a Northern city where, apparently, 'everyone was at it'. He did not enjoy school, truanted and was involved in petty crime. When he reached school leaving age, his father, with whom he did not 'get on', found him job on the building site where he (the father) worked, in an attempt to prise him away from the friends with whom he had been truanting and offending. However, he did not like the work and quickly went back to his friends who had by then moved on from 'selling a bit of weed' to retailing larger quantities of cocaine.

Similarly, Respondent G said he was 'kicked out' of secondary school and began 'hanging out' with similarly disaffected friends. He said that the area in which he lived was notorious for crime and drug dealing and he knew many of the people involved in it.

Respondent F who entered the interview room saying 'I'm a criminal and I haven't worked a day in my life', said he didn't like school and had only attended sporadically. He implied that he was offending when he was out of school. He said that he liked to be out of the classroom where he felt uncomfortable and 'strange' and preferred 'doing things'. He said that he now regretted missing out on his education but when asked which educational courses he'd attended in the prison, it emerged that he had not attended any. Although he was not particularly forthcoming, it is reasonable to assume that he was offending from a fairly early age. The interviewers gained the impression that Respondent F was suffering from a, probably undiagnosed, learning difficulty.

Respondent H came from a notorious OCG family in a notorious neighbourhood and said he was involved in a great deal of fighting at school because he was pushed by others to live up to the family name. His father insisted that he stay in school and he passed some GCSEs. Respondent H's father died when he was 17 and he started drinking heavily and getting into fights and other petty crime. On another occasion he and a friend abducted a cocaine dealer and Respondent H was jailed for false imprisonment. Latterly he got drunk and crashed a car killing his friend. He was imprisoned for dangerous driving. Until the present five year sentence he had not been convicted for any major OCG-related offences. In this case he says he was trying to help a friend who was in debt to buy 9oz.

of heroin but because, as a member of a notorious OCG family, he was under constant surveillance by the police he was caught and prosecuted for Intent to Supply.

Late Onset Criminality

Respondent A, a property developer, was convicted of mortgage fraud involving hundreds of thousands of pounds at the age of 43, having had one previous fraud conviction in his mid-20s. He was a notorious gambler and had incurred large gambling debts.

Respondent B was convicted for a first offence, laundering £800,000 worth of drugs money at the age of 52. He claimed that the money was given to him in payment for cars he would be supplying to the person who passed him the money.

Respondent C was convicted of his first offence, Conspiracy to Supply Class A Drugs, at circa 45 years. He was in debt because his car repair business was failing and he claimed that a friend of his brother-in-law 'threw him a lifeline' by settling his debts and giving him some additional income in return for storing some boxes in his garage.

Respondent D was convicted in 2009 for his first criminal offence, Drug Trafficking, at the age of 56. He was found guilty with 15 co-defendants and given the longest sentence (17 years). He claimed that he was helping his brother-in-law out by delivering a van load of goods which, unbeknownst to him, had a very large stash of heroin under the floorboards. He said that he was a market trader.

All but one of the late onset group were involved in the upper echelons of the illicit drugs trade; these were the people Respondent G (see below) described as 'untouchable' (although they clearly were not). It seems unlikely, particularly in the cases of Respondents B and D that they had not offended before, raising the question of how their offending could have gone undetected for so long.

All of these respondents claimed to have been wrongly charged and imprisoned. Respondent A claimed to have been wholly unaware of what a 'bent' business associate's solicitor had done with money he was owed and claimed that he was 'taking the rap' just for trusting him. Respondent D cited gullibility and an unquestioning desire to help a family member, plus wrong advice from his QC. Respondent B also cited poor legal advice (he said he was 'suing his brief') and pressure from the Serious & Organised Crime Agency. Respondent C said that he had been insufficiently curious about the contents of the boxes he was asked to store. The other lower echelon respondents, by contrast, readily accepted that they had committed the crime for which they had been sentenced.

Familial Links into Organised Crime

The father and other relatives of Respondent H had all been heavily involved in a variety of criminal enterprises and implicated in several murders and serious assaults. However, Respondent H appears to have been 'the odd one out' who was either unsuited to involvement in organised crime or prevented from being involved by his family. Yet his association with this criminal milieu meant that he was frequently involved in violence and, ironically, his criminality seems in part to have been a response to his exclusion from the family business and the stigma of being a family member.

Respondent B left school at 16 and joined his father's plant hire business. In the mid-1990s his father, who appears to have been solidly embedded within the criminal community, was convicted for making 'cash-in-hand'/'off-the-books' payments and spent 6 months in jail. Respondent B was a director of this company and branched out into the car leasing businesses, which may well have served as a front for class A drug dealing and money laundering (see above).

As we have noted when Respondent C got into serious debt he was introduced by his brother-in-law to OCG nominals who could 'help him out'.

Respondent D claimed that he was not in fact a drug smuggler but had stumbled into the alleged conspiracy inadvertently because he was 'helping out' his brother-in-law. This help consisted of bringing a van containing unspecified goods from Holland where he said he was working at the time, although he later claimed that this main occupation was selling clothes in a street market in Liverpool.

The Neighbourhood Effect

Respondent E said that although he came from a good family, his neighbourhood was notorious for gangs, guns and drug-related crime and when he was growing up, most of his contemporaries were involved in some form of villainy. He denied that there was a gang problem in the area and said that it was just groups of friends getting together to make a bit of money. However, he acknowledged that there was what appeared to be gang conflict and spoke about a group with whom he and his friends were in conflict, who settled their differences by shooting people. He began using and dealing when he effectively dropped out of school.

Respondent G said he came from a good family. His sister had attended university and his brothers were all working but when he was kicked out of school he began hanging out with similarly disaffected friends. He said that the area in which he lived was notorious for crime and drug dealing and that from a young age he knew, personally, many of the people who were involved in it.

While it is not inevitable that young men like these will become involved in crime in general and drug distribution in particular, the odds of this happening to disaffected young people in high crime, gang-affected, neighbourhoods are comparatively high. As Manuel Castells (1999) has observed, it is poorly educated, socially disadvantaged young people from high crime neighbourhoods who constitute 'the shop floor' of the international drugs trade. The area in which we conducted our Case Comparison Study exemplifies this situation, and it suggests that interventions that address the dynamics of the neighbourhood and the networks within it should run alongside interventions with particular individuals or families.

Networks

At his trial it emerged that respondent D was the kingpin in an extensive and highly ingenious drug trafficking network. He was also said to know and be on good terms with the main figures in organised crime in the North West. Yet he was also renowned locally for his charitable work and his commitment to the Catholic Church.

Respondent E did not reveal where the cocaine he was being paid to transport came from because he wasn't sure himself. It seemed that his role was to pick it up from someone he did not know and take it to somebody who came up from the south coast every week. He and a friend earned around £1,500 (£750 each) for this and Respondent E thought this was a 'reasonable screw' for not doing a great deal of work. He was involved in other deals but this appears to have been his main source of income. Respondent E was part of a network but he was not aware of the identities of most of the other people in it and he played only a minor role. Thus, while he was technically involved in a conspiracy, he was not a conspirator in the generally accepted sense of the term. Nonetheless, because of the large quantities of drugs being trafficked and the numbers of people involved in the network selling them, Respondent E was convicted of conspiracy to supply Class A drugs.

Respondent G indicated that the people who were running the drugs business in his area, the ones making the biggest profits, were effectively 'untouchable'. He said that they had legitimate businesses which served as a cover for the drugs trade; drove nice cars; had nice houses and nice holidays. He said that the police never seem able to 'get anything on them' and nobody 'grasses them up'. He said that one of the reasons people get involved at the bottom end of the business (street dealing) is that they want to be like them but he had come to realise that this did not happen to people like him. This suggests that there is no career ladder reaching from the street to the 'boardroom' in the illicit drugs trade and that while 'street people' like him can achieve some seniority in terms of being the connection between this upper echelon of drug 'wholesalers' and street 'retailers' there is little or no scope for further progression.

Respondent B, who both drove and leased nice cars, was an ostensibly law-abiding businessman. He spoke about *colourful characters* who hired top-end cars and that 'all

sorts of people rent cars and you can't know what all of them are up to'. In reality it seems that Respondent B had had extensive contact, both socially and professionally, with organised crime figures who were seriously involved in the production and trafficking of illicit drugs and money laundering.

As Kleemans and de Poot (2008) suggest, these upper echelon OCG members like Respondents B and D tend to be involved in high value financial fraud/money laundering and/or cross-border transit crime (drug trafficking). Members of these groups tend to be specialists and membership changes over time depending on the skills and contacts necessary to facilitate the illicit enterprise in which they are involved. They describe themselves as businessmen, lead ostensibly conventional lives and endeavour to keep a low profile vis-à-vis criminal justice agencies.

Respondents G and E by contrast were lower echelon 'nominals' from apparently successful, law-abiding, working class families. These were the children who felt they had 'let their families down'; failed to meet their expectations and been excluded from, or dropped out of, school. As a result they ended up hanging out with their similarly disaffected peers in the high crime neighbourhoods in which they lived, using and selling drugs and eventually being drawn into storage and lower-level wholesale supply, possibly because, in one case, they became indebted to the upper echelon wholesalers/traffickers.

Their lifestyles tended to be chaotic partly because of drug use but also because they were estranged from their parents and law-abiding siblings who could have acted as a positive influence. Significantly perhaps, it does not appear that a great deal of effort was made by their school or social welfare agencies and criminal justice agencies to get either of them back into education or to achieve a rapprochement with their parents.

Financial Problems

Respondent A claimed that in 2008 as a result of the financial crash the value of his assets plummeted and his property company went bankrupt. He said that he was owed large sums of money and wanted to pay off debts (one of the largest was to a Casino). He therefore approached the solicitor of a well-known property developer with whom he had worked for £80,000 that he was owed. He claims not to have known that the property developer was raising multiple mortgages against properties, many of which he did not even own, and believes that because of his prior association with the man he was convicted of fraud.

Respondent C said he leased a unit on an industrial estate where he did car repairs. He ran into debt and was eventually working 20 hours a day to 'keep his head above water'. He claims to have had no previous convictions. He said that just as it looked as if he could not sustain his business any longer a friend of his brother-in-law 'threw him a lifeline'. This lifeline consisted of this friend settling Respondent C's debts and giving him

some additional income in return for storing boxes in his garage. Respondent C was remarkably incurious about the contents of the boxes but just grateful that his finances had been sorted out.

Respondent G said that he and a team of five or six street dealers were turning over around £3,000 a day. However, because he was using a great deal of crack he ran up a debt of around £100,000. He was arrested for dealing and served a prison sentence, having done which, he was determined to go straight. However, the people to whom he owed money said that unless he worked off his debt by warehousing their drugs they would come after his family. He said he could not go to the police because that would have been too dangerous.

Respondent H said that, in 2013, with Christmas looming, he realised that he needed to find a way of raising some money for Christmas presents etc. He contacted somebody involved in the illicit drug business and got a job delivering drugs in a van. He claimed to be earning £50 to £70 a day doing this, which seems a remarkably poor wage in the light of the hundreds and sometimes thousands of pounds relatively low-level operatives can earn for storing and transporting Class A drugs.

Kleemans and de Poot (2008) found that involvement in organised crime, particularly late onset involvement, was often triggered by indebtedness. However, resolving debt problems in this way required contact with or knowledge of organised crime figures or some way of contacting them via a third party in their social network. Paradoxically, if debt is the driver of much late onset involvement in organised crime it could mean that the aggressive pursuit of funds through the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) could make further offending more likely.

The Impact of Conviction and Imprisonment on Partners and Children

Respondent A said he had a stable family and that he spoke to his nine year old son every day on the phone although he would not let him visit him in prison. He said his partner suffered from depression that was precipitated in part by the media coverage of his trial and the loss of their luxury home as a result of asset seizures.

As a result of his involvement in the drugs trade, Respondent E became the target of some particularly dangerous people. He and his long-term girlfriend have a three year old daughter who became the subject of a child protection investigation because of the threat posed to the family. Respondent E and his partner cannot have custody of their daughter who is currently being fostered.

Respondent C said that his conviction had cost him his good reputation because the press had presented him as someone at the centre of a 'Crack Cocaine Empire'. He said he had lost the respect of friends and associates in the motor trade who now 'put the phone down on him'. Respondent C's house was seized under Proceeds of Crime Act

and his wife and child had to find alternative accommodation. At the same time their income dried up and they became reliant upon means-tested state benefits. When asked whether he had considered filing for bankruptcy when his debts became unmanageable, Respondent C said he did not because 'you've got to support your bird ... your family'. It was as if he was saying 'real men don't go bankrupt - they tough it out'.

The car in which Respondent F was being carried was found by the police to contain two sawn-off shotguns. Following this, Children's Services had investigated to establish whether his children were at risk and they were placed with his mother.

Respondent I had a wife and five children in the North West of England but was about to be deported to Jamaica leaving them unsupported.

The impact of imprisonment upon the families and children of respondents was profound. For young respondents parenthood had caused them to re-evaluate their lives and rethink how they should behave now that they were responsible for a child. This was a particular challenge for those whose children had been removed from their care as a result of their actions and this would suggest that interventions aimed at trying to put the family back together again could be relevant and effective.

Custody and After

When Respondent B was asked whether he had seen the proverbial writing on the wall when he was the subject of death threats from people he had 'grassed', he said that he had never considered moving out of the area or into a different line of work. In saying that supplying prestige cars is *all I know* it was evident that he could not conceive of a life beyond the geographical area and cultural milieu in which he operated.

Respondent C seemed to feel very bitter about the way he had been treated by the police and the Courts since, he implied, he had been duped and, in his view, had played only a very minor role in the Conspiracy to Supply Class A Drugs for which he was prosecuted. He said he would never get involved in crime again, noting that he should have been more suspicious when the friend of his brother-in-law had offered to settle his debts. He said, ruefully, that he had a minimum wage job lined-up with a car leasing company for when he was released. He said this involved persuading people leasing Mondeos to trade up to BMWs and 'Mercs'. The researchers assumed that this was not one of the companies owned by Respondent B.

Respondent E said that when he was young he had been a good boxer and was 'mad about motorbikes'. He now feels that he should have stuck with the boxing and that if his interest in motorbikes could have been harnessed in some way things might have turned out differently. He hopes that when he gets out of prison he will secure a steady job. He is currently involved in a Network Rail training scheme and hopes to get a job at £800 per week working on the railway. This, he says, is about the same as he was earning from

drug dealing and does not bring the same risks. Having a job will, he hopes, enable him and his girlfriend to move to an area where he isn't known to either the police or members of rival OCGs which will, he hopes, enable them to get back their daughter, who is currently being looked after by the local authority. He says that his family, who have nothing to do with crime, are now very supportive and will help him stay on the straight and narrow. He was always close to his mother he said, and appeared to have developed a better relationship with his father. He said that he has grown up in prison and can't stand the thought of doing another sentence. He said that this meant he would have to avoid his old friends and associates because they could tempt him back into his old ways.

When Respondent F came into the room saying 'I'm a criminal and I haven't worked a day in my life' it was not clear whether this was merely an attempt to wind up the interviewers or whether he really was living the stereotype. It was certainly said aggressively. Asked about what plans he had for when he was released, he said he needed to get a job, although he seemed to have no idea what kind of job this might be. He said that if he couldn't get a job he would probably go back to crime, because he was, as he said, 'a criminal'. The researchers were left with the feeling that the latter was the most likely outcome.

Respondent G said that he only got into trouble this time because he was under pressure to pay off a drug debt. He still owes money to the dealers whose drugs he was storing but despite police pressure he did not 'grass' on them. He said he did a deal with them wherein, in return for not grassing and spending four years in prison, the remainder of the debt would be regarded as paid. He also said that if they reneged on the agreement he, and presumably others, would come after their families, just as they had threatened to come after his. He said that growing up and having a daughter had changed his point of view and that when he leaves prison he will not be going back to his old neighbourhood and he will not lead a life which will put him at risk of imprisonment.

Respondent H said that he had a partner who was sticking by him and two young children who he sees regularly and are 'always asking after' him. He says that having children has changed his attitude completely and he wants to be a good father to them. He has taken a course in Enhanced Thinking Skills while in jail and bought or rented a house outside the neighbourhood where he was brought up. He says that when he gets out he won't allow his 'old mates' to come round to his house in order to reduce the temptations of his old life. He said he wanted to get a job but seemed vague about what that might be. He referred to 'labouring on a building site or something'.

Whereas the early onset group admitted their involvement in the offences for which they were imprisoned, the late onset group all denied or sought to minimise their culpability claiming, variously, that they were duped or poorly advised by their barristers. This might suggest that rehabilitative efforts would be better directed towards the early onset group.

The Systems Thinking Workshops and Key Informant Interviews

The Systems Thinking Workshops programme consisted of 10 three-day events held in each of the local authority areas, attended by senior strategic and operational leads from voluntary, but predominantly statutory, organisations.

This approach, utilising real life case studies, aims to identify and dismantle the barriers that prevent collaborative problem-solving by a plurality of agencies and organisations. At the end of the three days, attendees were asked to reflect on the actual and potential outcomes in the cases considered and how the functioning of their own agency might be shaped to facilitate more effective collaborative working. The workshops also aimed to illuminate the ways in which the OCG problem impacted upon the work of non-policing agencies and the kinds of interventions that might be made with actual and potential OCG members, their families, and/or entire OCG networks to prevent their involvement in crime or promote desistance from it.

Members of the project team attended the first Systems Thinking Workshop in early 2014 and attended and observed the last four, between February and April 2015. In addition, the team members undertook individual interviews with participants in the earlier Workshops.

In all but one of the local authorities,¹ two organised crime ‘nominals’ were identified and their life histories mapped against a timeline using the information presented by agency representatives. In almost all cases, because of the relevance of their families to their OCG involvement, the mapping included members of their immediate and, in some cases, extended families.

The process usually started with the identification of the first known incident of criminal activity involving the identified ‘nominal’. The workshop then backtracked in order to garner any available information about the pre-crime risk factors evident between birth and the first recorded offence. Where available, and it often was not, information from education and social housing providers concerning behaviour, attendance, complaints from neighbours etc. was used to flesh out the nature of the vulnerabilities and threats presented by these families.

Both the quality and quantity of the information shared varied from area to area and agency to agency. Some agencies did not feel it appropriate to share personal information that they believed to be irrelevant to the subject’s criminality. In other areas however there were frequent examples of apparently irrelevant information throwing light

¹ In one area the workshop focussed on a victim of organised crime and considered the impact of the criminality of that person and the local agencies.

upon previously unknown, but highly relevant information vis-à-vis OCG involvement. In one area, for example, a representative from 'Health' presented information about several visits to A&E made by a mother and child related to an OCG nominal because of injuries suffered by the child. This highlighted the fact that the children and partners of OGC nominals were sometimes frequent users of A&E in similar circumstances, suggesting that men whose profession is facilitated by violence seldom confine this violence to their criminal activity. The Children's Services representative observed that if they had been aware of these A&E episodes and the father's involvement in violent organised crime, their response would have been far more robust.

Twenty interviews were conducted with key informants from a range of criminal justice and social welfare agencies operating in the conurbation, many of whom had participated in earlier Systems Thinking Workshops. In these interviews the project team aimed to gain an understanding of the impact of the Workshops on the thinking of personnel within the participating agencies.

The Findings

Information Sharing

It was apparent in all of the workshops observed that, historically, most agencies, most of the time, had shared only the limited amount of information that they believed to be directly relevant to a particular case. It became clear, however, that sharing contextual information and family histories served to answer questions to which individual agencies had previously sought answers in vain. This, participants said, enabled them to think more clearly about the most appropriate foci for their interventions and the 'minimum sufficient network' of agencies and individuals necessary to facilitate them.

In a number of the cases studied by participants, a wide range of interventions had been tried, and repeated, despite their apparent ineffectiveness. Even where there had been some 'partnership working', the situation had often got worse. It was difficult to identify precisely why these interventions had failed. While it was clear what concerns had triggered the interventions, the responses were often insufficiently robust and collaboration was obstructed by poor information sharing between areas and between agencies in the same area.

One possible solution could be that information relating to OCG-involved families be held centrally and made accessible to the relevant agencies. This would, of course, raise the issue of how sensitive data was to be managed, particularly that relating to current offending behaviour. Such an initiative would require a clear information sharing protocol with sensitive information only shared on a need-to-know basis, via a central point.

The 'deep dives' in the local Workshops were achieved because of the willingness of participants to share information, although some concern was expressed about what the police and health services were prepared to share. However, some key informants expressed scepticism about whether this could be done in real time, although others with experience of the clean room (a multi agency meeting of professionals with decision-making powers which, in many ways, replicated the Systems Thinking Workshops), suggested that this might be possible.

Key informants suggested that the Workshops were, necessarily, post-crisis and to that extent, were more akin to serious case or domestic homicide reviews. While praising the thoroughness of the exercise they pointed to the irony that agencies were generally far more effective in sharing information after, rather than during, a critical event.

Family Mapping and Separate Agency Assessments

The process used in the workshops, of developing a timeline of events built around the identified individual and family was accepted to be useful. As this timeline was constructed a clearer picture of the wider family structure and the links between family members emerged. It also became apparent that, historically, no single agency or group of agencies had tried to map the family. Although the police mapped the OCG to which the nominal belonged, they did not map the extended family, yet doing this at the workshops yielded new and useful information about the nefarious activities of other family members and their links into OCGs, suggesting that this might usefully be done as a matter of course in real-time case management.

It also appeared that it was common practice for separate agencies to each make assessments of the OCG-involved individuals or families without reference to one another. Thus, for example:

- Children's Services would make an assessment of the family's parenting capacity
- The Multi-Agency Risk Assessment Conference (MARAC) Public Protection Team would make an assessment in the case of alleged or suspected domestic violence
- The Police would make an assessment that supplemented the mapping under the Organised Crime Group Mapping protocol
- Probation would assess the risks posed by the probationer

Thus, at least four agencies would undertake an assessment of a high risk, potentially dangerous, individual and their family, none of which cross-referenced the others. Not only did this result in unnecessary and costly duplication but it also produced four parallel, but partial pictures of a family situation, the real dynamics of which could probably have been grasped if the agencies had collaborated.

The Early Years: The Role of Education and Pre-school

In most of the workshops, early years information from schools tended to be sketchy or incomplete. Accepting that in many cases this information was very old and likely to have been archived or lost, in contemporaneous cases this should not have been the case. Where pre-school or school information was available, it was invariably significant and corroborated later patterns of behaviour. This indicates the importance of involving educators in multi-agency discussions about organised crime families. Something similar was achieved by a gangs initiative in the conurbation some 15 years before, and the results in terms of violence reduction and criminal desistance were remarkable. One head teacher interviewed by the project team clearly understood the nature and impact of organised crime in his area and had developed a robust system of pastoral care and oversight for children from OCG families attending his school.

In one area where it was possible to analyse attendance, performance, and exclusion data provided by education, this information offered an insight into the impact of the behaviour and lifestyle of the parents upon their children and the school they attended. The children of the family were in need of extra support at school both to maximise their attainment and contain their anti-social behavior, particularly in relation to their violent behaviour in the playground. The emotional disruption caused when the parents left the children, apparently randomly, with family members and friends, exacerbated by their tiredness from being allowed to play out in the street till late in the evening also had a deleterious impact during the school day.

Potentially, schools have an important role to play in identifying these vulnerable young people at an early age and working with them on the issues that assail them. However, unless they are working in conjunction with other professionals who are endeavouring to deal with the complex problems and vulnerabilities afflicting their families, and their criminality, it is difficult to see how these school-based interventions can succeed. In this case it was apparent that the interventions of the 29 agencies involved were more or less uncoordinated. The Workshop identified between 30 and 40 referrals made during the period under discussion but little action followed these referrals until, eventually, a crisis point was reached. When this happened, a family assessment was undertaken but without information from the many other agencies that had been intervening with the family. Given that these crises frequently manifest themselves at school, it may be that the school is the agency best placed to coordinate a joined-up response. However, this would require a rethink of the skills and resources schools might need to undertake this role.

Sexual Violence at an Early Age

A number of the cases presented at the workshops included incidents of sexual violence perpetrated against young people in OCG families in their early teens. Given the small

sample size it was hard to know how prevalent this was although findings from the Case Comparison Study suggest that it should be considered in family assessments.

Domestic Abuse

The Workshops revealed widespread domestic abuse, whether perpetrated by the OCG nominal or experienced by them as a routine part of his/her early life within the family. In most cases the abuse was reported and later retracted. The withdrawal of the allegation or the failure of a prosecution appeared to mean that non-policing agencies were prepared to offer only very limited support to the victim. A MARAC may have been a better response, but may not have had sufficient focus on the behaviour of the perpetrator.

In cases where there is an ongoing risk to a partner and/or the children, it would seem imperative that at the very least the option of a civil intervention should be considered, particularly if non-policing agencies can corroborate that such abuse is occurring. However, while on many occasions agencies were poised to act in such cases, the lack of a criminal prosecution appeared to stop them in their tracks.

It seemed that victimised family members were seldom asked what they wanted to happen next and what might make things better. Nor was the perpetrator asked what might make them stop committing these offences. Yet, a multi-agency intervention akin to that developed by Operation Ceasefire in Boston in which the offer of support to end abusive behaviour was linked with the promise of robust enforcement or a controlling civil intervention if the offence was repeated could represent an innovative and potentially successful response to an apparently intractable problem.

The comparative quantitative data gathered and the information supplied in the Workshops, as well as the observations of key informants suggest that domestic abuse is particularly prevalent in families associated with OCGs. Respondents identified the incidence of domestic abuse in the majority of the cases analysed in the Systems Thinking Workshops. In the Workshops in which the project team participated, the incidents of domestic abuse directed at partners and children was widespread and frequent throughout the extended family. Where it was reported to the responsible agencies it was rarely prosecuted because these complaints, made on impulse, were usually withdrawn. The evidence we gathered suggests that domestic violence in OCG-associated families is a risk factor which portends future criminal involvement for the children of that family. How this differs from the impact of domestic abuse in non-OCG and ostensibly non-offending families is difficult to assess.

The Role of the Criminal Justice System as a Trigger for Intervention

In all the observed Workshops social intervention in cases of domestic abuse and sexual violence appeared to be contingent upon criminal justice involvement. In one area,

allegations of intra-familial sexual violence were being investigated by the police but were retracted by the young victim and were not therefore pursued through the criminal justice system. However, information about the allegation was not passed on to the Youth Offending Service so no interventions were developed to address the consequences of sexual violence. It seemed that criminal justice, social welfare, and safeguarding agencies were operating in quite distinct spheres, seldom communicating with each other.

In another area a series of interventions were developed during the early criminal career of the person concerned even though their success appeared limited. These interventions aimed to change specific behaviours but were abandoned when a criminal conviction was not obtained because their focus was the particular offence rather than their behaviour in its social context. Problem solving interventions were stifled because of the need for the police to achieve a positive criminal justice outcome. Thus pre-emptive measures to reduce risk of harm were put on hold and information was not shared with agencies with the capacity to ameliorate the situation.

Where criminal prosecution was not possible there seemed to be no consideration of how the information obtained could support a purposeful civil intervention to address and change the behaviour and lifestyle that led to the offending behaviour.

Lack of Inter Agency Understanding

The need for a key worker or professional who could understand and manage all the issues raised during the review of cases was clear. In Police terms this would be a Lead Responsible Officer but it could just as well be a professional from any agency who had the professionalism and authority to question, hold to account, and challenge the activities of partner agencies without fear or favour. We have described this person as a meta professional. This person could also be the guardian of the intelligence and information held on the family concerned.

Thresholding

Agency thresholds also limited their ability to act. Assessments undertaken by single agencies in response to particular problems often failed to reach the threshold for intervention. However, when information from several agencies was collated the case for intervention often became far stronger. All too often, however, families were referred on from agency to agency, each of which focused on only one aspect of the problem and each of which could be more easily manipulated by the family as a result. This was an approach which maximized professional effort while minimizing a positive impact.

A multi-agency approach to planning and intervention would be more effective in terms of its impact on behaviour and lifestyle and far more cost effective. This could be achieved if each of the partners had a clear understanding of which aspects of the problem they

were best equipped to address; their respective powers and responsibilities and the benefits, both professional and fiscal, that they would gain by virtue of their involvement in the partnership. However, research shows that if the problem to be solved or the benefits to be gained from joining a problem-solving partnership are not obvious to potential partners, a champion with a new narrative, which identifies the scale and nature of the problem and its likely impact upon the agencies and their clientele, as well as access to the places where decisions are made, is imperative (van Staden et. al. 2011).

Key informants echoed the concerns of Workshop participants about thresholding. Put simply, it appears that while, on the basis of limited information, agencies conclude that something should be done, their information may suggest that the seriousness of the problem does not meet the threshold requirements. When information is gathered from a plurality of agencies, however, it often appears that the problem does meet and indeed surpass that threshold. In one area the agencies established a triage system where cases were assessed in terms of risk and harm. However, although this appeared to offer a practical management solution, it was not systemic and so suffered from the same problems as a sole agency assessment.

In another area, cases were referred to a 'clean room' (see above). The clean room approach had not been used to focus upon organised crime groups, being primarily concerned with families with complex needs or high dependencies. However, this was proving a beneficial approach with positive outcomes for the referred families. Further analysis was being undertaken to ascertain the ongoing impact on agency demand and to identify whether the high demand these families had previously shown was being displaced to other public agencies.

Fear of Engagement

Two key informants suggested that for some professionals, and their agencies, the prospect of direct face-to-face intervention with individuals involved in organised and violent crime was frightening. This was in part a fear about the risks involved in dealing with a known offender, with a reputation for violence, but there was also a concern that such intervention might precipitate a backlash against the agency. They noted that several of the people who featured in the case studies were serial complainers, and the professionals and agencies wished to avoid the extra work and risk to their reputations that complaints bring with them. On the other hand, of course, these professionals and agencies were under ever greater pressure from government to intervene pre-emptively to prevent abuse and neglect.

Avoidance Techniques

Key informants noted that many of the families analysed at the Workshops had developed ingenious ways of avoiding contact with public agencies, one of which, as we have noted, was serial complaining. Another was to use A&E services rather than the

family GP on the assumption that by doing so patterns of injury were less likely to be spotted and reported to Children's Services. This desire to avoid contact with the public services was picked up by the children and this behaviour was in turn replicated by them. More typically, they would avoid visits from social workers and undermine social work interventions. Avoidance techniques, when effectively deployed, could lead agencies to hold an overly optimistic view, wherein individuals were given every chance to change their behaviour without being effectively challenged or held to account. This phenomenon was not remarked upon in all of the Workshops.

The Costs of Managing OCG-involved Families

In one Workshop, although it was difficult to collate all the information available for the family of six children, a mother, a father, a new partner and the paternal and maternal grandparents, the analysis identified the fact that 29 agencies had been involved with this family between 2006 and 2015. The estimated cost of this involvement was between £4,000,000 and £6,000,000. This estimate did not take into account the economic impact on both housing associations and private landlords who were unable to let properties in the vicinity of the family home. Moreover, the huge sums spent on this family over the period seem to have produced few tangible results in terms of behavioural and lifestyle changes.

There were also unintended outcomes of well-intentioned interventions which ended up incurring even greater costs. One family was eventually evicted from a housing association property on the basis of painstakingly gathered evidence of breaches of the tenancy agreement. This was a costly and time-consuming process yet, having been evicted, the family was rendered officially homeless. As a result, they were rehoused in a privately rented house three doors away from where they had previously lived and the mayhem continued.

The Role of Organised Crime Group Mapping (OCGM)

Most Workshop respondents felt that, at present, the OCGM, did not facilitate the targeting of OCG nominals or inform partners about the level of threat they posed. There was some acceptance that the OCGM could have a role in assessing risk, threat, and capability and, as such, could be one of a basket of indicators that assessed performance and outcomes.

Support for the OCGM was strongest amongst respondents from the police service who believed it was a potentially important tool. Other partners thought that they might have information that could support an enhancement of the OCGM through processes that enable partnership information, insight, and data to be shared. They acknowledged that when information from a wide range of agencies was pooled, a much clearer picture of risk, threat, and harm was achieved.

The challenge for the OCGM, particularly as there is currently no national drive to extend its information gathering remit, is to develop a system that allows for information to be collected and stored systematically to give an enhanced view of risk, threat, and harm, without having to undertake a deep dive information sharing process in all cases.

One clear example of the limitation of the OCGM if the information it uses comes from only one source was highlighted at a Workshop where the case study presented by the police was of an individual mapped as an OCG nominal. However, there had been no attempt to widen the scope of their assessment beyond his criminal associates. Yet, as his family was mapped with the help of other agency representatives, other dimensions of the threat he posed, and the potential risks to and threats posed by his family, became clear. Taken together with this additional information about his behaviour and lifestyle from non-policing sources, a much richer picture of the scale and nature of his offending emerged.

Recommendations

The Focus of Intervention

A distinctive feature of the criminal careers and familial cultures of lower echelon OCG members is the use of violence as a problem solving technique. Family violence is a major concern for all the non-policing agencies that might form a multi-agency alliance and the prevention of family violence could be a shared objective to which they could all subscribe. This would suggest that a major focus of multi-agency intervention would be violence reduction through prevention and enforcement.

There is a paradox here however because while the women in OCG-involved families are likely to experience domestic violence and sometimes be the victims of retribution from their partners adversaries, they are also powerful figures in these families and neighbourhoods who can, if they wish, both prevent and promote desistance from involvement in crime amongst their children and their partners. This would suggest that professional intervention with these women would play a central role in any such initiative.

The development of methods of measuring the incidents of violence perpetrated by and against the targeted families would offer a reliable indication of effectiveness. It would be crucial, however, that the intervention was tightly focussed upon particular children, families, and youth groups, as was the successful gang strategy developed previously. Thus everybody in the partnership should understand the goals they are pursuing, which aspects of the problem they are best equipped to address, their respective powers and responsibilities, the role/s they would play in the team and the benefits, both professional and fiscal, they would gain from involvement. For such an initiative to work, however, a mechanism for effective information sharing would need to be developed.

Information Sharing

As we have noted, the clean room is an approach to the sharing and evaluation of information adopted in several local partnership Hubs in the conurbation. The initial focus of clean room evaluations is the individual, their social circumstances, and their family relationships, the risks to which they are exposed and the harms they might generate. This approach involves co-ordinating information held by partner agencies in order to intervene pre-emptively to forestall exploitation, abuse, and criminal victimisation. Thus, partners are involved prior to any intervention thresholds being met and are able to consider all options for intervention including civil measures. We would therefore recommend that this model be promoted and facilitated in each of the local authorities within the conurbation working with dynastic crime families.

Co-location

Information sharing is key to addressing serious and organised crime and information sharing is enhanced significantly in co-located and/or integrated teams which is increasingly the model adopted in child protection. We would therefore recommend that in areas where dynastic crime families are prevalent, co-located multi-agency hubs be established to develop preventive and pre-emptive interventions.

Meta Professionalism

The reconfiguration of public services and the increasing co-location and integration of professionals from different agencies and disciplines presents many challenges, particularly in terms of ensuring serious and organised crime is prioritised. Workshop participants and key informants, some of whom had developed multi-agency hubs, identified a need for those with lead responsibility to gain an understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the participating agencies and how joint work might best be facilitated. Ideally the appointee would bring experience in and knowledge of a range of agencies and, in particular, an understanding of their cultures, structures, discourses and priorities. Crucially, they would have the ability to challenge single agency decisions if it was felt they did not reflect the overall objectives of the participating agencies.

We would therefore recommend that such a meta-professional be appointed to each of the hubs and that the employing authority institute appropriate training with particular references to families whose members are involved in OGCs, and that independent professional supervision be made available to support the incumbent and enable them to develop their role in the light of local circumstances.

The Locus of Intervention

If the initiative is to counter the forces supportive of violent organised crime in the area it would need a presence both actual and psychological in the targeted neighbourhoods

because professionals would need to connect with, and exert influence within, both the professional and the informal networks therein. This would indicate the need for an outreach function which might well involve mentors and/or parents from families targeted by the initiative. We would therefore recommend that alongside the family interventions undertaken by the co-located hub commended above, team members develop interventions in the neighbourhood to reduce levels of violence and intimidation in the area.

The development of an anti-violence counter-narrative within the targeted neighbourhood is now being pioneered in UK counter terrorism initiatives and might usefully be adopted in these kinds of high crime, violent, neighbourhoods.

Policy Development at a Local Level

To mount an effective multi-agency intervention to prevent involvement in, and limit the impact of, organised crime there is a need for the establishment of a multi-agency alliance. This would require a commitment from the heads of all the relevant services to ring-fence, in terms of funding and staffing, a sustained multi-agency intervention in OCG-affected neighbourhoods. Any such multi-agency intervention should be based on joint commissioning. Staff should be actually (occasionally virtually) co-located and formally linked to key personnel in relevant national agencies (e.g. the National Crime Agency, the Borders Agency and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC)). OCG mapping in the area should therefore become a responsibility of the whole partnership. The intervention should be overseen by a steering group of senior stakeholders from the relevant agencies. Clear success criteria should be agreed and monitoring and evaluation should be built into the intervention from the outset as a steering mechanism. On the ground, the initiative would be led by a meta-professional with an understanding of the cultures, structures, discourses and priorities of all the participating agencies in the alliance.

Policy Development at a National Level

The Organised Crime Group, Cross Government Strategy. Local Practitioner Guidance (Home Office, 2014) indicates how a local problem profile might be developed and the roles that the agency partners might play. However, the Guidance is already outdated vis-à-vis the reconfiguration of OCG services within the Police, Regional OCG units, and the National Crime Agency. We would therefore recommend that the Strategy be revised to take account of recent developments and that efforts to establish OCG Problem Profiling with partner agencies should begin with an explanation of the nature, scope and impact of organised crime in their area, the characteristic behaviours and lifestyles of OCG nominals and their families, and the roles the various agencies might play in reducing risk to their clients. This would aid the development of local OCG hubs.

A major flaw with OCGM identified in this research is the haphazard nature of information sharing between law enforcement and partner agencies. This is due in part to uncertainty about what partners believe might be relevant and their interpretation of what current information sharing legislation allows. This suggests a need for guidance on the relevance of information sharing, what can be shared legally, and how the client's rights can be safeguarded.

Currently, police and agency partners appear to find the OCGM largely irrelevant to their day-to-day practice which further reinforces the need for the development of a systematic approach to information sharing which is understood and agreed by the relevant agency partners.

Legislative Innovation

At present, asset seizures are cumbersome to implement and sometimes devastating for the families of offenders when they are successful. We would therefore recommend the development of **provisional and partial asset seizures** wherein some assets are seized but the subject is allowed to retain some of the more equivocal assets as long as they desist from further criminal involvement.

In the prison interviews it emerged that beside imprisonment itself, the greatest blow for these offenders was the seizure of assets because it often had devastating effects on partners and children. We would therefore recommend that in the cases of late onset, upper echelon, OCG Members, *Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA)* applications, an arrangement be made with the nominal that the application is partially deferred or suspended. Such a suspension would fall short of allowing criminals to gain significantly from their illegal activity but would not be so draconian that their only option is to continue in a life of crime.

The logical extension of a non-policing element in an organised crime intervention would be that civil measures be developed to deter people from involvement in organised crime or to promote desistance from it. We would therefore recommend the development of a type of an Organised Crime Banning Order (OCBO) similar to the 'Gangbo' devised by the present authors, which would provide support, but the breach of which would incur a criminal sanction.

The Categorisation of OCG Prisoners

Respondents expressed concern about the ease with which prisoners who have been involved in serious and organised crime can progress from secure prison establishments to those with open conditions. This has sometimes allowed them to re-establish contact with former associates and become involved, albeit vicariously, in further offending. We would therefore recommend that the officer who leads the organised crime group

mapping process should have greater involvement in decisions about the prisoner's trajectory through the prison system and their categorisation.

Pre-release Planning for OCG Prisoners

Pre-release planning for prisoners who have been involved in serious and organised crime seldom gathers information from agency partners in the areas to which they are returning and the Multi-agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) is seldom used to manage these prisoners upon release. We would therefore recommend that before their release the lead OCG mapping officer, the relevant local agencies and the MAPPA are consulted about the nature and level of the supervision and surveillance that will need to be put in place on release.

The Release of Late Onset, Upper Echelon, OCG Members

The criminal careers of late onset, upper echelon, OCG members are distinctive. It is more difficult to identify members of this group prior to their involvement in organised crime since many of them have led ostensibly conventional law-abiding lives before their involvement with OCGs.

The main driver of offending amongst this group is money, to pay off debts, sustain an opulent lifestyle, or both. Unlike the subjects of our Case Control Study, these offenders are involved in a broad range of offences, ranging from drugs and human trafficking to cybercrime and manufacture of counterfeit goods. As a result, prevention and intervention is more difficult because of a paucity of information and intelligence. Development of relevant intelligence concerning debts accrued as a result of involvement in the illicit drugs trade should be considered in the prison release planning stage. However, collaborative working between relevant national and local agencies, like Work & Pensions and HMRC, with local housing providers and Children's Services, can maximise information sharing and make for a remarkably effective intervention with OCG members.

Clearly, pre-emptive family intervention with the late onset group would be difficult, but in the case of dynastic crime families who are well known to many public agencies this is not the case and, as the Systems Thinking Workshops revealed, despite the skill some families display in avoiding contact with the public authorities, when information is pooled, previously unimagined opportunities for preventive intervention present themselves.

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The Research Group

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He has written extensively about youth justice in England and Wales, most notably in *The New Politics of Youth Crime* (Macmillan, 2001) and in the past ten years he has undertaken studies of violent youth gangs and drug markets in London, Manchester and West Yorkshire, some of the findings of which are recounted in *Reluctant Gangsters* (Routledge, 2008). He is Associate Editor of *Safer Communities* and *Youth and Policy*.

Since 2007 he has acted as an adviser on violent youth gangs to local authorities and police forces. He was a consultant to the Centre for Social Justice Enquiry into violent youth gangs in the UK, published as *Dying to Belong* (2009) and a participant in the Prime Minister's Gang Summit in October 2011. He is deputy chair of the London Gangs Forum and was a member of the Children's Commissioner's Inquiry into Child and Adolescent Sexual Exploitation. In July 2011 he was awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Letters by the University of Bedfordshire for his "outstanding contribution to the development of youth justice in England and Wales".

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Between 2010 and 2017 Tim was Chair in Criminology at the University of Salford. Previously he was Professor of Criminology at Keele University, and before that he held positions at the Universities of Manchester and Missouri-St. Louis, CACI Ltd., and as a Principal Research Officer at the Home Office Research and Planning Unit. He was Director of the Economic and Social Research Council Crime and Social Order Research Programme (1993-1997). He holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of London. From September 2007 to February 2008, he was Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the CJ-Quest Network, Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research (SCCJR), University of Edinburgh.

His research interests lie in the fields of victimology; communities, crime prevention and community safety; and evidence, policy-making, and evaluation research methodology in criminal justice. He has published widely and internationally on these topics, including the USA, Canada, Germany, Italy, France and Poland. He has extensive experience of

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Michael Hurley OBE

Michael's career has been focused on tackling youth crime, youth violent crime and latterly street gangs and organised crime. Working initially in the youth offending service, Michael became the head of service for Manchester Multi-agency Gang Strategy in 2003; this highly successful programme was led by Michael at the height of the gang problems in South Manchester. In 2007 he was asked to transfer his expertise to the Home Office where he was part of the Tackling Gangs Action Programme (TGAP), which was set up by government following the fatal shooting of Rhys Jones in Liverpool. He was retained in the Home Office as a senior advisor on gangs and youth violence. After leaving the Home Office in 2011 Michael has primarily been engaged with Greater Manchester Police, Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and the Home Office working on the development of the Serious & Organised Crime approach: development of Programme Challenger, a unique multi agency approach to tackling serious and organised crime and spearheaded the creation of the Challenger Multi-agency Fusion Hub. Michael is the co-author of the research paper 'A profile of potentially vulnerable gang associated girls and women' (2015) and recently co authored with Ian McGibbon the Home Office Publication 'How To Identify and Work with Those Vulnerable to Involvement in Serious and Organised Crime' (2017).

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Ian is currently a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Central England. His background is in social housing. Developing a specialism in managing anti-social behaviour, Ian became Birmingham City Council's first Anti-Social Behaviour Unit Manager in 2003. After successfully using civil interventions to help tackle the city's gang problem in 2006/7, Ian was seconded to work on the national Tackling Gangs Action Programme (TGAP) in September 2007. He remained at the Home Office as an advisor on gangs until 2011, working on several Knife and Serious Youth Violence programmes. Along with his colleague Michael Hurley, he led on the introduction of the legislation providing for Injunctions to Tackle Gang Related Violence (Policing and Crime Act 2009). In 2011 Ian formed Specialist Crime Solutions (SCS) with Michael Hurley. SCS has worked with a number of major partnerships and police forces in the UK and has delivered training nationally and internationally for a range of clients. He was awarded the

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