Al-Jazeera (Arabic) Satellite Television: A Platform for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

Mohammed-Ali M. A. Abunajela

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A Platform for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt

Mohammed-Ali M. A. Abunajela

Ph.D

2015

UNIVERSITY OF BEDFORDSHIRE
Al-Jazeera (Arabic) Satellite Television:

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by:

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Ph.D

A thesis submitted to the University of Bedfordshire in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

June 2015
ABSTRACT

The Qatari-funded channel, Al-Jazeera Arabic (AJA) has been subject to criticism as being in favour of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt. The approach taken by AJA Satellite Television to represent the MB, the Mubarak regime and other political actors in Egypt, during its coverage of four key electoral moments - before and after the 2011 ‘revolution’ - is reviewed in this research.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) is applied to study the constructive effects of AJA’s language in an interpretive way (Parker & Burman, 1993). The effect of the language used by two predominant AJA TV programmes, Without Borders بلا حدود and Opposite Direction الاتجاه المعاكس has been investigated and a number of current and former AJA journalists have been interviewed.

Van Dijk’s Ideological Square and Pier Robinson’s Framing Model, in conjunction with Chouliaraki’s Three Rhetorical Strategies (Verbal Mode, Agency and Time Space) have been used as analysis tools to study the process of AJA’s representation of different political ideologies: the MB’s Islamic ideology and the Mubarak regime’s secular ideology. Van Dijk’s Ideological Square helps to identify the boundaries between ‘us’ (the good) and ‘them’ (the bad), and to classify people according to their support of specific ideology against another - the ‘in-group’ or the ‘out-group’.

AJA positively framed the Islamic MB movement on the basis that the group and its members were democratic, Islamic and victims, whereas it negatively framed the Mubarak regime and the Military Council in Egypt as repressive, secular and villains. The assigned role of different actors (including; the Egyptian people and opposition parties) in AJA TV programmes changed from one electoral moment to another. While the
Mubarak regime, its supporters and the Military Council were represented as the ‘out-group’ at all times, the role allocated to the Egyptian people and the opposition shifted between the ‘in-group’ and the ‘out-group’, depending on the political mood they held towards the MB.

KEYWORDS
Al-Jazeera (Arabic) Satellite television; Al-Sisi; authoritarian regime; Egypt; framing; ideology, military regime; Morsi; Mubarak; Muslim Brotherhood; political Islam; Qatari foreign policy; revolution; uprisings.
I have always thought of media, throughout my professional and academic experiences, as a powerful tool that can influence the very nature of someone’s identity, beliefs and thoughts. Philip Seib (2008) writes ‘the media can be tools of conflict and instruments of peace. They can make traditional borders irrelevant and unify people scattered across the globe.’ Joseph Goebbels, Hitler’s minister of Nazi propaganda said: ‘Give me media with no conscience I will give you people who are unconscious’.

The powerful influence of media has encouraged my desire to study this field in order to understand how it can impact the way we think, act and believe in order to determine what is ‘right’ and what is ‘wrong’. I also believe that the answer to either of these, is largely determined by someone’s social surroundings and understanding of it.

I have always viewed AJA, since it was launched in 1996, as a channel of pride that belongs to Arabs. It has reshaped the very nature of mainstream Arab media services which have been government mouthpieces and under the control of Arab dictatorships, for a long time. Its daring approach and mixture of Arab journalists from almost every Arab nationality, has particularly attracted my attention.

I often watch AJA and have always admired not only the fact it reports the news from around the world in a very innovative and attractive style, but also it has offered me a different perspective of what is happening in the Arab world in general, and Palestine in particular, my home country. It has placed the Palestine cause at the heart of its coverage. AJA’s daring approach, diverse and challenging questions to Arab dictators, and its ability to bring opposition voices to us (including Israeli official voices), have provided a different side of the story.
I passionately watched AJA’s 24-hour live coverage of the uprisings in Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and elsewhere when the Arab ‘revolutions’ broke out. In a way, I was watching history in the making through AJA, while sitting in my living room.

When the Libyan uprising started in 2011, followed by Syria, however, criticism of AJA had increased with claims that the channel was aligned with Qatar’s foreign policies, and was becoming a platform for promoting Islamists, while ignoring secular and other groups. Questions were also raised about its coverage of Bahrain.

The channel was seen as celebrating and arguably promoting the victory of the MB and equally challenging any opposing voices to the Islamic movement. The channel received wide disapproval after the fall of Morsi. Its offices were shut down, reporters were arrested and persecuted, and journalists were banned from entry. Ahmad Mansour, for example, AJA’s presenter and an Egyptian national, could not attend his brother’s funeral as he had been declared ‘wanted’ by the Egyptian authorities. All these factors made me ask what has changed? Has AJA’s language changed or is it people who have changed? Did AJA’s ‘revolutionary’ language change after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings or did people’s expectations change? I wanted to study AJA’s language, to dig deeper through academic research in order to understand what had happened to the channel that I had for so long respected, and indeed, loved.

I do not try to make a value judgement for or against AJA, rather I wish to offer an explanation of how the channel covered the Egyptian MB in four different electoral moments before and after the fall of Mubarak in 2011, and discover whether the claims made about the channel’s alleged support towards the Muslim Brotherhood were sound.
Studying Egypt is important for me, not only due to its strategic and historic geo-political place in the Arab world, but also because it is located next to my homeland, Palestine – Egypt’s stability means stability for the Palestinian people as well.
DEDICATION

First of all, I would like to dedicate this paper to Almighty Allah, the Most Compassionate and the Most Merciful, for guiding me and giving me the strength to accomplish this research.

Secondly, I would like to dedicate this research to my loving parents, (Seham and Mansour), who supported me throughout my day-to-day life and education with their endless encouragement and prayers.

Thirdly, I would like also to dedicate this paper to my beloved wife, (Sawsan) and my two adorable children, (Haytham and Hamza), who have generously and patiently supported me during the course of my studies and endured my mental and physical absence.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to sincerely thank my Director of Studies, Professor Noha Mellor, for her valuable guidance, support and endless encouragement, and Professor Ivor Gaber for his helpful comments and advice.

My thanks also go to my charming family in Gaza, Palestine, (sisters: Fayqa; Nazek; Nehad, and brothers: Abdel-Raouf; Ahmad; Dr Mahmoud and Abdel-Aziz) for giving me their thoughts and powerful inspiration every time I doubted myself, and to my extended family and dear friends in Palestine, the U.K. and elsewhere, for their constant encouragement.

I would like to thank Dr Imad Karam, Dr Nael Jebril, Dr Mohammed Alsousi, Dr Tareq Bakri, Dr Haider Al-Safi, Dr Qassem Kassab, Barbara Lohr, Abid Katib, Emad Moussa, Ibrahim Habib, Ihab Anbar, Mahmoud Shalatoni, Maher Kassab, Khalil Lubbad, Hussam Jahjoh, Nigel Gibson, Jaine Magpie, Ala’a Eid, Ahmad Joha, Salem Qudwa, Abdulla Ali, Ziad Mustafa, Osama Qaddoumi, Helen Deller, Paul Rasmussen, Tarik Kafala and Felicity Tessaro for their reassurance, humour, and support throughout my research.

Last but not least, I would like to thank the Al-Jazeera journalists who contributed to this research with their valuable testimonies.
OUTPUT BASED ON THIS RESEARCH

Portions of this research have been presented and published in the following output:


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<tr>
<td>AJA</td>
<td>Al-Jazeera Arabic</td>
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<td>AJE</td>
<td>Al-Jazeera English</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASBU</td>
<td>Arab States Broadcasting Union</td>
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<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDA</td>
<td>Critical Discourse Analysis</td>
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<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<td>CNN</td>
<td>Cable News Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>FJP</td>
<td>Freedom and Justice Party</td>
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<td>GCC</td>
<td>Gulf Cooperation Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MB</td>
<td>Muslim Brotherhood</td>
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<tr>
<td>MBC</td>
<td>Middle East Broadcasting Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>USA</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.1. Research Context

The Tunisian, Mohammed Bouazizi\(^2\), who immolated himself in protest against appalling living standards in his country and died on 17 December 2010, possibly transformed the geo-political scene in the Arab world (Beaumont: 2011; Inbar: 2013; Brownless & Renolds: 2015; Lynch: 2012). His death sparked the Tunisian uprising which had a domino effect on other Arab countries (see map below)\(^3\). Tunisian masses took to the streets in 2010, protesting against the 23-year-old regime led by President Zine Al-Abidine Ben Ali, and a few days later, Ben Ali and his family fled the country and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia (Bouzouita: 2014).

People in other Arab countries including Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain also rebelled, demanding change - not only for better living conditions but also of their dictatorship regimes. Protests became violent in some Arab countries, as angry demonstrators often clashed with the security forces. The Egyptians marched on Al-Tahrir Square (ميدان تحرير: Liberation) in Cairo and demonstrated against the longest-ruling regime in Egypt's modern history (1981-2011), led by President Mohammed Hosni

\(^2\) Mohammed Bouazizi, 26 years old set himself on fire in front of a local municipal office after being assaulted by police officers in the centre of the Tunisian town of Sidi Zouzid (Brownless & Renolds: 2015, P10)

\(^3\) Map availabale at: [http://thebenchjockeys.com/tag/arab-spring/](http://thebenchjockeys.com/tag/arab-spring/) [retrieved 27/02/2015]
Mubarak (Goldschmidt: 2013). Mubarak made a historic decision in February 2011 to step aside and hand over power to the Military Council. He was arrested in April 2011, together with members of his leadership team and two sons, all of whom were prosecuted (Filiu: 2011).

The Yemeni people managed to oust the President Ali Abdullah Salah, in what seemed to be a political compromise between Yemeni political parties and tribes, following a mass uprising in January 2011 (Bruck, Al-Wazir, & Wiacek: 2014).

The public uprising in Libya in February 2011 was more challenging: Colonel Mou’ammar Al-Qaddafi promised to sweep out demonstrators who called for freedom (Abushagur: 2011). The peaceful ‘revolution’ became violent as Libyans took up arms and fought the Colonel with military support from NATO. Al-Qaddafi was eventually killed by his own people on October 2011 (Sawani: 2013).

The violence in Syria prompted one of the worst humanitarian crises in a century. The Syrian people began a peaceful protest against Bashar Al-Assad in 2011, but the situation went out of control and Syria has become a battlefield, involving not only the rebels and Al-Assad, but also regional and international powers. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed, many have disappeared without trace, and millions have fled the country. Al-Assad vigorously fought the rebels and Syria’s civil war still
continues to date, without any obvious political or military horizon (Starr: 2012).

The Arabian Gulf saw the Shi’a-led protests break out against the royal family in Bahrain resulting in violence, but the uprising was quashed by the Bahraini government (Ulrichsen: 2014).

This research studies AJA Satellite Television’s coverage of the Arab uprisings, particularly in Egypt. The focus of this research is the exploration of how AJA reported on the Egyptian revolt, mainly on the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), before and after the uprising.

The station which, for a long time, was seen as representing Arab national identity and managed to capture the ears, eyes, and minds of Arabs, recently received widespread criticism. It was accused of being biased in

4 Map available at: https://arabspringanditscontexts.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/arab-spring-protests-map.jpg [retrieved 22/02/2015]
favour of Islamists, namely the MB, and against the Mubarak regime, the Military Supreme Council, and other opposition parties (Hamed: 2014).

This research will inspect the channel’s language usage by focusing on two of its main TV talk shows (*Without Borders* and *Opposite Direction*) and interviewing a sample of AJA current and former journalists.

This chapter introduces the rationale behind the research topic, explains the research problem(s), presents the main research question and sub-questions, argument, significance, contribution, objectives and limitations. The conceptual framework will be integral to the research, including the logic behind applying certain theories: media and religion framing. Critical Discourse Analysis, including interview techniques will be applied.

### 1.2 Research Rationale

Arab media was nothing more than a ‘mouthpiece’ medium, historically speaking, orchestrated by Arab authoritarian regimes which obstructed any scope for investigative journalism and trusted news (Pintak: 2008). The establishment of AJA\(^5\) in 1996, however, was a defining moment in the chronicles of Arab mass media (Al-Theidi: 2003). Its attractive and daring news coverage openly touched on issues considered to be forbidden according to Arab standards, and broadcast what no other Arab

\(^5\) *Al-Jazeera* is an Arabic word for (the island) which refers to The Arabian Peninsula available at: [http://www.wordsense.eu/Al_Jazeera/](http://www.wordsense.eu/Al_Jazeera/) [retrieved 27/02/2015]
news organisation dared to, which substantially assisted in the channel’s gain of public approval (Rinnawi: 2006; El-Nawawy and Iskandar: 2003). The channel’s pioneering elegance and attractiveness motivated other Arab channels to follow suit by changing their reporting narrative and presentational style to cope with the competition from the newly-established station.

AJA inspired other channels to open up to opposite viewpoints, and largely managed to spice up the Arab media environment and its nuances when addressing complex social, political and (or) economic issues that mattered most to Arab audiences (Miladi: 2003; Rugh: 2007; Seib: 2005; Quinn and Walters: 2010; Ghosh: 2003; El-Nawawy & Iskandar: 2003).

The importance of AJA satellite channel - as a pan-Arabic media service - has been widely acknowledged by media scholars. Khalil Rinnawi (2006) asserts that shortly after AJA’s launch, it won the hearts and minds of millions of Arab viewers and made them not only discover that it was possible to have an Arab institution that they could call their own, but it was also an example of Arabs turning away from Western news channels (Miles: 2005; Miladi: 2003). It had profoundly enabled Arab audiences to enhance their national identity, collective morale, and self-belief (Saghieh: 2004).
Khaled Hroub (2011) noted - in his article published online in ABC Religion and Ethics - that AJA had created a new venue for political freedom, culminating in its unreserved support for Arab ‘revolutions’. The author quoted a popular joke when Mubarak stepped down: Three of Egypt's former presidents, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Al-Sadat, and Hosni Mubarak meet in hell and ask each other how they lost power: Nasser replies ‘poison.’ Al-Sadat says ‘assassination’, and Mubarak answers ‘Al-Jazeera’. This illustrates how the perception of the media such as AJA can also have a satirical slant.

Academics such as Sharp (2003), Iskandar and El-Nawawy (2003) argue that many of AJA’s correspondents were drawn to work for the station because they believed that it would provide an alternative perspective, particularly from the American and British news media. Realising the power of media and the strong influence AJA had on the Arab public, several Arab states recognised the strategic importance of a pan-Arab satellite television as an effective and influential public relations tool.

The station stands as an example of pushing the boundaries of what is politically possible on Arab television. It gives more than the official view and deliberately offers contrasting opinions, creating ripples in the stagnant pool of Arabic broadcasting. Its reputation for controversy - operating from an Arab capital, Al-Doha (the capital of Qatar), rather than
from a European capital - represents a breakthrough in media-related development in the Middle East (Sakr: 1999).

Philip Seib (2008) argues that AJA may not be a stalking horse for the United States, Israel, Islam, or even Qatar’s ruling family, but it is the latest in a line of broadcasting ventures that have sought to use mass media in order to establish a pan-Arab identity.

The channel’s funding revenue has been under the academic radar. This factor represents an on-going temptation for researchers to define the thin-line-boundaries between the channel and its major financial sponsor and host, Qatar. Tatham (2006) claims, for example, that the failure of AJA to approach financial independence is due to limited advertising revenue, thus obliging the station to maintain its relationship with the Qatari royal family in order to survive. Khalil Rinnawi (2006) however, retains his enthusiasm for AJA’s future plans for independence, which seems tenuous at present.

It is noted in this research that little academic work exists on AJA, without reference to its host country, Qatar, and to the question of its independency and ownership. Khaled Hroub, in ABC Religion and Ethics (2011) for example, argues that AJA is not a CIA, Israeli or Al-Qaeda tool, but a sophisticated ‘mouthpiece’ for the state of Qatar and its ambitious emir; its existence would not have been possible without Qatari support.
The channel, according to Hroub, stands as an amalgamation of Qatar’s national ‘branding’ and its foreign policy aspirations.

Zayani (2005) points out that due to the financial support from Qatar, AJA rarely criticises the country’s domestic and foreign policies in the same vein. Pintak (2008) states that the emir of Qatar did not finance the channel in order to obtain a membership card for Washington’s National Press Club: ‘He did it for the same reason as he invited the U.S. central command to set up a military base, to make himself a player in the region’ (p. 22). Rinnawi (2006: p. 98) agrees with Zayani: ‘the internal Qatari politics are out of bounds for AJA commentary’.

The Qatari-MB relationship has existed since the second half of the twentieth century, according to Zvi Mazel (2009), former Israeli ambassador to Egypt, and has had an impact on the Middle East, not least on AJA’s coverage of the recent Egyptian uprising. Mazel explains that the first wave of the MB came from Egypt in 1954, after Abdel Nasser, former Egyptian president, had cracked their organisation. The next wave came from Syria in 1982, after Hafez Al-Assad (the late father of Bashar Al-Assad) bombed their stronghold in Hama. The last group arrived after 11 September, 2001 (9/11) – from Saudi Arabia.
More recently, the political leadership of the Palestinian Islamist group, Hamas, moved from Syria to Qatar in February 2012 (Cafiero, 2012). A year later, Afghanistan’s Taliban movement opened its first official overseas office in Qatar (BBC News, 2013). Qatar’s hosting of Islamists may arguably have influenced AJA’s editorial policies - notable is the paradox in Qatar’s foreign policies: it not only accommodates Islamists but also hosts one of the biggest U.S. military bases, Al-Udeid (Kamrava: 2013). Academics such as Rinnawi (2006) suggest that Qatar’s implied desire to occupy a leading role in the region requires it to have a solid public relations tool such as AJA.

Ahmad Azem (2012) argues in his article, ‘Qatar's Ties with the MB Affect Entire Region’, published in the Middle East Online site, that the alliance between the MB and Qatar is becoming a noticeable factor in the reshaping of the Middle East.

Academic discussions on AJA and its relations with Islamic political discourse are also noteworthy. Dima Dabbous-Sensenig (2006) argues in her study of the channel’s Islamic programme (Shari’a and Life), that the pluralism celebrated in the channel’s news and current affairs is abandoned in its religious programmes which promote Orthodox Islamic discourse. Furthermore, Sam Cherribi (2006)’s analysis of AJA coverage of the story of the veil in France between 2002 and 2005, finds that the station devoted significant air-time to the views of Islamic leaders.
The channel quickly became a star, not only in the Arab world, but also on international platforms. AJA made headlines in Western media soon after its inception in 1996, following its exclusive broadcasting of Bin Laden’s tapes (Seib: 2008). The channel was accused of serving Bin Laden’s propaganda by some, while others declared it had a direct link with Al-Qaeda. These claims resulted in the arrest of AJA reporters, including Tayseer Allouni (under house arrest in Spain), who was accused of collaborating with Al-Qaeda, especially after he secured an exclusive interview with Bin Laden, only a month after the 9/11 attacks in 2011 (Zayani: 2005).

Haim Malka (2003 p. 19-28) wrote an article, ‘Must Innocents Die?: The Islamic Debate over Suicide Attacks’, in which he discussed the issue of suicide attacks or, as described by AJA, ‘martyrdom operations’ against Israel. He claimed that some Muslim clerics and other commentators justified these attacks on political, moral, and religious grounds.

The channel was also seen as a platform for principal Islamic clerics such as Sheikh Yousef Qaradawi, one of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) spiritual leaders. He was jailed in Egypt and stripped of his Egyptian citizenship in the 1970s. Qaradawi adopted Qatar as his second home and was featured as a permanent guest on AJA’s popular Islamic TV programme, Shari’a and Life (Lynch: 2006).
Oren Kessler (2012) explains in her article: ‘The two faces of al-Jazeera’, that the channel was perceived as favouring ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ against ‘dictatorships’, but clearly appeared to be supporting Islamic parties. Kessler demonstrates how the channel promoted the Taliban in Afghanistan and similarly in Iraq. Words like ‘terror’ and ‘insurgency’ were rarely mentioned and were usually replaced with ‘resistance’ or ‘struggle’. The article also reflects the U.S. viewpoint on AJA’s coverage of Arab uprisings. Kessler quotes Secretary of State Hillary Clinton: ‘Al-Jazeera has been the leader in that they are literally changing people’s minds and attitudes. And like it or hate it, it is really effective’ (Kessler: 2012, p.48).

Kessler’s article projects other opposing views regarding AJA such as those of Judea Pearl, who warned that its ‘unconditional support of Hamas’s terror in Gaza, the Hezbollah take-over in Lebanon, and the Syrian and Iranian regimes, betray any illusion that democracy and human rights are on Al-Jazeera’s agenda’. He further asserted: ‘I have no doubt that today AJA is the most powerful voice of the MB’ (P.53).

Marc Lynch (2006) also commented on the channel’s relationship with the U.S. saying that there had been a switch in AJA perception because at present, the U.S. and AJA were more aligned in backing democratic movements: ‘It’s not like Al-Jazeera or the US have changed that much, the issues have changed.’ (p. 65).
Hugh Miles (2011) explains how AJA played a substantial role in its coverage of the Egyptian uprising, the main focus of this research, and kept the momentum going regarding the Egyptian ‘revolution’, due to its considerable influence on the Arab street, and its ‘electrifying’ message concerning Arab dictatorships. The ‘special relationship’ between AJA and the MB attracted academic scrutiny.

Mehdi Hasan (2011) states that in the wake of the Arab uprisings, AJA’s correspondents and producers were harassed, arrested, and beaten in most Middle Eastern countries, and, in the case of the cameraman, Ali Hassan Al-Jaber, killed by pro-Gaddafi fighters in Libya. He wrote in his article for the New Statesman (2011), ‘Voice of the Arab spring: Mehdi Hasan on Al-Jazeera’⁶, following his visit to Qatar in order to verify the claims: ‘in Egypt, for 18 days straight, Al-Jazeera’s cameras broadcast live from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, giving a platform to the demonstrators, while documenting the violence of the Mubarak regime and its supporters’.

The MB secured a landslide victory in the Egyptian parliamentary elections, following the fall of Mubarak in 2012, and its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, won the presidential election. Qatar promised billions of dollars to support the Egyptian economy in recognition of the new MB-led government, aiming to reinforce the party’s position (Cunningham: 2014); consequently,

⁶ Available at: http://www.newstatesman.com/broadcast/2011/12/arab-channel-jazeera-qatar [retrieved 10/06/15]
AJA’s ‘balanced coverage’ of the MB role in Egypt has been widely questioned.

Sultan Al-Qassemi (2012) criticised AJA and its relationship with MB in his article, ‘Morsi’s Win Is Al-Jazeera’s Loss’. He argues that AJA’s ‘love affair’ with the MB had been evident since the channel’s establishment and further claims that this relationship was mutually beneficial due to its blatant bias towards the Brotherhood. Ahmed Mansour, AJA’s top presenter and MB member was rewarded with several interviews with not only Khairret El-Shater, a senior MB leader, but also General Guide Mohammed Badie and Mohammed Morsi, the President. Al-Qassemi wrote for Al-Monitor news website (2012): ‘The Brotherhood also appreciates this relationship and even bizarrely extends official congratulations and “support” to AJA on significant occasions. When Morsi’s office wanted to kill the story of what seemed to be a fabricated Iran news agency interview with the president, it knew exactly who to call’.

The MB’s political practices in Egypt were widely seen as incompetent and unable to meet the promises made to the Egyptian people during its one year in power (The Economist: 2013; Russell: 2014). A military coup in July 2013, backed by the masses, overthrew the newly-elected first civilian president, Mohammed Morsi (Carter: 2014; Kirkpatrick: 2013; Masoud: 2014). The MB’s top leaders, including Morsi, were prosecuted and put in jail. Egyptian media outlets linked to Islamists were shut down as were all
AJA’s offices; some journalists were arrested and others banned from entering Egypt.

President Mohammed Morsi’s fall from power, according to BBC News (2014), was followed by about 20 reporters from AJA’s Mubashir Masr (Egypt Live)\(^7\) and AJE\(^8\) being arrested and charged with joining or aiding and abetting a terrorist organisation (the MB) and ‘harming national unity and social peace’. Peter Greste, an Australian national and former BBC staff member, was among AJE’s detainees. He was finally released after 400 days in prison (The Telegraph: 2015). It has been reported that some 22 members of AJA’s Mubashir Masr resigned over alleged biased coverage: ‘the management used to instruct each staff member to favour the MB’, one of the journalists told Gulf News (Sharaf: 2013).

The study of AJA (as a predominant Arab media organisation) and the MB (as an Islamic political organisation) is significant to this research. It is this intersection between media and religion framing which will be useful for this research. The main focus will be on AJA and its relationship with the

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8 Many observers note that Al-Jazeera (English) is different from al-Jazeera (Arabic) in terms of editorial agenda, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/media/greenslade/2014/feb/26/ al-Jazeera-egypt [retrieved 2/03/14]
MB, and a study of some key electoral moments before and after the fall of Mubarak’s regime in Egypt, in January 2011.

1.3 Research Problem

AJA has reported on key historical moments in the Arab world since its birth: the wars in Afghanistan in 2001; Iraq 2003; Lebanon 2006; Gaza 2008/09; and more importantly for this research, the Arab uprisings that broke out in late 2010. The channel has, by and large, been seen as enforcing the sense of Arabness and has ‘revolutionised’ the Arab media scene (Arafa: 2013). It has positioned itself in favour of political change and encouraged the value of ‘democracy’ against ‘authoritarianism’ in the Arab world (Maalouf: 2008). The station has offered a wide-open platform for opposition voices, including Islamists (victims) against Arab autocracies and external actors (villains).

AJA’s coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, for example, generally attracted very little criticism, if any, in the Arab world. There was insignificant questioning of the channel’s intention in supporting the Palestinians (the victims) against the Israeli occupation (the villains). AJA reports on the U.S. - Iraq war, arguably illustrates the channel’s support for Iraqis against the ‘enemy’, (the U.S. intervention) was comprehensive. The channel managed to secure wide approval from its Arabic-speaking audiences because its narrative favoured Arab national identity and
rejected tyrannical regimes – Libya, Syria, Egypt, and so on - and foreign players in the Middle East – U.S. involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Israeli occupation of Palestine.

The Arab political scene dramatically changed after the Arab uprisings. The reports on the outbreak of Arab uprisings originating in Tunisia encouraged AJA to dedicate its entire coverage to live streaming, 24 hours a day, on the rebellions happening in the Arab world. Some Arab protestors often raised banners saying ‘Thank you Al-Jazeera’ for adopting and supporting the “revolutions” and overtly standing against the authoritarian regimes on the side of the people and ‘democracy’ (Bridges: 2013: p. 340).

This research argues, however, that in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the internal Arab political scene became profoundly fragmented, and particularly complex. People with different political views were hungry to take part in the ‘political transformation’ and therefore became polarised. Reporting on Arab internal affairs has become uniquely challenging for both Arab and international broadcasters. The assumed role of AJA supporting one camp (the good) against another (the bad), while claiming a ‘balanced’ stand, was particularly unsound and widely debated between the Arabs themselves in countries such as Tunisia, Yemen, Syria, Libya, and Egypt.
The people had become divided in Egypt between different ideologies: revolutionists; anti-revolutionists; Islamists; anti-Islamists; liberal; secular; Christians; and so on, since the fall of Mubarak in 2011 (Cohen: 2014). The close adoption of the Arab uprisings in general and the Egyptian one in particular nevertheless made the channel fall into the eye of the storm through its extensive 24-hour coverage – AJA had now become news itself rather than a news source. The very nature of the channel’s relationship with the MB was therefore noticed by Arabs, and its notion of ‘impartial’ coverage by ‘favouring’ one opinion and ignoring the opposite opinion was noticed (the main focus of this research).

This research aims to complement the few existing scholarly studies on AJA and its relationship with Islamists. Few academic studies exist on the relationship between AJA and the MB, a void this research intends to fill.

1.4 Research Questions

Based on critical reading and the existing debate surrounding AJA’s coverage of the Egyptian political scene and its representation of the MB and different political parties, this research identifies the following questions for discussion:
Main Question

- To what extent has AJA’s coverage of the role of MB as part of the Egyptian political landscape contributed to the formation of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ identities in the Egyptian society?

Subordinate Questions

- How do AJA journalists generally perceive the role of Qatar in the Arab uprising countries and the impact of such role on AJA narrative?
- How do AJA journalists respond to the claims of favouring the MB and how have they reassessed their journalistic values and practices following the Arab uprisings?

1.5 Research Conceptual Framework and Contribution

This research adopts Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as the main methodological approach in an attempt to answer the above questions. This methodology is based on data scrutiny from different information sources in order to support the validity and reliability of the research (Golafshani: 2003). Two different data sources will be collected and analysed: (i) text analysis of two well-known AJA TV current affairs talk shows; (ii) interviews with some 10 TV presenters; current (at the time of this research) and former AJA and AJ’s Egypt Live.
The analysis of a combination of different data sources: two television programmes and journalist interviews, should assist in discovering whether or not AJA consciously stood as a promoter or the ‘mouthpiece’ of the MB rather than opposition voices in Egypt, including the ‘remnants’ of Mubarak’s regime and the Egyptian Military Council. The two TV programmes are: Opposite Direction الاتجاه المعاكس and Without Borders بلا حدود (see chapter 7 & 8).

The research parameters are four different key historical electoral moments: two before and two after the fall of Mubarak in 2011.

**Before:**
1. 2005 election
2. 2010 election

**After:**
3. 2012 election
4. 2014 election

The aim of studying a variety of data selected from different yet relevant periods in recent Egyptian history is to examine whether or not the channel’s language changed during these significant phases. The representation of different political actors, especially the MB and the Mubarak regime, before and after the Egyptian uprising, is of particular interest for this research.
The application of CDA not only helps researchers to study the constructive effects of language in an interpretive way (Parker & Burman: 1993) but also helps identify the multiple meanings assigned to the text (Phillips & Hardy: 2002). Data selection and analysis will be based on relevant episodes obtained from AJA’s digital archives regarding the selected four key electoral moments.

The research interviews are a sample from current and former AJA journalists. Phillips & Hardy (2002) assert that interviews play a useful role in discourse analysis in order to understand the social context of the primary text and possibly to reach information which cannot be obtained from the analysis of the targeted data.

The relationship between AJA and the MB, as a predominant Islamic movement in the Arab world, will be investigated by drawing data from the study of media and religion framing as well as the study of media and ideology. This will be the main theoretical framework adopted in order to understand the channel’s coverage and its verbal mode, representation of different actors and the reference to various periods. The description of particular events is in accordance with Van Dijk’s ideological square and Pier Robinson’s framing models (see Chapter 6).
Media, according to Paul Soukup (2002), assists scholars to comprehend how and why religion appears in the Arab media as it does, and then helps to understand why and how a social force like religion interacts with the other primary social forces of the day. By and large, religion has overwhelmed the fields of mass communication research and media studies in the Middle East (Hoover: 2002). Academics’ common view is that the media have become the principal source of religious ideas, and the language the media use shapes religious imagination in accordance with the genre of popular culture (Hjarvard 2006: p. 2). Lawrence Pintak (2008: p. 22) states that, for many Muslims, Islam is not merely a belief system but ‘a complete way of life’

This research will also discuss the concept of media framing: whether or not AJA’s coverage was sided towards the MB during the historical events already mentioned.

The aim is to appreciate the meaning of ‘framing’ which will also be studied in this context, in order to clarify how the channel frames both the MB and the Mubarak regime – before and after the ‘revolution’ – in order to trace any changes that may exist in the AJA setting. This research will primarily look at two types: distance framing and empathy framing, as defined by Pier Robinson (2002).
1.6 Research Significance and Limitations

The overall significance of this research is to explain the basis on which AJA TV programmes (selected for analysis) represented the ideology of the MB as well as the ideology of other agents (i.e.; Mubarak regime, opposition parties, the Military Council and so on). The focus of this research is AJA’s editorial decisions in talk shows in relation to the ‘Arab Spring’ countries in general, and the Egyptian uprising in particular. This researcher considered the study of news output and decided to focus on TV programmes because, to my knowledge, there is a paucity of studies analysing AJA TV programmes, and also to dig deeper on the channel narrative in relations to their coverage of the MB. The study of AJA representation of the MB in the general news output is therefore out of this research scope.

The aim is to comprehend, if proven to be true, how AJA’s language had changed before and after the Egyptian uprising. Research on how the Egyptian audiences perceived AJA’s coverage of the ‘Arab Spring’ (audience research), although important, is beyond the scope of this thesis. Audience research however, could arguably benefit from this present project in identifying social themes and cultural implications emanating from viewers’ polls and interviews.
This research intends to complement the few existing studies on AJA’s controversial role in covering the Egyptian affairs, before and after the ‘revolution’, with reference to the MB. The language that AJA’s TV programmes used in reporting both the MB and the opposition, prior and subsequent to the Egyptian uprising will be investigated; furthermore, the factors which may have influenced AJA’s coverage of Egypt, including its relationship with Qatar, will also be examined.

Qatar’s foreign policy and its impact on AJA’s editorial values regarding countries such as Bahrain will be briefly discussed in the interviews. However, due to the specific scope of this study, in-depth analysis of the uprising in Bahrain will not be conducted. Questioned on the link between AJA and Qatar’s foreign policy, for example, AJA’s and Qatar’s enthusiasm for supporting Libyan rebels against the Al-Qaddafi regime (Roberts: 2011), how and why Qatar, and perhaps AJA, supported the Syrian opposition (MB) against Al-Assad’s regime (Freeman: 2013), and the general perception of the Arab world of why Qatar, and arguably AJA, have lacked passion in dealing with the upheaval in Bahrain, which has a large Shi’ite population (Friedman; 2012) are important but are out of the scope of this research.

The rationale behind the choice to examine the Egyptian uprising in relation to the MB but not others is significant: why Egypt and why the MB? Egypt is internationally recognised for its political place in the region
and reputation as an ancient civilisation (BBC\(^9\)). It is the largest Arab country – by landscape and population - and has played a key role in Middle Eastern politics in modern times, and is particularly significant, not only due to its economic and geographical position, but also because any political changes within its borders will undoubtedly affect the surrounding countries (Chatham House: 2009).

Studying the MB is essential to this research (see Chapter 3 for additional background information). The MB is one of the oldest and most influential Islamic movements in the world (Al-Jazeera website: 2011)\(^{10}\). Egypt's first and largest Islamist organisation was founded by Hassan Al-Banna in 1928, and has influenced Islamist movements world-wide with its partly political activism and partly charitable work. It renounced violence in the 1970s, endorsed ‘democratic’ principles and promoted its ideology with slogans such as ‘Islam is the solution’, in its vision to create a state governed in accordance with Islamic law\(^{11}\).

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\(^9\) For more information about the significance of Egypt, see:

\(^{10}\) Muslim Brotherhood available at:

\(^{11}\) BBC News (2013): ‘Profile: Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood’, available at:
1.7 Summary

The context of Arab uprisings and the role of media coverage were discussed earlier in this chapter. It was explained how Arabs perceived the media as having a limited scope of investigative journalism before the inception of AJA. The establishment of AJA from an Arab country transformed the very nature of the media in the Arab world and inspired several other media services.

The channel has covered significant historical moments in the Arab world. It has always represented the Arab viewpoint rather than that of external actors. The channel was seen as a reinforcement of the sense of Arab national identity. Ownership and independence were the major issues that brought significant criticism of AJA, and yet, the channel managed to maintain its place among Arabs - with each political and military crisis in the Arab world, AJA’s popularity grew remarkably, simply because these crises arose between the Arabs and external interventions – such as the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 – or between Arab nationals in opposition to authoritarian regimes.

The outline of this research will be offered in the form of eleven chapters. With the introduction chapter which introduces the research rationale, questions, parameters and significance, the second chapter reviews existing academic literature on AJA satellite television, its place among
other Arab media services, the station's role in endorsing the value of pan-
Arab identity, its relationship with its host and owner country, Qatar, the
channel's perception of the value of democracy, and the existing literature
on organisational cultures in Arab newsrooms.

The third chapter sheds light on AJA and the rise of political Islam ideology
including: existing literature on the channel’s coverage topics related to
Islamic political movements, the channel adoption of the Arab uprisings,
and the discussions on Qatar hosting AJA and Islamic parties.

The fourth chapter focuses primarily on the MB, which includes: a brief
historical background of the movement since establishment, an overview
of the MB under the Mubarak regime, and the short-term leadership of the
MB following the fall of the Mubarak regime.

The fifth and sixth chapters draw the theoretical and methodological
framework of this research. In chapter five, the theory of media ideology
and religion framing will be explained including understanding religion and
media in a cultural context, Islam and media, and the theories of media
framing. In chapter six, the appropriate research methods will be defined,
this includes: data selection, interview methods, qualitative approach,
ontology and epistemology, language, power and ideology, and identifying
the research themes from the selected data.
In chapters seven and eight, the empirical data of the selected two programmes (Ahmad Mansour’s Without Borders and Faisal Al Qassem’s Opposite Direction), will be critically analysed by applying the three selected rhetorical strategies (verbal mode, agency and time space) to the three selected themes that emerge from the text.

Chapter nine presents the inside accounts of AJA high profile presenters of ethical values, perceptions and editorial judgements on topics related to the relations between Qatar and AJA, the channel coverage of the Egyptian uprising and its alleged relations to the MB, and assessment of AJA’s role in polarised Arab world.

Chapter ten and eleven offer discussion and conclusion of the research findings that have emerged from the analysis of two empirical data sources, the research contribution and implications, and future research recommendations.

The next chapter will review existing academic literature on AJA satellite television, its place among other Arab media services, the role and perception of the station in endorsing the value of pan-Arab identity, and the existing debates around its relationship with its host and owner country, Qatar.
Chapter Two

EXISTING LITERATURE ON AJA SATELLITE TELEVISION

2.1 Introduction

The main research context, the rationale behind the choice of the research topic, research problems, questions and sub-questions, conceptual framework, and significance were briefly introduced in the previous chapter. This chapter will have a closer look at the existing academic debates around key previous media studies amongst Arab scholars, media and democracy, and AJA and its place among other Arab media services. The role and insight of the station in endorsing the value of pan-Arab identity will also be reviewed, together with existing debates around its relationship with its host and owner, Qatar.

It was noted that many trans-national Arabic news broadcasters such as AJA TV, Al-Arabiya TV, and the BBC Arabic TV dedicated most of their airtime reporting on outstanding uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that more or less reshaped the Arab world. Each channel seems to have had its own rhetoric and agenda, each of which has been widely challenged (Hashem: 2012). The first public uprising occurred in Tunisia, followed by other countries such as Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria, which shook the Arab world. Media coverage of such momentous and fundamental developments in general and AJA in particular was brought into academic discussions. Questions regarding the
channel’s motivation, relationship with Islamic political parties, and its independency and legacy of presenting conflicting political views were discussed.

It has been acknowledged by academics such as Khaled Hroub (2011) that the channel’s establishment founded a new venue for political freedom which culminated in its unreserved support for Arab ‘revolutions’. He notes in his article, ‘Al-Jazeera: the source of the Arab Spring’, published in ABC Religion and Ethics, that the channel covered a plethora of Arab masses declaring their demands to the world. He wrote:

The channel cancelled its regular programmes, and was transformed into a round-the-clock workshop of live news and interviews, switching from one revolution to another. So, while the Arab Spring has been a genuine popular uprising against decades of corrupt and oppressive authoritarian regimes, its rapid spread, which caught almost everyone by surprise, was due in part to the influence of Al-Jazeera, which became the voice of the voiceless throughout the Middle East (Hroub: 2011, ABC)

The channel represented a platform for political and religious opposition groups in the Arab countries, according to Hroub; furthermore, some Arab enthusiasts may have become impassioned and described the channel as the main drive behind the Arab uprisings (Pintak: 2010). These arguments, whether exaggerated or not, perhaps explain the power of media as a tool of change and not a change agent in and of itself. Pintak further explains: ‘Al-Jazeera may have set the tone for an aggressive new style of
journalism in the Arab world, but at the end of the day, it is still owned by a government’ (2010: p. 296). The relationship between AJA and Qatar will be reviewed later in this chapter.

This research agrees that it is an overstatement to say that AJA’s role was perhaps the main drive for Arab uprisings, but certainly, the channel has played a role in offering its platform, not only by reporting on, but also by adopting the public uprisings against dictatorship governments, which will be later explained (see Chapters 7, 8 and 9).

2.2. AJA: A Splash in a Stagnant Arab Media Scene

To understand the significance of AJA’s place among other media services, it is worth reviewing Arab media history in order to realise the past nature of media before the channel’s inception.

It was evident that since the 1950s, the landscape of Arab media was little more than a ‘mouthpiece’ for Arab regimes, as the vast majority of media services were owned by Arab totalitarian governments, therefore investigative journalism was limited or non-existent (Pintak: 2010). The Arab media were very loyal to the Ottoman Empire and largely committed to its regulations and norms. No adverse commentaries on the politics of friendly countries were permitted, consequently, Arab regimes always
thought of the media as one of their possessions and a tool for their own interests (Zayani: 2005).

The government-controlled media sources were arguably accepted by the majority of people as they had no other choice, however, the defining moment of lost public trust in Arab media came after the Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, despite the existence of *Voice of the Arabs Radio* - known as the ‘nationalist’ Arab media outlet during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s era in the 1960s (Al-Theidi: 2003).

This lack of trust, and the absence of alternative Arab media channels, made Arabs turn to foreign-based, Arabic-speaking, short wave radio broadcasters, such as the Voice of America, Radio Monte Carlo - Middle East, and BBC World Service - Arabic Radio - seeking reliable news sources that were perhaps accurate, independent, and more comprehensive (El-Nawawy and Iskander: 2003).

The media scene in each Arab country, by and large, varies according to long-term politics and short-term needs (Seib: 2008). The Arab media weakness, according to Kai Hafez (2008), lies in its inability to secure independence due to commercial complications which stand as considerable obstructions in providing an effective and trusted media service with solid editorial values. Hafez asserts that in the Arab world, like anywhere else, mass media struggle for their survival due to financial
complexities and lack of political freedom. The public therefore had little choice but to go to foreign-based media services or remain with government-controlled and (or) commercially funded media that probably had little interest in politics, preferring instead to focus on sources of revenue for their organisations.

It was recorded that the very first attempt to establish a pan-Arab TV channel was in London. The BBC’s World Service partnered with the Saudi Orbit Network in 1994, and launched the first pan-Arab satellite channel with values of ‘impartiality’ and ‘independence’ at the heart of its editorial practice (Torstrick & Faier: 2009). The introduction of this channel represented a modicum of hope for the Arab public. The marriage between the Saudi organisation and the BBC, however, soon ended in divorce, as the Saudi organisation prohibited any reportage on the Saudi royal family, which was unacceptable to the BBC (Al-Jaber: 2004).

It was in such a fragile Arab media environment that AJA satellite channel was established. It managed to hire the ready-trained journalists from the BBC and offered them a chance to work on a channel which was purely Arab and from an Arab country, Qatar. Its inception and scope of influence on the Arab public was a turning point in the history of Arab mass media (Al-Theidi: 2003).
The channel attracted the attention of scholars as much as viewers from its inception in 1996. Academics such as Sharp (2003), Iskandar and El-Nawawy (2003) argue that many of AJA’s correspondents were drawn to work for the station because they felt that American and British coverage of the 1991 Gulf War was not balanced – it did not cater for the specific interests of Arab audiences such as the plight of Iraqi civilians during the struggle. The channel consequently believed that it could provide an alternative perspective, particularly to the American and British news media, and the channel’s strategic importance during times of conflict was soon realised by several Arab states.

Scholarly consensus such as that of Rinnawi (2006), seems to exist regarding AJA’s inception. It offered not only a decisive remake in Arab mass media by acting as a substantial hand in triggering Arab news agenda from an Arab-based perspective, but also changed the relationship between the Arab and Anglo-European world; nonetheless, Khalil Rinnawi notes that the channel established new examples in the mass communication environment.

Lawrence Pintak (2010) asserts that the launch of AJA transformed the way Arab media functioned. It stirred the ethos of Arab journalism as television shows began openly discussing issues that the general public had previously addressed behind closed doors.
The channel subsequently managed to acquire a leading role in the Arab media scene by constructing a competitive drive in some mainstream Arab broadcasting, and in playing a central role in liberalising the Arab media discourse. This initiated a profound shift which was seen as potential inspiration for the reconfiguration of the political system in the Middle East region (Zayani: 2005).

Many academics view the existence of AJA as an incentive for other Arab channels to improve their broadcasting quality and to encourage diversity of views. The station stood as an example of not only pushing the boundaries of what is politically possible on Arab television, but also reinforcing the basic idea that democratic political concerns are very important for the media. The channel was viewed as providing its audiences with more than the official government view, and deliberately offered opinions from different perspectives, thus creating ripples in the stagnant pool of Arabic broadcasting (Miladi: 2003; Rugh: 2007; Seib: 2005; Quinn and Walters: 2010; Ghosh: 2003).

AJA promptly occupied a unique position in the Arab media world, soon after appearing on the scene, and improved the way Arab reporters worked. It arguably stood as a viable alternative to Western news organisations and attracted global recognition Arab media voices. Some Arabic satellite networks adjusted their editorial output, based on AJA
format, and realised the need to include more debate-style programmes in their talk shows (Sharp: 2003).

It is worth noting that AJA is not a member of the Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU), although it did apply for membership. The Union rejected the application, claiming that AJA failed to respect the Union’s code of conduct which included not broadcasting critical material against any Arab head of state (Quinn and Walter: 2010).

Academics noted the channel’s influence on other Arab broadcasting news networks including Al-Arabiyya (The Arabic), which started operating in Dubai Media City in the United Arab Emirates in February 2003 (Sharp: 2003). Sheik Walid Al-Ibrahim, a Saudi Arabian national, is the owner of Al-Arabiyya and the Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC), and, according to Samantha Shapiro (2005), his intention was to provide a more moderate alternative to AJA. His goal was to position the channel as the equivalent to CNN and Fox News, as an equable and professional media outlet that would be known for objective reporting rather than for loud and excited opinions (such as those exhibited on AJA programmes). Sheikh Walid believed that the market was ready for an alternative Arab voice at that time:

Sheik Walid’s personal political interests may also be a motivating factor. He is the brother-in-law of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi royal family dislikes Al-Jazeera because it gives air time to Al-Qaeda, and one of Al-Qaeda’s most
cherished goals is the overthrow of the Saudi government (Shapiro 2005: New York Times).

The popularity of AJA reflected frustration with the general bias of Western media, particularly American. Zayani (2005) argues that the establishment of AJA bridges the differences among many internal and external actors: it stands for a mixture of Eastern and Western, left and right, religious and secular, tribal and urban, local and global.

Academics such as Rinnawi (2006), assert that AJA is a reporter-driven rather than a personality-driven news medium, and models itself on the BBC and CNN formats, professing approbation of Western stations' roundtable discussion programmes, one-to-one interviews, and documentaries. Some even labelled the channel as 'the Arab CNN' - equivalent to, or arguably better than CNN.

Channels such as Al-Hurra Satellite TV were described by Marwa Samei (2010) as part of the strategic U.S. mission for the region whose aim was to improve its image in the eyes of the people of the Arab and Muslim worlds. The U.S. government decided to sponsor one of its largest and most expensive public diplomacy campaigns since the Cold War era: Radio Sawa and Al-Hurra television channel, in order to achieve this goal. This initiative was based on the assumption that the Arab media were prejudiced and that their coverage would promote extremism in the region.
Philip Seib (2008, p. xii) suggests that ‘the media’ are no longer merely the media, in his book, *The Al-Jazeera Effect*: ‘the media can be tools of conflict and instruments of peace, they can make traditional borders irrelevant and unify people scattered across the globe. This phenomenon – Al-Jazeera – is reshaping the world’.

The significance of AJA’s inception, according to Pintak, is that the channel reflects an appetite that is well suited to an audience that feels passionately about many of the issues and events it covers; not only that, but the channel’s newscasts and talk shows considerably altered public perceptions of politics, consequently allowing people to see more of what events were occurring, and implicitly encouraging them to become involved; yet, this approach was totally absent in Arab media history.

The channel has consequently ‘revolutionised’ the media environment in the Arab world by broadcasting what no other Arab news organisation dared to: the hard, often harsh truth of Arab life, culture, and politics (El-Nawawy and Iskandar: 2003).

2.3. AJA: A Scope of Pan-Arab Identity

It is necessary to take a closer look at the channel’s effect on, and its role in, Arab national identity, not from the perspective of Western policy-makers who consider it to be a malignant nuisance, but rather, from the
standpoint of its Arab audience, who sees it as a magnifier of shared frustrations and aspirations and as a truth-teller (Seib: 2008; Pintak: 2005). Philip Seib asserts that it is ‘naïve’ to limit the performance of Arab broadcasting according to Western mainstream standards: the political structures and cultures are very different from developed democratic systems.

The significance of the channel in a changing Arab world was through its programmes and news, its presentation of crucial and taboo political, cultural and social issues, and the threat that the channel was deemed to represent the very hegemony and ideology of dictatorial Arab regimes (Zayani: 2005). El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003) explain AJA’s ‘daring approach’ in touching on issues considered by Arab regime standards to be forbidden: sex, polygamy, government corruption, women’s civil rights and Islamic fundamentalism. This tactic served not only to present a popular station, but also led to the argument on pan-Arab national identity for which the channel perhaps played an important role.

The Qatari-based channel made Arabs not only realise that it was possible to have an Arab institution which they could admire and call their own, but was also an example of Arabs turning away from Western news: it created a platform on which Arab public opinion could be extensively expressed (Seib: 2005; Miladi: 2003).
Seib (2008: p. 22) argues that AJA may not have been a stalking horse for the United States, Israel, Islam, or even Qatar’s ruling family, but it was the latest in a line of news ventures that had sought to use mass media to help establish a pan-Arab identity: ‘Al-Jazeera is a descendent of “Voice of the Arabs” (VOA) in that it supplies cohesion to the notion of “Arabness”.

Khalil Rinnawi (2006), the author of Mc-Arabism, thoroughly examines AJA’s influence on Arab audiences. He notes that the channel had won the hearts and minds of millions of viewers on one hand, and inflated the anger of various Arab governments and British and American officials, on the other; in a sense, this had given the channel public trust and appeal:

The channel’s attractive presentations, live interviews, news brought straight from the scene, the engagement it offers viewers through audience participation, high proportion of investigative journalism programmes, have all worked to create legitimacy as an Arab news and current affairs station (p. 120).

The viewers’ expectations of Arab media changed after the station’s inception: Arabs were no longer seen as media consumers in a one-way information stream. AJA helped to initiate a new kind of viewer experience and fed hungry Arab audiences with news and serious political analyses through interactive debates and live public participation. AJA had come to play an important role in broadcasting pan-Arab interaction, as it projected an inclusive dignity which crossed national boundaries (Zayani, 2005).
Zayani elaborates on the significance of the station in the pan-Arab trend saying:

The station employs people from various Arab nations who are Arabs from almost every corner of the Arab world, with no apparent domination of any single group. The lack of a dominant group gives the network a pan-Arab ring. The channel which broadcasts exclusively in a modern standard Arabic language, has gone a long way to creating a kind of connectivity between Arab viewers. In many ways, it has reinvigorated a sense of common destiny in the Arab world and is even encouraging Arab unity, so much so, that pan-Arabism is being reinvented on this channel (p. 7).

James Poinwozik (2005) argues that the media is one of three institutions: the mosque, the press, and schools that have the power to influence people’s lives and their social behaviour, and the newest and perhaps most ‘revolutionary’ is AJA. It has, more importantly, been at the forefront of Arab satellite channels which have brought about ‘a pan-Arab consciousness’ or ‘a pan-Arab imagined community’, consisting of individuals who have a sense of collective belonging and an affinity with people they have never met, but who actually speak the same language and who are not geographically limited (Zayani: 2005, p. 9).

Sakr (2001) and other academics note that the station’s policy of portraying ‘the opinion and opposite opinion’ and the criticism it earned across the Arab regimes, including Jordan, Kuwait, Egypt and others, increased the channel’s popularity (Thussu and Freedman: 2003). AJA, as
a ‘pan-Arab’ channel, may be one of the reasons that outside viewers perceived it as biased, according to Zayani. He concludes that it is a new voice, a new channel, and a new influence on the Arab world and other spheres (Zayani: 2005). El-Nawawy and Iskander (2003) write on how people react to criticism of AJA by various governments:

[…] with every dramatic action a government has taken against Al-Jazeera, its popularity among Arab audiences appears to grow. With every attempt to reprimand or silence the network, satellite subscription and website traffic increases (p. 128).

Rinnawi (2006) similarly asserts that the AJA’s emergence is a case study which describes the various nuances and consequences of Arab transitional media on Arab politics, society, culture, and even religion (Al-Jenaibi: 2007). Tatham (2006) places the station in an Arab nationalism standpoint and its exploitation of ‘no red lines’ approach by touching on topics no other channels have dared to do. Sakr (1999) illustrates the argument of AJA’s acceleration trend towards live and compelling talk-show programming that obliged the older channels to keep up with the competition. Sharp (2003) complements other arguments on the channel’s programmes and its implications on the Arab world, and clarifies that the approaches of its programmes have proven to be informative and entertaining for many viewers; some Arab intellectuals however have criticised the approach as being too sensationalist and animated, according to Sharp.
Quinn and Walters (2010) discuss the ‘revolutionary’ tone and language of the station’s broadcasting, and portray the channel as a ‘ripple in a stagnant pool’, yet Marc Lynch explains that those people who may even look at the channel as a ‘state’ that will itself bring out democracy, are mistaken:

What one enthusiast called the Democratic Republic of Al-Jazeera does not exist. Al-Jazeera cannot create democracy on its own, nor compel Arab leaders to change their ways. Television talk shows cannot substitute for the hard work for political organizing and institution-building (p. 57).

It is worth inspecting academic debates regarding the channel and its host country Qatar, after having looked at the added value that AJA contributes to the concept of pan-Arab identity. The importance of studying such a central factor is to understand how different the channel is from others which, over a protracted period, have been accused of being a ‘mouthpiece’ tool for their owners or governments.
2.4. Qatar: A place in the World Stage

Figure 2: Qatar’s tiny location in the world map

Qatar, a small peninsula in the Persian Gulf, to the east of the Arabian Peninsula, occupies approximately 11,437 square kilometres. Saudi Arabia is to the west and the United Arab Emirates to the south. The estimated total population in Qatar (2015) is 2.2 million (only 12% are original Qatari nationals), according to the Qatari Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics\textsuperscript{13}. The country is one of the leading exporters of gas in the world (Com: 2013) and is listed as one of the world’s richest countries (Scott: 2012). The country was selected to host the FIFA World Cup in 2022 which put Qatar in a universal spotlight in more ways than one: the country and FIFA selection committee members are currently under investigation (May 2015), following allegations of bribery and corruption in order to win the bid (Gibson: 2014); in addition, poor human rights records in Qatar (AJA’s and AJE’s host country) reflect abuse of

\textsuperscript{12} The map is available at: http://www.101traveldestinations.com/qatar-in-world-map/ [retrieved 27/02/2015]


It is argued here that the Qatari-based channel, AJA, remains not only a phenomenon that is worthy of exploration but also one which begs better understanding (Zayani: 2005). Appreciation of the significance of AJA is based on being aware of Qatar’s history and its motivation behind the establishment of such a predominant satellite channel. This research places the very nature of the channel’s establishment by its host country Qatar, as a key element that cannot be ignored in any study related to AJA.

Based on the study of existing academic work on AJA, it has come to light that a considerable number of academics have questioned the nature of the relationship with Qatar. Academics appear to agree that the channel’s inception was part of the Emir’s political reforms and suggest that AJA’s establishment sets a new direction for Qatar (Sorenson: 2011). The dissolution of the BBC and Saudi joint channel project offered a golden opportunity for Qatar to set up AJA and absorb the ‘jobless’ experienced, Western-trained journalists (Miles: 2005; El-Nawawy and Iskandar: 2002-2003; Zayani: 2005; Sakr: 2001).

Hugh Miles (2005) presents the history of Qatar and its Emir, at that time, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani, as a Western-educated person and
more open to political and social ideas acquired from the West. The young Emir of Qatar, who took over power from his father in a bloodless coup in 1992, decided to invest $140 million in a new channel with a mandate to freely report the news (Pintak: 2010).

Miles (2005) explains that the political attitude of the new Emir was innovative: he constantly declared his policies and ideas, often speaking directly to the press. This approach opened the platform for public participation in making decisions, unlike the rest of Arab rulers, who remained aloof from their subjects. Hugh Miles also acknowledges that Qatar dramatically changed under the Emir’s new tangible reforms, consequently, the inception of AJA made Qatar feel that it was finally a player on the world stage.

The channel transformed the way Arabs saw the world and their own region, and also brought prestige and recognition to its host country (Pintak: 2010; El-Ibiary: 2006). Miles (2005, p.34) states, furthermore, that political openness and public participation is progressive but Qatar is neither a democracy nor a police state: ‘it is an autocratic state subject to the whim of one man, the Emir, who although, (fortunately) not a tyrant, is unelected, unaccountable and all-powerful.’ Miles believes, therefore, that:

The reaction of Al-Jazeera was an act of liberalism, not one of democracy, and the channel could be unmade as quickly as it was made, if, one day, the Emir changes his mind […] without
his continued political and financial benevolence, it would have ceased transmitting long ago (p. 35)

El-Nawawy and Iskandar (2003, p. 73) suggest, on the other hand, that the Qatari process of political change led by the Emir, has enhanced the credibility of what was formerly one of the most conservative countries in the Arabian Gulf, one of the least inclined to explore social and political reforms: ‘in fact, Sheikh Hamad’s actions in the conservative, autocratically-governed Qatar amount to “a one-man revolution”. It is rather a mixture of both liberalism and autocracy, as Qatar is not the only financial source of AJA: other private investors also make monetary contributions to the channel, including a Jewish man, which places AJA in the conspiracy theory bracket, according to many critics (Rinnawi: 2006).

The channel’s funding revenues open political economy debates by academics. Such a theme represents a temptation for researchers to define the thin-line boundaries between the channel and Qatar as its major financial sponsor. Tatham (2006) and Campagna (2010) claim that AJA’s lack of financial independence due to its limited advertising revenue, forced the station to maintain its relationship with the Qatari royal family in order to survive. Khalil Rinnawi (2006, p.92), however, remains enthusiastic that AJA’s future plans will incorporate independence.

Zayani (2005), in the same context, points out that due to Qatari financial support, the channel rarely criticises or even addresses the country’s
policies that involve the Qatari royal family. The Qatari political leadership subtly manipulates AJA for the purposes of controlling Qatari society by ignoring domestic issues. Pintak (2005) aligns with other academics and states that the motives of the Emir of Qatar are to place his country as an important player in the region and to enjoy world-wide approval by adopting a middle-of-the road policy by hosting AJA as well as a U.S. military base.

Rinnawi (2006, p.98) further states that AJA was compelled to leave one topic untouched: internal Qatari politics: ‘Al-Jazeera has worked as the fourth estate in the Arab world, its target group, but has left Qatar untouched.’

El-Nawawy and Iskander (2003, p.34) conversely justify the fact that the directors of AJA have ‘identified a market demand for serious and independent journalism, thereby narrowing and specialising their content exclusively to political matters’, and therefore are more concerned with being allowed to freely practice their reportage, even though it may mean that certain areas are out of bounds. The market demand serves as a contrast to most other Arabic-language satellite services which dedicate much of their airtime to entertainment. It is worth mentioning that some critics note that El-Nawawy and Iskander focus too much on the AJA success story and omit to point out the channel’s negative aspects which are AJA’s intentions or motives (Lahlali: 2007).
Qatar has been subjected to criticism regarding its foreign relations policy. The daring approach adopted by AJA was deemed a threat to the hegemony of Arab regimes. Strained relationships developed between Qatar, the U.S. and some of the Gulf States, specifically Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, because of the channel's content in its telecasts (Zayani: 2005, p.3).

U.S. officials accused AJA of collaborating with the Taliban leadership (it was initially the only network permitted in Kabul), and declared AJA as the ‘mouthpiece’ of Osama Bin Laden, especially after the network aired Bin Laden’s tapes on 7 October 2001. U.S. officials consequently complained to Qatar and requested that the channel should be required to revise its reporting methods and content (El-Nawawy & Iskandar: 2003).

AJA’s talk shows and questionably free debates on programmes such as the *Opposite Direction*, were seen as ‘revolutionary’ in a region where free speech was severely limited or virtually non-existent, consequently unnerving Arab autocratic regimes - Qatar received complaints and objections on several occasions (Miles: 2005). The former Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, paid a state visit to Qatar in 2000 and was taken to the AJA TV station. He remarked: ‘All this trouble from a matchbox like this?’ (Zayani: 2005, p. 40)
The question of the channel’s censorship and dependence on Qatar was brought into academic analysis. Most television channels in the Arab world are government-subsidised, partly because a considerable amount of money is required by the channels and partly because Arab governments have a stake in the media (Zayani: 2005):

Who owns what in the Arab media is an entangled issue and a subject of inquiry in itself. Still, the patterns of media ownership in the Arab world point to some contradictions. On the one hand, governments are ideologically inclined to more commercialisation and privatisation. On the other hand, they still conceive of media as a state-controlled public service. The outcome is an interesting marriage of the two models: the public and the private, the ideological and the commercial. As it is, a network like AJA is both private and public (Zayani: 2005, p.15)

Khalil Rinnawi (2006) briefly narrates the story of how the Emir decided to end media control without much consideration of the implications:

He abolished the Ministry of Information, responsible for censorship. It ran radio and television, set quality standards for local newspapers. There is no other Arab government that functions without such a ministry or its equivalent. Even in the United States, many of these kinds of media controls are scattered among various federal departments (p. 88).

Rinnawi also suggests that Qatar is the only Arab state that does not have a Ministry of Information and that AJA enjoys a unique ownership and policy structure. Policy is dictated by upper-level AJA staff, not by the Qatari government, although it receives its funding from there. Others like
Rathmell and Schulze (2000) assert that the station exists as a highly visible declaration of the regime’s commitment to liberalisation. Rugh (2007), conversely argues that the channel is independent of Qatar and it has taken on a different role that seems revolutionary and inconsistent with Qatar’s past history. The new measures do not necessarily mean that journalists can write whatever they want: the main difference is that now, instead of knowing with certitude where the red lines are drawn, they have to guess; in practice, the lack of censorship has even proven to be a real headache for local journalists who are no longer sure of how far they can go:

Since its inception in 1996, the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera Satellite Channel has risen to prominence as the most professional and independent broadcaster in the Arab world. Drawing on the rich and diverse experience of its staff, Al-Jazeera seems to have managed to establish a foothold for itself in an Arab media scene long characterised by government censorship and restrictive policies. As much as Al-Jazeera’s daring attitude has won the admiration of millions of viewers around the world, it has also generated countless diplomatic incidents involving its host and other Arab countries (Zayani: 2006,p. 106).

The Qatari government reduced restrictions on freedom of speech and the press, but many Qatari journalists continued to practice self-censorship due to real or perceived social and political pressure:

Even though Al-Jazeera sometimes falls short of its ambitious goals, it remains the most viable network of its kind in the region. Al-Jazeera has revolutionized the Arab Middle East,
challenging censorship imposed by the government-controlled media and addressing any relevant issue, including weak democratic institutions, fundamentalism, state corruption, political inequality, and human rights violations (El-Nawawy and Iskandar: 2003, p. 216).

Miles (2006) answered the question: Is Al-Jazeera Censored? in a journal article by saying that the station occupies a peculiar space in the Arab media - although it presents itself as a beacon of free speech and editorial independence in the region, the chairman of the network's board of directors is Sheikh Hamad bin Thamer Al-Thani, the former Qatari Deputy Minister of Information. The exact nature of the relationship remains opaque, but it is a testament to the Emir's vision that, so far at least, he has been tolerant; whether he continues to refrain from interfering with the channel's output, remains to be seen. Qatar has long had a 'loyalist' media system, and its newspapers still fall into that general category. The Arabic channel, however, has taken on a different role that seems revolutionary and inconsistent with Qatar's past history (Rugh: 2007).

William Rugh (2007) further supports his argument with three reasons: first, the channel initially emerged as a taboo-breaker, after a significant political change took place in Qatar when the former ruler was deposed by his son, who was determined to undertake some reforms in the direction of political liberalisation. Second, AJA's aggressive political attitude can be seen, to some extent, as the result of a policy decision by the new ruler to put his country on the map, by way of constructing a different international image
from his neighbours, and using AJA to stir up controversy in a controlled way; and third, because of Qatar’s small size and the fact that AJA focuses on regional and international news that is of interest to the Arab world as a whole, there is little real news interest on which the channel could focus in Qatar, and therefore it has few Qatari taboos to challenge.

The channel is viewed by some as the closest thing to independent television journalism currently available in the Arab world (Genntzkow and Shapiro: 2004); if there is one exception to the rule of ownership by government or government proxy, the only candidate, out of the six leading satellite broadcasting channels, is AJA, based in Qatar. This is officially an independent station whose ‘only’ connection with the government is that it was promised government loans over a period of five years (Sakr, 1999).

Critics continue to point out the fact that AJA does not treat Qatar with the same degree of scrutiny as it does other Arab governments. The channel’s executives have countered that Qatar is relatively free of political strife and therefore does not require as much attention as other neighbouring Arab countries with a catalogue of questions (Sharp: 2003).

Ahmed Al-Theidi (2003) has looked at the channel censorship from a different angle and suggests that the station has sparked a race, not only amongst private media, but also within government-sponsored media of
the Arab world. They have been pressurised to improve their performance, and re-think their old-fashioned methods of censorship in order to retain some of their audience. Arab governments have had, therefore, to loosen their grip on mass media, and adjust themselves to the new culture of debate and live discussions, thus allowing a certain level of criticism. Ali Abusalem (2007) agrees with this argument and states that the station effectively participated in lifting decades of government control over media. The station has given Arab world viewers the opportunity to exercise their basic human rights, to freely express their opinions, and to represent an Arab perspective on world events, particularly those closer to home. El-Nawawy and Iskander (2003) write:

Although the Qatari government denies any influence over AJA Al-Jazeera broadcasts and editorial policy, most official Arab complaints are directed at the Qatari government, not at the network. Because Al-Jazeera is a new phenomenon in the Arab world, and because Arabs are not accustomed to an independent Arab network, free of government control, many refuse to accept that Al-Jazeera truly operates on its own. They simply cannot separate Al-Jazeera from Qatari government (p. 88).

The motivation, as explained above, of Qatar being behind AJA has been of interest to academics. Such motivation is regularly questioned during times of crises in the Arab world.
2.5. AJA and Democracy

Although it is out of this research scope, it is beneficial to generally present an overview of existing scholar discussion around media and democracy and how AJA viewed its role in endorsing democratic values in the complex and changing Arab world.

In defining the term democracy, Leo Bogart (1998) suggests that the term democracy is hard to define as no single political system can lay exclusive claim to the term. He notes that democracy is often defined by what it opposes, rather than as an operational format for any specific kind of government.

Over the past decade the paradigm of democracy and democratic practices have dominated the analysis of political change, reflecting the dramatic transitions from authoritarian rule in Southern and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia, while the new literature on democratisation has pointedly excluded the Arab world (Wickham 1994).

Bogart (1998) correctly notes that any answer to the question of whether media serve democracy must be qualified; which media, and among what part of the public? Generally, media can serve democracy only when
those who manage them feel a passionate responsibility to create it and maintain it.

Michael Schudson (2008, p.8-9) argues that democracy and journalism are not the same thing; democracy does not necessarily produce journalism, nor does journalism necessarily produce democracy. Schudson (ibid) presented six primary functions news has served or can serve in a democracy. The six functions journalism has frequently assumed in democratic societies, in different combinations and with different emphases, are:

1. **Information**: the news media can provide fair and full information so citizens can make sound political choices.

2. **Investigation**: the news media can investigate concentrated sources of power, particularly governmental power.

3. **Analysis**: the news media can provide coherent frameworks of interpretation to help citizens comprehend a complex world.

4. **Social Empathy**: journalism can tell people about others in their society and their world so that they can come to appreciate the viewpoints and lives of other people, especially those less advantaged than themselves.

5. **Public Forum**: journalism can provide a forum for dialogue among citizens and serve as a common carrier of the perspectives of varied groups in society
6. Mobilization: the news media can serve as an advocate for particular political programmes and perspectives and mobilize people to act in support of these programmes.

Zizi Papacharissi’s (2009) views that journalism is based on democratic values, but can thrive with or without democracy; in dictatorships or monarchies, journalists’ coverage of abuses of power are typically instrumental in cultivating democratic resistance.

Margaret Scammell and Holli Semetko (2000: p. xii) introduce three duties for media to democracy and note that the emergence of a free and critical press is a key indicator of the transformation to democracy. The writers suggest the media’s duties to democracy flow from three premises; [1] to act as a watchdog against the state, [2] to supply accurate and sufficient information, [3] to represent the people in the sense of adequately reflecting the spectrum of public opinion and political competition.

To test these three premises of Scammel and Semetko on AJA, this research suggests that before the uprising, the channel has represented the notion of media power in the Arab world since the very moment of its inception as it - directly or indirectly - criticised Arab tyrant regimes and acted as the most perceptible watchdog against states. The channel has
also supplied Arabs with not only information but also brought all opposing views to people’s living rooms throughout its informative daring approach. After the fall of Mubarak, the Arab world has evidently become fragmented hence what stands as democratic practices – represented in the ballot boxes - has been in question and widely controversial.

This research argues that both the channel and its host country, Qatar, mutually benefit from their coexistence. The station has an unwritten understanding of avoiding any criticism of the state of Qatar (as discussed in chapter two, three and seven).

Tokunbo Awoshakin (2010; p. 49-50) explains the Nigerian model of mature democracy, in which media has always been a vehicle for social reengineering and political redirection. The Nigerian journalists have successfully shown consistent attempts to look for more effective ways to engage the public. They also aimed to create opportunities for members of the public to come aboard and shoulder some stake in a participatory democracy (Awoshakin 2010).

Democracy is usually thought of as a product of Western Enlightenment thinking but many of the critical questions that revolve around the linkage of media and democracy occur in the non-industrial world (Bogart 1998).
Such critical thinking of media-democracy linkage opens the platform for this research to discuss AJA representation of the MB in relations to democracy and ideology (discussed in chapter six and seven).

2.6. Organisational Cultures in Arab Newsroom:

In this section, this research reviews key previous studies amongst Arab journalists in order to clarify the connections between the wider political influences in the region and the organisational cultures in Arab newsrooms (particularly pan-Arab news outlets such as AJA). In general, studies on journalism and politics tend to focus on journalists themselves, the structure of their media organisations or the socio-political and technological context outside the newsrooms (Benson, 2004).

In his sociological analysis of news production, Schudson (2000) suggests three main influences on this production process: political economy of the society, the organisation of the newsroom, and the political culture surrounding the news outlets. Building on that model, Benson (2004, p, 80) suggests three major factors which shape news coverage of politics: economic, political and inter-organisational, where the first two factors are subsumed within the political economy approach while the third factor encompasses individual as well as organisational factors. He also emphasises the need to examine historical and cultural contexts before
analysing such major factors in order to explain the intertwining relationship between journalism and politics.

Arab studies adopting a political-economy approach (e.g. Ayish, 2002, Rinnawi, 2006, Rugh, 2007) focused on the new western style programming and reporting in pan-Arab media such as AJA. Ayish (2002) suggested that this new style was due to the fact that many journalists in those outlets were trained, and previously worked, in the West. The news agenda of such outlets remain regional (Rinnawi, 2006) which is applied also in talk shows such as AJA’s programmes (Rugh, 2007). This, however, does not mean that such outlets are completely autonomous from national pressures, as their content can still be determined by external political pressures, national or regional (Boyd-Barrett and Xie, 2008).

A previous study (Tarabay, 1994), for instance, examined the patterns of ownership in Pan-Arab and Lebanese press and identified three patterns: editor-owner, semi-organisational, and government-owner. In the case of the Lebanese press, in particular, the study linked the press with religious factions such as the case of An-Nahar, owned by a Greek Orthodox family versus Assafir which is owned by a Shia family (ibid.).

Moreover, Ayish (2002) categorises pan-Arab news media into three categories: traditional, reformist, and liberal commercial. The first pattern
includes traditional television channels, such as the Syrian Satellite Channel, which, still very much follows the traditional editorial orientation in its news output. The second category refers to channels such as Abu Dhabi (which has now ceased to function as a news channel and has turned into a family channel), with higher journalistic professional standards in order to compete with other news channels. Then, the third category includes channels such as AJA, driven by its professional rather than political interests. Studies focusing on AJA journalism (e.g. Ghadbian, 2001; El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002; Lynch, 2006) suggest that the channel has played a pivotal role in challenging the customary role of government-controlled media thereby raising the professional standards of Arab media. For instance, politicians have to respond to AJA’s critical reporting of their policies which explains why the channel’s offices were shut down in several Arab cities (Hammond, 2007).

Given the proliferation of new and social media in the MENA region, some recent studies (e.g. Hamdy, 2009; Khamis, 2011; Ayish, 2010) suggest the rise of citizen journalism. Ayish and Mellor (2015), for instance, argue that the recent uprisings in the region helped trigger a new use of social media in journalism and activism. One example is the coverage of the Syrian conflict, which was described as one of the most socially mediated events in the region. With the censoring of state media, Syrian citizens turned into storytellers and set up their own local news agencies feeding news to overseas media including satellite channels (Ismail 2012, 106).
In light of the increasing role of new media in Arab newsrooms, especially post-Arab Spring, Khaled Abdel Sattar (2013) argues that political factors constitute an important factor in implementing innovative policies in Arab newsrooms, such as hiring social media editors or using SMS services.

The recent uprisings have also brought hope for the relaxation of state control of media and its heavy censorship. However, a recent study (el Issawi & Cammaerts, 2015) of Egyptian journalists argues that those journalists struggled to uphold a monitorial role after the end of the MB rule, to which many private and public media were opposed. Instead, journalists re-assumed their traditional role as mouthpiece for the military regime especially as many private outlets were controlled by political and military elites. As such, their oppositional journalistic style against the Brotherhood was only an expression of their collaboration with the traditional elites (ibid.).

Other studies about the organisational structure of Arab newsrooms adopted the theory of gatekeeping. Applying gatekeeping theory to the Saudi context, for instance, Almaghlooth (2013) argues that gatekeeping is an important concept in analysing the Saudi media landscape. Through interviews with Saudi journalists, Almaghlooth (2013) shows various aspects of post-production gatekeeping including editing material after publication, deleting posts and news items, blocking and pressure on
microbloggers. He also argues that gatekeeping can be manifested in blocking social issues such as women’s issues, or religious issues.

Moreover, in their scrutiny of AJA’s organisational model, Zayani & Sahraoui (2007, p. 171) argue that AJA “has many of the symptoms that plague Arab organisations”. For instance, staff did not feel empowered and their “level of commitment to the mission of AJA is not as strong as it was in the first few years of the network’s history” (p. 175). Internal reward system such as promotion is not systematic combined with the “clan mentality” such as in hiring native Qataris (ibid.). In terms of content, Zayani & Sahraoui (2007, p. 172) argue that AJA is toning down its populist appeal in covering crises but “it still comes off as the channel of Arab discontent, giving an outlet to people’s anger and frustration about a Middle East that is going through troubled times.”

Drawing on Cultural Studies, Mellor (2008 & 2011) argues that Arab journalists are cultural producers articulating their ideologies about politics and pan-Arab identity. In line with Zelizer’s argument (1993/1997) that journalists form their own interpretive community, Arab journalists here form an interpretive community with their own shared practices and narratives (see also Mellor: 2011, p. 6).

Journalists actively negotiate their professional identity and autonomy from the political regimes by “redefining their role in society” (Mellor, 2008, p.
For instance, in her study amongst journalists in pan-Arab media outlets including AJA and its rival Al Arabiya (as well as BBC Arabic), Mellor (2011) argues that such pan-Arab media has a global news agenda and their journalists therefore see themselves more detached from their local political news and more attuned to regional news agenda. They also see their pan-Arab institutions as more visible and credible via-a-vis their local counterparts, and this motivated some of them to pursue their dream of joining a global news media outlet such as the CNN.

Other studies amongst Arab journalists tended to highlight their attitudes particularly towards Western political powers. For instance, Pintak and Ginges (2008) surveyed more than 600 journalists in selected Arab countries in order to analyse their attitudes toward their mission post-9/11. They argue that Arab journalists value their commitment to the Change Agent function, in that they see their mission as contributing to the development of their societies. Ramaprasad and Hamdy (2006) argue that Egyptian journalists, for one, regarded the value of supporting pan-Arab identity as one important function of mass media.

Another survey amongst a sample of Arab journalists in the MENA region (Pintak and Ginges, 2009) showed that Arab journalists were critical of western media coverage of the region although the study also highlighted the economic and ethical pressures facing Arab journalists and their autonomy as watchdog, a role that they themselves adopt from Western
practices. In terms of their ethics, those journalists saw themselves as representative of a Muslim culture which unites the region and they were therefore interested in covering issues which they regard as important in improving the lives of Muslims in the region such as poverty and education (ibid.). Moreover, in his comparison between journalists in pan-Arab outlets with their local counterparts, Valeriani (2010) argues that national identity is one important assessment variable for those journalists who assess each other’s work according to their national priorities, which makes the news agenda very much determined by national and/or regional interest.

To sum up, the above studies highlighted the significance of the political context in analysing news culture in local and regional newsrooms in the Middle East. Although a few of the above studies highlighted the importance of national and regional identity (e.g. pan-Arabism) in defining journalists’ roles, they did not touch upon the impact of values and ethics on journalistic practices in pan-Arab media (including AJA), and here lies the contribution of this study as it presents the findings of interviews collated with selected AJA journalists showing how they justify their coverage from an ethical viewpoint.
2.7 Summary

It was evident in the existing literature that AJA has managed in no time to be able to position itself as a leading media service in the Arab world, following a long period of government-owned media. The channel has founded a culture that media cannot only be a representative voice of the majority of regular and marginalised Arabs, but has also defied the very existence of Arab authoritarian regimes. The channel's tone of 'electrifying' language, daring approach and attractive presentation, has encouraged other Arab media services to follow the same technique, and therefore has arguably changed the very nature of the way Arab media function. It won the hearts and minds of millions of ‘hungry’ Arab audiences, soon after its inception, by telling them what they wanted to know, maybe not what they should know; nonetheless, for many Arabs, AJA, as a media source, represents pan-Arab identity.

The question of the relationship between AJA and Qatar is substantial in any academic work regarding the channel. The motivation of Qatar to launch AJA is arguably clear: many academics seem to agree that the channel is a public relations tool and a ‘mouthpiece’ for Qatar, a place that has many paradoxes in terms of having the biggest American military base, and also hosting Islamic movements such as Hamas and Taliban, described by the international community as ‘terrorist organisations’. 
Academics have also raised several questions on the channel’s independence and ownership, and therefore the impact of AJA’s editorial coverage and impartiality in reporting stories relating to Qatar appears to be either under-researched or not critically investigated. What seems limited in the existing literature on AJA is the in-depth analysis of identifying its relationship with Islamic discourse, including its association with Islamic political parties, particularly the MB in Egypt, which is the main focus of this research.

Identifying the story of AJA’s establishment, its place among Arab media, its pan-Arab identity, and unpacking its relationship with Qatar, underpins this research’s focus in following the development of the channel in the Arab world. This background review, more importantly, gives this research an overview of whether or not AJA’s construction of its place in providing an ‘impartial’ news source (presenting Opinion and the Opposite Opinion الرأي والرأي الآخر) in the Arab world has changed. This is revealed through examining the channel’s relationship with the MB in Egypt.

This chapter has reviewed the literature on AJA, the channel’s significance and place among other media services and its relationship with Qatar. The next chapter will look at the scholarly discussions on AJA in relation to Islam and Islamic political parties, before and after the outbreak of the Arab uprisings.
Chapter Three
AJA AND THE RISE OF POLITICAL ISLAM IDEOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The significance of AJA in the Arab world, the place it inhabits among other Arab media services, and the questions of its ownership and independence in relations to its host country, Qatar, was discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter focuses on reviewing the existing academic literature on AJA’s relationship with political Islam in general and in particular the MB in Egypt.

This chapter seeks to build on the few academic works available regarding the channel’s alleged role of its positive representation of the Egyptian Islamic movement, the MB. This chapter also looks at the role of Qatar, AJA’s host country, its accommodation of Islamists and Islamic movements, and the impact this has on the channel’s editorial practices - a topic of academic interpretation. Discussions around the channel’s reportage of the Arab uprisings will also be discussed.

Academics have often mentioned that AJA has generally provided a platform for ‘opposing voices’ to Arab dictator regimes, in which case, the MB is perhaps seen as the most prominent in the Arab world.
3.2 AJA: A platform for Islamic Ideology

Debates on AJA’s relationship with Islam and Islamic political parties is not recent; in his article: ‘How Arab is Al-Jazeera English?’, Abeer Al-Najar (2009, p. 4) notes that one of the main challenges facing AJE in the West, for example, is its brand, specifically, the reputation of its sister channel, AJA - a channel that has been accused of representing ‘terrorists and Jihadists’, ‘Jihad TV’, ‘Killers with Cameras’, ‘the most powerful ally of terror in the World’, and so on, by many U.S. officials

The fall of Mubarak in January 2011 attracted much academic commentary. Sultan Al-Qassemi (2012), for example, criticised AJA and its relationship with the Islamic movement, the MB, in his article: ‘Morsi’s Win Is Al-Jazeera’s Loss’ and claims that AJA’s connection with the MB was evident since the inception of the channel. He also notes that the main guest of its chief religious programme, ‘Life and Shari’a’ is none other than Yousef Al-Qaradawi, a well-known member of the MB, and a permanent resident and citizen of Qatar. The channel, according to Al-Qassemi, spared no effort or time in promoting Al-Qaradawi through its various channels.

The management of AJA showed great foresight when, a few days after the fall of Mubarak, it launched AJ Mubasher Misr (Egypt Live), a 24-hour
channel dedicated to Egyptian affairs and arguably supporting the MB and its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, in its coverage.

The championing of AJA, according to Gillies Kepel (2009, p.5), did not start or end with the MB. Kepel argues that Al-Qaradawi’s explanation of Israeli attacks, for example, as ‘martyrdom operations’ reinforces his argument that because every Israeli, including women, has done military service, they are all combatants, even though they may temporarily be in civilian clothes; consequently, suicide attacks against Israeli civilians are a legitimate means of Jihad (in the path of Allah).

Kepel also openly accuses AJA of providing Islamist extremists the platform on which to express their views, and notes that ‘without Al-Jazeera there would be no Al-Qaeda, because such operations could only become instruments for mobilisation if they were broadcast favourably by a non-Western satellite TV channel’ (p. 5). Hanna Rogan (2008) has a similar opinion and considered AJA as a media instrument to spread the message of Al-Qaeda.

It was claimed that there was a confluence of interests between AJA, the Qatari TV channel, and Al-Qaeda in the discussions on how AJA’s media policy transmits Al-Qaeda messages (El-Zein: 2012). Hatem El-Zein argues that one of the main reasons for the channel’s fame is AJA’s exclusive access to Al-Qaeda messages and ‘terrorist’ leaders because of
its backing of this group: ‘Al-Jazeera has supported Al-Qaeda which knows the importance of media in its war’ (p. 442). He noted, however, that until AJA aired the Al-Qaeda tapes, American officials praised the channel for its free speech ethos.

3.3 AJA: Adopting the Arab Uprisings

AJA Satellite TV played a substantial media role in the Arab world, as discussed in the previous chapter, and helped in transforming the very nature of media perception, not only in the Arab world, but also around the globe, due to its attractive presentation, live interviews, fast news-gathering, public engagement, and style of investigative journalism programmes. Such dynamics gave the channel the legitimacy to be referred to as ‘the’ Arab news and current affairs station. Deborah Horan, (2010), in her report ‘Shifting Sands: The Impact of Satellite TV on Media in the Arab World’ writes:

[…] Al-Jazeera has covered a string of Middle East conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Gaza—building its reputation across the region, though not without controversy. The channel has come under harsh criticism for its coverage of Osama bin Laden, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and Iran, with Bush administration officials leading the charge that its reports were anti-American. It has also been criticized in the West for showing graphic violence (Horan: 2010p. 10)
Mehdi Hasan (2011) states in an article for the *New Statesman* regarding the recent Arab Spring events, that AJA’s correspondents and producers were harassed, arrested, and even killed, in their attempts to capture the current news:

As Arab governments toppled from Tunisia to Egypt to Libya - and, last month, Yemen Al-Jazeera has been on hand to beam the pictures of ecstatic protesters, revolutionaries and rebels into the living rooms of ordinary Arabs across the region - and beyond […] In Egypt, for 18 days straight, Al-Jazeera’s cameras broadcast live from Cairo’s Tahrir Square, giving a platform to the demonstrators, while documenting the violence of the Mubarak regime and its supporters (Hasan: 2011)

Aref Hijjawi (2011), Programme Director, AJA in Qatar, notes in his article: ‘The role of Al-Jazeera in the Arab Revolts of 2011’, that the function of AJA in mobilising the Egyptian streets was minimal. The channel imprinted one idea in people’s minds: that everybody believed Egypt still lived in the shadow of a regime that defied time. Hijjawi explains that what kept the streets ablaze was the stubbornness of Egyptian youth, aided by the strong presence of an organised force on the street, the MB. The channel was very clear and immutable in its pro-rebellion stance, in contrast to other stations that visibly wavered.

The station sacrificed much of its diversity by devoting most of its broadcasting and a larger part of its newscasts to the headlines of the day. It lost a considerable portion of its viewers who migrated towards BBC
Arabic, France24, AJE, and so on, by failing to satisfy the viewers’ desire for more diverse and interesting regional and local information (Hijjawi: 2011). Hijjawi concludes (p.72) that a television station does not create a revolution, nor does it participate in it, despite what some researchers may think; at most, ‘it is like a panel on the highway telling the revolutionaries that “you are on the right path”’.

The Economist published an article in 2010 entitled ‘Al-Jazeera: More powerful than ever’, in which it notes that AJA was considerably more controversial than its English counterpart (AJE). Pro-Western Arab governments, particularly those of Egypt and Saudi Arabia (which denied AJA a local office), repeatedly accused it of bias: they said it favoured the MB, Egypt’s chief opposition, and Hamas, the Islamist movement that runs Gaza and refuses to recognise Israel. The article also states that the former AJA service’s head, Waddah Khanfar, and his news editor, Ahmed Sheikh, were both West Bank Palestinians reputedly enjoying close relations with Hamas. Many of the station’s Egyptian staff members were believed to be sympathetic towards the Brotherhood (of which Hamas is a branch of) which they refuted:

AJA’s bosses deny bias but explain that Palestine and especially the plight of Gaza are bound to top the agenda for Arabs. The sometimes emotional lexicon of struggle is, they say, inevitable. Shaheed, or martyr, is deemed a fair term for a suicide-bomber. The phenomenon of political Islam, they have argued, badly needs friendly illumination (The Economist, 2010).
Hugh Miles (2011) also comments on the impact of AJA during the revolution, and notes how the station kept the momentum of the Egyptian revolution on-going. He states that while AJA was reporting live, hundreds of thousands of people were calling for the end of the regime, the Egyptian national TV showed very few incidents, only the scenes of quiet Cairene streets; in addition, when AJA was producing live streaming of people queuing for bread and petrol, the Egyptian TV showed ‘happy shoppers’ with full fridges from footage filmed at an unknown time in the past. The enormous influence that AJA had on the Arab street through its revolutionary message against Arab dictatorships, made Arab ‘dictators’ feel considerably uncomfortable, if not alarmed: there were already hints of insurrections in Algeria, Jordan, Yemen, and Bahrain.

It is these ‘electrifying messages’ and nuances in AJA’s programmes, the main focus of this research, that are important in order to understand how they represented the conflicting political parties in Egypt. Mehdi Hasan (2011) questions the accusations that the channel was a platform for Islamist parties and they were over-represented on the channel’s output. Khanfar, according to Hasan, defends the stance of the channel and justifies this representation by saying: ‘there are too many Islamists on the screen, not because of an editorial decision or an editorial bias, but because Islamists right now are the most influential movement in the Arab society’.
The channel was blamed for stimulating Arab ‘radicalism’ and feeding anti-Western sentiments, but it still denied having any agenda other than presenting the views and opposing views of its guests. AJA was being perceived as the channel that advocated all the supposedly dangerous ‘isms’ that appeared in Arab world media such as ‘Islamism’, ‘terrorism’, ‘populism’, ‘anti-Semitism’, and so on (Lamloum: 2004: p. 12)

Kai Hafez (2004) argues that AJA is more critical of the United States than many other Arab media. Mamoun Fandy (cited in Hafez’s article) from Georgetown University in Washington, also notes that, as early as 2000 AJA represented a new kind of alliance between nationalists and Islamists – a view that, until today, is shared by some critical Arab journalists.

Mohammed El-Nawawy (2004) explains that the ‘emotionality’ and ‘anti-Americanism’ of AJA’s reporters was evident when covering the battle of Fallujah (Iraq) between American troops and Iraqi resistance fighters in 2004. Arab television was generally not able to report the variety of political views on the war in Iraq in 2003, and oppositional perspectives against Saddam Hussein were given little or no attention.

The criticism that the channel receives on its relations with Islamists is arguably not only driven by AJA’s editorial practices but also by the intimate relationship between Qatar and Islamists, which will be discussed in the following section.
3.4 Qatar: A Host for AJA and Islamic Parties

It is interesting to note that the host and the principle financer of AJA, Qatar, also hosts and deatably finances Islamic parties such as the MB, Hamas, and Taliban, which raises questions about Qatar’s intentions and the impact of these relations on AJA’s editorial practices. A channel that is owned by Qatar, a country that hosts Islamists perhaps puts both Qatar and AJA in a frail position – neither is able to deny this apparent long-standing relationship.

Zavi Mazel (2009) argues - in an article published in Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs - that there was ‘never any doubt’ about the network’s political orientation: starting from being pro-Palestinian since the second Intifada; broadcasting against the United States at the time of the Afghanistan conflict (Bin Laden’s video and audio tapes); pro-Saddam in Iraq; behaving as the Hezbollah ‘spokesman’ in the Second Lebanese War in 2006; reportage of the Gaza war, in which a senior AJA reporter stationed himself at Al-Shifa Hospital, from where he broadcast a stream of carefully selected horror pictures, and so on. Mazel quotes the Egyptian critical writer, Maamun Fendi, who wrote in Asharq Alawsat that some 50 per cent of the network’s personnel belonged to the MB.

Fandi claims that by embracing Islamists while hosting American military bases, Qatar has found the perfect ground for Islamists to attack Arab
leaders. He further argues that AJA had become a weapon in the hands of an ambitious Emir Hamad, who may have been driven by the Islamic parties, particularly the MB, and who was ‘threatening’ the stability of the Middle East. He also accused the AJA and Qatari relationship as a ‘dangerous phenomenon’:

[…] with the Muslim Brothers increasingly aligned in recent years with Iran, by repeatedly attacking the Sunni Arab regimes and inciting against them, Al-Jazeera is serving as an important instrument for Tehran and its effort to undermine their internal stability […] with the help of the powerful satellite network he created, the Emir of Qatar, a man who does not overly care for democracy and freedom of expression, is trying to assume the mantle of a great power, aided and abetted by the Muslim Brothers – one of the most extreme movements in the Muslim world. (Fandi, cited in Mazel: 2009).

Wadah Khanfar, a Palestinian and former director of the AJA, was born and raised in Jordan where, consistent with a MB background, he was educated as an engineer. The same report indicates that he was also a student activist, organising a student union in keeping with a Muslim Brotherhood setting. An article published by The Economist (2011): ‘Al-Jazeera why did he go?’ (Referring to the resignation of Khanfar) attracted critical opinion that although AJA did not sponsor rebellion, it did promote one particular aspect:

Colleagues who quit the channel complain that Mr Khanfar packed its staff with Islamists, many of them sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood. In coverage of Libya, for example, Al-
Jazeera has put Islamist factions, some of which happen to be backed by Qatar, in the spotlight at the expense of secular rivals. Perhaps the appointment of a member of the emirate’s ruling family as the channel’s new chief will curb such enthusiasm (The Economist: 2011)

The American Foreign Policy Council’s ‘World Almanac of Islamism’, gave an overview of Qatar and its relationship with Islam, and explains that Islamism is very much an ‘in-house’ phenomenon in Qatar (American Foreign Policy Council: 2014). It pointed out that a necessary precondition for the rise of an Islamist opposition is the decline in government legitimacy and efficacy. These governments use their control of the media to create a monopoly on reporting, making the reportage itself a tool in regional rivalries.

The review defines the nature of Wahhabi Qatar and notes that Qatar’s government and ruling family have traditionally been strongly linked to Wahhabi-Hanbali Islam. Not only is Wahhabi Islam the official state religion, but Islamic jurisprudence is the basis of Qatar’s legal system: civil courts have jurisdiction only over commercial law.

Among the political exiles who sought refuge in Qatar are prominent figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, many of whom fled persecution at the hands of Nasser’s Egyptian government during the 1950s. Some of these

14 Wahhabi doctrine is based on the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence and is characterized by acceptance only of original texts of the Quran, the hadith, and the sunna’ (Rabasa: 2004: 15)
exiles reportedly laid the foundations for the Qatari Education Ministry, and taught at various levels there until the early 1980s. (American Foreign Policy Council: 2014, p. 291)

The nature of Qatari media was clarified: since the 11th September attacks on New York and Washington, AJA underwent a process of increasing ‘Islamisation,’ with many of its more secular staff replaced by Islamists. The channel was alleged to have moved away from its rather ideologically diverse origins to a more populist — and more Islamist — approach. It was increasingly becoming a participant in the sectarian feud between Shi’a and Sunni, and Qatar itself was centrally placed in this battle: on the one hand, it hosted an American military base on its soil, where tanks and vehicles damaged in the fighting were serviced and sent back into battle to protect the Shi’ite-led government of Iraq, and on the other, Qatar’s Sunni majority saw (and still see) Shi’ite Iran as the main threat to the region (American Foreign Policy Council: 2014 p. 291).

The questions asked in this overview are aligned with this research’s main investigation: how much of AJA’s increasing Islamist slant is a matter of design and how much is evolution? Has the station been changing its approach in order to promote the interests of the Qatari ruling family, or is the shift a simple reflection of the growing popularity of Islamist causes in Arab society? Whatever the true cause (and they are not mutually exclusive), AJA is more than a mirror of public opinion and is increasingly
taking the initiative in influencing events, rather than merely reporting on them.

Oxford Analytica (2005) published an article: ‘The Advent of Terrorism In Qatar’ in which it also claims that Qatar has a long-standing tradition of hosting exiled Islamic ‘terrorists’ and radical preachers from Algeria, Chechnya, Egypt, Lebanon and the Occupied Territories. Elizabeth Weingarten (2010) explains in her article in The Atlantic, the reason behind Qatar’s strong ties with Islamic groups is to allow the free flow of funds through the country:

Beyond Qatar’s alleged funding of Al-Qaeda and its ties to Hamas and Iran, it has also tried to bolster its reputation by allowing money to flow freely through the country, no questions asked. Implementing more scrutiny would likely anger terrorist groups and put Qatar at greater risk (Weingarten: 2010).

Mohammed El-Oif (2011) states in his article in Le Monde: ‘What to do about Al-Jazeera?’ that the editorial position of the satellite TV network AJA, based in the Qatari capital of Doha, has allowed Qatari foreign policy to shape trans-national Arab sentiment. The channel drives its legitimacy from its media professionalism and its approach of blending ‘pan-Arabism’, ‘Islamic sensitivity’ and ‘liberalism’, has empowered AJA’s success and reach. The channel became an important media tool of the ‘revolution’ in January 2011 in Egypt, in spite of the closure of its office in Tahrir Square when the Mubarak regime shut down the Internet. It was AJA that
disrupted that communication strategy. El-Oif also speculates on the equivocality of the situation:

> How do supporting Arab revolutions serve the interests of the local dynastic regime? Or defending Hamas against Israel but also against Fatah? These are concessions made by leaders to the Arab journalists they employ, and to public opinion. They are the price Qatar has to pay for sending warplanes to Libya or hosting Israeli leaders in Doha (El-Oif: 2011).

Steven Stalinsky (2007) identifies the fact that Arab reformists who had witnessed first-hand incitement by AJA often discussed its connection with the MB (Ikhwan) movement. This organisation is one of the world’s leading Islamist groups, based in Egypt and founded in 1928 by Hasan Al-Banna (see Chapter 4). Today, its ideology influences groups ranging from Hamas to Al-Qaeda. He writes: ‘Many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood use Al-Jazeera for their own platform’ (Stalinsky: 2007).

Judea Pearl (cited in Oren Kessler: 2012) claims, as many other critics do, that the channel had ‘unconditional’ support for Hamas’s ‘terror’ in Gaza, the Hezbollah takeover in Lebanon, and the Syrian and Iranian regimes, and that it is an illusion that democracy and human rights are on AJA’s agenda. Pearl continues by putting the channel’s strategy more plainly: ‘I have no doubt that today Al-Jazeera is the most powerful voice of the Muslim Brotherhood’ (p. 52).
Pearl’s arguments are based on his personal opinion rather than analysis; although his point of view is generally echoed by commentators, little has been done on the subject at academic level. This research attempts to examine whether or not AJA is the most powerful voice for the MB in Egypt, or whether it is only a platform for diverse ideologies, including secular movements.

AJA became more widely known in the West, principally when it made headlines in Western media following its broadcasting of Bin Laden’s tapes. Some Western commentators, as previously discussed, accused the channel of serving Bin Laden’s propaganda while claiming a direct link between Al-Qaeda and AJA (Figenschou: 2013). These claims were later made solid by the arrest of a few AJA reporters such as Tayseer Allouni (under house arrest) on the grounds that they collaborated with Al-Qaeda by serving them financially, especially after he secured an exclusive interview with Bin Laden, only a month after the 9/11 attacks in America (Beckman: 2013; Zayani: 2005).

Dima Dabbous-Sensenig (2006) focuses on one particular programme, which, by definition, is a religious programme, but she observes that the channel’s general abandonment of its diversity was illustrated by not presenting both views from different religious backgrounds. Dima presents an interesting argument, however, on which this research could further build a case by investigating the current news programmes such as
Opposite Direction and Without Borders, and examining the language and what stands beyond it in AJA’s framing of the MB, before and after the fall of Mubarak (see Chapters 7 and 8).

The nature of the language used by AJA, according to Haim Malka (2003), is ‘biased’. He notes the different Islamic views and analyses one particular incident:

[…] three main arguments have emerged: the first, endorsing the attacks of September 11 and against Israeli targets, the second, rejecting attacks like September 11, but supporting attacks against Israeli targets, and the third, rejecting all suicide attacks, wherever they take place. This academic piece shows how Qaradawi has gained popularity and legitimacy throughout the Arab world by questioning the authority of the state, and he reaches a broad audience through his regular appearances on the Arabic satellite channel, Al-Jazeera (Malka: 2003, p. 8).

Malka further asserts that Qaradawi has emerged as one of the pre-eminent Islamic religious figures in the Arab world, and arguably represents the mainstream of Arab Muslim society. Oren Kessler (2012) highlights the channel’s backing of the Islamic movement, Hamas, in its rivalry against the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority (PA), ‘It’s unmistakable — Al-Jazeera is not just pro-Palestinian, but pro-Hamas’ (p. 53).

Previous analysis research was made on the fragmentation of U.S. cable news media, specifically comparing CNN and The Fox News Network, showed that Fox consistently resonated more and was thought to have
less bias with a more conservative audience and CNN was more likely to resonate with people who viewed the press, as a whole, as a less biased entity (Morris, 2005; 2007).

The rising power of political Islam ideology was not only limited to the Arab media but also to the Western ones. Kelsey Glover (2011) explains how the U.S. media (CNN and Fox News) framed the MB during the Egyptian revolution in 2011. Her research specifically focuses on the characterisation of, and information reported about Egypt’s leading political opposition group, the MB, both during the revolution and directly following Mubarak’s resignation. Glover’s study examines the portrayal of the MB by CNN and Fox News through a content analysis of television broadcast transcripts. She notes that the change in the Egyptian leadership put the ‘revolution’ in the headlines of virtually all major news media outlets in the U.S., due to the rise of MB and its playing a potential leadership role in Egypt. Glover finds the results were most often associated with radical Islam or a threat to democratic ideals, after examining the context in which the MB was discussed through both cable network transcripts:

The significance of portraying MB in such a manner will almost certainly affect American public opinion of the MB when taking into account America’s sensitivity concerning Terrorism. Furthermore, on numerous occasions, the MB was evaluated as a threat instead of as a positive part of a pluralistic system in Egypt (Glover: 2011: p. 130).
The fact that Glover’s analysis is primarily focused on the U.S. media network in relation to the MB supports this research on how media framing of the MB can directly or indirectly shape public perception and opinion about it.

The decline of secular political parties in the Arab world has strengthened Islamic opposition, which exerts a powerful influence on social norms throughout the Arab world (Touzani: 2009). It is at this juncture between media and religion - which is the main emphasis of this research project - that the focus on AJA and its relationship with MB is relevant; although a significant topic, it has been under-represented in Arab and Western scholarship, with the exception of a few studies focusing on AJA’s promotion of the Islamic veil. Sam Cherribi (2006) for example, argues AJA is equivalent to the Christian Broadcasting Network (CBN) and not to Cable News Network (CNN). He based his study on an analysis of AJA’s coverage of the story of the veil in France between 2002 and 2005, showing that the channel had devoted significant time to the views of Islamic leaders, and argued that the channel’s religious message was mono-denominational.

Khaled Hroub (2011), in his article ‘Qatar: the source of Arab Spring’ on the ABC website, describes the channel as having pushed the boundaries of information by providing live coverage of major developments in the Arab world and elsewhere:
It is a platform for political and religious opposition groups in the Arab countries…. Al-Jazeera is not a tool of the CIA, Israel or Al-Qaeda. Rather, it is the sophisticated mouthpiece of the state of Qatar and its ambitious Emir, Hamad Al-Thani. Simply put, the Al-Jazeera success story would not have been possible without Qatar’s backing. For Al-Thani, Al-Jazeera is integral to the national “branding” of Qatar and its foreign-policy aspirations (Hroub: 2011).

Hroub’s argument regarding the channel is seen as integral to the national branding of Qatar and its foreign policy aspirations. To what extent have Qatar’s relations with Islamic groups affected the channel’s attitude towards Islamic parties, considering that it is host to both AJA as well as exiled MB members such Al-Qaradawi? Hroub particularly notes that Qatar created strong links with both Israel and many Islamist movements, including Hamas and Hezbollah. This paradox of Qatar’s association with Islamic parties as well as with the West and Israel requires investigation.

Ahmad Azem (2012) authored an article published in Middle East Online: ‘Qatar’s Ties with the Muslim Brotherhood Affect Entire Region’ in which he argues that the association between the MB and Qatar was becoming noticeable in the restructuring of the Arab world. He based his assertion on three reasons:

First, the relationship ensures that Islamists will not criticise Qatari government policies or be active there. Second, as Islamists head towards power in several countries, Qataris are in a position to expect special economic and political treatment
in each. Third, Qatar will be well-positioned to mediate between Islamists and their rivals and also between Islamists in general and the West (Azem: 2012).

Looking at the intimate ties between Qatar and MB benefits this research, as it could be argued that such relations could be directly or indirectly represented as a basis for AJA having a solid bond with MB, translated throughout its programmes, including ‘Shari’a and Life’ (Al-Qaradawi is the main speaker), and its agenda in promoting MB by providing them with the space and time to project their viewpoints.

3.5 Summary

The channel’s relationship with Islamic political Islam in general was noted by observers in terms of AJA’s religious programmes, the channel’s regular guests such as Al-Qaradawi, the history of its staff such as the former director of the channel, Wadah Khanfar, and Ahmed Mansour, who were known to be active members of the MB, and the language used by AJA in its news and current affairs programmes that reflected the channel’s policies and agenda.

The close ties between Qatar, AJA’s host country, and the MB can open academic interpretation on the effect of this association on AJA’s editorial practices, seen by observers as a public relations tool for the tiny country of Qatar. This research, nonetheless, raises the question: is it a
coincidence that Qatar hosts Hamas and the Taliban offices, and granted the newly-elected president at the time, Mohamed Morsi, billions of U.S. dollars? Does this warm welcome extended to these Islamic groups, directly or indirectly influence the channel’s coverage of Islamic political parties such as the MB? These questions are once again, open to academic debate.

AJA’s coverage of the popular uprisings in the Arab world in general, and Egypt in particular, also gives a clear idea of the channel’s position in endorsing ‘the opposition’ against dictatorships. The channel’s language and ‘electrifying messages’ were clear and therefore, it could be seen that the channel positioned itself to backing one side of the story rather than the other. The station was a clear platform for an opposing voice of the Mubarak regime, yet unaccommodating for the views of Mubarak’s supporters.

The next chapter presents an overview of the history of the MB which is said to be one of the oldest Islamic movements in the Arab world. It is essential to this research to understand what the MB symbolises, who its members are and their motivation, and what they have undergone since the movement’s inception and during certain historical periods, particularly before and after the Mubarak regime’s tenure.
Chapter Four

THE MB: KEY OPPOSITION POWER IN EGYPT

4.1 Introduction

The existing debates around AJA’s coverage of the Islamic political parties were examined in the previous chapter. This chapter primarily looks at the MB movement during different political stages in Egypt.

To better understand the central question of this research regarding AJA and the MB in Egypt, this chapter projects an overview of the history of the movement. This overview is not an in-depth study of the MB *per se*, which is beyond the scope of this paper, but a glimpse at the stages that the MB encountered, before and after the fall of Mubarak’s regime. A discussion of the significance of the movement’s history will follow, and the place that the MB occupies in the wider Egyptian political scene will also be discussed.

It is widely acknowledged that the MB movement is the world’s oldest, largest, most influential Islamist organisation - and yet the most controversial - that has been condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East (Leiken and Brooke: 2007; Harvey: 2012; Brennan: 2013; Tadros: 2012; Castle: 2013). The map below shows the MB’s diffusion in the Middle East and North Africa.
Topics relating to political Islam as a perception, generally speaking, and to Islamic parties, specifically to the MB, have been discussed in existing literature. The dominant view among researchers is that Islamic movements have, for a long time, been seen in the Arab world as well-organised and the most influential opposition entities. Some scholars claim that, in many instances, any political activity that does not involve mainstream Islamists will eventually collapse, and its credibility or effectiveness will be challenged (Brumberg: 2009).

Sergio Bianchi (2012) also discusses the MB in his article: ‘The Brothers’ spring: the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood: towards a new populist Islam?’ He suggests that the movement is the most important phenomenon in the modern world of Islam, above all, in the Arab region. It

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15 This researcher pin-points the countries in which the MB exists. The Middle East Northern Africa map available at: https://arabspringanditscontexts.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/arabspring-map-black-and-white.jpg [retrieved 27/02/2015]
is a phenomenon that has grown exponentially in the last few decades, according to Bianchi’s argument, resulting in preparation to meet its full potential by taking advantage of the spaces that have been created, in light of the Arab Spring. He further asserts that the MB is the best equipped force, ideologically and organisationally, to manage the post-Mubarak transition. The movement has been able to connect with satellite television, exploit the numerous opportunities of the moment, and possesses the necessary global dimension to ‘talk’ both to the West and to the most conservative elements of Islamic society in order to express its vision and mission.

The movement is perhaps one of the most prominent, and in most places such as Egypt, non-violent, with a less radical vision of the world, and certainly one of the longest-lasting Islamist groups (Provencher: 2011; Fuller & Kupershoek: 2004). Provencher cites Feiler (2011), who explains how the movement is well rooted and has strong connections with the people by providing them not only with different political perspectives based on moderate Islam, but also offering them social, cultural and educational amenities:

The organisation built its popularity by deftly deploying social services, such as constructing hospitals, pharmacies, and schools, along with forming strategic alliances. In 1954, however, soon after the movement’s establishment, the MB was never able to fully implement its policies into actions due to the government of Gamal Abd al-Nasser’s fear of the movement’s growing influence. [He] banned the organisation for
The MB, an established organisation, over 80 years old, has a long history of being the victim, having been continually repressed, first under the Egyptian monarchy (MB’s founder, Hassan Al-Banna, was murdered in 1948 by King Farouk’s police), followed by even greater persecution under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Anwar Al-Sadat, Hosni Mubarak, and then Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, the current president of Egypt. It has been noted by some academics that the MB has always been seen by the West as radical, anti-Western and overtly hostile to Israel (Wistrich: 2012). Bianchi (2012) argues that the MB as a movement is an ideal political party, well-prepared to take over the transitional period in Egypt, following the fall of Mubarak’s regime. The MB had invested heavily in political, social and economic factors for decades, which helped it to gain widely-based popularity in Egypt and elsewhere.

The MB’s relationship with the media is scarcely represented in existing literature, but this research argues that the movement received significant external support for its voice, namely, from AJA. The channel arguably provided the platform to promote – directly or indirectly - the movement’s ideologies and plans for a transitional period, depicting them as a viable alternative to authoritarian regimes, able to bring to the people a developed political system and social justice; although it is premature to conclude whether or not the nature of the relationship between AJA and
the MB is robust, this research presents the hypothesis that AJA may have had a role in endorsing the MB’s movement on Egypt’s political scene, both as a predominant opposition Islamic political party and as a movement perhaps seen as representing an Islamic identity.

The MB realised the power of media and frequently capitalised on every chance to denounce and criticise the U.S. and Israel, a source of embarrassment for the Mubarak regime who fundamentally believed in establishing a solid relationship with the U.S. (Palmer M. & Palmer P.: 2008).

The overthrow of the Mubarak regime in 2011 and the rise of MB in the Egyptian political leadership campaign encouraged some writers to claim that the movement tried to take control of the Egyptian state media, which hitherto had been a mouthpiece for the regime and a tool used against opposition. Muhammad Shukri (2012) notes in his article: ‘Egypt’s Brotherhood accused of trying to control media’, that ever since Mubarak stepped down, the MB had consistently accused state media outlets of adopting a hostile line towards it; consequently, the editors-in-chief of state-owned papers (Al-Ahram) were directly appointed by the chairman (who was also head of the Supreme Council of the Press under Mubarak) of the Upper House of Parliament, the Shura Council; for many, loyalty to the regime was an essential, if unstated, requirement for applicants:
The current Shura Council, controlled by Islamists from the FJP [Freedom and Justice Party] and the ultra-conservative Salafist Nour party, decided to change the way editors-in-chief were appointed. New criteria for applicants were introduced, and a selection committee, chaired by someone affiliated to the MB, was established. Many complained that the Islamist-dominated committee would only offer posts to loyalists (Shukri: 2012, BBC Monitoring).

Sergio Bianchi (2012) asserts that the MB achieved several accomplishments by winning the elections in various Arab countries including Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco. This indicates that the movement was the most organised opposition to Arab regimes. Other writers such as Azarava and Tadros (2007) question the movement’s intentions and plans in dealing with minority civil rights, and note that the MB tried to limit public liberties by banning alcohol, Western novels, and individual artists from performing in Egypt. The development of the MB securing majority seats in the parliamentary election of 2012 – following the fall of Mubarak - alarmed secularists, who were wary of the Islamists’ latent conservatism and authoritarianism (Dalacoura: 2012).

The MB victory and that of its presidential candidate, Mohammed Morsi, represented a significant mark in the history of the MB. This victory, as shall be seen later, soon came to an end by the fall of Mohammed Morsi in

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16 The Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) was established by the Muslim Brotherhood and supplied its leaders. Details available at: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15899548](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15899548) [retrieved 2/03/2015]
a military coup, backed by the masses in July 2012, which arguably puts the MB back into the victimisation bracket.

What is the MB? How has it survived since inception? How did the movement and its members evolve from being one of opposition working 'underground' to one that attained a leading position during a sensitive transitional period following the fall of Mubarak - and then fall again following a military coup that took place shortly after being in power for only a year?

To present an overview of the answers to such questions, this research looks back at the history of the MB in Egypt, before and after the era of the former Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak.

4.2 Brief History of the MB

Steve Coll (*New Yorker*: 2012) introduces the vision of the MB through its founder:

Hassan Al-Banna, an Egyptian schoolteacher, founded the MB in 1928. His goal was to restore economic and political power to the Islamic world by creating governments grounded in conservative Islamic principles. Although it started in Egypt, the Brotherhood established branches worldwide—there are Brotherhood-influenced movements and political parties in most of the world’s Muslim majority nations, from Asia to the oil-rich Gulf States to North Africa.
Egypt is the country where Islam has had an organised political movement since 1928, according to Sami Zubadia (2000). This is not to say, however, that it was not preceded by a ferment of ideas and debates, including the notable reforms of the late nineteenth century, but the MB was the first movement to organise and mobilise followers at a popular level, and rapidly developed programmes and strategies.

Kinza Khan (2011, p.1) touched on the first milestone of the MB. She pointed out that during the 1920s, ‘it was the age of ideology, in which the urban space started growing and new classes and elites were created in Egyptian society’. This movement, as Khan observes, was different from the preceding Islamic movements because it was all inclusive, bound together by feelings of close association and therefore appealed to a wider audience: it interacted with the local events in Egypt, as well as being the largest religious movement in the modern Middle East. It had, furthermore, an overwhelming impact on many other political Islamist groups in other Arab countries. The movement represents the most organised and well-funded opposition in the country. It offers both its charitable services and da'wa (literally ‘call to God’ or preaching), which has operated outside state control (Azarava & Tadros: 2007, p. 48).

The founder of the MB, Sheikh Hassan Al-Banna, who was from the city of Ismailiyya (situated on the west bank of the Suez Canal), from where he
recruited members by going door-to-door, and building a movement held together by ‘meticulous organisation and strict master-discipline relations’ (Hanna & Capstone: 2010).

The MB movement materialised from Egyptian society’s growing contempt towards the ruling monarchy, its manipulation by the British, and the general secular nature of the political system:

By the 1930s the organisation had quickly grown throughout Egypt and began to spread across the Middle East and began to face extreme persecution by the monarchy (Glover: 2011: p. 126).

Tensions rose in the 1940s between the MB and the Egyptian regime, as did the violence carried out by the MB’s militant wing known as the ‘Secret Apparatus’ that assassinated Egyptian Prime Minister Nuqrashi in 1948 (Glover: 2011). Glover’s narrative is that the secret government police assassinated its founder, Hassan Al-Banna in 1949 in retaliation, and forced the movement to operate in secret. The political landscape of Egypt changed drastically in 1952 with the coup d’état led by the Free Officers, ultimately abolishing the monarchy and installing Gamal Abdel Nasser as President.

The MB suffered its most severe repression under Nasser’s regime. It allowed no political dissent and arrested, imprisoned and tortured thousands of members held in concentration camps. One of the MB
members, Sayyid Qutb, took to writing about his disillusionment with the secular Nasser government during his imprisonment. He suffered abhorrent treatment and poor health, and became one of the most influential Islamist ideologues in history. Sayyid Qutb’s books, most famously *Milestones*, have become part of the basic ideology of almost every Islamist movement today - from the MB to *Al-Qaeda* - depending on its interpretation. Sayyid Qutb, a leading theoretician of the MB, executed by the Egyptian government in 1966, strongly objected to any notion of popular authority. Wistrich (2012) wrote about the MB’s vision:

The Brothers learned from this harsh school the need for caution, yet they have never deviated from Hassan Al-Banna’s central axiom: *Allah* is our objective, the Prophet is our leader, the *Qur’an* is our law, *Jihad* is our way, dying in the way of *Allah* is our highest hope. Their radical vision remains focused on the comprehensive attainment of a fully Islamic society and way of life (p. 24).

The MB had been different from earlier reformers since its establishment in Egypt in 1928: it combined a profoundly Islamic ideology with modern, grass-roots and political activism. The MB pursued an Islamic society through *Tarbiyyah* (preaching and educating), concentrating on first changing the outlook of individuals, then families, and finally societies; although the Brotherhood’s origins were lower-middle class, it soon pushed Islamisation into the local bourgeoisie and then into the palace (Leiken & Brookes: 2007).
Sana Abed-Kotob (1995, p. 322-334)’s article, ‘The Accommodationists Speak: Goals and Strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt’, gives an explanation of the objectives and strategies expressed within the movement. She discusses two scholarly discourses on the MB: ‘confrontationists’ and ‘accommodationists’. Confrontationists attribute an anti-democratic, hostile philosophy that encourages violence and terrorism and poses a risk to the movement in both regional stability and Western interests. Accommodationists, on the other hand, argue that hostility and violence are not inherent in all the factions of the Islamist movement, and that prudence requires the West to display a willingness to cooperate with what might prove to be an inevitable rising power in the Middle East.

Accommodationism, according to Abed-Kotob, is in the interest of regional stability that people identify and come to terms with those groups willing to work within the contours of the modern nation-state, in order that they may prevent the violent seizure of power by the more militant factions. She asserts that the MB describes its organisation as more than a political party or a charitable, reformist society; rather, it is a spiritual, worldwide organisation that is: (i) a *da’wa* (call) to the Qur’an and the *Sunna* (tradition and example) of the Prophet Muhammad; (ii) a method that adheres to the *Sunna*; (iii) a reality whose core is the purity of the soul; (iv) a political association; (v) an athletic association; (vi) an educational and cultural organisation; (vii) an economic enterprise; and (viii) a social concept. She writes:
The central objective of the contemporary Brotherhood continues to be the establishment of an Islamic state that is governed by human, man-made laws by the *shari’a* (Islamic law). Whereas the former system of legislation implies the sovereignty of man over man, this being interpreted as man’s servitude to man, the latter testifies to the sovereignty of God alone. Divine sovereignty is equated with man’s liberation and therefore must be enforced if the state is to be other than nominally Islamic. It is critical to most Muslims that sovereignty cannot be assumed by man [...] (Abed-Kotob: 1995: p. 322)

The movement was ultimately able to survive Nasser’s persecution. It emerged onto the political scene after his death and the transfer of the presidency to Anwar Al-Sadat in 1970. Sadat quickly began to reverse many of his predecessor’s policies and initiated a liberalisation of the political structure, which permitted the MB to reconstruct itself after the devastation caused by Nasser’s draconian treatment. Al-Sadat, in fact, allowed the MB a measure of vocal opposition as long it stayed within specific boundaries, and for most of his rule, the movement experienced a reasonably tolerable political landscape. It was also during this time that the MB officially renounced violence as a method of bringing about change. Once Al-Sadat initiated and secured peace with Israel through the Camp David Peace accords in 1978, however, the MB’s criticisms of his regime and of the President himself became vociferous. Al-Sadat reacted with cruelty and carried out his own mass arrests against its members. The MB was not the only Islamic group unhappy with Sadat’s relationship with Israel and America, and, in October 1981, a radical Islamic extremist group
assassinated Al-Sadat while he was reviewing a military parade (Perry: 2004; Soage and Franganillo: 2010).

Steven Cook (2012) argues that the group may have ceased to be an organised presence after its brutal defeats by Nasser in 1954 and 1965. Hosni Mubarak, the little-known vice-president at the time, came to power following Al-Sadat’s assassination in 1981.

4.3 The MB and the Mubarak Regime

Power was handed to Al-Sadat’s vice-president, Hosni Mubarak, who soon declared a state of emergency in the country, and therefore granted himself absolute authority to deal with what he considered as domestic threats, which lasted for more than twenty-five years. Although Mubarak allowed a fair amount of political liberalisation and pluralism within the Egyptian political environment, the MB had participated in parliamentary elections since 1984 and yet their limited representation was not sufficient to undermine the absolute control of the government party over the legislative body (Glover: 2011). The MB more recently made significant gains in the parliamentary elections of 2000 and 2005 in which it won 88 out of 444 seats (Glover: 2011).

President Hosni Mubarak (at that time) was able to more sharply distinguish between political dissent and direct challenges to the authority
of the state in Egypt than his predecessor, Anwar Al-Sadat. Islamic groups such as the MB were arguably allowed more space to participate in political and economic life and to express their criticism of government policies under Mubarak. They published newspapers, appeared in the media, opened schools, and ran financial institutions. Their influence was felt both in the universities and in professional organisations such as those of doctors, lawyers, and engineers (Esposito and Piscatori: 1991; Shehata: 2010).

Recognising the strength of such Muslim sentiment, the Mubarak government itself arguably attempted to enhance its Islamic credentials by publishing its own Islamic newspaper, Liwa’ Al-Islam (The Islamic Banner), whose circulation of 750,000 copies soon rivalled that of Al-Ahram and Al-Urwah Al-Wuthqah (Arabic: The Firm Tie).

Mubarak allowed the MB movement to play a significant role in the early 1980s, in order to be able to confront violent groups like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya which threatened his rule. He used intimidation and force on the MB throughout the 1990s, when many of the group’s prominent leaders were court-martialled for the first time since Nasser’s era (Al-Anani: 2012). Mubarak’s main battle during the three decades he ruled Egypt was against Islamic movements and trends, according to Anani. Mubarak benefited from the mistakes made by his predecessors Nasser and Al-Sadat in dealing with these movements. He
did not try to destroy them, particularly the MB. Mubarak did not give them the freedom to fully practice their activities as did Al-Sadat, who paid for it with his life:

Mubarak sought to manipulate the Islamic movements in a way that would guarantee that they did not become too powerful or expand too far into the community. He did not try to uproot them in a way that would have led to violent reaction that would have threatened the stability of his regime. He did not give the Islamists any opportunities for legitimate representation in political life [...] The MB, therefore, committed itself to the rules of the game as set by the regime [...] whenever they tried to increase their political influence, they were met by repression from security forces, political exclusion, and social harassment [...] (Al-Anani: 2012: p. 10-11)

Some argued that despite the fact that the Mubarak regime tightened the grip on Islamists, particularly the MB, when tens of thousands of members were arrested and subjugated to further oppression, the MB still managed to capture twenty per cent of the seats in parliament in the 2005 election (Provencher: 2011), which is unprecedented in the history of the MB.

Kirpatrick and Goodman (2011) state:

Banned since 1954, the Brotherhood has for more than a decade operated as a de facto political party, running independent candidates who all used the same slogans and the same platform and all caucused together. In the 2005 elections, the Brotherhood won 88 seats in Parliament, or about 20 per cent of the total, but the Mubarak government pushed the group out of the country’s most recent vote last fall, in elections
that were widely seen as fraudulent (*The New York Times*: 2011).

The Mubarak regime seized millions of dollars in assets and arrested some of the group’s top financiers in late 2006. Mass arrests of the MB activists had become routine, with more than 800 being detained in the lead-up to the 2008 municipal elections. The ruling National Democratic Party, furthermore, pushed through a constitutional amendment banning religiously-oriented parties (Hamid and Kadlec: 2010).

Kelsey Glover (2011) quoted several scholars who assert that during Mubarak’s era as president over the last 30 years, he had systematically depicted himself and his regime as the only roadblock between the Islamists, namely the MB, and the establishment of an Islamic state (Al-Awadi: 2009, Stilt: 2010).

The Muslim Brotherhood not only transformed into a terrorist organisation but also eventually spawned some of the most violent terrorist organisations throughout the world. The Muslim Brotherhood became the prototype for the Muslim fundamentalist terrorist organisations and some of its members later created organisations such as Hamas and *Al-Qaeda*. (Stilt: 2009, p. 953)

Stephan Rosiny (2012: p7) states in a wider context that the MB and moderate Islamist groups had already enjoyed significant successes in (relatively) free elections, including those in Jordan 1989, Algeria 1991, Egypt 2005, and Palestinian Territories 2006. The three main reasons
behind such successes, according to Rosiny, are: i) the movement’s network of religious, social and political institutions; ii) organisational structures; and iii) experience at their disposal that the new oppositional forces still did not have.

It is worth mentioning the conclusion drawn by Kinza Khan (2011), before moving the discussion to the revolution and post Mubarak era. She notes that the MB of Egypt had changed its position on democratic participation throughout the course of its development: from its establishment until the present time. Khan (2011) asserts that the largest change that took place occurred in the early 1980s, when the organisation publically announced its goal to become a political party, and later when it obtained seats in parliament. The reasons for this change include societal and international pressure, the group’s increased passion under political suppression, and its realisation that the best way to achieve its goals would be to join the political system itself.

The role played by the Islamic movement in the early stages of the Egyptian ‘revolution’ was that they participated in the uprising, particularly the MB, albeit in a non-institutional and undeclared way. The MB movement engaged in the revolt within a few days of its beginning, specifically starting with the ‘Friday of Rage’ on 28 January 2011. The Brotherhood’s position had been unclear before 25 January 2011, when its youth wing still had a strong individual presence from the first day, a
phenomenon that led the Brotherhood to make a public decision and actively participate in the revolution over the ensuing weeks (Al-Anani: 2012).

Over the revolution’s first three weeks, the Brotherhood maintained a strong presence in Tahrir Square, and a Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Beltagy, was one of the most influential figures in the field, not to mention the official Brotherhood representation within the revolution’s Youth Coalition through the participation of Islam Lotfy, Mohamed al-Kassas, and Mohammed Abbas, despite the differences that emerged later between the Brotherhood leadership and the Brotherhood’s youth wing (Al-Anani: 2012: p. 8).

Approval was given on 6 June 2011 for the establishment of the Freedom and Justice Party that emanated from the MB, according to Anani: a vehicle consciously modelled after the Turkish Justice and Development Party. Ewan Stein (2012) argues that although there were some questions raised concerning the establishment of the party and its programme and future relationship with the Brotherhood, it represented a significant step towards legitimately integrating the group into the political process. The MB was by far the most organised force in Egypt after Mubarak’s ruling party. It had been in operation for decades as an officially-banned but nonetheless tolerated movement which had (and has) taken care of social welfare services in many parts of the country where the regime had failed to meet the needs of the people (Hellyer: 2011).

The Israeli writer, Amichai Magen (2012) states in alignment with Hellyer’s view, that after only eighteen days of mass protests, Hosni Mubarak
handed over power to the military on 11 February 2011 — ending what Magen calls 'the pharaoh’s thirty-year reign as president'. Crowds poured into Tahrir Square (located in central Cairo) to celebrate and to demand a swift transition to civilian rule. The following day, the Egyptian army suspended the country’s constitution and said it would rule by martial law until general elections were held in 2012. Elections were currently being held for the Lower House of the Egyptian parliament, with the MB widely expected to emerge as the largest political party in the country:

[...] it is only the organised Islamists who are truly positioned to exploit opportunities for acquisition of power. The Muslim Brotherhood, in particular, has an unparalleled organisational network and no compunction in using its mosques, schools, and charities in the service of its electoral ambitions (Magen: 2012: p. 14).

The relationship between the military and the MB was set to be a crucial element in the path which Egypt took, and was subject to much debate and speculation. The military had been accused of making under-the-table deals that allowed the Islamists to participate unhindered in the political system in return for protecting the military's interests (Zahid: 2012). Mohammed Zahid (2012) also notes that post-Mubarak Egypt was marred by uncertainties and the path forward was littered with obstacles, but the MB was positioning itself to dominate the political scene for years to come. The complex relationship between the diverse political actors that have emerged in this latest environment, all competing for a share in a new Egypt, continues to unfold and shape an unpredictable transition process.
The table below (figure 4) lists the key developments in the history of the MB since its establishment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Development</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>Abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish National Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>The Muslim Brotherhood is founded in Egypt by Hassan Al-Banna.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>The Egyptian government proclaims the dissolution of the Brotherhood. The Egyptian Prime Minister Mahmud Fahmi Nokrashi is murdered by Muslim Brotherhood member, Abdel Meguid Ahmed Hassan. According to the Brotherhood there are half a million members in Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Al-Banna assassinated by gunmen in Cairo.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>Martial law is removed and announcements on the Brotherhood fade. MB re-legalised, but only as a religious organisation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>Hassan Al-Hudaybi, considered a moderate, elected as leader of the Brotherhood. Sayyid Qutb enters the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt on his return from United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>Members of the Brotherhood take part in anti-British riots in Cairo. A military coup, with the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, puts an end to British colonial rule over Egypt.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>(October) failed assassination attempt on President Gamal Abdul Al-Nasser by Brotherhood member, Abdul Munim Abdul Rauf, motivated by the Anglo-Egyptian agreement relating to Suez. Persecution and imprisonment of members of the Brotherhood (4,000 arrested) including Qutb, sentenced to 15 years hard labour. Organisation goes underground and many members flee to Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>Egyptian President Nasser proclaimed general amnesty - including many MB members. Association made legal again and several prisoners released.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>1,000 Brothers arrested, 365 sentenced, and Sayyid Qutb hanged by Egyptian Government as well as other top-level Brotherhood leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>President Nasser releases 1,000 members of the MB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>(September) Death of Egyptian President Nasser. Anwar Al-Sadat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>General amnesty in Egypt frees all MB remaining prisoners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>MB was not allowed to participate in elections as political party, only as individual candidates - obtaining 15 seats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>The MB vigorously opposes the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>1975  General amnesty in Egypt frees all MB remaining prisoners.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>1979  The MB vigorously opposes the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>1981  (September) More than 2,000 dissidents, mostly members of FM, arrested in Egypt (October) Egyptian President Al-Sadat killed by four members of radical movement Jama'at Al-Jihad, founded by Faraj, former member of the MB disappointed with its moderation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1987  MB obtains 37 seats in coalition with Liberal-Socialist Party and Labour Islamic Alliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>1992  Salsabil affair. Discovery of a plan to seize power in Egypt by MB through infiltration of state institutions and security apparatus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000  MB members 17 seats in the political elections.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>2005  General elections in Egypt - members of the Muslim Brotherhood win 88 seats, becoming the biggest political opposition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>2007  Constitutional amendment prohibits establishment of political parties of a religious nature, arrest of Khairat Al-Shater, Deputy General Guide of the MB.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2011  After the fall of Mubarak, MB in Egypt register (April 30) new Party of Freedom and Justice to participate in the elections of 2011 and following parliamentary elections.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 4:** Chronology of the MB (Bianchi: 2012: p. 54)
4.4 The MB: Short-Term Leadership of Egypt

The remarkable MB victory in a narrow election following the fall of Mubarak in 2011, allowed the MB to form the first civil government in Egypt. Led by the successful presidential candidate, Mohammed Morsi; not only, was the group the country’s first Islamists, Morsi was also its first civilian president (Sharp: 2012; Magstadt: 2014; Agbese & Kieh: 2013). Morsi’s rule, however, only lasted for one year before he was ousted by General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in a military coup in July 2013: an action that was a manifestation of the unstable Egyptian mood (Al-Awadi: 2014). What occurred that led to the ousting of the short-term President Morsi?

President Morsi promised to be a president ‘for all Egyptians’ on his appointment, and addressed the Egyptian people saying: ‘You are the source of all authority and legitimacy’. He also pledged that he would not give up the ‘people’s revolution’ until its objectives were met (Alianak: 2014, p. 86). The Egyptian people, however, began to feel that Morsi was exceeding his powers as president by appointing MB members to his government, and accused him of permitting Islamists to monopolise the political scene.

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17 According to a running tally on the Al-Ahram website, Morsi leads Shafiq (Morsi’s opponent) by 900,000 votes (cited in Sharp: 2012: 1), available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/ui/front/townvotes.aspx [retrieved 1/03/2015]
The BBC website ‘Profile: Egypt’s Mohammed Morsi’ explains that ‘Public opposition to Mr Morsi’ began growing in November 2012 when, wishing to ensure that the Islamist-dominated constituent assembly could finish drafting a new constitution, the president issued a decree granting himself far-reaching powers (The Guardian: 2012).

Some critics argue that Morsi’s declaration was ‘effectively putting himself above the law’ and granted him additional unlimited dictatorial powers (Isakhan: 2014: p. 157; Cambanis: 2015). Morsi’s decree – which cast doubts on Morsi’s democratic commitment - was the beginning of the end for Morsi’s presidency; while Morsi and his supporters viewed that decree as protecting the people’s revolution from anti-revolutionists, it created a furious reaction from non-Islamists who called for massive protests against Morsi and the MB (Al-Anani: 2015):

While Morsi justified his decree as “an attempt to fulfil the popular demands for justice and protect the transition to constitutional democracy”, the opposition, which hastily formed under a loose umbrella called the National Salvation Front (NSF), tread it as an attempt from Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood to consolidate their grip on power. Not surprisingly, a few days after Morsi issued his decree, violence and deadly clashes broken out in front of his presidential palace among his supporters and opponents (p. 232).

The writing up of Egypt’s new constitution was another dilemma that Morsi’s presidency faced. It was approved by the constituent assembly, despite a boycott by liberals, secularists and the Coptic Churchprotesting
against the lack of inclusion of leftist groups and women, and also following accusations that the MB was trying to dominate the constitution by padding it with its allies (Cesari: 2014; Sallam: 2014).

The political scene in Egypt became more complicated as a growing number of angry protestors took to the streets of Egypt. The military had warned that such political crisis might lead to the collapse of the state. Movements in opposition to the MB, particularly liberal and secular ones, formed a campaign called *Tamarod* (Arabic: Revolt) which set out to collect signatures for a petition to which millions of people subscribed, demanding that President Morsi should step down and calling for a new presidential election (Abdelrahman: 2014). *Tamarod* called for mass protests to mark the first anniversary of the day Morsi was handed power, and, on 30 June 2013, millions of protesters took to the streets across Egypt (Ahram Online: 2013).

The mass protests encouraged the military council to warn Morsi on 1 July that it would intervene and impose its own ‘roadmap’ if he did not satisfy the public's demands within 48 hours (BBC News: 2013: Morsi’s Profile).

As the deadline approached, President Morsi insisted that he was Egypt's legitimate leader and that any effort to remove him by force could plunge the country into chaos. General Al-Sisi, on the other hand, had already announced on 3 July 2013, on state television that Morsi had been
removed from office, the controversial constitution had been suspended and a transitional period imposed, led by the Supreme Constitutional Court (Al-Saleh: 2015).

Morsi’s last speech came via his Twitter account, according to Al-Saleh, denouncing what he described as a ‘Military Coup’ and asking people to reject it, but he was later arrested and put in prison. Mass protests were staged by his supporters on the streets of Cairo, demanding his release and immediate return to power.

The army responded by storming protests on 14 August 2013 and arresting key Brotherhood figures and killing at least 600 MB members and supporters on a security crackdown in Raba’a Al-Adawiya Square and Al-Nahda Square (the two places in which the MB members and their supporters held as protest locations), a move which was widely condemned by human rights organisations (Amnesty: 2014). Morsi was later charged in court for inciting murder and violence as well as conspiring with Hamas, when the group was accused of prison break-outs in 2011; moreover, the MB movement was declared a terrorist organisation (Wain & Joyce: 2014).

Mohammed Morsi and 16 other top MB leaders – including the supreme leader, Mohammed Badei - were sentenced to death on charges of delivering secret documents abroad between 2005 and 2013; the
sentences were upheld by Egypt court recently (in June 2015), (BBC News: 2016)\(^\text{18}\).

### 4.5 Summary

The MB movement has been a significant and well-rooted political organisation in Egyptian society since its establishment in 1922. It has been through different stages of harassment, subjugation and sanctions: from the assassination of its supreme leader Al-Banna; oppression under the Nasser and Al-Sadat eras; and oppression and banishment under the Mubarak regime. The place occupied by the MB on the Egyptian political scene has been evident. Although it has operated underground for a long time, it has played a significant role in politics and made different governments (Nasser, Al-Sadat and Mubarak) feel the pressure that it is a growing Islamic political movement that has considerable popular support.

The MB emerged as a major political force following the ousting of Mubarak. The Freedom and Justice Party established as the group’s political arm, went on to win half the parliamentary seats in the general elections in 2012; though long supressed as an illegal organisation, the MB won wide support as a civil society network of social empowerment and religious reform. Its sweeping victory of 47 per cent of the seats in the House of Parliament was attributed by observers to its long history of

\(^\text{18}\) Available at: [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33147206](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-33147206) [retrieved 19/ 06/ 2015]
social service, religious appeal and public sympathy for its oppression. Its considerable success in political contestation however, undermined the people’s popular trust when it failed to keep its promises such as not seeking to dominate parliament and not to field a candidate for the presidency (Bahri: 2012).

Bianchi concludes:

The MB appears as the set of movements that today is best equipped as an organisational and ideological profile to respond to the challenges of the Arab spring, since before others were able to critically review their own ideological baggage and modernise its facilities, making the head of their organisations from third generation of reformers. It’s easy to assume that they will play prominent roles in the Arab transitions, which have contributed to the insurrection in countries like Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Syria. Even in the Gulf region, from Iraq to Bahrain, Kuwait and up to Saudi Arabia their presence is important and constantly monitored for the potential threat they represent to the regional governments (p. 48).

Hellyer (2011) conversely notes that it is important not to fall into the trap of viewing the Egyptian political spectrum as divided primarily between ‘liberal’ and ‘Muslim Brotherhood’. There are several other forces, including ‘fairness and equality’ leftists and Arab nationalists. The relative strength of these various groupings however, is highly contested, and it is not clear which of them is electorally significant.
The existing literature relevant to AJA and the MB has been reviewed in this chapter. The next chapter will examine the theoretical framework utilised in this research.
Chapter Five
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MEDIA IDEOLOGY AND RELIGION FRAMING

5.1 Introduction

A brief history of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) was presented in the previous chapter. This chapter studies the theoretical framework for religion framing and media ideology. The existing literature on AJA’s background information, its place among Arab media and the channel’s relation to political Islam was reviewed in order to establish whether its purported close connections with Islamic movements, particularly the MB in Egypt, before and after the fall of Mubarak in 2011, were verified. Studying media religion framing and media ideology will assist this research to comprehend the nature of the channel’s coverage of the MB in Egypt.

The study of media and religion, according to Paul A. Soukup (2002), underpins the understanding of how and why religion appears in the media as it does, and how and why a social force like religion interacts with the other primary social forces of the day.

History cannot be made without the presence of the ‘media’ as some form of communication (White: 2007), therefore, the history of religion is perhaps directly connected to the history of the media. It appears that the association between media and religion in antiquity was long-standing, for
example, the telling of myths and sketches in cave paintings to justify inexplicable phenomena (Soukup: 2002).

Daniel Stout and Judith Buddenbaum (2002) note that the term ‘science of religion’ was first used by Max Miller in 1867 (Kitigawa, 1959, cited in Stout and Buddenbanum 2002) as psychology began to address how religion shapes personality and public perception. Freud (1938) later considers religion as a key to understanding emotion and regarded spirituality as a manifestation of feelings of helplessness. He acknowledges religion as an emerging element in modern psychology, because ‘religion’ is treated as an ‘orientator’ of cognition (knowing) and affect (feeling), psychology, according to Freud, offers media researchers a framework on which to think about media content and audiences.

The intersection between media and religion began receiving scholarly attention in the mid-20th century (Hoover: 2002). Thanks to media technology, religion was brought into people’s homes, streets and places of power (Stolow: 2005, p. 120). These helped to structure images in people’s minds which not only constitute people’s individual reality but arguably also formulate people’s political and social perceptions (Thorn: 1978).

Departing from this argument, *Al-Jazeera* (Arabic) (AJA), as a media service similar to many others, brought into people’s homes various social,
political, cultural, religious and economic topics. The relevance of the aforementioned to this research is to investigate whether the channel brought the MB’s ideology, as an Islamic party (where Islam as a religion and Islamic values are at the heart of its politics), into people’s homes, and more significantly, whether the channel structured the people’s perception regarding this movement.

Berger argues that the media of mass communication - from radio to television and the Internet - have made knowledge of alternate religious possibilities more generally available than ever before (2007). Religion has, by and large, overwhelmed the fields of mass communication research and media studies (Hoover: 2002). Nonetheless, religion - as Hoover argues – has been a particular challenge to both theory and research, owing to its fundamental prominence; it has proven formidable as a discipline that traces its intellectual roots to positivist social science.

Stewart Hoover and Nadia Kaneva (2009) also explain that for most of the 20th century, it was assumed that religion would decline in importance and influence. They note:

This assumption was long held by secularisation thesis in the social sciences and humanities which assumes that the intellectual and moral religious fruits of modernity, education, economic, liberalisation, increasing human liberty and autonomy would make religious faith less and less necessary (Hoover: p1).
Academics such as Hjarvard believe that the media have become the primary source of religious ideas, and the language the media use shapes religious imagination in accordance with the genres of popular culture:

The media representations of the supernatural world have acquired richness in detail, character and narrative, making the supernatural appear natural (Hjarvard: 2006, p. 2).

Based on this argument, the examination of AJA’s language is imperative to this research. It will give an idea of how it was used to form people’s understanding, not only of Islamic political ideology represented by the MB, but equally to secular ideology represented by the Mubarak regime and the military.

It can be argued that although media often play a decisive role in shaping public perceptions of religion and cultural diversity, it may also be disruptive when focusing on negative aspects of a certain faith, particularly those related to fundamentalist views (Lefebvre: 2009).

Based on Lefebvre’s discussion, this research examines the role that AJA played regarding the MB in Egypt: whether it assumed a decisive role in formulating the Egyptian public’s perception by favouring the MB and providing a stage for a movement that had long been subjected to the intolerance of totalitarian regimes, or simply played a disruptive or divisive role by arguably enforcing the MB’s political ideology (‘us’: the good).
against other ideologies (‘them’: the bad) and secular and liberal ones (see Chapter Six, Van Dijk’s Ideological Square).

5.2 Understanding Religion and Media in a Cultural Context

Understanding religion in a cultural context is immensely significant. The perception of religious ideologies and practices may vary from one society to another, as this research argues, and may even have conflicting opinions. What may be seen as ‘extremism’ in one culture, for example, may not be seen as such in another. Religion may be treated by AJA (a pan-Arab and arguably religious channel) differently from the BBC (an international and arguably secular channel).

Stewart Hoover (2002) rightly states that studies of media and religion should take into account the question of ‘lived’ culture and actual practice. They should be methodologically daring, inventive, and creative, and should consider religion in the broadest possible terms. A wide range of issues present themselves as ‘religion’ when, in fact, they may not be; at the same time, a range of things may deny that they are an element of religion but resemble it in principal ways. Both of these are important areas of cultural inquiry: ultimately, it is the question of the social construction of religious experience that is central. How and where that is articulated and given a meaning, and in what manner, should be the analytic field where media and religion research is active.
The media, according to Hassan Hamed (2004), are considered as the most powerful creators and transmitters of cultural images. Media images and media presentation of different cultures and civilisations are decisive factors on how the public perceives cultural differences. The media facilitate the education of audiences about universal human concepts, such as the universal importance not only of respect for human rights and tolerance, but also respect for cultural, religious and ethnic diversity, throughout the world (Hamed: 2004).

The definition of what constitutes religion as a social norm, according to Nancy Ammerman (2007), is controversial among researchers (see Beckford 2003, cited in Ammerman). Some cultures and institutions strongly discourage the presence of any apparently religious meanings or practices; although religion is about how people make sense of their world, constructing a religious presence and defining goals for action are two different kinds of symbolic work, each with its own potential effect on collective action (McGuire: 2007; Lichterman: 1996).

Paul Soukup (2002) records in his article: ‘Media and Religion’ that, despite the desire for a broader understanding of religion and its effect on daily events presented by reporters, the culturally ‘received view’ of religion makes this difficult. Hoover (cited in Soukup: 2002) identifies several factors from this ‘received view’ that makes reporting on religion
problematic: (i) a growing secularisation has led to less news coverage of religion; (ii) many regard religion as a private matter; (iii) religion lies outside the realm of empirical data; (iv) religion is too complex a subject; and (v) religion is inherently controversial.

Religion is a personal response to seeking meaning in one’s life and in one’s universe. Religious expression is generally found within institutionalised religion, but the formal creed, rituals, devotions, and moral codes do not exclude a personal experience.

The central question of the cultural studies approach, explained by Robert While, is concerned with how individuals in groups use media to construct religious meaning in their lives, and how this religious meaning relates to many other aspects of human existence (White: 2007). The most significant impact of media, according to Marshall McLuhan’s ‘Understanding Media’ (1964, cited in Robert White, 2007), is not on individual psychology but on whole cultures and societies.

Stig Hjarvard (2006) approves of the theory that the interface between media and religion should be considered in their proper cultural and historical contexts, and the ‘mediatisation’ of religion is not assumed to be a universal phenomenon, neither historically, culturally nor geographically. As a channel of communication, the media have become the primary source of religious ideas, and, as a language, the media mould religious
imagination in accordance with the genres of popular culture. The media, as a cultural environment, have therefore taken over many of the social functions of institutionalised religions, providing both moral and spiritual guidance and a sense of community:

The interesting point may not be how much and what kind of religion is distributed by the various types of media. For a sociological understanding of the role of modern media in relation to religion, it is much more important to understand how modern media do not only represent religious issues, but also change the very ideas and authority of religious institutions, and alter the ways in which people interact with each other when dealing with religious issues (Hjarvard: 2006: p. 1).

Joshua Meyrowitz (1997, cited in Hjarvard, 2006), suggests three media metaphors to distinguish between different aspects of media communication: media as a channel, media as language, and media as environment:

1. The metaphor of media as a channel draws attention to media transporting symbols and messages across distances from senders to receivers; according to this point of view, therefore, the research should focus on the content of the media: what kind of messages are transmitted, what topics occupy the media agenda, how much attention one theme acquires compared to another, and so on. The media are distributors of religious representations of various kinds; for example, key religious texts
like the Bible, The Qur’an, hymn books and so forth, are also media products that are distributed both within religious institutions and through general media markets. The media, in the sense of independent media production and distribution companies are, however, channels for the distribution of texts originating from religious institutions, only to a limited extent.

2. Media as a language focuses on the various ways the media format their messages and frame the relationship between sender, content and receiver; in particular, the choice of medium and genre has an influence on important features like the narrative construction, reality status and mode of reception of particular messages, and as a consequence, the media will adjust and mould religious representations to the modalities of the specific medium and genre in question.

3. Media, as environment, will draw interest that concentrates on the ways media systems and institutions facilitate and structure human interaction and communication; since environments are much more stable than individual messages, this metaphor encourages studies of broader historical changes - how the invention of the printing press revolutionised the distribution of information in society, for instance.

Hjarvard (2006) notes that in earlier societies, social institutions like the family, school, and the church were the most important providers of
information, tradition and moral orientation for individual members of society. Today, these institutions have lost some of their former authority, and the media have, to some extent, taken over their role as providers of information and moral direction, and at the same time, the media have become society’s most important story-tellers about society itself:

The media's specific impact on religion may be manifold and at times contradictory, but as a whole the media as channel, language, and environment are responsible for the mediatisation of religion. Mediatisation designates the process through which core elements of a social or cultural activity (e.g. politics, teaching, religion etc.) assume media form (Hjarvard: 2006: p. 4).

The media are large-scale suppliers of narratives – fictional and factual – about adventures, magic occurrences, the fight between good and evil, and so on (Clark: 2005, cited in Hjarvard: 2006).

Hoover (2002: p. 2) notes that the realms of both religion and the media are themselves transformative and being transformed:

Religion today is much more a public commodified and personalised set of practices than it has been in the past. At the same time, the media (movies, radio, television, print and electronic media, and more) are collectively coming to constitute a realm where important projects of ‘the self’ take place-projects that include spiritual, transcendent, and deeply meaningful “work”. This means that, rather than being autonomous actors involved in institutionalised projects in relation to each other, religion and media are increasingly
converging. They are meeting on a common turf, the everyday world of lived experience.

Different media touch different senses—the ears, the eyes, the whole consciousness—and the individual responds by constructing the meaning of the text according to the major sense influence, thereby producing an ‘oral culture’ or a ‘visual culture’. The perspective of McLuhan and his student, Walter Ong (1982), also helped to shift interest of religious communicators from broadcast effects to the interaction of medium and religious cultural movements.

5.3 Islam and Media

Pintak (2008) says that Islam is, first and foremost, a religion, but, for many Muslims, it is ‘a complete way of life’. He explains that the advent of broadcasting, audio cassettes, fax and ultimately, satellite television in the late 20th century, and the flood of new media that have transformed communication, have redefined Muslim identity politics and put control of science into the hands of anyone possessing a computer. The Islamic approach, according to Pinak, calls for the media to actively ‘form’ or ‘shape’ a ‘correct opinion’ in the minds of news consumers, hence, a proactive stance built on a specific agenda, in this case da‘wa, the Muslim call to follow the straight path to God.
Pintak points out that most Arab broadcasting laws prohibited criticism of the head of state, defamation of religion, or undermining public order, and additional taboos were observed by broadcast editors based on local customs and political circumstances. He argues that, for AJA, the sensitivity regarding Qatari foreign policy in the complex evaluation that took place in the newsroom and the upper reaches of AJA’s management, meant the essential question became: ‘will this have a negative impact on Qatar’s foreign policy?’, before controversial stories were aired.

The primary mission of Arab journalism, according to Pintak, was that of fostering political and social change in the Arab world, with a secondary role of defending the Arab and Muslim people and their values against outside interference.

Chandra Muzaffar (2004) states that the stereotyping of Islam and Muslims in today’s media has a long history behind it. Islam as a religion has been reviled by sections of European scholarship and popular literature, for more than a thousand years. Tracing prejudiced references to Islam - prejudices which were later transmitted through the writings of reformers like Martin Luther, playwrights and poets such as Shakespeare and Dante, and historians of Gibbon’s ilk – the late Erskine Childers, a distinguished diplomat and scholar said:

The theme of Islam as a ‘curse of the world’, the product of ‘a strain of cunning, of revenge, of self-indulgence’ beginning with
Muhammad and infecting all Muslims, persisted even in Western academic circles into the twentieth century (p. 22).

Muzaffar adds:

In both the West and the Muslim world, segments of the media have instead chosen to project their differences as a way of proving that it is only their position that is right and legitimate, while the position of the other is wrong and illegitimate” (Muzaffar: 2004, p. 28).

The early encounter between religion and social sciences, broadly speaking, was affected by the positivistic assumptions of some social scientists. Religious people who wished to use social science approaches to study their religions, often found secular social scientists to be unwelcoming because of their own positivistic and materialistic prejudices (White: 2007). Robert White (2007) clarifies that in more recent years, social scientists have broadened their outlook and have become more receptive to both qualitative research methodologies and to the study of religion; nevertheless, much of the growing interest in religion has overlapped a growth of social and political problems around the world which have roots in religious differences:

The war in Iraq is a case in point. Failure to take account of the complexity of religious factors in that country has been a major contributor to the escalating chaos there during the last few years. The political role religion can assume even in the modern world has become painfully evident there and in many other trouble spots. Conflicts, even those that appear purely
political, often cannot be resolved without a deep understanding of the religious factors that influence the various parties involved (p. 21).

White (2007) also argues that the most influential contemporary religious movements owe less to modern communication media such as the internet, than they do to combinations of more traditional forms of communication. The Islamic fundamentalist movement has been exceptionally successful in this respect. Robert White also asserts that Islamic fundamentalism has spread its message largely by word-of-mouth and print media. Its promoters, however, have been alert to the appearance of new possibilities. The Middle East seems to have been used to reinforce the influence the fundamentalists had long been fostering through more mundane means, such as direct interpersonal contact during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, and in religious schools throughout the Muslim world.

This complex political case, in line with White’s argument (2007), provides an example of a situation that co-mingles religious influences with mass media and many other cultural influences. The study of cases of this kind requires attention with regard to a large number of factors that demand a holistic research methodology. This will ensure that as many of those factors as possible are given an opportunity to be recognised, and their influences given their due weight.
Leon Barkho (2009) asserts that while guns may not be available to everyone, words, thanks to today’s advanced information technology and digitalisation, are everywhere: television, newspaper, radio and the Internet:

> Arabic television is dominated by religious programmes and the number of Arabic satellite channels which are wholly devoted to Islam and Islamic issues outstrips those dedicated to entertainment and news (p. 85).

Barkho continues his argument by saying that even the most influential news channels rely on their religious programmes to seek and sustain wide viewership. AJA, for example, has propelled Sheik Yousef Qaradhawi to ‘star status’ in the Arab and Muslim world, owing to his weekly phone-in programme: *Al-Shari’a Wal-Hayyat* (Islamic Shari’a and Life). Televised radical clerics’ rhetoric is more forceful and perhaps more convincing for the average person, than that of the print and official media; after the events of 11 September 2001 many Islamic websites noted substantial increases in traffic, as people sought to understand Islam as a religion and possible motivation for the attacks (Bunt: 2009,p.153).

Mohamed Zayani (2009) points out that, in the case of AJA, upon the transmission of the controversial *Al-Qaeda* videotapes, the station was accused of serving as a mouthpiece for the so-called ‘terrorist’ organisation, thus providing Bin Laden with a platform from which to preach *Jihad* on ‘the West’ in general, and the U.S., in particular. AJA’s
claim to transmitting unbiased news notwithstanding, the channel has often been blamed for its 'sensational' approach and for its tendency to air what viewers want to see.

Cultures, like individuals, change through the communication of information, the mass media represent one of the major vehicles that influence the way people view politics, society, culture and religion, in some instances, the mass media may even instigate change (Sterin: 2012: p7):

Historians generally consider the period between mid-18th century and today as the 'age of democracies'. It is during this period and, to a large degree though mass media, that democracies were born and upheld. The media can influence the public and political agendas by making the process of government transparent to the people.

Ali Al-Kandari (2011) states that the political influence of a religion in a society may be feeble or powerful, depending upon its perceived role in that society: religious media might guide Muslims to know what Allah forbids or allows. Many people currently telephone in to live programmes to obtain a fatwa (a ruling) on the Haram (forbidden) and Halal (permissible):

During the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the coverage of Arab news networks portrayed Americans as the merciless killers of civilians. During those wars, the Al-Jazeera network ran some video tapes of Osama Bin Laden who claimed that the
American war on terrorism is a war on Islam, reminding viewers of the middle ages when Christian crusaders invaded Muslim lands. The problem in much of this coverage is that it conflates the actions of Western politicians with Christianity (Al-Kandari: 2011, p. 208-209).

Philip Seib explains the religious element as a factor in the Arab political uprisings, in his online article: ‘Religion and the Awakening’ (2012). He notes that Islam is an important part of the lives of most Arabs. The uprisings of 2011 include a religious dimension that needs to be thoroughly and critically investigated.

The circulation of the Worldwide Web, and the introduction of satellite news channels into the Muslim world, have somewhat changed the very nature of mass media in that sphere, with the Al-Jazeera network at the forefront of these changes, described by many scholars as an Arabic-language channel that provides a pluralist and diverse perspective of world views to audiences in the Arab world (Golan & Skiousis: 2010); some have argued, however, that the channel pushes a pan-Islamic perspective in an attempt to shape world public opinion (Cherribi: 2006).

5.4 Media and Religion Framing

How do the media frame religious ideologies? This is a significant question, at the core of this research, and requires attention in order to examine if and how AJA represented the MB’s political ideology, and the nature of
language it used, which may or may not have reflected the channel’s endorsement of the movement.

The article: ‘Media, Religion and Framing’, by Stout and Buddenbaum (2003), suggests how religion is depicted by journalists, which is a key area of interest to researchers of media and religion, even though scholars seem to disagree in their interpretations of news coverage. Framing has a value far beyond merely knowing what is in the news. The study of media and religion also determines the types of information that ultimately contribute to public opinion about particular religions. Knowing what type of information is available is very important, given that treatment of religious groups is tied to the kind of information available to citizens.

Unpacking the nature of information and knowledge AJA channel broadcasts about the MB is essential for this research and underpins the channel’s policy and its relationship with religion and religious groups such as the MB. The media, according to Lynn Schofield Clark (2007), fundamentally participate in defining and highlighting what can count as religion, and what should be seen as outside the boundaries of religion or spirituality, and give people stories and examples that provide the arena in which this ‘boundary work can be delivered’.

Charles Hirschkind and Brian Larkin (2008,p.4) note that McLuhan’s argument regarding the influence of media lay not in the messages they
circulate but in their technical effects on the human sensorium and society at large:

The effects of media do not occur at the level of opinions or concepts, but alter sense ratios or patterns of perception steadily and without any resistance (p. 4).

The question of religion and media has been subject to considerable public and scholarly debate, highlighting the new possibilities for religions to articulate themselves in public, and to assume a political role as a result of the easy accessibility of electronic mass media (Hischkind and Larkin: 2008). The media, therefore, is a significant social agent, with the potential to influence community perceptions (Akbarzadeh and Smith: 2005), including religious perception and ideologies. Based on this argument, this research argues that AJA acts as a social advocate with potential influence on community perception; disputably, the influence may not be on all community layers, but possibly on one political group such as an Islamic political party, particularly the MB.

The media plays an important social role in the community, according to Shahram Akbarzadeh and Bianca Smith (2005). It has the ability to influence people which mean that journalists are also shaped by various social forces which contribute to their understanding of Muslims and Islam. How one perceives particular events is generally influenced by various factors, including one’s background, education, and a wider social and cultural environment; editorial practices and writing styles, therefore, also
significantly shape the type of language and images that form portrayals of Muslims and Islam, and the type of information provided. The key question here is whether journalists allow their personal religious beliefs and practices to influence their reporting of religion.

The most straightforward news report is the outcome of unavoidable choices that reflect the journalist's sensibilities in weaving together fact and interpretation. We have illustrated in the ways stories can vary according to choices and emphasis, source selection, descriptive versus insinuation language, and even poetic license that reshapes the fact to fill the truth (Linchter, Rothman, and Lichter 1986: p. 165 – cited by Biernatzki 1995).

The media have the power to shape the public mind and develop public opinion in the political arena and in modern society. They are able to explore an issue by analysing the difference between external reality and the image carried in people's minds (Thorn: 1978).

The academic discussion on the inter-relation between media and religion is important; however, this research contends that by definition, being a supporter of a particular religion or a particular religious group is prejudiced.

5.5 Media Framing

Media framing has become both an integral concept and a method of analysis in the field of mass media studies (Rane: 2014). Studying framing
in this research is imperative to learn if and how AJA framed the MB during key electoral moments, before and after the fall of Mubarak; both framing and representation of events and news in the mass media can thus thoroughly affect how news recipients come to understand these events (Price, V., Tewksbury, D. & Powers, E.: 1995).

The understanding of framing helps to more generally deepen the theoretical insight into the political influence of the news media, and into the relationships between the elites, media and the public (Entman: 2009). Robert Entman explains that the verb ‘to frame’ (or framing) refers to the process of selecting and highlighting some aspects of a perceived reality, and enhancing the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that reality; on the media level, journalists’ framing of an issue may be influenced by several socio-structural or organisational variables (Scheufele: 1999).

The concept of media framing is significant because it offers researchers an alternative to the old ‘objective and bias’ paradigm. It helps in understanding the mass media effect, and it offers valuable suggestions for communications practitioners (Tankard: 2001). Hackett (1984), (cited in Tankard: 2001, p. 96) suggests that the concept of framing is one of the useful approaches because it has the potential of ‘getting beneath’ the surface of news coverage and exposing the hidden assumptions.
Piers Robinson discusses the framing model in his book: *The CNN Effect* (2002) and projects two types of framing: distance framing and empathy framing which will be scrutinised in this research. Distance framing, for example, is illustrated in words such as ‘remnants’ or *foloul*, coup, military council, and criminals, whereas words such as victims, tortured, children and innocents, suggest empathy framing.

Victimisation framing, as Kendall (2011) points out, identifies specific villains or persecutors – ranging from national political leaders and top corporative executives to individuals designated ‘ordinary street criminals’. Most of framing analyses are not explicitly annotative because they focus on exploring the realm of what is, rather than what ought to be in the news:

> Journalists dedicated to a ‘watchdog’ role may not readily accept a political actor’s framing of an issue or event at face value; rather, they may see it as their job to reframe the actor’s point of view. (Lawrence: 2010, p. 165)

Lawrence’s argument is essential for unpacking how AJA journalists who are ‘dedicated watchdogs’, frame and re-frame the MB in the complex Egyptian political scene, and how they detect any sense of support in AJA’s news coverage.

The verbal representation by AJA of different ideologies including Islamic, secular and liberal, are fundamental to this research. Ruth Wodak (1989: p.
59) asserts that assuming ideology is a system of ideas based on value judgements and attitudes, which aids certain forces within a society to further their interests or stabilise their power, a descriptive approach which elucidates the origin activity of such structures of ideas serving political powers, by analysing the means and patterns by which ideology is linguistically realised.

Most media scholars believe that media texts articulate coherent ways of seeing the world. Hence, ideological analyses of mass media products focus on the content of the messages—the stories they tell about the past and the present—rather than the “effects” of such stories (Croteau & Hones: 2013). David Croteau, William Hoynes (2013, p. 159) explain: “Ideology is a decidedly complicated term with different implications depending on the context in which it is used [...] When Marxists speak of “ideology,” they often mean belief systems that help justify the actions of those in power by distorting and misrepresenting reality. When we talk about ideology, then, we need to be careful to specify what we mean by the term.”

In the study of social movements, ideology is generally invoked as a cover term for the values, beliefs, and goals associated with a movement or a broader, encompassing social entity, and is assumed to provide the rationale for individual and collective action (Snow & Byrd: 2000, p. 120).
Igbarumah (1990: p.3) notes that ideology can be said to be the role of ideas in shaping the minds of individuals. Political influence, however, is not limited to the expression of support or opposition by the news media. In keeping with the general process of framing, the political ideology of a news medium will also be reflected in ways in which the news package is constructed to make it more familiar to audiences (Wolfsfeld: 1997, p. 40).

To sum up, the approach in which media frame ideologies, including those based on religion, is significant as media communicate the ways of seeing our world and then shaping our views and values.

5.7 Summary

This chapter has identified media and religion as a theoretical framework to test and ascertain the very nature of the relationship between AJA, a pan-Arab media outlet, and the MB, as a religious and political Islamic movement. It helps to trace whether or not AJA and (or) the MB have employed political Islam's ideology to endorse the movement's political status. This research agrees that the cultural context is important when discussing religion framing through the media. What may be seen in one country as terrorism may be viewed in a different light by another.

Islam and the media were discussed. The relationship between both also depends on how a particular media service sets its agenda to frame Islam
or Islamic political organisations: for example, how AJA frames the MB is vastly different from the way *Al-Arabiyya* channel does, which is arguably seen as opposing the MB. The language and the presentation of the MB, as an example, are determining factors in evaluating where a particular media service stands.

The next chapter will project the methodology of this research and identify data selection and appropriate analysis tools. Critical discourse analysis will be the primary approach for scrutinising the collated data of AJA’s two programmes. Interviews will also be a helpful technique and enable this research to obtain original data which cannot be obtained from the analysis of the actual text. Van Dijk’s ideological square and Robinson’s framing models, in conjunction with Chouliaraki’s three rhetorical strategies (verbal mode, agency and time space) will also be applied.
Chapter Six

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

6.1 Introduction

The relationship between religion and the media was discussed in the previous chapter. This intersection between media and religion is important for this research as media representation of religion (political Islam ideology) is moulded by the framing process. How the MB (Islamic political movement) is represented in AJA’s text is determined by the selection and highlighting process (framing) of specific topics, events and actors, while disregarding others. The selection process of emphasising and de-emphasising particular ideas or actions leads to the discussion of van Dijk’s ‘ideological square’ by which he explains how different ideologies are divided between us (positive) and them (negative). This research examines such separation in different rhetorical strategies according to Chouliaraki (explained later).

This chapter outlines the targeted data for analyses (in terms of source, period and selection) and the principal methodological techniques in the text analysis of AJA Television’s coverage of the Egyptian MB, before and after the fall of Mubarak. The study of the language of two AJA TV talk-shows, Opposite Direction and Without Borders, as well as the data collected from interviews, will be critically examined using the qualitative research approach.
Qualitative research, including Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) and interview techniques will be useful methods for analysing the data selected for this research. These techniques help to obtain, endorse and verify the data gathered in different ways (McMurray: 2004) and provide a richer, contextual base for interpreting the end results (Kaplan & Duchon: 1988; Deacon, Pickering, Golding & Murdock: 1999). The aim is to achieve truthful results through in-depth analysis of the channel’s language and the rhetoric adopted in discussing the complex Egyptian political scene, during four different electoral periods - before and after the fall of Mubarak in 2011 - and examines verbal representations of different political actors and ideologies, during key political changes, before and after the Egyptian uprising.

The interpretation of the constructive effects of language is best presented in the critical discourse analysis (CDA) approach (Parker & Burman, 1993), by which the multiple meanings assigned to the text are inspected (Phillips & Hardy: 2002). The application of CDA helps this research to judiciously scrutinise social realities which stand behind the language of AJA regarding its representation of the MB, during the proposed period of this study.

Interviews, furthermore, will assist this study to obtain data which cannot be extracted from the actual analysis of the AJA text contained in its two
TV programmes. The interview technique allows researchers to look at insider views or justifications for certain actions (Jovcheolovitch: 2000) by countering with the question of why such an action happened in a certain way and not in another.

The ontological and epistemological approaches will be considered in this chapter, predominantly the Interpretist (Constructionist) approach, with consideration given to the Realist position, deemed to be the most beneficial for this research. Interpretists and Realists believe that the world in which one lives is socially constructed, and therefore, personal prejudices and their interpretation cannot be ignored.

6.2 Data Selection: Population and Sampling

The term ‘population’ of data constitutes a multi-faceted investigation of persons, objects and events, whereas a ‘sampling’ of data is a specific portion of a ‘population’ (Kumar: 2002); in practical terms, if the selection of AJA’s two programmes is considered to be the ‘population’, then ‘sampling’ is the selection of specific episodes in four electoral moments in relation to the MB and the Mubarak regime.

Data selection in this research will be based on analysing relevant episodes of two TV talk-shows obtained from AJA’s digital archives,
covering four key electoral moments in Egypt: two before and two after the Egyptian 2011 revolution.

The TV programmes which will be examined are two popular, current-affairs talk-shows: Without Borders and Opposite Direction:

Figure 5: The two main targeted TV programmes to be analysed

(i) Without Borders: presented by Ahmed Mansour. Each episode hosts one guest, usually selected from senior public figures, and often top Islamic leadership.

(ii) Opposite Direction: a weekly TV programme presented by Faisal Al-Qassam, in the same format as the American Cross Fire production that hosts two guests with extreme opposite views.

The choice to examine the above two AJA flagship TV programmes (each has a different format) is to offer this research suitably representative content to assess the channel’s language and its relationship with social
reality. Unlike news, these two key TV programmes offer in-depth debate on a wide range of political and social issues directly linked to Arab countries, including the growing political role of the MB movement and the Mubarak regime in Egypt, before and after the 2011 uprising, and the controversial discussions surrounding the movement’s role.

Having reviewed the existing literature, not many studies focused on TV programmes as most studies focused on news such as (Miladi 2006, Barkho 2011).

Nevertheless, the examination of these two programmes set the ground of further future research for the channel’s general newscasts and the language used. The two selected TV programmes and presenters are:

(A) Without Border’s Ahmad Mansour

*Without Borders* (بلا حدود) was (at the time of writing) a weekly, one-to-one programme which broadcast on the AJA channel, presented by one of AJA’s predominant television hosts, Ahmad Mansour. The programme hosted Arab leaders, influential people, politicians, experts, and decision-makers and allowed them to discuss particular topics related to politics, economy, religion, and other issues.
Noticeable is the fact that Mr Mansour was both the presenter and the producer of the programme. He selected the topics, guests, talking points, and then moderated the programme himself. Mansour explained to this researcher that his role, as a presenter, was to open the discussion and then play the role of ‘devil’s advocate’ – to show an objective stand - in which he represented the opposite view held by his guest:

If the guest is a minister or a president, I adopt the view of the opposition, whereas if the guest is from the opposition, I adopt the government’s view (email interview with Mansour 2014).

Some critics claimed that Ahmad Mansour had strong ties with the Muslim Brotherhood (*ITP News*: 2014), arguably evidenced by being rewarded with several interviews with the top leadership of the movement including its Supreme Leader, Mohammed Badei, his deputy, Khairat El-Shater, the Egyptian former prime minister, Hisham Qandil, and the deposed president, Mohammed Morsi (Al-Qassemi: 2012).

Mansour’s social media accounts - *Twitter* and *Facebook* (which have a considerable number of followers19), reveal that, since the outbreak of the Egyptian uprising, the presenter’s views were expressed in favour of the MB: he denounced the overthrow of the MB’s elected president, Mohammed Morsi, and showed robust opposition to the Military Council.

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19 On *Twitter* and *Facebook*, Ahmad Mansour has some 377,000 followers [retrieved 1/03/2015]
Mansour openly criticised the Mubarak regime, and described the ‘military coup’ in July 2013 as orchestrated by ‘Mubarak’s remnants’ (Foloul: فلول), after the MB had been in power for only one year. In November 2013, for example, shortly after the fall of Morsi, Ahmad Mansour posted a *Tweet* on his *Twitter* account, addressing the Military-General, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, and promising him retaliation for his actions against the MB:

> Hey you, Al-Sisi, killer and war criminal, wait for a daily painful strike to your head from me, through an article, a programme, or a *Tweet*, on behalf of bereaved mothers, widows and orphans (November, 2013).\(^{20}\)

When asked about his views reflected on social media platforms, and the risk they may have shown that he held an imbalanced viewpoint as a TV programme moderator, Mansour insisted that journalists and programme presenters across the world expressed their personal views on their social media platforms. These views, according to him, were not necessarily mirrored in what they presented on TV:

> I’m like them. If you go back to my articles and posts I wrote during Morsi’s presidential time, you will find that most of them stand against him, as well as his way of ruling. Such views are not reflected in my programme (email interview with Mansour: January 2014).

\(^{20}\) Researcher’s translation
Mansour was declared a ‘wanted’ person by the Egyptian authorities, following the fall of Morsi in 2013. Abdel Bari Attwan (2013), the former editor-in-chief of the pan-Arab newspaper, *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, wrote an article in which he asserted that the perceived association of Mansour to the MB was common knowledge. Attwan criticised the action that the Egyptian authorities had taken against AJA’s presenter, as it was based on trumped-up charges, not on facts, according to him. Attwan also pointed out that Mansour had declared that Morsi should be re-instated, a possible reflection of the presenter’s association and supporter of the MB and its members:

The affiliation of Mansour to an Islamic group, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, isn’t a secret. He himself has publicly declared it in his articles and interviews. He has stood on the Muslim Brotherhood’s protest stage, aggressively criticising the Military Council and supporting the legitimacy of Mohammed Morsi […] and demanding his return to his presidential palace.

Mansour’s ‘wanted’ status prevented him from travelling from Qatar to Egypt to attend his brother’s funeral in April 2014, due to the allegations made by what he called ‘the leaders of the military coup’ (Shaban, 2014).

Mansour was also sentenced to 15 years in prison by the Egyptian authorities, accused of torturing and sexually assaulting a lawyer during the 2011 uprising against the former president, Hosni Mubarak (*Daily News Egypt*, 2014). His response, according to AJA’s website (2014), was to utterly deny the accusation, and, in retaliation, he attacked the Egyptian
military regime and judicial system in Egypt, ‘led by General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’, the new Egyptian president. He charged them with fabricating the claim without any concrete evidence. Mansour wrote:

Several people have asked me to comment on such a verdict. I do not comment on corrupt verdicts, coming from a corrupt legal system and a bloody [military] coup and criminal regime (Al-Jazeera (Arabic) website: 2014).

The Egyptian authorities reacted by confiscating Ahmad Mansour’s assets and belongings in Egypt (Al-Shorouk Online, 2014). This action against the presenter was not the first: during the 2005 election, he was assaulted by two unknown men, while waiting for his guest outside AJA’s office in Cairo (see Appendix EP3, EX4). This incident reflects the tense political situation in Egypt on the one hand, and how Mansour was possibly regarded as an opponent of the Mubarak regime, even before the Egyptian uprising, on the other.

Ahmad Mansour, by openly expressing his political views and passionate statements on social media platforms, was therefore perceived as heavily involved (active participant) in the political scene in Egypt, with strong views in favour of the MB and against the Mubarak regime, which is perhaps problematic, not only for the reputation and objectivity of his programme which he moderated, but also for AJA as a whole.
(B) Opposite Direction’s Faisal Al-Qassem

*Opposite Direction* (Aletejah Al-Moakes) is a weekly TV programme presented by Dr Faisal Al-Qassem, a Syrian, who used to work for the BBC’s Arabic radio, before joining AJA TV (*BBC News*: 1999). He is a British national and studied journalism at a U.K. university (*Cherribs*: 2006).

Al-Qassem’s programme is different in structure and style from Mansour’s *Without Borders*, in that *Aletejah Al-Moakes* is a live, in-studio weekly programme (inspired by CNN’s famous *Crossfire* current events TV programme, *Nawawy & Eskander*: 2003) - hosting two guests, each with strong views from opposite ends of the political spectrum. The debates either focus on a particular political issue related to a certain country or on a pan-Arab matter. *Mohammed Qarqouri* (2014) observes that, soon after the programme begins, the discussion moves from its initial rational approach to screaming arguments, followed by a catalogue of verbal abuse and even physical attacks between the two guests.

The programme is arguably one of the most popular and controversial shows of its kind in the history of Arab television, and has attracted both endorsement and denunciation to Qatar, AJA’s host country (*Democracy Now*: 2006). *Opposite Direction* has managed to invite both wide approval
from Arab people and considerable condemnation from Arab governments (Dabbous-Sensenig: 2006).

Sam Cherribi (2006) explains that the presenter attempts to be ‘impartial’ when introducing each of the guests’ views at the beginning of the programme; during the discussions, however, he often overtly takes sides and therefore relinquishes his position as an ‘objective’ moderator. It is not unusual, according to Dabbous-Sensenig, for guests on the programme to begin shouting and having, what appear to be ‘temper tantrums’ (2006). The programme often been dominated by more by emotion and lack of ‘rationality’ (Abdelmoula: 2012, p. 184).

Brian Whitaker of The Guardian newspaper wrote that the secret of the programme’s popularity, according to the programme presenter, Al-Qassem, was that it broke all the Arab world’s taboos (Whitaker: 2003). Al-Qassem told Whitaker: ‘in the past, in the Arab world, you couldn’t even talk about the price of fish, because that might endanger national security, as far as the security services were concerned’. Al-Qassem mentioned the Algerian government as an example of the disapproval of his programme by some Arab states:

They cut off the electricity supply so that people could not watch the programme, because we were talking about the military generals and how they [were] wasting the money of Algerians (Whitaker: 2003).
The programme’s presenter frequently denounced Arab leaders whom he often negatively described as ‘symbols of corruption, backwardness, and tyranny’ (Pintak: 2006: 165). Al-Qassem’s claims regarding the disconnection of electricity in Algeria being linked to his programme were unsubstantiated.\(^{21}\)

Al-Qassem posted comments on his social media pages (Twitter and Facebook) on various political occasions, asking why the Yemeni government cut off the supply of electricity in Yemen, as soon as his programme started.\(^{22}\) This may have been coincidence, as power supplies in the Middle East are unreliable at the best of times, but it is argued here that the aim behind relating power cuts to the presenter’s controversial programme was to draw attention to it: he wanted to show that autocratic governments were afraid of the ‘freedom of expression’ (حرية التعبير) that Al-Qassem and his guests adopted, and that it would encourage viewers and their friends to denounce such ‘undemocratic action’. Al-Qassem is a nationalist, unlike Mansour, who is allegedly an Islamist and said to be a member of the MB, and yet appears to support the MB, not from an Islamic ideology point of view, but more likely driven by his strong stand against authoritarian regimes.

\(^{21}\)Irregular electricity supply in the Middle East (and Africa, for that matter) occurs for many reasons – see [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21752819](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21752819) [retrieved 28/12/2014]

\(^{22}\) [http://yemennow.net/news383157.html](http://yemennow.net/news383157.html) [retrieved 28/12/2014]
The existing debates surrounding the programme are significant, yet lack the rigours of academic analysis which this research attempts to cover in this chapter. The presenter appeared to have strong views against dictatorships and favoured democracy. He seems to have viewed his programmes as ‘revolutionary’ which encouraged the value of freedom of expression and invited people to revolt against the symbols of backwardness and corruption, particularly regarding Arab regimes. The vision of bringing about democracy and freedom is, without doubt, widely debated in the Arab world. This Western concept, however, has torn the region apart and created chaos in the name of ‘freedom’ and immature democracy. It is interesting to observe how Al-Qassem, as a supposedly neutral moderator, presented different, often passionate views. The selection process he and his guests adopted for specific actions or events in order to credit or discredit one side or the other, are inspected through the lexical choices, representation of different actors, and the ideologies or values highlighted in the sample texts.

The presenter’s stance made his programme widely contentious, as the definition of the politically ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is a matter of opinion in the Arab world. The presenter’s political stance and the direction of the discussion will be examined as well as the nature of his questions, time allocated to each guest, and his provocative style.
The selection of data from the above TV programmes is primarily based on four key electoral moments (see Fig. 6 below) in which the MB participated. Each moment represents a different phase in a different political situation. The variability of this selection helps this research to obtain an understanding of AJA’s language before and after the Egyptian uprising.

**Figure 6: Four targeted key electoral moments in Egypt**

- **2005**: the MB participated in the parliamentary election as an opposition party and won 87 seats out of 444, which represented the MB as a challenging rival to Mubarak’s National Democratic Party (NDP).
- **2010**: in the wake of the Arab uprisings, the two main opposition political parties (MB and *Wafd*) boycotted the second round of the 2010 parliamentarian election, declaring the existence of widespread fabrication in the first ballot. The final results showed
that the NDP won 83 per cent of the seats, which signalled the beginning of the end for Mubarak and his party.

- **2012**: following the fall of Mubarak, the MB’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) won almost half of the parliamentary seats and was able to form a government. The FJP’s then chairman, Mohammed Morsi, won the presidential election and became Egypt’s first democratically-elected president, winning 51 per cent of the vote in a deeply divided run-off against retired military commander and former prime minister during Mubarak’s time, Ahmed Shafiq.

- **2014**: following the fall of FJP’s Morsi, most of MB leaders were arrested and the military chief, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, took command of running the country. Al-Sisi was appointed commander-in-chief of the armed forces in Mohammed Morsi’s government, and became the Egyptian president, nine months after taking over from Morsi. Morsi and other top MB leadership members were arrested, dozens of its supporters killed, and FJP was banned and dissolved.

The process of selecting the sampling episodes for analysis was based on two steps: shortlisting episodes of the two programmes directly linked to Egypt in four different years, as previously mentioned. This was done by reading the headlines of each episode and inner text, and using keywords directly referring to the four significant electoral periods of which the MB was part, for example, the parliamentary or presidential election (الانتخابات), Muslim Brotherhood (الإخوان المسلمين), Islamic movements (الحركات الإسلامية),
and opposition parties (احزاب المعارضة), and so on. Based on this process, this research identifies some 24 episodes (12 episodes in Without Borders, and 12 episodes in Opposite Direction) in the two selected programmes during four key electoral moments.

For Without Borders, each episode will be given a code and number in the text analysis: episode = (EP). Each episode will have a number (EP1 to EP12) in ascending order (see list of Without Borders episodes in Appendix 1.1); for example (EP1 = 26/10/2005 - Title: The expected political role of the MB in Egypt) and (EP12 = 7/05/2014 – Title: Yousef Nada: Egypt’s Coup will break from within the military), and so on (see Appendix 1.1).

A similar system will be applied to the second programme (Opposite Direction): each of the 12 selected episodes will have the same code (EP) and a number from (EP13 to EP24) in ascending order (see list of Opposite Direction’s episodes in 2.1); for example, (EP13 = 31/05/2005 – Title: The MB’s political activities in Egypt) and (EP23 = 20/05/2014 – Title: Will the issue of national security be used to scare people in Egypt?), and so on (see Appendix 2.1)

Some extracts of the actual episodes will be retrieved from the text as samples, in order to illustrate the main themes. Extracts will be given code ‘EX’ and a number, which will be either included within the actual text
analysis or reference made to it in the Appendix with extract numbers; for example, extracts taken from *Without Borders* programmes will be given a number (from EX1 to EX44) and extracts from *Opposite Direction* will be given a number from (EX1 to EX32) (see Appendix 1.2 and 2.2)

### 6.3 Interviews

A total of ten interviews with AJA TV presenters were obtained in this study: (six interviews with presenters currently working with AJA, (at the time of this research) and another four former AJ and AJ Egypt Live TV presenters (some who resigned over allegations of bias).

This research primarily targeted TV presenters (who were) working for AJA channels (the pan-Arab news channel *الجزيرة الاخبارية* and AJ’s *Egypt Live*). The process of selecting the interviewees was not an easy task and was mostly based on the availability of the AJA TV presenters and their consent to participate in this research. It was challenging to convince some of the presenters (inside and outside of AJA) to participate due to the complex political situation in the Arab world, as some of them explained.

The reason of interviewing high profile AJA TV presenters is because they were closely involved in covering Arab news in depth and were at the frontline, representing AJA’s editorial policies through reading the
newscasts, moderating interviews, and moderating talk-shows such as *Without Borders* and *Opposite Direction*.

A senior TV presenter, for example, Mohammed Krishan, in AJA TV (current presenter and interviewed in this research), was a member of the panel which designed AJA’s editorial guidelines. Others, such as Waddah Khanfar, former Director-General of AJA (interviewed in this research), was a decision-maker in determining the channel’s editorial stand in covering the uprisings before he decided to step down from the post. The unique access to such high profile presenters and the former director will certainly enrich this research and give in-depth testimonies in relation to different topics.

The ethical considerations were taken into account in this research regarding the interview process. It entailed approaching some of AJA presenters for their comments, and their written consent to use their testimonies. This research approached about 18 current and former presenters in AJA and AJ Egypt Live, of whom only ten agreed to participate while others either refused to participate or ignored the request.

*Opposite Direction*’s Faisal Al-Qassem (as key presenter for this study) was approached, but he stopped answering the telephone, despite promises of co-operation. Others, such as *Without Borders*’ Ahmad Mansour, requested that the questions should be sent to him by email;
most of his answers were either more general rather than specific to the questions, or he ignored the questions. Two of the AJA journalists interviewed were willing to speak to this researcher, but requested not to be named, which has been respected.

A request to participate in this study was sent to some of the former AJA TV presenters who resigned over bias allegations concerning AJA’s coverage of the Egyptian uprising, refused to become involved, in spite of being given the option of remaining anonymous contributors. Two officials in AJA, the editor-in-chief and the director-general ignored the requests.

The interviews (which were mostly obtained through telephone or Skype conversations), were, nevertheless, equally and substantially important for the data analysis that is based on the two TV programmes. The interviews obtained provided important additional information and answers which were not clearly or fully obtained from the data analysis of the two programmes.

The process of identifying the interview questions and themes, in a semi-constructed interview style (as shall be seen later), has been prepared in this research with a set of questions, some specific, directly relating to the channel and its editorial role played in the Egyptian scene regarding the MB and the Mubarak regime, and the allegation of favouring Islamists. Other questions were generic and discussed the role of Qatar (in terms of
ownership and independence), the rise of Islamists and then the fall of the MB in Egypt, the channel’s motto, and so on (see interview questions in Appendix 3).

6.4 Qualitative Research Approach

This study uses the qualitative method as a primary analysis approach in order to examine and interpret the language used, to inspect the references made to the language (verbal mode) and the assigned role of different actors (agency) at different times (time space), incorporated in the targeted text in relation to the MB and the Mubarak regime.

The qualitative research methodology chosen for this study enables one to ‘read between the lines’ of the language used within a social surrounding context (transitivity), in an attempt to rationalise the actions taken and the actors behind this action (Newman: 1998; Silverman: 2010). Greenhalgh and Taylor (1997) explain the difference between quantitative and qualitative approaches:

Quantitative research should begin with an idea (usually articulated as a hypothesis), which then, through measurement, generates data and, by deduction, allows a conclusion to be drawn. Qualitative research, in contrast, begins with an intention to explore a particular area, collects ‘data’ (observations and interviews), and generates ideas and hypotheses from these data, largely through what is known as inductive reasoning (1997: p. 740).
Michael Trumbull (2005, p. 102) asserts that qualitative research is inclusive of interpretative and naturalistic slants. Researchers, according to Trumbull, study things in their natural settings, in an attempt to make sense of phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to them. Qualitative research incorporates the study, use, and collection of a variety of empirical material: interviews, observations, historical background and interaction that describe routine and problematic moments and meanings in the lives of individuals (Denzin & Lincoln: 1994; Patton: 2002). It is in this broad term that covers a wide range of techniques and philosophies which is not easy to define (Hennik et al: 2011); consequently, qualitative study allows researchers to examine people’s experiences in detail, by using a set of research methods such as in-depth interviews and life histories and biographies (Hennikp. 8 - 9).

The benefit of qualitative approach for this research is the possibility of reading through the data in depth, and, by relying on an interpretative technique, it offers not only the possibility of understanding what exists beyond the language discourse and the hidden nuances featured in AJA TV programmes, but also a way of discovering whether or not the channel was favouring the MB, as an Islamic political party during the period under study, and how AJA envisioned the ideology of political Islam and Islam in reporting on the MB.
Margarete Sandelowski (2000, p. 336) notes that researchers conducting qualitative studies rely on the collection of as much data as possible which will allow them to capture the totality of the elements of an event that have been accumulated to make it the event that it is. This method helps to examine the various meanings in a text, and involves some degree of interpretation when approaching it (Graneheim and Lundman: 2003, p. 106).

The qualitative approach, by and large, looks at the significance - a taken-for-granted or an assumptive enquiry that studies meaningful social action (Schwandt: 2001). Data collection is often turned back on itself to provide the understanding of the growth and development of the field as a whole (Kung-Shankleman: 2006). Evelyn Jacob (2001) points out that the distinction between ‘theory-oriented’ and ‘practice-oriented’ qualitative research is often blurred, as data is rarely collected merely to make a theoretical argument or to bring about improvement.

This researcher is aware of the criticism surrounding the qualitative research method and the claims that it lacks scientific rigour (Mays & Pope: 1995, p. 109; Charmaz: 2008). The approach, nevertheless, is still commonly used as a valid technique, not only in order to understand social realities, but also to make sense of social practices. Researchers normally utilise qualitative methods to seek a ‘deeper truth’, which, according to Greenhalgh’s and Taylor’s article, ‘Papers that go beyond
numbers’ (1997, p. 740), this is hard to obtain through quantified systems. Quantitative research, however, usually deals with numbers, uses statistical models to explain the data, and is considered ‘hard’ research compared to qualitative research. Qualitative research is therefore considered appropriate for this paper, which attempts to avoid numbers and deal with ‘interpreting’ social realities - ‘soft’ research (Atkinson, Bauer, and Gaskell: 2000).

The study of language as a social discursive practice lies at the heart of critical discourse analysis (CDA), as it offers validity and reliability of data (Golafshani; 2003). ‘Language as a social practice’, according to Fairclough and Wodak (1997), is crucial as it is a discourse that gives rise to important social issues.

CDA provides a set of strategies as an integrated type of dialogue analysis, for unveiling the assumptions and hidden messages in a text, the discursive practices, and the surrounding social context (Huckin: 1997, p. 6; Harvey: 1997, p. 128). Huckin perceives the primary activity of CDA lies in the close analysis of written or oral texts that are deemed to be politically or culturally influential on a given society. Discourse analysis is viewed not simply as an act of ‘linguistic description’, but more as ‘socio-linguistic explanation’, attempting to answer the question: ‘why do members of specific discourse communities use the language the way they do?’ (Bhatia: 1997). This research endeavours to address the
question of AJA and the MB, and, in line with Bhatia’s assertion, it consequently requires sound understanding, not from linguistic descriptions alone, but equally importantly, from a socio-linguistic position.

CDA offers a powerful arsenal of methodical tools that can be deployed in the close reading of editorials, ‘op-ed’ columns, advertisements, and other public texts (Huckin: 2002, p. 3-4). It enriches the analysis further by insisting that such close reading can be done in conjunction with a broader contextual analysis, including consideration of discursive practices, intertextual relations, and socio-cultural factors. It might, therefore, be the best choice for analysing written texts, social semiotics for visual media, and socio-linguistics for classroom discourse (pp. 3-4). CDA stands at the heart of the study of the effects of AJA’s language, while interviews are an integral part of the qualitative method applied in this study.

The interviews technique also plays a useful role in discourse analysis, as stated by Bhatia, in order to understand the socio-linguistic context of the different actors. This research applies interview techniques as a primary source for data analysis, which is essential in order to comprehend the strength of interviews and is a commonly recognized research method. Interviews, according to Horrocks and King (2010), have become a ubiquitous aspect of contemporary life and are frequently used within a wide range of methodological traditions in qualitative research. Interviews are regarded as among the most familiar strategies for collecting
qualitative data (Di Cicco-Bloom & Crabtree: 2006, p. 314), and are widely-used research methods as they generate information which the researcher cannot obtain by observation alone (Berger: 2000, Jorgensen & Phillips: 2002).

Mason (1996) defines this method by saying that an interview, in its simplest form, is a conversation with a purpose between a researcher and an informant; although face-to-face interviews are considered to be the most suitable investigative form for gathering important, supporting information, telephone interviews are the best alternative for collecting sufficient data (Weiss: 1994; Seidman: 2013). There are three commonly used types of interviews in scholarly research (cited in Al-Theidi, 2003, p.15):

i. **Unstructured Interviews**: the researcher concentrates on generating information from the informants in a casual setting, but he or she has limited control over the responses;

ii. **Semi-structured Interviews**: the researcher has a written list of open-ended questions to ask the informants, whilst maintaining the casual nature of the interview; and

iii. **Structured Interviews**: the researcher uses a list of questions with a specific set of instructions for the respondents. Self-administered questionnaires are categorised as structured interviews.
The semi-structured interview method, as defined above, will be used in this study. A sample of current AJA presenters, as well as some of those who resigned, will be interviewed, in order to make sense of the channel’s editorial choices around different topics (explained later).

Phillips & Hardy (2002) assert that interviews play a useful role in discourse analysis in order to relate to the primary text. The interviews in this research offer an exclusive opportunity to apprehend the views of AJA journalists on topics that are not necessarily expressed in the channel’s programmes, thus enabling this researcher to obtain an ‘inside’ perspective of AJA’s journalists regarding how the channel covered MB affairs in Egypt, the language it used, the factors that led to such language use, the channel’s relationship with its host country, its place in the Arab world, and so on.

6.5 Research Ontology and Epistemology

It is significant for this research to realise the meaning of the two terms: ontology and epistemology, which is best explained by David Marsh and Paul Furlong (2002, p. 185):

If an ontological position reflects the researchers’ views about the nature of the world, their epistemological positions reflects their views of what we can know about the world and how we can know it; literally an epistemology is a theory of knowledge.
Marsh and Furlong (2002) project three different approaches towards these terms:

(a) Positivist

(b) Interpretist (often called Constructionist)

(c) Realist

The writers, therefore, assert that the positivist stand is that there is no appearance or reality dichotomy, and that the world is real and not socially constructed: ‘the world exists independently of our knowledge of it’ to the positivist, but is unlike that of the Interpretist position (constructionist). Marsh and Furlong (p. 186) explain the connections between ontology, epistemology and methodology, and note that positivists employ a quantitative approach, while realists use both qualitative and quantitative, and Interpretists only use the qualitative approach.

This researcher disagrees with the positivist argument, in that the world exists independently from *a prior* knowledge, but stands in line with interpretists and realists, as the world is governed by social norms and knowledge. The world, therefore, does not exist independently of knowledge and the understanding of it, but is shaped by ideology, awareness, values, beliefs and interpretations of it.
This research adopts the interpretist approach which includes consideration of the realist’s position, therefore, the qualitative method will be applied in order to help establish ‘how’ people understand their world (Marsh and Furlong: 2002). Marsh and Furlong also remark that the argument for other approaches such as positivism, merely offers opinions or subjective judgements about the world, which makes a response from someone from the interpretist tradition difficult as ‘it is based on a totally different ontological view and reflects a different epistemology and thus, a different view of what social science is about’. Thomas A. Schwandt says:

The qualitative technique is the activity of making sense of, interpreting, or theorising data. It is both art and science, and it is undertaken by means of a variety of procedures that facilitate working back and forth between data and ideas (2001, p. 6).

Interpretists argue that the world is socially or discursively constructed, therefore, in ontological terms, as noted by Marsh and Furlong (2002), this position is reinforced by the ‘anti-foundationalist’ view, which believes that there is no real world to discover which exists independently of the meaning which actors attach to their actions. The supporters of this interpretist approach believe that ‘objectivity’ is improbable, noting that there is no ‘objective truth’ that exists, as the world is socially constructed by an individual’s own views, feelings, and the surrounding social norms, in line with realists, who consider that not all social phenomena - and the relationship between them - are questionable. Marsh and Furlong (2002)
note: ‘realists do not accept what appears to be so, or, perhaps more significantly, what actors say so, is necessarily so’.

It is essential to read between the lines and beyond the language that exists through a systematic examination of AJA’s language, which allegedly supports one political group or another. The realist, according to Malcolm Williams (2006), questions the fact that the social world is ‘real’ because of causal tendencies. Social constructionists, on the other hand, say that objects have no properties outside of their social setting: they are constructed by the setting, and that construction is usually created as a linguistic structure.

Williams (2006, p.14) writes: ‘social construction can be “real” and the “real” can be socially constructed’, therefore, objectivity hardly exists in a socially constructed world because what may be seen by one person as objective reality is not necessarily viewed as such, by another. The constructivist paradigm, moreover, contains the naturalistic, hermeneutic, or interpretive pattern.

Tom Rockmore (2005) describes constructivism as most interesting in the context of the theory of knowledge, consequently, the core concern of constructivist authors consists of fundamental re-orientation: the centre of attention must no longer be held by the ontologically-intended ‘what’ question but by the epistemologically understood ‘how’ question (Bernhard
Poerksen: 2011). The reflection of the constructivist approach – based on Poerksen’s assertion – will be helpful to this research, as the intention is to analyse the ‘How?’ rather than the ‘What?’ question.

How AJA socially constructs itself in the Arab world, and how it employs language the way it does in relation to different groups and ideologies, are questions that mainly rely on the socio-linguistic stance (including the representation of language, power and ideology) integrated in its editorial values, journalistic beliefs, and its own perception of the Arab world within the social context.

6.6 Language, Power and Ideology

Textual discourse analysis includes conversations, interviews, observations, and written materials, according to Linda Philip (2007), which are considered to be a hybrid of linguistic and social theory that focus on discourse within social practice. The discussion surrounding discourse analysis is very much based on the grounds that there are interrelations between language, power and ideology, and between how the world is signified in texts, and how people look at their world (Stubbs: 1997).
Based on Stubbs’s assertion on the inter-relation between language (lexical choice), power (actors) and ideology (action), the analysis of AJA text (two programmes and interviews) will be constructed.

Power, by and large, is linked to any discourse, and is not initiated by language itself as ‘language is not powerful on its own – it gains power by the use powerful people make of it’ (Weiss and Wodak: 2003, p. 14). This means that the ideology of power represented by ‘actors or agency’ is very much determined by the selection of language which defines someone’s identify and then is transformed into action(s).

Media (as a form of power) are used as a mediation power (an actor) according to Pasha (2011, p. 60), through which social meanings are produced, stored, distributed and consumed on a mass scale: ‘what the media are actually doing is offering their audience selective presentations of selective events’. Pasha (2011) presents Fairclough’s view (2001, p. 41) who suggests that mass media discourse involves hidden relations of power: text producers in mass communication address an ‘ideal subject,’ construing their own notion of their ‘ideal reader,’ and by these means may succeed in influencing audiences to accept particular social realities in accordance with their ideological scope and view of it. Hartley (1982, p. 47) explains how the news takes the discourse form it does as something determined by ‘the way the news-makers themselves act within the constraints’.
The process of ideology is best explained by Van Dijk (1998, p. 6), who notes that groups with certain ideologies such as communism and anti-communism, socialism and liberalism, Islamism and secularism, and so on, are largely governed by their specific beliefs about the world, their interpretation of events, and understanding of their social practices. This type of ideology generates polarisation of people into ‘us’ and ‘them’, and the audience begins to produce and consume discourse in terms of a ‘we’ and ‘they’ dichotomy.

This process of polarisation leads to what Van Dijk describes as an ‘ideological square’ which clarifies the dichotomous character of the fundamental discourses in societies. This ideological square, according to Van Dijk, separates the ‘in-groups’ from the ‘out-groups’ through both emphasis and mitigation: ideological discourses categorically emphasise the good ‘self’ and the bad ‘other’ and instantaneously mitigate these two concepts. Van Dijk (1995) asserts that the articulation of ideologies is often based on several forms of the ideological square:

I. Emphasises positive things about us;
II. Emphasises negative things about them;
III. De-emphasises negative things about us;
IV. De-emphasises positive things about them.
The forms of Van Dijk’s ideological square and the process of emphasising the good ‘us’ or the bad ‘them’, moves the discussion to the ‘framing’ process, in which framing different actors or actions is based on a specific ideology. Framing, according Robert Entman (2009), refers to the process of selecting and highlighting (or emphasising and mitigating) some aspects of a perceived reality, and enhances the salience of an interpretation and evaluation of that reality; at the media level, journalists’ framing of an issue may be influenced by several socio-structural or organisational variables (Scheufele: 1999). Framing helps to deepen the theoretical insight more generally into the political influence of the news media and into the relations among elites, media, and the public (Entman: 2009).

It is in this selection and highlighting process (emphasising some aspects and de-emphasising others) that the influential role of power or social factors can be explained, in which language, power and ideology are represented in the targeted data in this study. There are two types of framing models ‘distance framing’ and ‘empathy framing’, according to Pier Robinson (2002). Robinson explains that the way an action is framed defines the standpoint of the actors. The selection or emphasis of some adjectives or verbs assigned to actors such as; ‘kill/killing’, ‘dictate/dictating’, and ‘loot/looting’ generally suggest ‘distance framing’ with negative implications, whereas, adjectives and verbs such as
'reform/reforming', 'suffer/suffering' and 'support/supporting' suggest 'empathy framing' with positive inferences.

Departing from the ideological square and the framing model, AJA’s text regarding its coverage of different actions (different electoral moments) and actors (the MB and the Mubarak regime) at different times will be scrutinised. This process will enable this research to identify adjectives and verbs incorporated in the text and the different roles assigned to actors at different times.

Three important features, in line with discussions on language, power and ideology, are central to the rhetorical strategies in the sample texts: verbal mode, agency and time space, according to Chouliaraki (2006, p. 77), and will be examined below.

**Verbal Mode**

Language usage or verbal mode is represented in the transcripts of each episode, and performs fundamental classificatory activities. It includes and excludes foregrounds and backgrounds, justifies and legitimises the content, and separates ‘us’ from ‘them’ or the model of good ‘self’ and ‘bad others’.
This research raises the following questions regarding language in the analysis of the text:

- What is the main idea or topic?
- What are the actions and story behind it?
- What is the verbal mode (adjectives and verbs) that are used to emphasise the description of the MB and the Mubarak regime?
- How was the actor framed?

**Agency (Actors)**

It is important to trace the assigned power relationships that existed before and after the 2011 Egyptian revolution, at different electoral periods, in order to analyse the position held in connection with the social context: how the two programmes represented different actors regarding the MB and the Mubarak regime (the Egyptian people, opposition parties, the Military Council, Women, Copts, and so on).

The process of language representation is very much related to the discussion of ‘transitivity’, which suggests a distinction between transitive and intransitive verbs associated with participants and the circumstances (Halliday cited in Pasha: 2011, p. 117). Transitivity incorporates the relationships between the process (verbs) and the participants involved with it (subjects and objects). Transitivity includes identifying who is set as
agent (‘doer’ or ‘sayer’), what is set as a goal (upon whom the action is performed), and the processes (doing or saying).

The assigned role of actors (agency) aims to promote or condemn the particular ideology of that actor: for example, victims or persecutors, democratic or dictatorial, Islamic or secular. The incorporation of humanistic enquiry in the analysis of journalism could contribute not only to unravelling how the authority of this profession is constructed, but also to the journalists’ authority in constituting the social world as a discursive practice (Zelizer: 1993/1997; Fairclough: 2002, p. 309).

Journalists deploy a range of strategies as a means of distributing power among the different agents, therefore, when discussing the role of different actors several questions will be asked, including:

- How this agent was represented?
- What are the adjectives and verbs associated with this agent?
- What role or actions was this agent assigned in the text?
- How is this agent represented in terms of the ‘ideological square’ and ‘framing?’ - Positive things about ‘us’ and negative things about ‘them’.
**Time Space**

Time space, as a third rhetoric strategy, is imperative in the analysis of AJA’s text, in order to uncover the presentation of language and actors at various times.

1. How were the different actors assigned in the text, namely the MB and the Mubarak regime, represented in the past, the present and the future?

2. How the ideological square of emphasis and mitigation was used on the positive ‘us’ and the negative ‘them’ to represent different times?

3. How did the construction of language and actors change from one time to another?

The thoughts resulting from the set of questions raised in the three strategies will assist in detecting common themes that emerge from selected text.

**6.7 Research Themes**

Theme identification is one of the most fundamental tasks in qualitative research and yet one of the most mysterious. They can however, be found
through in-depth and line-by-line scrutiny (Ryan and Bernard: 2003, p. 81).
Themes are abstracts that are often blurred and come in all shapes and sizes, which, according to Ryan and Bernard (2003), can be found in two different approaches: inductive and \textit{a priori}. Themes in the inductive approach can originate from the actual data and the \textit{a priori} approach is based on a researcher’s prior theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under study by reviewing existing literature.

The process of retrieving the themes from the data is what theorists call ‘open coding’, ‘talent-coding’, or ‘qualitative analysis’ (Berelson: 1952). Bogdan and Biklen (1982, p.165) propose reading over the text at least twice in order to extract a general idea about the themes.

Bogdan and Taylor (1975, p. 83) suggest several techniques that can be used to look for themes in the data, such as repetition and similarities and differences. Repetition is one of the easiest ways to identify themes: some of the most obvious themes in a corpus of data are those ‘topics that occur and re-occur’. Similarities and differences, according to Glaser and Strauss (1967) is the ‘constant comparison method’ which involves searching for similarities and differences by making systematic appraisals of data units. This research utilises both inductive and \textit{a priori} approaches to identify common themes in the text of AJA’S two programmes and interviews.
6.7.1 Themes emerging from the text of two programmes

This research focuses on the inductive approach for the selected AJA episodes by identifying repetition and adopting the constant comparison method. Three common themes emerged from the data scrutiny:

Theme 1: victimisation versus criminalisation
Theme 2: democracy versus dictatorship
Theme 3: Islamisation versus secularisation

The retrieval process of these three emergent themes was based on both Van Dijk’s Ideological Square and Robinson’s Framing Model. The course taken to retrieve these themes in the text (see Chapters 7 and 8), was built on three concepts: verbal mode, agency and time space, together with the strategy questions discussed earlier, in connection with the MB and the Mubarak regime during four electoral instances.

Theme 1: this research has observed that repetition and constant comparison of references or words used in the TV programmes suggest victimisation of the MB and the criminalisation of the Mubarak regime. Each electoral moment repeatedly reflected that some references (adjectives and verbs) were used about the MB, such as: ‘banned group’ (جماعة محظورة), ‘legally pursued’ (ملاحقة قانونية), ‘subjected to cruel security strikes’ (تعرض لضربات أمنية قاسية), ‘subjected to policy of arrest, harassment and
pursuance (تتعرض لساسية الاعتقال والتضييق واللاجئة الأمنية), and so on. The constant comparison method revealed that these references indicated victimisation of the MB and criminalisation of the Mubarak regime which committed these actions at various times.

**Theme 2:** the text incorporated some repeated references that suggest the MB’s commitment to the value of democracy such as: ‘the choice of the people’ (خيار الشعب), ‘democratically elected’ (منتخب ديمقراطياً), ‘trusted by the people’ (تحظى بثقة الناس), ‘brings social justice’ (تستحق للإصلاح), ‘seeking reform’ (تسعى لتداول السلطة), ‘seeking devolution of power’ (السياسي للحصول على التنمية والاستقرار), ‘achieving development and political stability’ (للحصول على التنمية والاستقرار), and so on; some references, on the other hand, recurrently suggest the negative aspect of Mubarak’s dictatorship such as: ‘corrupted regime’ (نظام فاسد), ‘inheritance of power’ (تراث السلطة), ‘responsible for political blockage and stagnation’ (مسؤول عن الردكود الانسداد السياسي), ‘obstructing development and causing political chaos’ (اعاقة عملية التنمية وإيجاد حالة من الفوضى السياسية), and so forth.

**Theme 3:** other references emphasised in the programmes suggest that the MB supports the Islamisation value. Such references include words such as: ‘Islamic identity’ (هوية اسلامية), ‘adopting the Islamic project’ (مشروع اسلامي), ‘bearer of awakening project based on Islamic values’ (يحمل مشروع اسلامي, and so forth.)
These three themes will be further discussed in the following chapters.

6.7.2 Themes for Interviews

The process of selecting themes and questions for interviews was largely established on two grounds: existing literature (*a priori* approach) and the text of the two TV programmes (inductive approach).

This research initially identifies some general, yet relevant, questions and themes that emerged from reading existing academic work and current news reports (*a priori* approach) on AJA and the debates surrounding its role in covering the Arab uprisings in different countries (particularly Egypt), the nature of its relationship with Islamists, including the foundation of the allegations raised regarding the channel’s relations with the MB, the use of critical language in social media by some of AJA presenters, and the ongoing debates about the channel’s ownership and editorial independence (Qatar). Other questions that emerged were based on the critical reading of the actual text of the two targeted programmes (inductive approach) and the rationale of the assigned ideological square and framing in the text of the two programmes. This includes the presenter’s vision of the role of different actors, the representation of these roles and the verbal mode
assigned to them (including victimisation and criminalisation, democracy and dictatorship, Islamisation and secularisation), and the vision of the channel’s ‘objective or impartial’ motto of representing an opinion, on one side, and the contradictory opinion, on the other (see chapter 9).

6.8 Summary

Different methodology techniques will be used in this paper, including qualitative research, critical discourse analysis and interviews.

The interviews with some of AJA’s former and current journalists and/about the two TV programmes (Without Borders and Opposite Direction) will be critically examined. The benefit of the qualitative research method is to uncover hidden meanings of the language AJA uses within the Arab cultural context, and validates the end results. Interviews, moreover, help researchers to obtain data which is not available from the analysis of the actual text of the two programmes.

The ontological and epistemological interpretist approach (with the leaning towards the realist’s approach) is adopted, and will assist in studying and explaining the language of AJA and its journalists, in an attempt to understand the surrounding socially-constructed context.
The next chapter will critically analyse the text of AJA’s *Without Borders*, presented by Ahmad Mansour. The language of the programmes and what stands beyond it in four key electoral moments (two before and two after the toppling of Mubarak) will be scrutinised and measured by using three Rhetorical Strategies as tools for analysis: verbal mode, agency and time space. The model of the ‘Ideological Square’ process as presented by Van Dijk (1995), will be complemented by Chouliaraki’s Rhetorical Strategies in the analysis of the two programmes in order to understand the action taken and identify the language references and actors’ representation in different times and spaces.
7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter presented the data selection, qualitative methodological approach, including critical discourse analysis (CDA) and interview techniques, in which language, power and ideology were discussed. The ideological square of Van Dijk, rhetorical strategies of Chouliaraki (verbal mode, agency and time space), and the framing model of Robinson will be used, and the process of transitivity (verbs relating to subject and object) in terms of action and actors, will also be applied.

The language utilised in Without Borders, a well-known and principal AJA TV programme, will be inspected in this chapter. The implications of the
language used and the messages conveyed are important to this study, in order to understand how Ahmad Mansour, AJA’s presenter of *Bila Hudood* - *(Without Borders)*, represented the MB and the Mubarak regime in different electoral moments, before and after the Egyptian uprising.

It is considered necessary to first give a brief outline of Ahmad Mansour’s background before analysing the text, with the aim of better understanding the nature of the effect of language which had become integral to his programme.

### 7.2 Without Borders: Text Analysis

The analysis of a sample of *Without Borders* episodes featuring key figures of the MB, suggests that the programme framed the MB as the ‘victim’ of the Mubarak regime’s ‘brutality’. The MB movement was depicted as a bearer and promoter of a civilised mission with a grand political vision for the future and as a viable alternative to authoritarian regimes (Mubarak’s and his so-called ‘remnants’). This mission adopted by the MB, entailed a series of political and social reforms, working closely with the opposition’s political actors, offering sound governance in Egypt, based on an ‘Islamic awakening project’.

The former secular regime, on the other hand, is portrayed in *(Without Borders)* as the perpetrator (of criminal acts), the root of Egypt’s
problems, and the main obstacle hindering Egypt’s political progress. This regime practiced torture and oppressive policies, according to Mansour and his guests, which not only excluded movements such as the MB, but also many other opposition groups.

This research has identified three dominant themes (discussed in the previous chapter), which emerged from critical reading of the text (inductive approach). The repetition of some references (adjectives, verbs, subjects and objects) and the constant comparison method, based on three grounds for the inter-relation between language, power and ideology:

(i) victimisation versus criminalisation
(ii) democratisation versus dictatorship
(iii) Islamisation versus secularisation

The selection process for these three themes was based largely on the actual text scrutiny. It is through Van Dijk’s ‘ideological square’ of the ‘good self’ and the ‘bad others’ that the themes were retrieved, and the conceptions of victimisation of the MB (empathy framing and ‘in-group’) and criminalisation of the Mubarak regime (distance framing and ‘out-group’), that were identified. The value of democratisation and dictatorship, moreover, also located on the same scale as the representation of the two concepts, was not only based on the grounds of empathising power
relations between ‘us - the democratic’ and ‘them - the dictators’, but also
on the way this programme’s framing representation of actors and as
mitigating ‘negative us’ and ‘positive them’. The incorporation of verbal
mode, agency and time space in the text, appears to present the MB
positively, with an ambitious political vision, and the Mubarak regime,
negatively, as a hindrance to the process of democracy. The theme of
Islam (or Islamisation), as a political ideology, was also represented in the
text: the painting of the MB as the bearer of the Islamic awakening project
(as divine agents of Allah or God) in terms of ‘positive us’ and ‘negative
others’.

The three rhetorical strategies (verbal mode, agency, and time space), in
conjunction with the ideological square and framing model, will be useful
bases for scrutinising the text of the selected samples.

7.2.1 The MB: victims of the Mubarak regime of all time

The reference to victimisation was largely dominant in the analysis of the
sample text; as shall be seen, where there is a victim or object (the MB as
acted upon), there is a subject (the Mubarak regime as actor) and a verb
or adjectives relating to the action or process of victimisation.
The term ‘victimisation’ in criminology, as discussed by Sandra Walklate (2007), is related to the power of the media and the salience of a symbolic image or lexical choice in shaping dominant understanding of criminalisation and victimisation. The media play a central role in informing and cultivating people’s everyday perceptions of crime and disorder through the illustration of victimisation. The media (such as AJA) create symbolic identities (action or verbs and adjectives) for sufferers (the MB as object) and for villains (the Mubarak regime as subject) (Ferrell: 2005 – cited in Walklate: 2007: 468).

It was noted in the text that this programme presents the MB as ‘victims’, while the former regime as ‘villains’. This juxtaposition of victimisation and criminalisation is marked by the linguistic selection (‘verbal mode’) ascribed to the brutality of Mubarak’s regime. The critical lexical choice often embraced by the presenter (Ahmad Mansour) and some of his guests (primarily from the MB) was noted in the process of selecting and highlight the suffering endured by the MB members. This selection process and the highlighting of key words that signify the nature of suffering (action and process), the sufferer (acted upon), and the villain (actor), falls in the heart of the ideological square and framing model.

The leaders of the MB (as main actors) hosted in AJA’s Without Borders programme were given the platform to elaborate on their policies (ideology) and suffering under the former regime. The presenter allowed
the MB guests the time to highlight the pattern of victimisation by moving regularly between different times (history and the present), in order to illustrate the sacrifices the movement had made throughout its troubled past, in the context of the positive and negative paradigm.

The verbal mode in the *Without Borders* programme includes metaphors, terminology and connotations to emphasis the framing of ‘us’ (the in-group) and ‘them’ (the out-group).

The examination of the nature of the verbal process, including the assigned transitivity model (adjectives and verbs), is illustrated in the table below through the linguistic allusions and adjectives incorporated in the programme, describing both the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to the victimisation versus criminalisation theme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The MB movement (object)</th>
<th>The Mubarak regime (subject)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banned group</td>
<td>Banning the MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjected to cruel security strikes</td>
<td>Has cruel security services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legally pursued</td>
<td>Using the judicial system to pursue the MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjected to policy of arrests, harassment and pursuit</td>
<td>Threatening and spreading alarm among people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Members excluded from running Parliamentary election in 2005</td>
<td>Fabricating election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sacrifices</td>
<td>Oppression</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal and constitutional struggle</td>
<td>Unlawful and dishonest</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand by the deprived Egyptian people</td>
<td>Working for their own interests</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 8:** The representation of MB and the Mubarak regime in terms of victimisation and criminalisation

The interview with the former deputy head of the MB, a few weeks before the Egyptian parliamentary election in October 2005, allowed both the presenter and his guest, Khairat Al-Shater, Deputy MB Supreme Leader, to distance themselves from Mubarak and to show empathy towards the MB:

**Mansour:** [...] The MB, officially described as a banned group, is the most controversial political power in Egyptian society. Despite the cruel security strikes they've had since the assassination of its first founder and mentor, Hassan Al-Banna on 12 February 1949, observers consider them to be the most organised and influential political group in Egyptian society. (EP1: EX1).

It is noteworthy that in this sample the representation of the ideological square can be realised; how Mansour presented the process of emphasis and mitigation (including and excluding) the different actors as ‘the bad’ and ‘the good’ in both discursive practices and semantic relationships.

The presenter's lexical choice of the adjective ‘banned محظورة’, for example, stands as a reference to the MB movement being the victim (the object on which the action of banning was performed). Although the verb ‘to ban or
‘banning’ may be deemed to represent an objective description of the actual status of the movement during the Mubarak regime, the emphasis on ‘ban’ signifies the sympathising element to those subjected to the banning (the MB) and refers to the ‘bad’ subject or actor (the Mubarak regime).

The presenter evidently allied the adjective of ‘banned’ group to the adverb ‘the most’ more than once: the most controversial power which aims to emphasise a connotation by which the MB, despite banning and cruel security strikes (negative emphasis on Mubarak), was still a dominant, organised and influential power in Egyptian society (positive emphasis on the MB).

The presenter’s narrative in the 2010 parliamentary election also seemed predictive of the political picture before the results, implying a significant occurrence by forecasting the fabrication of the results by the Mubarak regime and a prolonged tenure of presidency (EP6: EX5).

The victimisation of, and suffering endured by the movement was reinforced by its Supreme Leader, Mohamed Badei, who was hosted to discuss the Egyptian general election in 2010, during peak political tension, immediately before the public uprising in that year. The Mubarak regime
had made mass arrests and suppressed the MB members during the electoral campaign, resulting in accusations that the election had been ‘fabricated’. The Mubarak’s party was, at that time, accused of manipulating votes to ensure a sweeping victory in the parliamentary elections (*The Guardian*: 2010\(^{23}\)).

Badei recounts to Ahmad Mansour how the former regime subjected the MB members, including its leaders, to unjust imprisonment, military trials, and confiscation of their private properties:

**Badei**: There’s no party in this world that takes such procedures towards their opponents by making arrests, attacking homes, looting properties, confiscating private and public companies, disrespecting legal and constitutional articles which they’ve sworn to respect, wasting the verdicts of courts issued, and still being issued, up to this date. Despite all this, there’s no way out but the way of using a legal and constitutional struggle to restore our rights and the Egyptian people’s stolen rights (EP6: EX9).

Mansour had rightly asked the reasons behind the MB’s participation in a ‘fabricated’ election, and Badei was given uninterrupted time to expound the movement’s vision, the brutality of the regime, and the level of suffering it had faced, which, according to the guest, were the main reasons for the MB’s participation in the election - in order to rescue the

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Egyptian people from long-standing injustice from the Mubarak regime, by what he described as a ‘legal and constitutional struggle’.

The language used by Badei was a clear example of the systematic approach to underpin the suffering of the movement by emphasising and re-emphasising the actions committed by the Mubarak regime. The transitive verbs, in terms of action and actors of a ‘corrupt-corrupted’ regime, ‘loot - looting properties’, ‘arrest’, ‘steal - stolen rights’ not only meant to distance and deepen the gap between the people and the regime (‘them’), but also invited the people to empathise and support the MB (‘us’) in order to eliminate such atrocities: voting for the MB would therefore bring about justice and a democratic system to the people’s ‘stolen rights’ by the Mubarak regime (EP6: EX6).

The affirmative use of the verb ‘restore…’ and the pronoun ‘our’ (our rights) and the noun phrase (Egyptian people) positively refers to the suggestion of harmony between the MB and the Egyptian people (‘in-group’) and distinguishes the Mubarak regime (‘out-group’) as the executor of the action: the thief of their rights.

Badei asserted: ‘We stand to say to [Mubarak] that he is the oppressor. The repetition of the first person pronoun ‘we’ – like the use
of ‘our’ - in the above example (6: EX6), not only refers to the MB members as the victims but also to other actors, the Egyptian people and opposition parties, who had been similarly subjected to the regime’s oppression. The implied message, as this research reads, was that the MB, Egyptian people and the opposition were on one side (the victims) and the Mubarak regime (the perpetrators) on the other. This is an illustration of emphasising the boundaries between the ‘good’ self, and the ‘bad’ others.

The Egyptian mass protests took to the streets soon after the 2010 election, and eventually Mubarak was unseated; a move which was widely seen as a glimmer of hope towards the path of ‘justice and democracy’ in the country, and returning to the Egyptian people their ‘stolen rights’, as earlier pledged by the MB’s top leader, Badei.

Parliamentary and presidential elections were held one year after the fall of Mubarak in 2011, in which Islamists made history in both elections (Kirkpatrick: 2012) by winning almost half of the parliamentary seats, and were therefore entitled to form a government, and its presidential candidate, Mohammed Morsi, became the Egyptian president (EP7: EX7).

Ahmed Mansour’s television episode on a discussion regarding this ‘electoral victory’, appeared, on the one hand, to celebrate the victory of the MB which had long been subjected to aggression and suppression by
the Mubarak regime, and on the other, blamed the ‘remnants’ (فلول) of Mubarak’s regime for obstructing the implementation of the MB’s political grand vision of democracy, based on Islamic ‘awakening’ (نهضة) (explained later).

Mansour invited the newly-elected MB president, Mohammed Morsi, to appear on his programme, on the first anniversary of the January 25th revolution – the date chosen was arguably no coincidence - it held, as this research argues, a cherished symbolism for the end of the tyrannical regime and the birth of a new era for Egypt’s prosperous future, led by the MB.

The presenter did not hesitate to emphasis the factor of suffering in the past in his introduction to Morsi, by highlighting that after many years of being unjustly ‘banned’, the MB had now gained the trust of the Egyptian people and would be leading Egypt through a representative process by the first civil government elected, after decades of military control:

**Mansour:** Today, millions of Egyptians have gone out on the streets and squares to celebrate the first anniversary of January 25th revolution, which has begun to bear its fruit [...]. This step stands as a defining mark in the history of Egypt and the MB organisation, which was described by the Mubarak regime, before the revolution, as a ‘banned organisation’. This so-called ‘banned organisation’ has now become the choice of the people’s majority vote (EP7: EX7).
Noticeable is the fact that the MB’s success was positively emphasised as ‘a defining mark in the history of Egypt and the MB’، and implicitly depicted the MB as the ‘saviours’ (subject) of the Egyptian people by gaining their trust and leading them to the shores of an ‘awakening’ and democracy; conversely, the presenter’s decision to use the phrase ‘banned group’ جماعة حظورة twice in his introduction, arguably reflects his personal stance towards the MB, by assigning the adjective ‘banned’ as a negative and distance verbal connotation for Mubarak, while using a positive verbal reference to the MB by stressing ‘them’ as ‘the choice of the people’s majority vote أصبحت هي خيار الشعب الذي صوت بالأغلبية للإخوان المسلمين’. The representation of the ‘Egyptian people’ as the ‘subject’ and the MB as ‘object’ (acted upon), illustrates the ‘in-group’ process by denouncing the Mubarak regime and electing the MB - a reversal of circumstances.

A few months later, following his interview with Morsi, the narrative of what was previously described as a movement that marked a ‘defining moment in Egypt’s history’ by gaining the trust of the Egyptian people, had shifted. It appeared that the MB was struggling to fulfil its promises made to the Egyptian people. Consequently, the public discontent began to increase against the MB’s leadership in less than a year of being in power.
Mansour wanted to continue addressing the challenges the MB’s leadership was facing, and in order to achieve this aim, he invited the current Prime Minister, Hesham Qandeel, in late 2012 to participate in two consecutive episodes. Mansour pinpointed the MB’s ‘inheritance of political chaos’ created by Mubarak and his government.

Strong metaphoric and passionate language was embedded in Mansour’s introduction to Qandeel, underlining the ideological square and framing models of ‘us’ (the victims) and ‘them’ (the perpetrators). He, alongside his guest, reasoned about the MB’s incompetency, by stressing the fact that the movement had not been given a chance by the people, the deep-state الدولة العميقة, and controlled media, to start rebuilding and re-ordering a country that had been damaged by the ‘dictatorial and corrupt’ regime and its remnants.

Mansour: … It’s extremely unlucky for any party to lead a nation, following a revolution. Whatever this party does, it will not be able to sew the holes which have turned the state dress into a mess. Following the revolution, freedom has become a form of chaos. The success of removing the tyrant, made people feel that they are bigger than anyone who governs them, regardless of his size and status - even if this person has been chosen by them. This is the reality of the people in Egypt today. The people who have been under dictatorship and corruption for more than six decades do not want to give their ruler a few weeks, months, or years to think about how to re-knit a new dress for the country, after electing the first civil president in its modern history. (EP8: EX10).
The above example shows how the presenter employed a vivid, empathetic, emotive and lexical choice favouring the MB, by blaming not only the ‘dictatorship’ and ‘corruption’ of the overthrown Mubarak regime but also the Egyptian people who were not willing to give the MB the time to ‘reknit a new dress’ or rebuild the damage left by the Mubarak regime in the past ‘six decades’. This example illustrates the presenter’s conscious choice of a passionate and elevated language and questions his neutral stand.

The role assigned to the Egyptian people in the above sample, apparently shifted and placed them in the (‘out-group’), after having been in the ‘in-group’ for some time. The stress of the adverbial phrase (the first لاول مرة in relation to Morsi as a ‘civil president’ (رئيس مدني, and in its modern history’ (في تاریخه الحديث), is another example of the emphasis and mitigation process: positive emphasis and empathy for the actor (the MB’s representative) voted for by the people in a free election, whereas mitigation (or de-emphasis) of the reasons behind the core question of why Egyptian people were not willing to give the MB’s leadership a chance.

The mass protest and the military ‘coup’ ended the MB’s one year of control in July 2013. Members of its top leadership (including President Morsi) were arrested, and tens of thousands of their supporters were
injured or killed during the protests against the ‘coup’ which demanded the return of the ‘legitimate President’, Morsi.

The ousting of Morsi was, once again, the deciding factor for the linguistic choice in this programme. It primarily stressed the victimisation of the MB’s leadership and its members by repeatedly referring to the ‘killing’, ‘torture’ and ‘arrest’ perpetrated by the armed forces, and the leader at that time, General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. It was noted that both Al-Sisi and Mubarak were categorised in the ‘out-group’:

Ahmad Mansour: [...] such a coup was met by sacrifices of thousands of martyrs, and tens of thousands injured and imprisoned (EP12: EX8).

The use of the noun in the plural ‘sacrifices’ and the noun ‘martyrs’ suggests a value-laden lexical choice which reflects the level of empathy of the speaker (presenter).

Moving between history and the present (time space) in the text, Mansour underlined the ‘endurance’ of the MB movement under severe political conditions for the last sixty years, in which it had experienced many crises in various other countries, but considered this crisis to be the biggest in its history (EP11: EX43).
The former military officer, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, (responsible for ousting Morsi), ran for the presidential election in June 2014, and won 96 per cent of the votes. Al-Sisi’s critics (including Mansour) argued that the figure was inflated, as many polling stations appeared to have been empty throughout the polling dates, according to the Guardian newspaper (2014)\(^{24}\).

Al-Sisi, as another perpetrator (agent) of oppression, was negatively framed in this programme, together with the Mubarak regime and its supporters, following the fall of Morsi. Ahmed Mansour addressed this development by hosting two episodes with Yousif Nada, Commissioner of International Relations for the Muslim Brotherhood. The first one on April 2014, entitled ‘Nada: Al-Sisi is not qualified to rule and the MB will not give-up’، ندا: السيسي ليس مؤهلا للحكم والإخوان لن يستسلموا, highlighted Al-Sisi’s election and the presenter and his guest repeatedly stressed the idea that Al-Sisi was an unlawful leader and incompetent to lead the country, let alone the Military Council. They also emphasised that he had been supported by external actors who were conspiring against the MB (EP11: EX43).

The second episode was two weeks before the Egyptian presidential election on 7 May 2014, in which Ahmad Mansour produced the programme from Paris: ‘New coalition against the coup … Does it gives a

glance of hope? قيام جديد ضد الانقلاب... هل يشكل بارقة أمل؟. He hosted the former member of the Egyptian National Security Council (Al-Shoura Council), Tharwat Nafe’a, to discuss a national document introduced by political parties opposing the military coup, in order to form a new political coalition. Their aim was ‘to restore 25th January’s revolution and democracy’, as well as to plan a clear political future, after ‘the coup’ that had ousted Morsi (EP12: EX8). The episode was arguably a platform for an open plea calling for the ‘honest’ political parties and the ‘people with conscience’ (the Egyptian people), to act quickly and revolt against the ‘illegitimate military coup’ led by Al-Sisi, and bring back the ‘legitimate president’, Morsi.

Another dominant theme emerged from the critical analysis of this programme in addition to the notion of victimisation: the MB and its grand political vision were depicted as a viable alternative to the authoritarian regime.

7.2.2 The MB: Alternative to Mubarak’s authoritarian regime

The value of democracy versus dictatorship is another dominant theme that surfaced from the selected data. The MB was represented as reasonable replacement for Mubarak’s dictatorship as it had far-reaching political plans for Egypt’s future. The MB was presented positively as
seeking reform, establishing devolution of power, ready to work with different political parties and prepared to entertain co-existence with Copts.

The table below illustrates how the MB and the Mubarak regime were represented in the text:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The MB</th>
<th>The Mubarak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demanding reform</td>
<td>Corrupt regime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seeking devolution of power</td>
<td>Inheritance of power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working together with other political parties</td>
<td>Singling out and excluding other parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Creating political dynamics and change</td>
<td>Responsible for political blockage and stagnation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Achieving development and political stability</td>
<td>Obstructing development and causing political chaos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having few women candidates</td>
<td>Creating challenging environment for women to operate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working together with Copts and the Church</td>
<td>oppressed under Mubarak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building an independent, modern and</td>
<td>Damages Egypt with fake promises of reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>democratic Egypt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish honest media</td>
<td>Control media services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish free and honest judicial system</td>
<td>Control judicial system</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 9:** The representation of MB democracy versus Mubarak dictatorship

The MB narrative before the fall of Mubarak, for example, was by and large, focused on their demands to reforms the ‘corrupt’ regime. Al-
Shater, the MB’s Deputy Supreme Leader, repeatedly put the request for ‘reform’ at the heart of the movement’s politics, during the 2005 election:

**Al-Shater:** We urge the government [the regime] to start the reform process. We would accept the reform to start gradually but a serious one, clear and specific in order to accomplish a true reform in this country (EP1: EX19, EX20 and EX29).

Al-Shater stressed the idea that the legitimate political vision of the movement demanded the attainment of ‘true reform’ by establishing a culture of ‘political participation’, ‘diversity’, ‘accepting the others’, and ‘devolution of power’. He denounced the process of the parliamentary election in 2005 as ‘false democracy’ and noted that it was exaggerated by the media and the security services in their positive description as part of the course towards ‘true democracy’ (EP1: EX27).

The notion that the MB’s political participation was one of cooperating with other political actors was also represented in this programme’s text (EP1: EX20 and EX 21 - EP 6: EX 30 and EX34); for example, in 2005, Al-Shater moved back in history and listed the number of political collaborations that the MB had had with others:
Al-Shater: If you look at Egyptian modern history, you would not find any political power that has collaborated with other powers as much as the MB. The MB has coordinated with Al Wafed Party in 1984, had a coalition with the Labour and Free Party in 1987. Now and before the election, with the start of political dynamics and before, we have approached Al-Arab Nasserite Partly, Unity Party, and Wafed Party and offered them [the opportunity to form a committee to draft a political project to save this country [Egypt] and establish political and constitutional reforms (EP1: EX29).

Noticeable is the fact that the presenter (Mansour) had given his guest (Al-Shater) the space and uninterrupted time to elaborate his point.

The opposition parties in the above sample were represented positively or neutrally as the ‘in-group’ by working together with the MB to ‘save this country’. The use of the verb ‘save’ may have a patriotic connotation in order to show that the MB was making every effort to achieve democratic practices by ‘establishing political and constitutional reforms’.

Morsi, furthermore, expressed his commitment to democratic values in January 2012, and noted that the MB was moving towards stability and development. The mission, according to Morsi, was to establish a ‘new and stable Egypt’, ‘modern Egypt’ and ‘democratic Egypt’ that had modern constitutional aspirations (EP7: EX22). Noticeable is the repetition of the same noun: ‘Egypt’ three
times with three different positive adjectives: ‘stable’, ‘new’, and ‘modern’, which signifies positive framing of the MB’s grand political vision of Egypt’s future democracy.

Morsi also reflected on the process of how his grand political vision would be carried out in the same episode (EP7), by working side-by-side with other opposition powers and ‘founding a balanced parliament for all parties on a percentage-based representation’ (EX31), another example of the projected inclusion of opposition powers (neutral or positive demonstration).

This positive or ‘impartial’ representation of the opposition parties radically changed by late 2012 immediately before the MB lost power. Mansour projected the Egyptian opposition actors in Egypt not only negatively but also used offensive language to describe them:

Mansour: Dr Qandeel, how come all ‘the remnants’ of the previous regimes: Nasserites, leftists, communists, artists, dancers, drummers, are in coalition against the government? Do you follow the political scene or not?


This sample clearly reflects Mansour’s subjective lexical choice. His critical portrayal of the opposition was offensive as he equated the different ideologies of Egyptian opposition powers (actors) to ‘dancers’.
‘drummers’، ‘artists’ and ‘remnants’، which essentially have negative connotations (extremely insulting in Arab culture) and is based on the ideological square which categorises them as the ‘out-group’. The Prime Minister, Qandeel, did not attempt to refute the presenter’s denunciation of the opposition powers, but limited his answer to showing his commitment to ‘democracy’, in his reply.

The Copts and women were positively or neutrally represented in the text, before and after the fall of Mubarak. Mansour opened the platform for his guest, Al-Shater (EP1), regarding the MB’s relationship with the Copts, as illustrated in the example below, to clarify the significance of this connection, painted in the programme by Al-Shater (Deputy of the MB’s Supreme Leader), with positive use of two adjectives: ‘healthy’ and ‘continuing’.

**Mansour:** In relation to the Copt candidate, what is the nature of the coalition between you the Copts?

**Al-Shater:** Regardless of religion, we strongly believe that the representation of Copts - as much as other political parties - in the political life is inevitable. We talk about Egypt and its awakening and progress following its status of extreme backwardness; in the wake of the triangle of: backwardness, corruption, and oppression [referring to the Mubarak regime] we have been living under, we believe that all political power must exist and be represented. Our relationship with Copts is healthy and continuing. It does not exist because of the election only (EP1: EX36, EX37 and EX38).
This ‘healthy positive relationship’ classified the Copts as part of the ‘in-group’, while the ‘out-group’ (the regime) remained ‘distanced’ with the use of three different negative adjectives: ‘backwardness’، ‘corruption’، and ‘oppression’ in reference to the Mubarak regime – ‘them’ (the ‘bad others’).

The MB’s vision towards women was likewise positively or neutrally signified. The MB attempted to show caution towards citing women by saying: ‘we do not want to expose women candidates to challenges’ لا نريد أن تعرض المرأة إلى مثل هذه التحديات‘harassments and arrests’ perpetrated by the Mubarak regime during fierce electoral battles such as those in 2005 (EP1: EX35); yet again, the verbal representation of the MB (subject) regarding women (object) with the words ‘not to expose them’ to ‘harassment’ suggests the ‘good self’ (the MB) and ‘bad other’ (the Mubarak regime).

The representation of this actor (Mubarak) was largely negative, considering that he once led the Military Council. Some MB guests (such as Badei and Al-Shater) stated that most of the MB members were given a military trial before being jailed during the Mubarak regime, and described the fall of Morsi as a ‘military coup’ (EP1 - EP6: EX16 - EP12: EX8), which had decisive implications. Those who believed in Morsi’s legitimacy described what had happened as a ‘military coup’, whereas
those who believed that Morsi’s ousting was legitimate, refuted the term and described it as ‘a correction of the revolution’s path’. تصحيح طريق الثورة.

Morsi’s fall in 2013 witnessed the Egyptian media, President Al-Sisi, and businessmen always being negatively represented. The media, according to Qandeel, (former prime minister), ‘distort[ed]’ the image of Egypt by painting a picture of chaos (EP8: EX39). Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, furthermore, was regarded in this programme as the leader of the ‘military coup’ who was building a ‘false democracy, attempting to legitimise the coup and seeking international recognition’ (EP12: EX8 and EX11).

Noticeable is the fact that different actors (agents - the MB, Mubarak, the media, women, the Military Council, and so on), were assigned specific roles in the programmes and were variously presented at different stages, both before and after the fall of Mubarak:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Before the fall of Mubarak</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The MB</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mubarak</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opposition powers</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egyptian people</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Copts</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The assigned roles of the ‘Egyptian people’ and the ‘political opposition powers’, for example, were represented either positively or neutrally before the fall of Mubarak, as being the victims and the source of power and legitimacy; after Mubarak’s regime was toppled, their representation shifted to being either neutral or negative by noting that they were not willing to give the MB government a chance.

The accreditation which included or excluded the foregrounds and backgrounds of each guest is noteworthy in this research. How were the guests introduced in this programme? Mansour usually began each episode with a long description about his guest, including several

| Businessmen | X |
| Judicial system | X | X |
| Media | X |
| The military | X |

| After the fall of Mubarak |
| The MB | X |
| Mubarak | X |
| Opposition powers | X | X |
| Egyptian people | X | X |
| Women | X |
| Copts | X | X |
| Businessmen | X |
| Judicial system | X |
| Media | X |
| The military | X |
| Al Sisi | X |

**Figure 10**: The assigned role of different actors in Egypt before and after the fall of Mubarak
references to dates, facts and places, in order to add an objective viewpoint:

**Mansour**: In this episode, we try to introduce the MB’s vision for Egypt’s future and their project to evolve it [Egypt] through our dialogue with Dr Mohammed Morsi, the president of Freedom and Justice Party. He graduated from The Engineering College, Cairo University in 1975, got his Master’s in Filzat Engineering from Cairo University, and was awarded his Ph.D from South California University in 1982. He worked as assistant professor in North Ridge University in the U.S. - in California between 1982 and 1985. He worked as a lecturer and head of Filzat Engineering department in Zagazeeq University from 1985 until 2010. He was a member and president of the parliamentary block for the MB in Parliament between 2000 and 2005. He was selected as the best parliamentarian in the world due to his performance […] (EP7: EX26)²⁵.

Mansour could have listed only one or two credentials or recent jobs held by each guest. It can be argued, however, that the emphasis placed on the MB leaders’ educational background added to their status as intellectual elites who combined both faith and education.

The listing and the selection of particular details of each date of his guests’ imprisonments (as in Badei and Al-Shater’s accreditations), arguably sought to achieve objectivity and factuality in offering not only a credible programme to his audiences, but also to demonstrate that the leadership

²⁵ See also (EP1: EX23) for Al-Shater introduction and (EP6: EX25) for Badei’s introduction.
of the MB had paid a heavy price and had been subjected to the injustices of different regimes. The presenter intended to send a message that in spite of the group having made many sacrifices, it now had the qualifications and therefore deserved a chance to lead the country as an alternative to the autocratic regimes.

Mansour, however, used a different approach towards his guests from the ruling party (Mubarak’s regime). He omitted to list any of their credentials such as education or political achievements in his introductions (EP5: EX44). Only a few guests from the Mubarak regime or its supporters appeared in Mansour’s programme (most of them rejected the invitation). The different ways of guest presentation therefore presents the question of whether the presenter was an ‘objective’ moderator.

The MB’s commitment, as an Islamic movement, to democracy and awakening was an apparent factor in the programme. The value of Islamisation will be assessed in the following section, in order to explain how it was represented in Mansour’s programmes.

7.2.3 The MB: Comprehensive Islamic project for Egypt

Having projected the MB’s references and commitment to democratic values, the representation of the MB’s vision to Islam or Islamisation will be inspected as the third emergent theme.
This research notes that at the beginning of each episode, the programme presenter, Ahmad Mansour, started his episode with a full Islamic greeting: ‘In the name of Allah, the Most Compassionate and the Most Merciful’ (السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته), which arguably reflects the presenter’s religious Islamic status, given his background as an Islamist.

The verbal mode in the programme incorporates illustrations of the Islamic vision and values of the MB. The table below explains the MB’s use of references that directly or indirectly suggest the use of Islamic values in its political narrative:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The MB</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>We have Islamic identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopting Islamic project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bearer of awakening project based on Islamic values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam is the solution and the Qur’an is also the solution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>criticising the MB means criticising Islam itself</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt awakening project includes Muslim individuals, Muslim family,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim society, Muslim institution, attain Islamic unity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopting peaceful <em>Jihad</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Punishment will come to people on Judgement Day [referring to Mubarak and others] and then God’s wrath will be harder on the day after.

The Creator of people gave them the right to believe in him [God]. People are free to choose their own beliefs and faith.

Figure 11: The representation of the MB’s Islamic values in *Without Borders* TV programme

The MB’s Islamic identity was overtly marked by Al-Shater in the 2005 election, in which he affirmatively illustrated the movement’s political and Islamic vision of the ‘Islamic Awakening project’:

*Al-Shater:* We do not hide our Islamic identity, we have an Islamic project: an awakening project for Egypt based on Islamic values. This is our beliefs and approach. We do not find any problems describing ourselves as such, or loudly marketing this slogan (Islamic identity) […] I say not only Islam is the solution but also the Qur’an is the solution. (EP1, EX12).

The verbal boundaries are represented by ‘we’ or ‘our’ as a separation ideology (Islamists ‘in-group’) and may also refer to ‘them’ or ‘they’ (other political powers as the ‘out-group’). Al-Shater explained in the same episode (EP1, EX14), what he meant by ‘comprehensive Islamic awakening مشروع نهضة متكامل’. He clarified that the aim of his movement was not to rule but to achieve an ‘awakening’ for Egypt. This ‘awakening’ starts with ‘Muslim individuals الفرد المسلم’, the ‘Muslim family البيت المسلم’, ‘Muslim
society and a ‘Muslim state’, and seeks to reach an ‘Islamic unity’.

Badei also explained (EP6) that the MB’s legitimacy comes from Allah (God) and the movement is devoted to its motto: ‘Islam is the solution’.

Badei: Our legitimacy comes from Almighty Allah, so the group carries the flag of reform, the promotion of virtue, the prevention of vice, and advice to rulers for the benefit of the country [...].

Mansour: have you abandoned your motto: ‘Islam is the solution’ which you’ve raised during this period?

Badei: No we have not.

The use of the noun (Allah ؛ اسم الجلاله: الله) as the subject (a divine actor) which gives the ‘legitimacy’ (action) to the object (the MB: recipient of the divine legitimacy), arguably represents their positive and highly spiritual status as an Islamic political group. The use of different positive verbs: ‘carry reform’، ‘promote virtue’، ‘prevent vice’، ‘advise rulers’ suggests that the MB had assigned themselves the role of divine or (Allah)’s agents or messengers to achieve comprehensive political and theological Islamic values in Egypt, as a complete way of life.
Badei also invokes the words of the Hadith (the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad), calling Muslims to peaceful *jihad*, in order to achieve justice and prevent oppression in his attempt to inspire the Egyptian people (the victims المظلوم) to take action against Mubarak’s regime (in his words: ‘the murderers’) to save themselves from death. Reference to the Qur’an and the Hadith is frequently made by MB guests on the programme, in order to justify not only their right to fight an oppressive regime, but also to square this battle with the teachings of Islam. They are left unchallenged by Mansour:

**Badei:** Do you imagine that this is something we should do nothing about? We stand to say to the oppressor [Mubarak] that he is the oppressor. We are encouraged to stand against that, as described and advised by the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) when he said: “The best jihad is a word of truth about an oppressor Sultan”; and we say as the Prophet once said: “the fear of people should not stop you from saying the word of truth when you acknowledge wrong-doing because this won’t change your divine livelihood (EP6: EX15).

The Islamic narrative and references such as the above, add to the authenticity of the MB’s demands and justification for its battle against the former regime(s). Badei’s reference to the injustices to which they had been subjected under the Mubarak regime, was a warning that it would not receive retribution from the MB, but would incur God’s wrath on the ‘Day After’ (Judgement Day), (EP6: EX16).
The language usage and references to Islamic values used in presenting the MB was explicitly described as being the bearer of Islamic values, compatible with the value of democracy and reform, whereas the Mubarak regime and his ‘foloul’ or remnants were largely represented as deterring the progress of democracy, and would be subjected to Allah’s divine wrath and punishment, was left unchallenged by the AJA presenter.

7.3 Summary

Ahmad Mansour’s TV programme, Without Borders, was examined in this chapter, in which the language of the programme and what stood behind it was scrutinised. It was argued that before the fall of Mubarak, Mansour presented the MB as victims, and the Mubarak regime as villains. The programme provided the platform for the MB’s political grand vision to be expressed. The language of the programme noticeably celebrated the victory of the MB after the fall of Mubarak, and largely blamed Mubarak’s ‘remnants’, not only for hindering the implementation of the MB’s political vision, but also the development of a civilised Egypt. Following the fall of President Morsi in 2013, the programme became an active campaigner against what was described as ‘the military coup’ led by General Al-Sisi and Mubarak’s ‘remnants’, as well as promoting the idea that the MB was still a victim of conspiracies.
It can be argued that the channel directly or indirectly showed positive representation to the MB’s ideology, not only because of the movement’s political and Islamic ethics, but also due to being the so-called ‘victim’ and the opposition and long-standing historical movement standing against tyrannical regimes, including Mubarak’s. This assertion was widely perceived by AJA that the MB was a growing force that could not be ignored (Reuters: 2014), not only in Egypt, but also across the Arab world.

The programme, moreover, positively projected the MB’s grand political vision of Islamic Al-Nadha project (‘Islamic awakening ).

Before the 2011 uprising in Egypt, the channel had long presented the movement as one of the powerful Islamic political forces on the Egyptian political scene. The fall of Mubarak saw AJA appear to favour the MB as an alternative power to the authoritarian regime in Egypt, by allowing Mansour to regularly host the movement’s top leadership to speak out about its electoral programmes, and its vision for a better Egypt, based on the Anglo-American concepts of democracy, justice and freedom.

The programme was widely seen as a defender of the MB’s political incompetence and lack of political judgement in leading the Egyptians during a very complex transitional period. It blamed Mubarak’s ‘foloul’ (the

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Military Council) and other liberal and secular political parties for the MB’s ineptitude during its one year in power.

The following chapter reviews samples from Opposite Direction, presented by Faisal Al-Qassem. His programme focuses on similar political issues as Ahmed Mansour’s, but has a three-way structure: two guests with robustly opposing views, and the presenter as moderator of the debate. The selected text of Opposite Direction will be scrutinised through the ideological square, framing models and in conjunction with the three rhetorical strategies (verbal mode, agency, and time space).
8.1 Introduction

Ahmad Mansour’s TV programme, Without Borders, was examined in the previous chapter, in which the verbal mode, agency and time space were scrutinised in accordance with Van Dijk’s Ideological Square and Robinson’s Framing Model. It was argued that the MB was represented as ‘victims’ and the Mubarak regime as ‘villains’, by regularly emphasising the atrocities committed against the movement. It was noted that Without Borders had provided a platform for the MB’s political grand vision to be positively communicated. The linguistic process included transitivity (verbs and adjectives - subject and object – action, actor, and acted upon), emphasised the separation line between the MB (‘us’ - democratic) and the Mubarak regime and supporters (‘them’ - dictatorial). Islamisation as
MB’s principle ideology was positively represented in the narrative, by regularly evoking the words of the Hadith and the Qur’an, which aimed to distance the Mubarak regime (‘out-group’) and represent the MB as the divine agent of a comprehensive ‘Islamic awakening’ project (‘in-group’).

The texts of the selected samples of *Opposite Direction* presented by Faisal Al-Qassem, are examined in this chapter. The programme has a different design and structure from *Without Borders*, although it often addresses similar political issues. Al-Qassem usually invites two guests each week with strongly opposing political views to debate certain topical issues.

The three Rhetorical Strategies (verbal mode, agency, and time space) in conjunction with Van Dijk’s Ideological Square theory and Robinson’s Framing Model will be applied to the analysis of *Opposite Direction*. Twelve selected episodes linked to four electoral moments before and after the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011, will be scrutinised in this chapter.

The linguistic choice (verbal mode) made by Al-Qassem, the presenter, it is argued here, was often inflated or passionate (adjectives describing the action of the subject ‘us’ and the object, ‘them’) with colourful metaphors and elusive connotations, not only to credit the MB and the opposition
parties standing against the Egyptian ‘dictatorship’ regimes, but also to depict the movement as a viable alternative, particularly for Egypt.

A discussion of power relationships (agency) will be made, considering the changing assigned role of different actors. People and opposition powers standing against the dictatorship were represented positively and as the ‘in-group’, whereas after the fall of Mubarak, the Egyptian people and opposition parties were represented as two groups: revolutionaries, positively characterised as the ‘in-group’, and the foloul: Mubarak’s ‘remnants’ negatively depicted as the ‘out-group’.

Al-Qassem and some of his guests regularly referred to different times, highlighting the years of suffering endured by the MB and ordinary Egyptian people under past governments and the current Mubarak regime. Al-Qassem blended his subjective views - often offensive - with ‘objective’ facts, aiming to increase credibility and viewership of his programme.

8.2 Opposite Direction: Text Analysis

The themes that emerged from the Opposite Direction sample texts will be analysed through the inductive approach, similar to the methodology adopted for Without Borders. The same discourse analysis techniques – Van Dijk’s ideological square and Robinson’s framing models – will be
applied to examine the rhetorical strategies: verbal mode, agency, and
time space in the three themes that surfaced:

1. Victimisation versus criminalisation
2. Democratisation versus dictatorship
3. Islamisation versus secularisation

The implications of the verbal mode in relation to transitivity will be studied
in order to understand the lexical choices made when describing a
particular action taken. The examination of the assigned role of different
actors is equally important, which will help to understand the ‘subject’ and
‘object’ (the performer of the action and the receiver of the action). The
examination of time space is also significant in order to trace the reasons
and context of moving between the past and the present by the guests
and presenter.

8.2.1 Standing with the ‘victims’ against the tyrannical regime

The sample texts revealed the argument surrounding victimisation versus
criminalisation made in the programme. The MB was painted as the victim
(object: acted upon) while the Mubarak regime as the tyrant (subject: actor). It seems that the lexical choice (verbs or adjectives) and the action
taken exhibit a catalogue of connotations, exaggerations, subjective and
often abusive and unrealistic narratives, to denounce and separate the
Mubarak regime (‘out-group’) from the MB (‘in-group’). The representation of people and the opposition parties moved between neutral and negative in the programme. The presenter and the MB guests often referred to history, in order to highlight the oppression they had been subjected to by the Mubarak regime (as the victims ‘acted upon’).

Studying the verbal process and the assigned transitivity model, the table below illustrates examples of the verbal allusions and adjectives which were repeatedly highlighted throughout the programme in describing both the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to victimisation and criminalisation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The MB movement (object)</th>
<th>The Mubarak regime (subject)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banned group</td>
<td>Banning the MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjected to persecution, oppression, pursuit and intimidation</td>
<td>Corrupt and tyrannical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjected to the culture of arrests and incarceration</td>
<td>Carried out arrests and jail sentences against the MB and opposition parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>banned from electoral campaigns in universities and public places</td>
<td>Electoral campaign control and fabricated results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived under oppression for decades</td>
<td>‘Killer’ and oppressive regime</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 13**: The representation of the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to idea of victimisation versus criminalisation
The MB candidates ran as independents in the 2005 parliamentary election and won 88 seats in Parliament out of 454 (20 per cent or one-fifth of the total seats), thus increasing the MB’s popularity among Egyptians, at that time (Hamid: 2014).

The two sample episodes under review regarding the 2005 election exposed the verbal mode of the MB and the presenter, by and large, as separating the good side (Islamists: the MB) from the bad one (dictator: Mubarak regime) - a typical example of Van Dijk’s ideological square. The presenter (Al-Qassem) underlined a principal idea of the MB’s victimisation by emphasising that the movement had won a significant number of parliamentary seats in Egypt, in spite of ‘fabrication (تزوير) ‘persecution’, ‘oppression’ (اضطهاد), ‘pursuit’ (الملاحقة), and ‘uprooting’ (استئصالهم). The listing of different negative adjectives referred to the action taken by the Mubarak regime against the MB (object: subjected to such atrocities) which suggested empathy towards the MB and distancing it, not only from Mubarak’s regime, but also from other Arab governments in the Middle East:

Isn’t it true that Islamists won a massive percentage of the Egyptian parliamentary seats in spite of all the pressure, fabrication and bullying? - an Islamist asks. What if the elections were free and fair? Islamists could have won more than 90 per cent of the seats, […] Aren’t such elections in most Arab states proof that Islamists are the number one power in the Arab street, in spite of persecution, oppression, being pursued and uprooted by Americans and Arabs? […] but on the other hand, don’t the
voters who vote for the Islamic trend reflect ignorance and lack of democratic maturity? Did the Egyptians really vote in the MB, or was it a protest vote because they hate the regime? Who said that Islamists are oppressed by Americans and Arabs? They would not have participated in the election without American blessing (EP14, EX0)

The provocative and emphatic tone of Al-Qassem’s questions in the above example was evident (arguably introduced to equally represent the opinions held by opposing sides). The nature of the questions listed by Al-Qassem, may seem, at first glance, to represent both viewpoints, albeit conflicting (Islamists - the MB) and (secular - the Mubarak regime), but, on deeper analysis, it becomes clear that the actual format of the text and the hidden meanings reflect empathy (positivity) towards the MB and the stand taken against Arab authoritarian regimes.

The incorporation of different adjectives such as: ‘pressure’ (الضغط), ‘bullying’ (البلطجة), ‘persecution’ (اضطهد), and so on, pinpoint the notion of the movement’s victimisation. The Mubarak regime (villain) was represented negatively and - arguably – the presenter aimed at not only disgracing the regime for the ‘crimes’ it had committed against the opposition, particularly the MB (victims), but also illustrating the fact that this ill-treatment eventually led to the popularity of the MB in gaining support from the Egyptian people (in-group).
Al-Qassem’s attempt to conceal his subjective views was evident in the above example. The attribution to an arbitrary person: ‘an Islamist asks’ (يتسائل ناشط اسلامي) maybe deceptive and debateable: is it aimed at pursuing objectivity in order to distance himself, as a balanced moderator, from any accusation of favouritism? Who and how credible this ‘Islamist’ was, as the source of affirmation was not supported by verifiable evidence.

Noticeable was the fact that the set of questions asked by Al-Qassem represented the opposite viewpoints to those of the MB. The intention was possibly to encourage audiences not only to reject the questions but also to embrace the opposite view (Islamists). It seems arbitrary for the presenter, for example, to raise the issue of ‘who said that Islamists are oppressed by Americans and Arab leaders?’ (من قال إن الإسلاميين مظلومون أميركيا وعربية؟). The question may indicate contempt towards those adopting such a view, but proves exactly the opposite, as it was widely known that although Islamists were subjected to oppression, they were also operating underground (EP14: EX0, EX1 and EX3).

Fateh Elrawi, the guest representing the Islamist's view in the discussion of the 2005 election, referred to history, and emphasised that Al-Banna (the founder of the MB) started from Ismalyyia’s coffee shop and from grassroots: ‘For more than 60 or 70 years this movement has been subjected to torture and injustices’ (يصب على الحركة الإسلامية من العذاب والظلم) (EP13:...
EX9); similarly, the idea of victimisation was also embraced by Rafeq Abdelsalam, an Islamic activist invited to talk on the show about the 2005 election and the rise of Islamists. He was given an uninterrupted opportunity to air his views. He highlighted adjectives that suggested empathy towards the MB and its victimisation, noting that in spite of the MB and other Islamic movements being banned (محظورة) and subjected to the regime’s pursuit and oppression (ملاحقة واضطهاد) its electoral performance had emerged as superior to all political opposition parties (EX14: EX4). The principle intimation behind highlighting the paradox of the negativity to achieve positivity in this example is evident in the guest’s narrative (supporting Islamists or the Islamic view). He employed different adjectives to paint the villainous actions perpetrated by the Mubarak regime (subject) against the MB (object: acted upon) to positively embrace the MB’s position.

The verbal nuances of the presenter and his guests during other electoral moments generally remained the same. The presenter allocated three different episodes to the 2010 presidential election and before the eruption of the Egyptian public uprising. The dominant tone of the episodes largely blamed not only the Mubarak regime, as seen in the 2005 election’s narrative, but also the Egyptian people for accepting the status quo. A catalogue of abusive connotations and metaphors were employed by Al-Qassem to generally describe the Arab people’s situation, particularly focusing on the Egyptians:
Al-Qassem: Why are Arab nations proudly talking about honour and dignity while they are the most suppressed, living with injustice, oppression and dictatorships? Isn't it the case that our people are like a man who proudly talks about his adventures with women while he is (sexually) impotent? Why do we fake manhood when we fear our own shadow? Why do we fake heroism when we are a nation of cowards? Why do we fake courage when we are the weakest of the universe’s nations? Has any Arab leader not committed the same sin that he commits against his people? When does an Arab nation revolt against its oppressor other than in its dreams? (EP17: EX12).

The incorporation of different negative adjectives by the presenter in the above example questioned the Arabs’ honour (كرامة) and dignity (الشجاعة) and branded them (the Arab masses) as sexually (adjective) impotent (عنين), faking heroism (يشد بالبطلة) and cowards (اجين), which are considered to be most insulting and provocative in Arab culture. The representation of ‘helpless’ Arab people (object: acted upon) as the victims of the Arab regimes (subject: actor) made them weak and not averse to living under totalitarian control.

It could be argued here that the hidden intention behind using different nouns such as ‘supressed’, ‘injustice’, ‘oppression’ and dictatorship’ was aimed at illustrating that the action taken by Arab regimes was criminal on the one hand, and a message for Arabs to rebel, on the other. It can also be argued that the presenter intended to invite people to join the right path (in-group), by inspiring them to revolt against oppression, and distance the

The Egyptian people took to the streets following the Tunisian uprising and revolted against the Mubarak regime. They accused it of fabricating the presidential election by winning more than 90 per cent of the votes. Mubarak stepped down and handed over power to the Military Council. The MB’s political position was becoming stronger, in the meantime, and it decided to put forward its candidate, Mohammed Morsi, against Ahmad Shafiq, the prime minister during Mubarak’s regime. The programme discussed this particular issue: people were divided on whether to vote for the Islamists or for one of Mubarak’s ‘remnants’ (Shafiq). The Egyptian people were placed in the ‘out-group’ in that episode, as they were being blamed by the presenter for their indecision: ‘how could the great Egyptian people - who had revolted against the dictator - replace the tyrant with one of its “tails”?’ The Egyptian people were once again being reproached for their ‘unjustifiable’ fear of Islamists and for not being willing to give the MB a chance to govern (EP18: EX13).

The Egyptian people were not the only actors rebuked in the programme: the Military Council, now in control, was aggressively represented. The fact that Mubarak had come from the military was repeatedly emphasised by referring to history. The objective, as this researcher argues, was to stress the link between Mubarak and the military (out-group) as villains, or
two sides of the same coin. This was evident in the MB guest’s narrative. He stated that for more than 60 years the military had been the reason for poverty (فقر), backwardness (تخلف), ignorance (جهل), diseases (امراض), dictatorship (استبداد), corruption (فساد), looting resources (نهب ثروات), and so on. This was the same narrative previously used to describe the Mubarak regime:

Ahmad Barakha (MB): Military control has been widespread in Egypt for 60 years, what did they give us? They brought us poverty, backwardness, ignorance, diseases, dictatorship, corruption, looting resources, and so on [...] until we need a revolution.

Al-Qaseem: Briefly, do you want to say that voting for one of Mubarak’s ‘foloul’, Ahmad Shafeq, is a result of intentional smearing of the revolution in Egypt for over a year?

Ahmad Barakah: Revenge.

Al-Qassem: Revenge against the revolution, is that possible?

Ahmad Barakah: Without doubt! This is the simple reality of which the Egyptians, Arabs and the world are aware.

The above sample illustrates how the presenter appeared to have made little effort to challenge the MB guest’s argument; instead, he was questioning the blame laid on Mubarak and his supporters by emphasising the separation line between the MB (‘good’ side) and the Mubarak regime, ‘foloul’ and military (‘bad’ side).

The reference to revenge (الانتقام) on the revolution was evoked by the MB guest and stressed by the presenter, by charging the ‘foloul’ (Mubarak’s
‘remnants’) for conspiring (مؤامرة) against the revolution and the revolutionaries. The ideological square representing the ‘out-group’ here includes different actors: Mubarak’s regime, the Military Council, Shafiq, and the ‘deep state’, which includes the media and businessmen (EP18: EX14).

This accusation of revenge was denied by Nabil Sharaf Aldine, an activist supporting Shafiq against the MB. He was regularly interrupted during this episode, and was not allowed to refute the allegations made by the MB guest and Al-Qassem (EP18: EX15); in addition, Shafiq (the candidate standing against Morsi), was branded a ‘killer of revolutionaries’ by Al-Qassem, when he asked: ‘how could people vote for the killer of revolutionaries (قاتل الثوار)?’, which again aimed at distancing Shafiq and supporting the MB (EP18: EX18).

Public discontent against the MB began to grow in Egypt soon after Morsi’s election. Egyptian opposition parties formed a movement named Tamarod (تمرد), demanding Morsi’s resignation, and threatening a campaign of civil disobedience if he remained in office (DW News Website: 2013). It was a critical time for both the MB and Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first civilian and Islamist president. He was ousted by the military on 3 July 2013\(^\text{27}\), after only a year in power. This event divided Egyptian society between those who supported the Islamists and those

\(^{27}\) see [http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18371427](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-18371427) [retrieved 29/12/ 2014]
who did not. Morsi’s removal was considered by the Islamists to be a ‘full military coup’ (انقلاب عسكري) and against the will of the people, and the ‘continuation of the January 25 revolution (استكمال مسيرة الثورة), by his opponents (Kingsley and Chulov: 2013).

Al-Qassem presented an episode entitled: ‘Who has led Egypt into a mess and destruction?’ in the wake of this serious development. The answer was that Egypt was facing a ‘counter-revolution’ (ثورة مضادة) led by the ‘remnants’ of Mubarak’s regime.

The presenter stated that demonstrators standing in Al-Tahrir Square in Egypt, calling for the MB president to step down, were inviting ‘the corrupt regime to return’ (عودة النظام الفاسد) (EP20: EX21). It is in this example that different actors are characterised in accordance with Van Dijk’s ideological square: the MB and the Egyptian people as the ‘in-group’ and the Mubarak regime and ‘remnants’ as the ‘out-group’.

Mr Shurbani (a member of the Tamarod movement) queried the so-called ‘balanced’ nature of Al-Qassam’s questions and his ‘unbiased’ moderation of the programme. Noticeable in the example below is how the presenter asked his guest (opposing the MB) several questions, but gave him little chance to reply, which raised the issue of the presenter’s impartiality:
Al-Qassem: let me ask you a simple question. Let’s assume that you’ve successfully managed to remove this president [Morsi] in such a revolutionary and street-wise way. You have put yourself in a jungle game or followed the law of the jungle. Let’s say that you’ve taken the leadership after Morsi, and have attained authority, do you think that Morsi’s supporters will leave you easily, or it will shake the land below your feet and will lead Egypt to a storm of coups, and so on? The man came through the ballot boxes and should go through ballot boxes, instead of death boxes. Do you want coffin boxes [sic] or ballot boxes?

Abdel Aziz Shurbasi: the way you format the question is very important. Al-Jazeera (Arabic)’s motto is ‘opinion and the opposite opinion’, which means you present both views and remain impartial. What you’ve just said has no traces of impartiality. (EP20: EX29)

Mr Shurbasi became aware of Al-Qassem’s subjective language, the unfair distribution of time and constant interruptions. Shurbasi warned Al-Qassem that he would abandon the live production on several occasions, unless he was given a fair opportunity to speak: ‘If you don’t give me equal time, I shall leave the programme’. It was evident that Abdel Aziz Shurbasi had been constantly interrupted and allowed to speak for much less time than his opponent representing the MB’s viewpoint: a blatant violation of AJA’s guidelines for programme presenters.

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28 The time distribution was not equal (words were counted by this researcher). Abdel Aziz Shurbasi, an activist (against the MB) was given almost half of the time (1,728 words) in comparison to that (3,089 words) given to Hani Salah El-Din, Media Advisor for the MB political party’s Freedom and Justice,
It can be argued that the above text placed doubt on Al-Qassem’s balanced approach in his questions to his guests. He implied, once again, that the MB was the victim (object) of a conspiracy theory (action), led by Mubarak and his supporters (subject). The presenter made unsupported statements to the opposition guest, and accused him of not appreciating Morsi’s conciliatory offers of forming an inclusive government.

The military coup - supported by the Egyptian masses – which overthrew Morsi and put him in prison\textsuperscript{29}, initiated another of Al-Qassem’s *Opposite Direction* programme called: ‘After toppling Morsi: Was there any conspiracy against Islamists or not?’ Al-Qassem made little attempt to hide his anger and frustration through the questions he raised:

Isn’t it ridiculous to say to Islamists: you are welcome to participate in the election but on one condition, you cannot win? Why do they put pressure on Islamists and then call them extremists? Wouldn’t this push Islamists to go for the ammunition box instead of the ballot boxes through which they were victorious? (EP22).

General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi seized power through a ‘military coup’ on May 2014, prior to the Egyptian presidential election. He vowed to tackle ‘terrorism’ and restore ‘security’ to the Egyptian people that had been lost

during the years after the Egyptian uprising (*BBC News*: 2014)\(^{30}\). The question of ‘national security’ (الأمن القومي) which was often used to alarm Egyptian people, was a talking point in the programme.

Two guests with extreme views were invited: Mahmoud Attya, Egyptian lawyer and general co-ordinator of the coalition party, ‘Egypt Above All’, representing opposite views to the MB, and Mohammed Qudosi, Egyptian writer, representing the MB’s view. The core of the episode was to question the very nature of Egyptian national security over democracy. Those who opposed the MB called for the military to intervene in order to control a country in chaos, even if that meant bringing back the old Mubarak regime and dictatorship through its ‘remnants’, according to Al-Qassem.

Attya’s viewpoint, standing against the MB’s governance, was challenged and even mocked by the presenter, when he tried to make a point that Egypt was facing a ‘great conspiracy’ (مؤامرة كبيرة) as were many other Arab countries. Al-Qassem contested the use of the phrase ‘universal conspiracy’ (مؤامرة كلية).

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**Attya:** Egypt was subjected to a great conspiracy as much as other Arab countries in the region.

**Al-Qassem:** Great conspiracy?

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Attya: Of course.
Al-Qassem: Universal, right?
Attya: It is not universal, no.
Al-Qassem: I thought you had taken it or were stealing it from Bashar [Syria].
Attya: Bashar has nothing to do with this.
Al-Qassem: Possibly, stealing it from this person [Bashar] who uses the word ‘universal’ as though the whole world was conspiring against him. (EP24: EX30)

This research argues that the idea of Al-Qassem evoking the example of Bashar Al-Assar in Syria was to say that the atrocities committed against the MB in Egypt were very similar to those in Syria.

Al-Qassem repeatedly interrupted his anti-MB guest and embedded his own views by using phrases that may have indicated objectivity, but were arguably an attempt to hide his personal view: ‘many have said…’ (يقول كثيرين) is an example of Al-Qassam’s aim to give his opinions authority and credibility, yet he chose not to substantiate ‘many’ by not quoting specific names.

Al-Qassam’s programme, Opposite Direction, similar to Mansour’s Without Borders, not only provided an opportunity for important members of the MB to voice their opinions, but also acted as an agent for the MB’s grand political vision, discussed in the following section.
The presenter moves between the past and present to prove or disprove his argument, and allows uninterrupted and unchallenged space for his ‘favoured’ guest to elaborate on various topics that particularly frame the Islamists and the MB in a positive light, due to their long suffering under autocratic regimes. The MB would be able to make positive changes in Egypt and elsewhere through democratic practices, according to him, and thus replace the ‘villains’ of secular military regimes such as Mubarak’s.

While the role of Mubarak’s regime and the military were represented negatively at all times (out-group), the assigned role of different actors, including the Egyptian people and the opposition parties, regularly changed from a neutral position to a negative one (in-group to out-group). The role of the MB, however, was steadily represented as positive (with empathetic tones) to illustrate its victimisation on one hand, and on the other, its capability to govern in a democratic fashion, as a viable alternative to an authoritarian regime.

8.2.2 The MB: democratic choice of the people

The programme used positive language towards the MB and regularly projected the movement as a leading opposition party, as victims that had been subjected to injustice but were now a qualified alternative to repressive governments. This displayed a distancing language towards
dictatorship regimes such as Mubarak’s and promoted the MB’s ideology and commitment towards democratic values.

The presenter and his guests from the MB habitually emphasised the victimisation of the MB as the recipient (acted upon) to highlight the bad practice of democracy from the Mubarak regime (perpetrator of the action). The solution to eliminate dictatorship in Egypt and elsewhere, according to the presenter and his Islamist guests, was to bring about freedom and democracy through the MB.

The table below shows regular references (transitivity: actor, action, and acted upon) used to describe Islamists (the MB) and the Mubarak regime in relation to democracy and dictatorship:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The MB</th>
<th>Mubarak and supporters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Calling for reform and willing to participate in the political process</td>
<td>control of media and security services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical movement</td>
<td>Agents for U.S. and Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The only social and political power that stands against the ruling regimes</td>
<td>Cause of poverty, backwardness, ignorance, diseases, continued dictatorship, corruption, plundered resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denounces violence, accepts democracy, respects human and women’s rights</td>
<td>Discredits the revolution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better alternative to most Arab governments</td>
<td>Dictatorship (‘shit’ democracy)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
more organised and accepted than other social powers

Destroys general public opinion on the principles of culture, identity and diversity

Widespread, diverse, and inclusive displays a different social layer

Egypt faces a great conspiracy from Islamists

Stands against dictatorship, corruption, aims to liberate homelands

Controls the state resources

[Islamists] arrive at the chair of power via ballot boxes, not tanks

Democracy is totalitarianism not according to ballot boxes

Diversity: Morsi appoints a Copt as his deputy

No political diversity

Islamists heart of democracy, progress, and national liberation

Apply the law of the ‘jungle’

**Figure 14:** The representation of the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to democracy and dictatorship

It was noted that the programme promoted the idea of democratic values and encouraged comprehensive political change that required – in the case of Egypt – replacing the Mubarak regime, thus giving the opportunity to the MB to rule through a free and democratic system (ballot boxes).

Al-Qassem, produced two episodes in relation to the 2005 election: the first, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’s political activity’, prior to the election in May, in which he discussed the implications of the rising power of the MB, not only in Egypt, but across the Arab world; and the second, ‘Islamists sweep victory in the Arab elections’ (EP13 and EP14).
The title of the first episode appeared to be general and neutral. The second one arguably reflected positive and embellished language favouring the MB, in order to celebrate its ‘sweeping’ victory (فوز كاسح). His approach towards the Egyptian regime under Mubarak, on the other hand, reflected a negative (distancing) position for losing seats to the MB. The use of the adjective ‘اكتساح’ (to sweep or sweeping), for example, could be interpreted as being both positive towards the MB and exaggerated. It might be true that the MB had won a significant number of the parliamentary seats (88) but certainly not enough to qualify the party to lead the country. The word ‘sweep’ implies an ‘overall majority’, which was not the case in the 2005 election.

The presenter depicted the MB’s ‘revival (نهضة) as a strong democratic step for the movement, as it offered a viable alternative to authoritarian regimes across the Arab world. He stressed two main points: (i) although the historical movement (the MB) had been the victim of dictatorship, now, as a peaceful movement, it was ready to be part of a democratic process and embrace political participation; and (ii) the MB, as an Islamic political movement, was accepted by the international community.

The presenter’s lexical choice of the questions in the sample (EP14: EX1), representing the government’s viewpoint, is overstated and can be viewed, as this researcher argues, as misleading. It indicates that the government undervalues the movement’s importance. Al-Qassem gives an example of
one of the Saudi officials’ statements which described the MB as ‘the source of the curse in the Arab world’ (أصل البلاء في العالم العربي). Although Al-Qassem’s statements and questions were sometimes obscure, they did emphasise the fact that Arab governments in the region viewed any opposition parties seeking to achieve social and political justice - including the MB – as a real danger to its leadership.

The principle idea of the MB as a deep-rooted movement in Egyptian society was regularly stressed. The message was that the MB (Islamists) and the Egyptian people were in one sector (in-group) and the dictators were in another (‘out-group’):

Rafeq Abdelsalam (Islamist): The MB is much more organised and accepted than other social powers on the Egyptian scene [...] they [MB members] have managed to organise themselves and extend into the depths of Egyptian society as well as many other Arab countries (EP14, EX4)

Visible was the positive language used to depict the MB’s political activity by using assertive phrases such as ‘are more organised’ (منظمون أكثر) and ‘accepted’ (ملققون) in Egyptian society. The verbal evaluation by the MB was against other political parties, arguably aimed at achieving a positive message for the MB as a ‘trusted’ movement while negative (or distant) message for others, including the Mubarak regime. This researcher argues that there is a hidden separation line between (‘us’: Islamists) and (‘others’: opposition parties and Mubarak’s secular regime).
The ethics of the MB were underlined by Al-Qassem: ‘denounced violence’ (يرفضون العنف), ‘accepted democracy’ (ويقبلون بالديمقراطية), ‘respected human rights’ (احترام حقوق الإنسان) and ‘women’s rights’ (حقوق المراة). The intended message was to highlight the movement’s positivity in being committed to the values of democracy (EP14: EX1).

The Egyptian people were distantly framed in other episodes hosted by Al-Qassem, in which he accused them of being passive, unable or unwilling to change their political reality under Mubarak’s dictatorship. The episode on 25 November 2010 debating the topic: ‘Why do Arab people not revolt?’, focused on blaming the Arab people in general, and the Egyptians in particular, for showing little concern about the status quo (EP17:EX12).

Al-Qassem often appreared to give himself both the right and the time to express his personal views in this episode. He strongly rejected the idea of ‘national security’ (الامن القومي) and described it as part of ‘illusion slogans’ (شعارات وهمية) and ‘lies’ (اكذوبة) made up by the military to control and discourage people from accepting democracy and change:

_Al-Qassem:_ For more than sixty years, Arab nations, especially Egypt, have lived under the impact of illusiory slogans and lies, only the sound of battle has been heard. They have been living for the past 40 to 50 years under the shoes of the military. Now, the Egyptian people have revolted and then returned to the
Aggressive and subjective language used by AJA’s presenter, Al-Qassem, is evident throughout his programme. He regularly refers to history (time space). The connotation that the Egyptian people had been living ‘under the shoes of the military’ (تحت احذية العسكر) – very insulting in Arab culture - for the last 40 - 50 years suggests that people who had suffered under the Mubarak regime (and the military), had revolted against it due to its corruption and tyranny and had democratically voted in the MB, were now back to living in misery (EP24: EX32). The above example stood as an illustration of the presenter’s attempt to distance the Egyptian people from the military and the Mubarak regime.

Al-Qassem questioned the meaning of democracy during the 2010 presidential election - which Mubarak was expected to win - when he said: ‘the president (referring to Mubarak) controls media services, security services and all state means’, noting that it was ‘silly’ (سخافة) to even call it an election, when the party opposite (referring to the MB) was banned
from embarking on an electoral campaign in universities and public places (EP15: EX11).

The presenter continued to voice his personal view that the MB was a victim of Mubarak’s regime and the military, and blame the Egyptian people for willingly accepting the humiliation of military control, once again, for ‘security reasons’ (اسباب امنية). The fact that the Egyptian people demonstrated their dissatisfaction by rebelling against Mubarak’s government in January 2011, seemed to perplex the presenter, but did not prevent him from promoting the MB and the former president, Mohammed Morsi, as the best option for a better Egypt.

The mass protests that took place in Egypt in 2010, following the Tunisian uprising led to demands for President Mubarak to step down. He relinquished his presidency after 18 days of protests, and handed over to the Military Council (Daily Mail: 2011). The Islamists’ prospects of playing a substantial role in the Egyptian political scene had now become increasingly predictable (Cambanis: 2011). The international community, on the other hand, particularly the U.S., remained concerned about how to deal with the rise of political Islam, especially after Mubarak had been ousted by popular demand (Hamid: 2011).

Mohammed Morsi, a leading member of the MB, ran as presidential candidate in 2012 against Ahmed Shafiq, (last prime minister in the now
deposed Hosni Mubarak’s government)\textsuperscript{31}. Morsi won, although the votes were very close: 52 per cent to Morsi and 48 per cent to Shafiq (Spencer: 2012). The MB and its supporters’ dreams of an Islamist leading the country had finally been realised. This realisation did not last for long, however; public dissatisfaction with Morsi’s government began to emerge soon after his election, and increased during his one-year tenure.

Al-Qassem hosted an episode in September 2012 – ‘The victory of Islamists and the defeat of other parties’ - following the ballooning criticism of Islamists being in power and the political incompetence of the MB’s leadership. The title may suggest defending the idea of the rise of political Islam against those who had ‘conspired’ against them.

The language used in the episode, as shall be seen below, was in defence of the right for Islamists to hold ‘legitimate power’ in Egypt, as they had won the public vote in free, democratic elections against other parties, particularly the secular ones (EP20: EX21). Al-Qassem said:

They [Islamists] arrived to the chair of power via ballot boxes, not tanks […] Do secular movements want the Arab nations to fit their own size and wishes?

\textsuperscript{31} Background of the two candidates (Morsi versus Shafik) available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/egypt/2012/06/201261482158653237.html [accessed 31/12/2014]
He rejected the comparison between the MB and the Taliban:

Isn’t it ridiculous to say that elected Islamists are like Taliban groups?

The changing critical tone of the presenter is noticeable, as the narrative moves between two ideologies: ‘secular’ versus ‘Islamists’, rather than specific actors (the MB and the Mubarak regime). The aim, as this research argues, was to widen the distance between the ‘in-group’ (MB and its supporters) and those standing against it, such as the Mubarak regime and other political parties (‘out-group’).

He stressed the fact that the MB president, Mohammed Morsi, had been imprisoned on several occasions for his political activities during the Mubarak era. Al-Qassam’s language, it is argued here, reflects the actual stand adopted by AJA in supporting the MB and framing them, not only as the legitimate power, but also as victims of the Mubarak regime and what is known as the ‘deep state’ in Egypt.32

Al-Qassem then sheds light on the MB’s political openness by appointing a Christian deputy president, and started to ask leading questions:

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Al-Qassem: who told you that the Islamists are not protecting the minorities? Do you know that the president has appointed a Copt deputy?

Nabil Fayad (opposing the MB): I’m not sure what mandate this deputy has.

Al-Qassem: Have you heard the speeches of Islamists and others when they say that we are the rulers for the entire nation, not only for our followers? (EP20: EX21)

The presenter stood firm, yet again, in challenging his guests who opposed the MB’s political stand. He positively painted the MB leadership as committed to democracy by appointing a Coptic deputy president and an inclusive government for all Egyptians, not only for its supporters. Nabil Fayad’s point was vaguely addressed. He was right to challenge Morsi’s appointment of a female Copt as his deputy as, it is argued here, it may have been a token gesture to show that Morsi’s government was ‘inclusive’ of all Egyptians.

Public discontent against the MB’s short-term government, ending in President Morsi’s deposition in 2013, was the background for another of Al-Qassem’s programmes. He hosted an episode to discuss the reasons behind the opposition’s unwillingness to give the MB a chance (EP20). He lost his temper and used insulting terms regarding the parties that opposed the MB government. He described the Egyptian National Salvation Front (جبهة الانفاذ) – which supported the rebel movement Tamarod (جبهة الاحرار) as ‘The National Destructive Front’. He also used the phrase ‘shit-democracy’ when he referred to the so-called ‘democracy’
practiced in the Arab world, particularly in Egypt, as a reflection on the victimisation of the MB. It is another example of how the presenter voiced his own prejudices, while claiming to host an objective and balanced programme. Al-Qassam took his time to lecture his guests. He stated that what had happened in Egypt was not only a full military coup against the MB, but also against the values of democracy and freedom - a contradiction in terms: first he denigrates democracy as worthless then cites it as the solution to the MB’s problems (EP20: EX29)

The references to democracy were positively presented in favour of the MB (available democratic alternative) against Mubarak’s dictatorship. The presenter and the Islamists (including the MB guests) frequently promoted the values of Islamisation in contrast to secularism.

8.2.3 Islamists are best alternative to seculars

The principle idea of the MB, as an Islamic party, was regularly present in the discussion in different electoral moments. It was depicted by the guests, endorsed or left unchallenged by Al-Qassem, as the advocate of an Islamic project which would not only lead the country to the promised Islamic awakening, but also to prosperity.
The table below shows the references regularly incorporated in the programme to describe the MB (Islamists) and the seculars (including the Mubarak regime):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamists (the MB)</th>
<th>Seculars (Mubarak)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revival of the ‘Brothers’</td>
<td>Destructive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural extension to the spread of <em>Ummah</em> (universal community) awareness</td>
<td>Cause poverty, backwardness, ignorance, diseases, corruption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Embrace totalitarian governance,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Encourage unlawful access to public and private resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic awakening based on education, culture and realisation</td>
<td>Accuse Islamists of misusing the name of Islam, and the terms ‘ballot boxes’ and ‘democracy’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam is the solution</td>
<td>Islam is a religion and is not limited to Islamists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Islamic project gave birth to Hamas, Jihad, Hezbollah, and the resistance</td>
<td>Agents for Americans and Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand for democracy</td>
<td>Support dictatorships (Mubarak regime)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopt development project to build a modern state</td>
<td>Highlight terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic project aims to build <em>Ummah</em>, the economy and societies</td>
<td>Immoral</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 15:* The representation of the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to two different ideologies (Islamic) and (secular)
Al-Qassem and some of his guests positively emphasised the MB’s vision (ideology) of the ‘Islamic Awakening’ (الصحوة الإسلامية), unlike Ahmad Mansour’s *Without Borders*, in which he and his guests regularly quoted the words of the Qur’an and Hadith. Al-Qassem’s discussion in 2005, encouraged and guided his guest to elaborate on the vision of the Islamic awakening for the Egyptian people, which may have led to the temporary ‘victory’ of the MB. This was evident in the MB’s verbal narrative since the 2005 election in which the idea of the Islamic awakening proposed by the MB was explained by an Islamist guest as the MB’s comprehensive project:

**Fateh Al-Rawi (Islamist):** The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement was a natural extension to spreading its ideology and awareness of *Ummah*, this is the reality of the Islamic awakening, based on education, culture and realisation [...]. The MB is approaching its first century since its establishment and it is the oldest movement in the Arab world. Throughout history, the movement (MB) had been living under difficult times. The MB is not today’s or yesterday’s project, it is an [enduring] Islamic, educational, political and economic project.

**Al Qassem:** Historic! (EP13: EX2)

Noticeable is the incorporation of different positive adjectives in the above sample. They define the MB as a ‘natural extension’ (امتداد طبيعي) to *Ummah*’s awareness (وعي الأمة). The noun: (*Ummah*)[^33] is used in this context to replace the nouns ‘people’ or ‘nation’, and refers to the community of

[^33]: Arabic, literally ‘people or community’:

[http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/umma](http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/umma) [retrieved 8/05/2015]
Muslims bound together by universal ties of religion. The presenter offered a platform for his guest to explain the MB's Islamic project, based on a renaissance (awakening): education (العلم), culture (ثقافة), realisation (لادراك), politics (سياسة), and economics (اقتصاد), which positively suggests the availability of all elements required for a successful political party that could not be ignored, according to the MB (see also EP13: EX9 and EX10 - EP14: EX5 and EX6).

The slogan ‘Islam is the solution’ (الإسلام هو الحل) was also constantly defended. It was explained by an Islamist that it was not a religious slogan and did not contradict the principles of the constitution: the concept did not encourage violence or sectarianism, but rather, its aim was to encourage the sense of nationalism without ‘discrimination’ (EP14: EX8)

The same concept of ‘Islamic awakening’ was repeatedly brought up for discussion. It was depicted as developing a project that would build a ‘modern state’ (دولة حديثة) and offer a grand strategic vision leading to prosperity. This was arguably an illustration of the compatibility of Islam with democracy:

Tala'at Rameh: Freedom for Islamists is essential because they are adopting the awakening project. They [propose] to adopt a development project to build a modern state […] is it not unusual to see all Islamists offering strategic programmes and plans? […]. Do you know that Morsi has offered a plan for
years to come to push this country towards ‘development’. We are witnessing a start of development and revival of *Ummah*, aiming to confront the occupation and aggression in Palestine and Iraq and elsewhere […]

**Al Qassem**: Popular Islamist.

**Tala’at Rameh**: This is to build *Ummah*, build the economy and societies […] (EP20: EX24)

The model of the Islamic community (*Ummah*) was continually stressed by the guests supporting the MB view. This research also notes that the use of the pronoun ‘we’ aimed to emphasise the grand Islamic ideology of the MB and also to de-emphasis the secular vision. It is in this sample that the ideological separation between (‘we’: the good) and (‘them’: the bad) is apparent.

The presenter evidently leaves his guest’s argument regarding *Ummah* unchallenged, but chooses to emphasise the fact that the MB represented a ‘widespread Islamic’ ideology.

### 8.3 Summary

The ideological square and the framing model were marked in *Opposite Direction*, in accordance with three rhetorical strategies: verbal mode, agency and time space. The lexical choice of the *Opposite Direction*’s presenter is particularly noteworthy. It was evident that Al-Qassam made
direct and indirect linguistic choices in an attempt to hide his partiality towards the opinion of one or the other guest.

The MB and its members, by and large, were painted as the victims (empathy framing) in this programme, and a politically competent opposition and Islamic movement that deserved a chance to substitute the ‘long-standing corrupt regime’ (negative framing).

The Egyptian military leaders (Mubarak and Al-Sisi) were portrayed as obstacles (distance framing and ‘out-group’) to any attempts to improve the lives of Egyptian people. The MB, however, could offer hope and prosperity for all citizens by adopting democratic practices and freedom values based on Anglo-American principles. The ideology of secularisation was denounced in this programme, whereas political Islam ideology (proposed by the MB) was positively presented as compatible with democratic values and could bring about social equality.

It was noted that the presenter and some of his MB guests had regularly moved between the past and the present, and indeed, the future, to positively support their arguments regarding victimisation, commitment to democracy, and grand Islamic ideology.

The three themes: victimisation versus criminalisation, democratisation versus dictatorship, and Islamisation versus secularisation that emerged
from the critical inspection of the sample texts have been discussed in this chapter. The next chapter will examine the internal ideologies or perspectives of some of AJA’s journalists and former journalists in relation to the themes that surfaced from reading the literature review and the analysis of the two programmes (inductive approach).

Various issues emerged from the analysis, for example, how AJA journalists viewed the rise and the fall of Islamists. The assigned roles of different actors will be discussed as well as the question regarding the two presenters’ ‘subjective’ views incorporated in the two programmes, Without Borders and Opposite Direction. Other questions posed to the journalists were based on the critical examination of existing literature in connection with the on-going debates surrounding the channel’s relationship with Qatar (channel’s independence and ownership), the journalists’ vision of the channel’s place in the Arab world, and finally, the debate concerning its motto of representing ‘an opinion and the opposite opinion’.

The next chapter will discuss data collected from AJA and AJE’s presenters. The inside accounts of the channel in relations to its representation and relation with the MB and other political actors in Egypt will be presented. Equally, the relation between the station and host country, Qatar will be discussed. The journalistic assessment of the channel’s role in the Arab world will be also mentioned.
Chapter Nine

INSIDE AJA: VALUES, PERCEPTIONS AND EDITORIAL JUDGEMENTS

9.1 Introduction

The Ideological Square and Framing Model of two main AJA TV programmes, *Without Borders* and *Opposite Direction*, were examined in previous chapters. The Rhetorical Strategies: verbal mode, agency, and time space were also adopted in the scrutiny. Three dominant themes were identified in the selected texts (using the inductive approach) of the two programmes: victimisation versus criminalisation, democratisation versus dictatorship, and Islamisation versus secularisation. The separation between ‘us’ (the victims, democracy and Islamists) and ‘them’ (the villains, the dictators, and the seculars) was repeatedly underlined in both programmes. This separation was emphasised by lexical selection (verbs and adjectives) to describe a particular action by highlighting the positive angle of the MB (‘good’) and the negative side of the Mubarak regime and the military (‘bad’).

The assigned roles of different actors (agency) incorporated in the two programmes (the Egyptian people, opposition powers, women, Copts, media, and so on) was examined. The Egyptian people, for example, were sometimes represented neutrally or positively (‘in-group’), as in the case of the 2005 and 2010 elections in Ahmad Mansour’s *Without Borders*. 
The reference to different periods (time space) was also evident, as the presenters and their guests, mostly from the MB, frequently evoked historical occasions to illustrate their suffering, allegiance with the people, and commitment to democracy. The intention was to emphasise the positive side of the MB (‘us’) and de-emphasise the negative elements by blaming others (‘them’).

This chapter will present the inside accounts of some AJA journalists. A sample of interviews (10 in total) with AJA TV presenters will be the focus of this chapter. Some were working with the channel at the time of this research, and others had resigned over the channel’s alleged bias towards the MB. The journalistic insights on how the channel generally covered the Arab uprising will be discussed, with the main focus on the Egyptian political scene, before and after the fall of Morsi.

The questions posed to the AJA journalists intended to discover what themes would emerge. A review of the existing literature (prior approach) will be made, followed by the scrutiny of the actual data from the two programmes.

The objective is to generally understand the insider viewpoints in relation to the channel's coverage of the Egyptian scene. The opinions held by the journalists regarding AJA’s editorial performance during critical political periods in the Arab world, are considered important for this research.
9.2 Qatar and AJA: Mutual Beneficial Ties

The debate around the channel’s ownership and independence has always been at the heart of any study on AJA. The Arab uprising attracted many questions concerning the extent of influence Qatar, AJA’s host country, had over the channel’s editorial line, in its news coverage during that period. The literature review revealed that this important topic had been discussed in the media through opinion pieces, but there was little or no academic analysis of the issue. An analysis will be presented in this chapter.

Qatar’s motivation regarding the establishment of AJA was primarily recognition, according to Abigail Hauslohner (2013) of The Washington Post. She notes that Hamad\textsuperscript{34}, Qatar’s former emir, wanted to place his country on the map when he came to the throne in 1995, and by that, ‘he did well’. Hamad challenged other autocracies in the Arab world in 1996, by launching the AJA and introducing a new form of critical reporting to the region. The channel’s success, according to Barrett and Shuang, lies in its enjoyment of a margin of ‘editorial freedom’, unprecedented in the Arab world (2008).

\textsuperscript{34} The Emir’s deposition of his father in a bloodless coup in 1995: available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/emir-of-qatar-deposed-by-his-son-1588698.html [retrieved 7/10/ 2014]
Hauslohner (2013) asserts that in the wake of the Arab Spring, Qatar was severely criticised for its coverage of the revolts that ensued. It was claimed that it had helped the Islamist governments, both in Egypt and elsewhere, to ‘have a voice’, and subsequently put not only this tiny peninsula in question, but also AJA’s own position. Hauslohner says:

A military coup toppled Qatar’s allies in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the new military rulers have found funding and allies in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates — Qatar’s regional competitors. (Washington Post)

Qatar’s ties with Islamists, according to Hauslohner, was evident in that Qatar hosts the Islamic Palestinian militant group, Hamas; the Sudanese President, Omar Hassan Al-Bashir; Darfuri, Libyan and Syrian rebels; Iranian diplomats, Egypt’s MB, and the Taliban.

President Mohamed Morsi’s unseating in July 2013 instigated many MB members and supporters in Egypt to flee to Qatar: a country considered to be a safe haven amid an on-going crackdown against Islamists in Egypt (El-Gundy, 2014). This considerable welcome to Islamists not only raised debates regarding the nature of the channel’s association with them, but the influence it had on AJA’s editorial practices in covering the Arab countries’ affairs. Morsi’s unexpected fall left the tiny Gulf state with a serious dilemma: the young Qatari Emir, Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani.  

had only taken charge of the country a month before (Law, 2013). His father’s introduction to certain autonomy in ‘editorial freedom’ was challenged. Condemnation began to emerge of AJA’s apparent lack of independent reporting, both during and after the Arab Spring (Kühn, Reuter and Schmitz, 2013).

The majority of AJA journalists interviewed told this researcher that there was general ‘harmony’ with Qatar but it did not exist in all aspects of its coverage. Mohamed Krishan, a principle TV presenter in AJA TV, believed that it is unusual to see disagreement between any news channel and its owner: in this case, AJA and Qatar. He explained however, that after the increasing role that Qatar played in the Arab Spring countries, it became difficult to persuade Arab audiences that Qatar neither had any influence or control over AJA’s editorial practices, nor over its journalists’ coverage of events in countries that had strong links with Qatar:

As a general and golden rule, it is very difficult to see any TV channel or media project distant from its sole financier. Now, since the inception of AJA in 1996, Qatar did not have the shine and weight as much as now, therefore it becomes very difficult to convince some viewers that the Qatari policy has nothing to do with AJA editorial practices […] It’s hard to see a separation line between Channel24 and France, between Russia Today and Russia, Al-Hurra and USA, and so on […]. The active role of Qatar is not in all issues and countries, it might be noticeable in the Arab affairs, following the Arab Spring, but not in other countries such as Morocco, Brazil, Australia and others. You may find consistency and intersection between AJA editorial
values and Qatar policies in some issues or files, while not in others. (Mohammed Krishan, telephone interview 13/1/2014.)

AJA had been criticised for its ‘uneven’ coverage of the Arab Spring countries (Baker, 2011). It was accused of ‘turning a blind eye’ in its reportage of the Bahraini uprising (Hesham, 2012). Aryan Baker (2011) argues that the channel’s justification was that the Bahraini government had blocked most coverage by simply preventing entry to journalists. This was an unacceptable excuse, especially coming from a media channel like AJA, which usually took such obstacles as a challenge, not a reason for retreat (Baker: 2011).

A presenter (name withheld by request), currently working at AJA TV (at the time of this research), admitted in a telephone interview that AJA, as a Gulf-based channel funded from Qatar, is part of ‘Gulf money’ and the Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC). The station works under a ‘freedom of speech’ which is granted by the Emir of Qatar, not acquired or earned by people. The coverage of AJA on the Bahraini uprising was less than any other country simply because Qatar was not keen to bring ‘chaos’ to the Gulf area, of which it is a part. The presenter further explained:

A granted freedom might be withdrawn by the ruler at any time because it is not protected by any laws or constitutions. We, as AJA reporters, appreciate such a given freedom, but we understand fully that it not acquired and not protected, therefore might stop easily. (Telephone interview: January 2014)
Khadija Ben Ganna, a well-known TV news presenter, commented on the question of whether AJA’s coverage was aligned with Qatar’s foreign policy (which supports the MB in Egypt). She argued that there might well be alignment between Qatar and the channel’s editorial policy regarding the Egyptian uprising and its aftermath: ‘nothing is wrong with that’, she said. The MB, according to Ben Ganna:

[…] was legitimately elected through ballot boxes, and therefore it is [AJA]’s right to cover [the MB] stories as newsworthy […] and it is not possible for any news organisation to ignore a movement [that] justly won the elections, simply because they are Islamists or the MB.

Noticeable is the positive representation of the MB painted by Ben Ganna. She appears to believe in the concept of democracy and the MB’s legitimacy. It was ‘justly’ earned through ballot boxes, she points out, and in spite of what or who they are.

Mahmoud Mourad, a news presenter in AJA TV said in a telephone interview that, since starting to work with the station in 2010, he was never ‘told what to say’ nor ‘what not to say’ about covering a particular issue. Management always reminded its staff that ‘professionalism’ in covering the news was the main drive behind the channel’s strength and success. Mourad also explained that countries do not open satellite channels for ‘charitable reasons’:
The BBC, as an example, in one way or another, works in alignment with British foreign policies. The ideal way to achieve a state’s foreign policy is through sponsoring a channel, like the AJ [Al-Jazeera] case, in order to attract the biggest number of followers. My personal impression is that I do not see any contradiction between the editorial line of AJ and Qatar foreign policy. (Mahmoud Mourad, telephone interview, 2014)

The former AJA network’s Director-General, Waddah Khanfar (who resigned after eight years in the post36), denied any allegations that Qatar influenced the channel’s editorial decisions. He acknowledged that the very nature of the relationship between both Qatar and AJA was ‘mutually beneficial’ (منفعة متبادلة). The channel had benefited from Qatar’s financial support, and, in return, AJA offered Qatar an important position in the Arab world:

I can confidently say that if AJA is a PR tool for Qatar, it would not have reached such significant popularity in the Arab world, and would have been categorised as any other Arab channels, controlled by regimes. […] however, the condition of such mutual benefit was a secured editorial independence, in order to achieve a remarkable presence, because, if this [were] not the case, AJ would have been a failed investment. (Waddah Khanfar, 2014, phone interview)

Khanfar emphasised that the matter of the channel’s independence had been one of his top priorities when he was in charge. His aim was to

36 Read more about the resignation of Waddah Khanfar at BBC News website (2011): Al-Jazeera boss steps down: strains with Qatar royals? [retrieved 9/10/2014]
ensure the channel’s success through ‘diversity’ (التنوع). He noted that the channel’s editorial line sometimes met with Qatari foreign policy and at other times it did not:

I have tried to avoid the channel being a mouth-piece of Qatar or any other country, political party, or group. Diversity at AJ is the key to reporting news, in employing reporters from different ethnic groups, etc. Such diversity was evident inside AJ and it was the secret of the channel’s success […]. The channel’s policy sometimes contradicts with [sic] Qatar foreign policy. For example, Qatar’s relationship with the US was and is still very robust, as Qatar … [hosted]… a US military base during the war on Iraq. During that time, AJ relations with the U.S. …[were]… at …[their]… worst. Also, while AJ … [journalists were]… unable to travel to Syria and Libya to cover their news, the relations between Qatar and the two regimes – Libyan and Syrian – [were] very strong […]. The channel has offices almost everywhere in the Arab world, and sometimes our offices get shut down due to a particular news line or a story that often angered the host countries […] which put political pressure on our operational field offices and on Qatar […] However, we sometimes tried, directly or indirectly, to tone down our critical reporting on conflicting topics to avoid angering movements, in order to keep our offices open [in certain countries]. (Khanfar, 2014).

Karem Mahmoud, a former AJ Egypt Live (Mubasher) presenter, resigned, together with 22 other journalists, over the channel’s alleged relationship with the MB37. He told this researcher that Arab regimes largely dictate the editorial practices of satellite channels, therefore: ‘no one should think that

there is any separation between Qatar’s policies and AJA (telephone interview 2014).

Some AJA journalists agreed that, although the channel had covered the Bahraini uprising, it was not on the same level of its coverage of other Arab Spring countries. Mohammed Krishan (2014) challenged this assertion. He said that he did understand those people who thought that the channel had not adequately reported on the Bahraini uprising, but defended AJA’s decision:

Some say that AJA did not cover what happened in Bahrain at all, and I say that was a lie. We sent a correspondent to Bahrain and covered the opposition and the government alike, but it was not as in-depth as in other countries such as Tunisia, Libya and Syria. Without an underestimation of casualty numbers, the Bahraini uprising had a death toll of almost 50 people: this number of casualties equals the number of victims killed by Bashar al-Assad [Syrian President] in an afternoon. The level of destruction and suppression is incomparable to what was happening in Syria, Tunisia, Yemen or Egypt. We in AJA might have not done enough in covering the Bahraini situation because it was not as big [news] as in other countries. (Krishan, 2014)

Ben Ganna also agreed with Krishan that the unrest in Bahrain was not as ‘big news’ as the uprisings in Yemen, Syria or Egypt. She noted that the demands made by the Bahraini protesters were arguably less dramatic in comparison to other countries. She did admit, however, that AJA had fallen short in its coverage of Bahrain and it should have been given more
airtime by AJA’s editorial team. Khanfar explained why this did not happen:

We were the first to send a crew of reporters to Bahrain to cover what… [was]… going on, but our team was evicted. Then, we sent a secret coverage which angered the Bahraini government, and some of our reporters were arrested. It is not fair to cover all countries evenly, because Arab countries have different strategic weights and importance. For example, the strategic weight for the Egyptian revolution is heavier than Bahraini’s or any other country […]. We are in the media services - we look at newsworthiness and its future implications and the given time for coverage of this or that story. I do not accept the allegations that AJA did not cover Bahrain because the majority of protesters are Shi’a or because Qatar is in the GCC, this is not accurate. The truth is that AJA tried to cover the Bahraini unrest with all possible means, given the busy time of all other mass uprisings which were happening around us at the same time. (Waddah Khanfar, 2014)

Taoufik Ben Ammar’s Ph.D. thesis discussed media ownership. He quoted Van Dijk (1998: 20), who observed three different ways in which powerful groups can effectively control the media: media owners, journalists with shared ideologies, and lobbying:

The first is media ownership which gives elite groups the power to tell the editors what (or what not) to publish or write about. The elite will always claim this is not the case, however, research shows the contrary (Curran, 2002). The second control method involves the dominant group hiring journalists that share its ideology, so that mind control is not needed. The third form involves the elite dominating the public discourse by saturating it with topics that are of interest to the government or
Based on Van Dijk’s above assertion, it can be argued that Qatar has the power to influence AJA’s editorial practices. This was marked in the example of the Bahraini uprising. AJA not only turned a ‘blind eye’ on the events occurring there, but also on its intimate coverage of the Islamists. The second model (shared philosophy) is that the dominant group hires journalists that have the same ideology: in this case, this research opens the debate that more or less most of AJA journalists share the same values and beliefs. It is true that although the channel hires journalists from diverse nationalities and backgrounds (as explained by Khanfar 2013), most of them still share the same ideological viewpoint. It can be argued that, in line with Qatar, the majority of AJA journalists support democracy for example, and therefore the MB’s right to political participation against the ‘military coup’ in Egypt is justified as is the opposition against Bashar Al-Assad in Syria.

9.3 Arab Uprisings: AJA and the Egyptian Uprising

The channel’s role in covering the Arab uprising has been widely contested. Some believe that the channel’s advent in the Arab world brought forth a ‘media earthquake’ that opened up restrictions on freedom of expression and democratic participation. It made people aware of the opportunity to revolt against long-standing dictatorships (Ismail, 2011).
The channel, according to some observers, helped the Arab Spring to blossom (Fisk, 2011), and according to Gornall (2011), AJA helped the Arab Spring to bloom. Others however, viewed the channel’s coverage as ‘provocative’ and that it had brought ‘chaos’ to a fragile region. The channel’s credibility collapsed as a consequence of its decision to support one side instead of remaining impartial (Hussain, 2013).

Mohammed Krishan (2014) noted that two ‘exaggerated’ views existed in the public perception regarding the role of AJA’s coverage of the Arab uprising. The first praised the channel for having ‘a big role’ in it by steering, or even leading, the masses towards change. The second, a tarnished view that AJA’s role in the Arab uprisings was confrontational and destructive. He noted that the channel had played neither role:

We, in AJA, have done our professional duties in covering the mass uprisings in several Arab countries. The very reality of the news we covered, as it comes from the field, is provocative by nature. For those who look for political change think that AJA has offered them a big honourable favour. However, for those who are followers of the regimes and oppose the public uprisings, think of AJA as provocative and destructive. In my view, the channel has played neither …[a]… provocative nor …[a]… preaching role, we have just covered the news as it is, but we might have made some mistakes here or there. It is impossible to change a system in any country as a result of television coverage, this is nonsense. Political systems in countries usually change due to social, economic and political accumulations, not media coverage (Krishan, 2014).
AJA has always been ‘pro-human beings’ (مع الإنسان) according to Khadija Ben Ganna (2014), therefore it supports ‘the people’ and provides a ‘voice to those who have no voice’ (صوت من لا صوت له). She clarifies that ‘Arab revolutions’ belong to the people and, as a journalist working in AJA, she would not have agreed to the channel ‘stand[ing] aside, or on the side of regimes, not the people’. She further explains:

The channel has stood by the people. It stood by the Egyptian people against the Mubarak regime and by the Tunisian people against Ben ‘Ali, former president of Tunisia. What has happened is that the people have split and people are no longer one voice, which makes it very hard for AJA to choose which … [side]… it should stand by. On the Egyptian example, should AJA stand by Morsi supporters against Al-Sisi supporters? With military rule [Al-Sisi] against democratic rule [the MB] which has been chosen by the people in ballot boxes and legitimately elected …[a]…President [Morsi]? In the end, AJA was faithful to its own message and stood by the sound of right. The sound of right, in the Egyptian case, says that the legitimate President [Morsi] and the legitimate regime [the MB] came through the ballot box and that is why AJA stood by them in its coverage. (Khadija Ben Ganna, 2014)

This research argues that the ideological square and framing models can be seen in the above testimony by Ben Ganna. The separation line between the two groups – ‘good side’ against ‘bad side’ - was emphasised in Ben Ganna’s narrative. AJA chose to stand on the ‘good’ and human side (the MB) against the ‘bad’ (Mubarak regime). Noticeable is the assigned role of different actors. The MB was positively presented as
It can be asserted that the Egyptian people and the MB were together depicted as the ‘in-group’, whereas the Mubarak regime, the military, and President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi as the ‘out-group’.

Egypt's military-led authorities shut down several stations, including AJA AJE, and AJ’s Egypt Live offices, in the wake of Morsi’s downfall in 2013. They detained several of its national and international reporters, accusing them of collaborating with the MB, a movement which, in December that year, had been declared a ‘terrorist’ group. The military-backed, interim Egyptian government blamed it for an earlier attack on police headquarters (BBC News, 2013)\(^38\).

The political scene in Egypt became a complex one during this period. People were divided between those supporting the military intervention against the MB (calling it ‘continuing the revolution’s path’ (استكمال لمسار الثورة)), and those who were against the military intervention and supported the MB (calling the takeover ‘a Military Coup’ (انقلاب عسكري)).

The majority of Western media saw what had happened as a ‘coup’ against a democratically-elected president, whereas some Egyptians standing against the MB saw it as a ‘revolution’ and a continuation of the

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rebellion that took place at the beginning of the year. Mubarak stepped down in January 2011 and handed over power to the Egyptian Military Council (Nawara, 2013). Debates around the labelling of Morsi’s ousting in July 2013 were largely academic, according to The Washington Post’s Max Fisher (2013). He says what had occurred could be defined as a coup, as well as a revolution:

Even though both words might apply, neither is in itself enough to describe what happened: It was both a coup and a popular movement, both the expression and subversion of Egypt’s democratic experiment.

This research argues that the channel had fallen into the ‘eye of the storm’. AJA had labelled Morsi’s removal from office as a ‘military coup’ from the outset. This, therefore, underpinned the general perception among most Egyptians that AJA positioned itself in favour of the MB rather than its opponents (Farhi, 2013).

Mohammed Krishan (2013) was adamant that what had happened in Egypt in July 2013 was a ‘complete military coup’ (انقلاب عسكري كامل الاركان) against a ‘democratically-elected president and an elected parliament’ (رئيس منتخب وبرلمان منتخب). People, according to Krishan, should not be ‘selective in a democratic process’: they should accept whatever results arise from their votes. He further proclaimed that, except for a few Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia and UAE, the majority of the international community
described it as a military coup against a democratically-elected head-of-state:

From a professional and objective point of view, I agree that what happened is, without doubt, a coup. It is true that the military coup was backed by the masses, but there were lots of victims killed [referring to the MB members] as a result of this coup. (Krishan: 2014).

Waddah Khanfar (2013) also said that it was normal media practice to sympathise with ‘victims of injustice and oppression’ (ضحايا الظلم والقهر). Being impartial, according to Khanfar, does not mean standing in the middle between ‘obvious rights’ (الحق البائن) and ‘oppression’ (الظلم). The media should be honest, accurate and courageous in describing events. The indication here is that the Egyptian incident was rightly named a ‘coup’ by AJA, according to Khanfar. He further explained that it was no secret that the first line in AJ’s code of conduct supported Arab people’s rights:

The channel defends the right of Arabs...[to]... knowledge, rights ...[to]... freedom and democracy, and ...[the right to]... freedom in choosing his [sic] governments.

Mahmoud Mourad, AJA TV presenter, agreed with his colleagues. He said that what had happened in Egypt in July 2013 was an action taken by the military to depose an elected president. He stated: ‘as the US Secretary of State, John Kerry, once said:
If it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, it's a duck. Hence, if the military factor has a decisive rule in ousting an elected civil regime, then this is a military coup. (Mourad: 2014).

Zain El-Abideen Tawfik, a former BBC journalist, (working with AJ's Egypt Live (Mubasher) at the time of the interview), said that most international media services, including the BBC and The Guardian newspaper, described what had occurred was a military coup, according to political science definitions and the channel was right to describe it as such (telephone interview, 2013).

The above accounts symbolise the MB’s victimisation and the military’s criminalisation. The use of the loaded noun ‘coup’ to label the action taken, as this research argues, can be principally interpreted as ‘distance framing’ of the ‘doer’ of the action (subject: the military) and ‘empathy framing’ towards those who were subjected (object) to the action of oppression (the MB).

Paul Farhi (2013) notes in his article: ‘Al-Jazeera faces criticism in Egypt over its coverage of Muslim Brotherhood’, that ever since the military’s ousting of Mohammed Morsi in July, AJA, the pioneering Arab-language news broadcasting service, had not shrunk from calling his removal a ‘coup’. AJA’s use of this contentious word, as well as its relentless and sympathetic coverage of Morsi and the MB movement, had turned the channel into a virtual enemy of the Egyptian state. Farhi quoted Hugh
Miles who substantiated this concept: ‘AJA has given a lot of support to the MB’.

9.4 AJA and the MB in Egypt

Examples of Mansour’s and Al-Qassem’s TV programmes were discussed with AJA presenter, Mohammed Krishan. He was asked about the criticism of the channel’s support of Islamic groups, namely the MB in Egypt. He argues that people needed to admit the fact that even before the outbreak of the Arab Spring, Islamists were the majority and the most powerful opposition in the Arab world. AJA’s coverage of the story of the MB movements in Tunisia or Egypt was newsworthy, according to Krishan. The channel may have appeared to be leaning towards the movement, he said, but accepted the fact that the channel had made a few errors of judgement:

If the main oppositions in Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia or Libya, were from Marxists and Lenin-based ideology, we might be accused of being [a] Marxist channel […] Having said that, the channel, in my view, has made some mistakes which may be apparent in the performance of some of its presenters in which they may have given the impression that they sympathised with one political Islamic movement or another. It might be shown by the nature of the questions posed to some guests, and the way they debated the answers. I consider this a mistake, and we, in AJA, have discussed this issue, and the editor-in-chief always reminded us [presenters] to pay more attention to this, saying that we need to stand equally …[regarding]… all parties, and should not show
empathy towards one side in favour of another. I need to confirm that this is not always the case, but such mistakes have given people... [this]... impression.

Krishan’s acknowledgement of the mistakes made by some of the presenters (referring to Mansour and Al-Qassem) illustrate the empathy and support the two presenters gave to the MB (see Chapters Seven and Eight). This was shown in the nature of the questions they asked and the debates they had over the answers.

Ahmad Mansour was directly accused by a presenter and one of his colleagues (requested not to be named), that the language he used in his weekly programme, Without Borders, was evidently sympathetic to, and supportive of the MB:

Some journalists show their political views regarding a movement that had lost [political] control, based on the presenter’s level of professionalism [...] Let’s be more honest, such political views are clearly shown in some of AJA’s talk-show programmes, such as [that of] our colleague, Ahmad Mansour. However, in the main, News Hour (حصاد اليوم, Today’s News) or other news programmes, such views do not exist.

Other TV presenters such as Khadija Ben Ganna (2013) concurred with Mohammed Krishan, saying that in almost every Arab Spring country, it was always the MB or the Islamists that were the most prominent element
in the electoral scene: ‘How is it possible for any media to ignore the existence of this segment, just because it is the MB?’.

Waddah Khanfar (2013) commented that, unlike many other local Egyptian and ‘unethical’ channels, AJA brought different voices to its screen:

I see a real balance in AJA TV, sometimes this balance angers people supporting the coup. How do we judge if the channel is sympathetic or not? If the standard is according to the official [government] media services, then AJA might be seen as sympathetic towards the MB, which is not true. (telephone interview, 2014)

Zain El-Abideen Tawfik (2014), (banned from entering Egypt, due to his work with AJA Egypt Live), offered a different point of view. He explained that the main problem in Egypt was that many people did not want to hear an ‘opposing voice’: ‘Islamists are not willing to hear the voice of liberals or secularists, and they in turn, are not willing to hear the voice of the Islamists’. He did clarify, however, that Islamists in Egypt were still the most organised and powerful political party:

Capable of “harvesting” more electoral seats and should not be thought of as a minority. What is requested from AJA by the opposing voices [...] to cover their news in the same ‘unjust’ way as the local media do, if not, the channel would be accused of being sympathetic towards them, which is not true. Rather, the channel covers their stories as evenly as others. [...] at the
moment, in Egypt, there’s no other voice but the voice that supports General Al-Sisi.

Ahmad Mansour\textsuperscript{39}, a prominent programme presenter in AJA, including the \textit{Without Borders} programme (see Chapter Seven), told this researcher in an email interview on 26 January, 2014, that media impartiality is a ‘lie’ and a journalist should be favouring the ‘weak’ (الضعيف), ‘oppressed’ (المظلوم), and the ‘rights of people’ (حقوق الناس): ‘that’s what I learnt from international trainers, including British and American [ones], who taught me media and journalism. Journalists are witnesses for good, not for lies’, he said.

Noran Salam\textsuperscript{40}, a former TV presenter, who resigned from AJA in October 2013 over its editorial practices towards Egypt (\textit{Almogaz}, 2013), told this researcher in an email interview, that the channel’s bias should not ‘surprise’ anyone: only a limited number of Arab media outlets enjoy ‘impartiality’. She further noted that the Egyptian people turned against AJA because the channel described their ‘revolution’ in 30 June as a ‘coup’.

Mohamed Krishan explained AJA’s language and why the channel may have appeared to sympathise with the MB or Islamists:

\textsuperscript{39} Ahmad Mansour declined a telephone interview and requested that questions should to be sent to his email address only. Mansour ignored answering most of the questions related to his programme.

\textsuperscript{40} Noran Salam requested the questions to be sent to her via email only. The email interview date: (18.1.2014)
AJA’s vision is that it provides a voice to the voiceless, and sees itself as a representative of all political and socially marginalised groups. When the channel covered the mass uprising in Tunisia, no one said that AJA was sympathising with any side; likewise, when the mass revolution took place in Egypt against the Mubarak regime, no one […] accused us of being supportive of the MB, as we were representing all sides. When the election took place in Egypt and the MB won, the channel was committed to stand by their side, and give them the platform to explain their political vision and agenda, as a new legitimacy in the country. Perhaps, from this point, confusion happened that the channel was more empathetic to the MB than other [parties]. The channel will always stand on the side of the oppressed - in the case of Egypt, the oppressed in a catastrophic way are the Islamists. They were declared terrorists and some wish that, in a blink of an eye, the MB would no longer exist. However, if we look at real politics, the MB is an existing social and political power that should not be ignored. (Mohammed Krishan, 2014)

Zain El-Abideen Tawfik argues that if AJA were sympathetic towards the MB by giving them a platform on which to speak out, so was the BBC: MB representatives often appeared on its TV screens. He acknowledges that the MB held a significant place as a rising political power in the region, but he keeps the logic of democratic values based on electoral practices:

Islamic movements are the biggest and most widespread in the Arab world …[and are]… aligned with our traditions and culture. Is it an alternative to authoritarian regimes? I do not know, only ballot boxes tell us who would be the alternative. The alternative, in my view, is democratic rule, whether Islamic or secular, in which people practice their freedom and it
[Democratic rule] does not distinguish between them for any reason. (Telephone interview, 2014).

The notion of the MB’s victimisation was yet again evident and justification given for the empathy shown. Representation of the movement was driven by journalistic values, according to Ben Ganna, Krishan and others: standing on the side of the oppressed (MB) against dictatorships (Mubarak regime and the military). It can be argued from the above account, that the channel had become an active participant (agent) for the ‘good’ side (the MB) against the ‘bad’ side (Mubarak regime and the military). It was clear that AJA categorised itself as the ‘in-group’ alongside the democratic and Islamic victims, and conversely, the oppressors, dictators, and secularists in the ‘out-group’.

9.5 AJA and Polarised Arabic Audiences

The exact number of AJA’s viewership in the wake of the Arab uprising is widely questioned. The channel faced criticism for biased reporting and backing Islamists (Middle East Online: 2013). AJA began to lose much of its support regarding the alleged link to the MB, and underestimating the mass movement which took place in July 2013 (Yousef, 2013).

Were any AJA audiences lost, during its coverage of the Arab Spring countries, particularly in Egypt? AJA presenters were asked this question, and responded that Arab people were no longer in one political camp: people became polarised with strong and different political opinions which affected the viewership of all Arab channels:

With all the complexities that accompanied the Arab Spring, audiences have stood in blocks. What does this mean? It means that there are blocks of Islamists and other blocks of those opposing them […]. audiences started to favour channels that shared their own political views. In other words, some audiences did not seek the truth of what happened, but rather sought a news channel which was closer to their own political views. The political division was followed by media division as well […] although AJA may be seen as close to one political party [referring to the MB], the channel was keen to provide a platform for two opposing voices, whereas if you look at Sky News Arabia or Al-Arabia TV, you would hardly hear an Islamic voice. (Mohammed Krishan, 2014, phone interview)

Ben Ganna (2014) said that people’s political mood in Egypt had changed. Those who were against Mubarak and his regime, for example, were now either supporting the MB (an Islamist and so-called ‘terrorist’ group) or General Al-Sisi (a ‘remnant’ of Mubarak’s regime):

I do not have any accurate statistics, but even if we assumed that AJA has lost some of its audiences in Egypt and elsewhere, I think the channel has morally won because it would have lost if it had aligned itself with the other side [the military coup]. The channel stood committed to its editorial line, therefore it has won [the argument], even if the station has lost some of its audiences. (Telephone interview, Ben Ganna, January, 2014,)
Zain El-Abideen Tawfik (2014) was enthusiastic that the channel had won a wider audience, contrary to what others were saying:

History tells us that with all the harassments, assaults, lies and local media blackouts, citizens tend to tune in to AJA, to learn more about what is happening around them, the Arab region, and around the world - not provided by local media. The channel offers audiences with diverse views, and that's why they come to us. Broadly speaking, all other channels have lost ...[viewers]... due to the existing sharp polarisation in the Arab world, but AJA won by maintaining the principle of hosting all different views.

Krishan also noted that for more than 17 years, AJA had played a substantial role in educating and informing Arab people. This consequently led to their political awareness. The rule of media, according to Krishan, is to inform and cover events as they happen, regardless of whether or not viewers or listeners like it. He explained that, if AJA managed to accurately cover all conflicting views, then the audience would be the judge and able to choose what is right and what is wrong, not AJA.

Karem Mahmoud (phone interview, 2014), however, said that since its inception, AJA had represented the voice of all people, but now ‘the Egyptian people have no doubts that AJA adopts the MB’s position and disregards the other side’.
Mohammed Krishan commented on the vivid language expressed on social media platforms by some of AJA presenters such as Ahmad Mansour and Faisal Al-Qaseem. He said that the channel had discussed this matter and was ‘between two ideas’ concerning the political situation in Arab countries such as Egypt and Syria. The first was to take a ‘military’ and ‘firm’ decision, in which no AJA journalist should have a Facebook or Twitter account, nor be given the space to write an article or ‘open his [or her] mouth’ regarding any political views or claims of impartiality or bias. The second was the right that AJA reporters had to express their own views, as no one was entitled to ‘confiscate’ someone else’s rights to having a personal opinion. He said:

AJA has chosen the second option, the least restrictive. In my view, the worst [thing] is that the channel is adopting the values of freedom and democracy, and an opinion and an opposite one, while banning its own reporters from having a Facebook account, or to write an article. The dilemma has been solved by allowing journalists to express their own views but without exaggeration, verbal abuse or provocations. At the end of the day, judging any journalist should be based on his [or her] performance on the screen [on air]. Their own political views off the screen [off air] are a human right and should be preserved (Krishan, 2014)

Khadija Ben Ganna said that, in general, social media use among Arab journalists was a ‘deep wound’ and ‘chaotic’. People usually judged this or that reporter based on his or her Facebook or Twitter accounts. She did
admit however, that sometimes journalists made mistakes. Ben Ganna explained:

There are lots of fabricated, unverified social media pages in my name: one has more than three million followers and does not belong to me. However, I personally admit as a journalist, it is difficult to control my feelings, as we are human beings, not machines. Often, there is a state of emotional boiling inside journalists because of existing injustices which force journalists to say something, consciously or unconsciously. I understand that sometimes it is professionally wrong to write something with a particular view but it is hard to control myself when looking at the existing chaos and oppression (Ben Ganna, 2014).

What is the limit for journalists to express their personal views, while working for a media outlet? This question is still being discussed globally by large international media organisations. It has not yet been answered, according to Waddah Khanfar. He said that AJA had provided guidelines for journalists to use in social media: for example, a commitment to avoid using inappropriate, bigoted, or insulting language:

Anyone using offensive language or verbal abuse is in violation of AJA’s social media guidelines and should be accountable and face disciplinary action. That was the rule I applied when I was in charge, and I am not sure if they are still using it or not. (Waddah Khanfar, 2014)
Ahmad Mansour insisted however, that journalists had the right to express their own views on social media outlets and write opinion articles as these do not necessarily represent their professional presentations on the air:

All journalists and programme presenters have got the right to express their personal views in their social media platforms, without influencing what they present on TV. I am one of them. If you go back to my articles during Morsi’s era, you would see that most of it was against his regime and his approach to leading the country, and yet that did not affect my programme (email interview 2014)

Social media platforms of some of AJA journalists maybe problematic, as some of the well-known presenters (such as Ahmad Mansour and Faisal Al-Qassem) are overtly critical about the regimes in Egypt and Syria. This arguably contributes to the perception that the AJA is favouring the MB’s ideology and against Egyptian governments led by Mubarak and Al-Sisi.

Mohamed Krishan (phone interview, 2014) said that although the channel had not changed in general terms, the Arab political realm had been dramatically transformed. He said that, in the past, the majority of Arab countries had stood united against the Israeli occupation of Palestine, the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and so on. Things were now different. Political polarisation had dominated the heart of the Arab world: ‘it is really difficult to maintain a comprehensive popular consensus around widely disputed topics’. Ben Ganna further explained, in line with Krishan’s view:
There are internal division(s) in Arab public opinion. When AJA used to cover the Palestine - Israel conflict, there was a general consensus on the channel's coverage, as no one from the Arab world supported Israel over Palestine. When the Arab Spring started, people began to have different views. Some supported the Mubarak regime, others supported the *foloul* ['remnants'] and still others the MB. Those who hate the MB tune into *Al-Araba TV* [Saudi-funded satellite channel], whereas those who support the MB, tune into AJA, and so on. Each [one] goes for what fits his or her ideology - even sectarianism.

Waddah Khanfar, however, suggested that AJA should revisit its motto: *Opinion and The Other Opinion*. He said: ‘since the launching of AJA, its motto was functional because the dominant view was that of the people together with the opposition and against the Arab governments’. A ‘rainbow of views’ dominated people’s perceptions after the Arab Spring, as they no longer had a unified opinion against the authoritarian governments: ‘I hope from AJA to have a comprehensive motto that fits the phase we are living in’ (Waddah Khanfar, phone interview, 2014).

Zain El-Abideen Tawfik (phone interview, 2014) said that the channel no longer occupied the same place in the Arab world, but its motto continued to be valid and operative in AJA. He added: ‘in my personal view, AJA is still the biggest pan-Arab network, and still has the largest viewership’.
9.6 Summary

The above testimonies from AJA’s current and former journalists demonstrate a general agreement that Qatar’s influence on AJA TV channel does exist, but, according to Khanfar, it is a mutual arrangement. The question of channel ownership and independence - much debated by academics and observers – has been more evident in the wake of the Arab Spring, according to the journalists interviewed.

The discussions around the channel’s coverage of the Bahraini uprising being less comprehensive than others were clearly driven by the channel’s alignment with the financial support received from its host country, Qatar. It might be true that the channel does not take direct orders from the Qatari Emir or the royal family, but AJA’s editorial practices regarding Qatar display a certain loyalty: self-censorship is arguably practiced when talking about the royal family.

AJA, as this research argues, exemplified a real break-through in the stagnant Arab media. It presented a real transformation of media discourse in the Arab world by challenging Arab authoritarianism, addressing people’s daily concerns, and bringing voices from the opposition on to its screens.
AJA was, by and large, sympathetic towards the MB ('good' side) and offered a platform in Egypt to advocate for its rights to exist and to be part of the political scene. The channel defended its political competences on the basis that the MB had won through the ballot box and therefore its right to rule should be respected. The channel not only admonished the Egyptian military role ('bad' side), but also the masses which supported what was described as a ‘military coup’ against the MB’s legitimacy ('out' group).

The majority of AJA journalists interviewed by this researcher, expressed their views that the MB and its members were the victims, therefore, it was the channel’s moral duty to defend them against injustice as they were ‘voiceless’, ‘oppressed’ and ‘weak’. This issue was widely contested and AJA seemingly chose to stand on one side rather than the other: the channel’s apparent support of the MB caused it to lose viewers (at least audiences with opposing views to Islamists).

The relationship with the channel’s audiences and the question of losing them is debateable. There is a perception that the channel was losing audiences by those who were against change and democracy, as Krishan (2014) mentioned, yet hardly any formal studies exist on the actual viewership of the channel.
The journalists’ use of social media was a good example of how much the channel actively participated in news coverage. It revealed their opinions regarding the unfolding events in the Arab Spring countries, including Egypt. Some presenters such as Mansour regularly criticised the military ‘coup’ against the MB. He therefore not only positioned himself, and arguably the channel, in favour of the Islamic movement and the MB, but also managed to anger the supporters of the military ‘coup’ or ‘remnants’ (foloul).

The validity of the channel’s motto (Opinion and the other opinion), as previously explained, was contested among AJA current and former journalists. Waddah Khanfar believed that the channel should revisit the motto because the people no longer had a single opinion about dictatorship. Other journalists thought the motto was still valid as, even after the Arab Spring erupted in 2010, the two sides were being offered a platform to express their views, albeit in unequal measure (see Chapters 7 and 8).

The next chapter will present a discussion and the conclusion of the previous chapters. It will explain how such findings relate to the theory, and more importantly, to answering the main research questions in relation to AJA and its coverage of the MB. The research implications and recommendations for further research will similarly be outlined.
10.1 Introduction

The inside accounts of some current and former AJA presenters were exclusively collated and inspected in the previous chapter. The questions (or main themes) asked were chosen based on the existing literature (a priori approach) and scrutiny of the text (inductive approach) of the two programmes; *Without Borders* and *Opposite Direction*. Van Dijk’s Ideological Square and Pier Robinson’s Framing Model were taken into account in connection with three Rhetorical Strategies in the discussion of the empirical data gathered from the interviewees.

In this discussion chapter, the analysis obtained from the two AJA TV programmes and the data gathered from the interviews will be linked to existing literature previously reviewed on AJA, and to the theory of media and religion framing and ideology, with the aim of answering the main and sub-research questions. The research implications and future recommendations will be also presented in the conclusion.

This research has allocated three different questions which will be answered in this section:
Main Question

- To what extent has AJA’s coverage of the role of the MB as part of the Egyptian political landscape contributed to the formation of ‘in-group’ and ‘out-group’ identities in the Egyptian society?

Sub-Questions:

- How do AJA journalists generally perceive the role of Qatar in the Arab uprising countries and the impact of such role on AJA narrative?
- How do AJA journalists respond to the claims of favouring the MB and how have they reassessed their journalistic values and practices following the Arab uprisings?

The discussion of these questions will be primarily based on examination of the targeted data of the two programmes, *Without Borders* and *Opposite Direction*, and the retrieved data from interviews.

10.2 AJA: The Ideological Framing of the MB

Based on the data analysis (two programmes and interviews) in which three principle ideas emphasised in relation to the MB’s political Islam ideology: victims, democrats, and Islamist, whereas the Mubarak regime, the military, and Al-Sisi were represented as villains, dictators and secularists, as explained below.
10.2.1 The MB was represented as the victim of all time

It was evident from the data analysis that AJA framed the MB in an empathetic manner and painted them as perpetual victims, whereas it distanced the Mubarak regime and the Military Council as the villains. The verbal representation linked to the MB in the two programmes and the interviewees’ accounts incorporated a record of lexical references which, by and large, reinforced the perception of victimisation toward the MB, before and after the uprising, while it criminalised the Mubarak regime and its supporters, including the military. The table below shows examples of regular references integrated in the text of the two programmes and the interviewees’ opinions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The MB</th>
<th>The Mubarak regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Banned group</td>
<td>Imposed banning on the MB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subjected to cruel security strikes, arrest and killing</td>
<td>Corrupt and tyrannical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victims of injustice and oppression</td>
<td>Unjust and oppressive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak and human</td>
<td>Strong and inhuman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 16**: Regular references of victimisation versus criminalisation in the two TV programmes and interviews

These verbal references were predominantly based on selecting and highlighting specific events and actions, with direct or indirect empathetic
connotations which endorsed political Islam’s position of the MB during different electoral moments, against its opponents (including the Mubarak regime). Such events or actions equally stressed the ill-treatment practiced by the Mubarak regime (arrest, killing, torture, looting, and so on).

The AJA’s representation of the MB’s political ideology, as this research finds, was often emphasised positively (positive ‘us’) while it de-emphasised negative actions by the MB (negative ‘us’). The Mubarak regime and military (including Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi), on the other hand, were emphasised negatively at all times (negative ‘them’).

The assigned role of different actors (agency factor) was another element of favouring the MB. It was noted that the role of actors shifted at different times, in accordance with the actors’ political stance towards the MB: when the actors (the Egyptian people and opposition powers) were supportive of the MB, then the representation of these actors was either neutral or positive (in-group). This was the case during two electoral moments before the fall of Mubarak; however, when the actors’ political stand shifted and became critical of the MB’s policies and ideology, they were represented negatively (out-group). This was the case after the fall of Mubarak. The representation of the Mubarak regime and the military, were regularly represented as the ‘doer’ or ‘subject’ of the action, whereas the MB was considered as ‘acted upon’ or ‘object’.
The framing and representation processes of an action, from a theoretical point, can determine how news recipients come to understand this action (Price: 1995) and thus become influenced by several socio-structural or organisational variables (Scheufele: 1999). The highlighting process of an action (transitivity) incorporates inclusion and exclusion of specific verbs and adverbs describing the action (the victimisation), the subject or doers (the Mubarak regime) and objects or actors subjected to the action (the MB as the victims).

Mansour, for example, appeared to have remarkable access to the MB’s top leadership for his programme. This notable phenomenon arguably indicates that his TV show represented a convenient platform for the MB leaders to exercise their views, vision and party politics. Mansour regularly tried to clearly distinguish between the victims (MB) and the perpetrators (Mubarak’s regime, his supporters, and the military), a possible attempt to establish a concrete boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’.

Different times (time space) were regularly stressed with the purpose of illustrating the movement’s idea of suffering by the hand of the secular oppressors. The references to history, for example, exhibited negative actions (imprisonment, killing, torture, fabrication, and so on), to which the MB had been subjected, were regularly mentioned, perhaps aimed at highlighting the crimes committed by the Mubarak regime and the military in order to gain political support for the MB.
The process of moving between different times often involved roaming between different historical moments to pin-point the ‘heroic’ sacrifices the MB had made, and the anguish it had been through since 1928 (the establishment of the MB) such as the assassination of the movement’s founder, Al-Banna, and the arrests and assaults its members had undergone at different stages. The regular verbal references to history, as this research reads, were aimed at turning people’s attention away from the MB’s political incompetence in leading the country (de-emphasising negative ‘us’), through campaigning to win people’s votes during the elections and lobbying against dictator regimes, thus showing the ordinary Egyptian people that the movement had suffered just as much as they had (emphasising positive ‘us’ or ‘in-group’ with the people).

The unsubstantiated subjective accounts of AJA presenters were interpreted by this research as taking one side against another. Mansour and Al-Qassem consistently criticised, often with offensive language, the Mubarak regime, the military (General Al-Sisi) and their respective supporters. The verbal choice at the introduction of each episode and the set of questions they asked their guests may be evidence of empathy towards the MB, ‘the all-time victim’, during the short term leadership of the MB. The movement leaders were offered the time to elaborate on the decades of being subjected to the brutality of the Mubarak regime and its
'foloul' with minimal or no interruption. Some interference or responses made by the presenters were leading questions or unverified statements.

It was noted that the construction of the questions guest(s) were asked may have seemed challenging on the surface, but in substance, they were largely leading and perhaps aimed at promoting the MB’s political position, while denouncing opposition parties, the military, Al-Sisi, and Mubarak’s regime.

10.2.2 The MB’s ‘democratic’ political ideology positively represented

The endorsement of the idea of ‘victimisation’ in the two programmes and in the accounts of AJA presenters was evident. The Islamist MB was positively represented as committed to democratic values, offered a grand political vision for Egypt’s leadership, and was viable alternative to authoritarian regimes (including Mubarak’s).

The chosen text of the two programmes and the collated testimonies have exhibited verbal choices which reflect the ideological political posture of the MB (positive ‘us’) as an Islamic movement committed to democracy, whereas they denounce the Mubarak regime’s secular ideology which was negatively presented (negative ‘them’) as irreligious and dictatorial. The assigned role of different actors in relation to democratisation versus dictatorship was also a noticeable feature.
The MB’s Islamic ideology (positive) was painted as inclusive – in harmony with democracy and willing to work closely with other political parties, women, and Copts, whereas the Mubarak regime’s and the military’s secular political ideology (negative) was distantly represented as narrow, divisive and exclusive of other political parties. Such representation and selection of actions, as this research argues, stood as an illustration of the channel supporting one side against another. The table below shows the regular representation of the MB and the Mubarak regime in the two programmes and presenters’ testimonies:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The MB</th>
<th>The Mubarak regime</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People’s choice</td>
<td>Fabrication of election results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for reform and willing to participate in the political process</td>
<td>Corrupt and divisive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic</td>
<td>Dictatorial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denounced violence, accepted democracy, respected human and women’s rights</td>
<td>Oppressors and violate human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimate</td>
<td>Illegitimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolutionary</td>
<td>Conspiratorial against the revolution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 17:** Regular references of the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to democracy and dictatorship, in the two TV programmes and interviews

It was noticed that the allocated role of different actors shifted between positive (in-group) and negative (out-group), depending on their support or
discontent with the MB’s political practices; where the Mubarak regime and
the military were positioned negatively at different times (out-group), the
assigned role of the Egyptian people and the opposition parties changed
between ‘in-group’ – before the fall of Mubarak - and ‘out-group’ - after the
fall of the MB’s Mohammed Morsi.

The approach utilised in the two programmes to introduce and debate the
MB leaders suggested that AJA had positioned itself on the side of the MB,
compared to others from the Mubarak regime or from opposite political
parties.

Mansour, for example, regularly introduced his MB guests by listing their
accreditations with their high level of education, professional and
academic skills and experiences, and the number of times they had been
jailed by the Mubarak regime. These accreditations for MB guests in
acknowledging their achievements emphasised the elevated intellectual
qualities of the Islamic movement’s leadership and the enduring injustices
it had borne, similar to many other ordinary Egyptians. The introduction of
guests from opposition parties, however, showed little accreditation or
totally ignored the guests’ backgrounds.

This research argues that the presenters’ stance was rapidly identified by
the set of questions and nuance of language, which broadly involved
‘cherry-picking’ subjective and sometimes unrealistic judgements. Based
on the text analysis and the interviews, the presenters positioned themselves on the side of the ‘human being’ (the MB), not only on the grounds that the movement’s ideology was an Islamic one, but also the fact that it was an opposition movement standing against unelected regimes (Mubarak and Al-Sisi), which were hindering the implementation of democratic practices promoted by the MB.

The presenters’ intensely emotional and provocative lexical choices were obvious throughout each of their programmes. These habitually fuelled the episodes and led to a record of heated discussions – evident between guests in *Opposite Direction*.

Subjectivity and personal views were another noticeable factor. The presenters’ personal views were apparent when they used phrases such as ‘said an observer’ or ‘as they say’, or ‘these are not my words’, or ‘this is what the people say’. These concealed the veracity of each argument and brought a doubtful element into their programmes. The presenters of the two programmes failed to provide balanced moderation and equal representation of the opposing views of each guest. This was evident when Mansour told this researcher (in an email interview), that impartiality and objectivity are a ‘lie’, and one should stand on the side of weak or support the ‘obvious right’ – also stated by other interviewees – against the ‘oppressor’. 
The value judgements made by AJA presenters on the MB and the Mubarak regime clearly existed, and were possibly driven by their personal interpretations and prejudices of the Egyptian political scene. They strongly believed that journalists should not stand neutrally or ‘in the middle’ when reporting on issues that were recognisable as ‘right-doing’ or ‘wrong-doing’: support the MB, ‘the obvious victims and democratic movement’ and reject the Mubarak regime and the Military Council, ‘the obvious criminals and dictators’.

Time distribution and constant interruption were manifest in the programmes. Al-Qassem, for example, often gave the guest representing or supporting the MB more time with few intrusions. It was observed that sometimes he allocated the guest standing against the MB half the time, constantly disrupting him and occasionally using insulting remarks. The previous chapter showed that Al-Qassem described the ‘Salvation Front’ opposing the MB as a ‘Destructive Front’ and ‘democracy’ as ‘shit-democracy’.

The structure and nature of *Opposite Direction* and two guests with strong opposite views may seem balanced, but the essence of the debate and nuance of his language (verbal mode) clearly leaned towards endorsing the opposition, including the MB, against authoritarian regimes such as Mubarak’s and the Military Council, was evidently judgemental. The analysis of the text in his programme and the implication of his language
shows that Al-Qassem forced his own political views into the discussion. He not only provided an unbalanced set of questions but an unfair distribution of time, therefore, his stand as an ‘objective’ moderator is largely problematic and unsound.

The AJA’s views reflected - in the text of the two programmes and interviews - an unconcealed personal belief in favour of ‘democracy’ and against authoritarianism in the Arab World. Respect for the outcome of ballot boxes was called for, no matter what the results were. The democratic election of Morsi (and the MB) through ballot boxes, in the case of Egypt, should be acknowledged, according to AJA. Hence, endorsing the MB’s position was a viable alternative to Mubarak’s totalitarian regime. AJA positioned itself as the ‘in-group’ together with the MB and democracy, not only on the basis that they were democratic but also Islamists, and the military ‘coup’ and dictatorship was represented as part of the ‘out-group’.

10.2.3 The MB’s Islamic ideology positively represented as inclusive

The third theme of AJA’s support towards the MB was the representation of Islamisation versus secularisation as an idea in harmony with the MB’s grand political vision of democratisation. This notion was evoked by the MB’s guests who were offered – in both programmes - the time and space for unrestricted communication, by the hosts. The MB occasionally
invoked the *Hadith* of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) and the words of the *Qur'an*, especially in *Without Borders*, to explain the injustices to which they had been subjected.

The MB’s vision of ‘peaceful Jihad’, for example, and ‘the divine wrath’ for those practicing injustice (referring to the Mubarak regime) were highlighted. The Islamic comprehensive awakening project adopted by the MB was often emphasised to reflect, as this research argues, that the MB’s Islamic political ideology was committed to, or compatible with democratic practices, as defined and implemented in the West.

The stress of the assigned role of women and Copts in the two programmes was positively represented as the ‘in-group’. It was illustrated that women, for example, played a substantial role in the Egyptian political spectrum and the MB would give them a chance to play a key role in politics. The deep concerns, for instance, that the Copts in Egypt had were fears that they could be in danger of persecution if an Islamic government formed by the MB, were to lead the country. The table below shows the frequent illustration of the concept in two programmes and interviews:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Islamists (the MB)</th>
<th>Secularists (Mubarak)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adopt Islamic project</td>
<td>Adopt secular project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam is the solution</td>
<td>Islamists misuse the name of Islam for political reasons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Islamic awakening based on education, culture and realisation</td>
<td>Cause poverty, backwardness, ignorance, diseases, dictatorship, corruption, misdirect resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stand for democracy</td>
<td>Re-produce dictatorship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adopt Islamic Awakening project</td>
<td>Adopt destructive project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aim to build the <em>Ummah</em>, develop economy and societies</td>
<td>Desire sex and drink alcohol</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 18:** Regular references of the MB and the Mubarak regime in relation to Islamic and secular ideologies, represented in the two TV programmes and interviews

These references reflect the MB’s ideology of political Islam, and, according to Van Dijk’s ideological square, it signifies the division of positive ‘us’ and negative ‘them’, and categorises different actors (Egyptian people, opposition parties, Copts, women, and so on) as either belonging to the ‘in-group’ or the ‘out-group’.

The Islamic discourse narrative presented in the targeted texts, particularly in Mansour’s *Without Borders*, was based on the ideology of political Islam rather than Islamic theology. The very nature of his TV programme was predominantly political; the policies of the MB, as a political and Islamic movement, were assertively highlighted. Questions of concern by the Egyptians and international community were addressed by citing the Islamic movement’s vision, its rise on the political scene, and potential leadership opportunities.
Islamists (the MB) were generally represented positively in the programmes and the accounts of AJA presenters, and painted as the choice of the people for their grand political vision, whereas other liberal and secular groups (including Mubarak) were negatively depicted as the dictators and obstructionists to the progress of democratic practices.

This research finds the answer to the main research question is that the AJA representation of the MB in the texts of the two programmes, surrounding four key electoral moments in Egypt (before and after the Egyptian uprising), was in favour of the MB’s ideology. This finding was established in accordance with the examination of the three predominant themes that emerged from the identified texts and interviews. The channel represented the MB during these electoral moments as the victims of the Mubarak regime and the Military Council. The movement’s Islamic ideology was positively portrayed as democratic, in which its grand political vision - communicated on AJA’s platform as a viable alternative to authoritarian regimes, on the basis that it was chosen by the people. The MB’s comprehensive Islamic ideology was positively framed and highlighted in the texts of the two targeted programmes and interviews.
10.3 AJA and Qatar’s Foreign Policy

It was evident from reviewing the literature on AJA’s question of ownership and independence that there are wide academic debates around this topic. The issue regarding the extent of AJA’s editorial policies being aligned with Qatar’s foreign policy in relation to the ‘Arab Spring’ countries was discussed (chapter 9) with AJA’s presenters and former presenters. It was not possible to obtain data to answer the question from the text analyses of AJA programmes. It can be said that Qatar’s foreign policy towards the MB is broadly matched with AJA’s editorial practices. Qatar supported the MB and defended its political existence. The AJA’s predominant presenter, Mohammed Krishan, told this researcher about the ‘golden-rule’ - it is not unusual to see alignment between news channels and their owners. AJA’s former General Director, Waddah Khanfar, similarly explained the ‘mutual benefit’ between the channel and its owners. Such testimonies are perhaps strong indications that AJA is not only an example of soft power for Qatar but also a robust public relations tool, or at least widely perceived to be so in some Arab Spring countries such as Egypt.

The overthrow of Mohammed Morsi in July 2013 saw Qatar and Egypt (Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi) a complete clampdown due to its alleged support of the MB and the critical coverage of its own channel, AJA (Reuters: 2014). Saudi Arabia brokered a reconciliation meeting between Qatar and the new regime in Egypt in December 2014, aiming to discuss a compromise
to end an 18-month standoff over Doha’s support of the MB; consequently, Qatar shut down its dedicated Egyptian channel – *Egypt Live* – in a step to show ‘goodwill’ towards bridging the differences (Reuters).

The question of AJA regarding the nature of its coverage of Bahrain’s upheaval (beyond the scope of this research), is worth briefly mentioning as it remains blurred. It was explained by one of the AJA journalists interviewed (who requested not to be named) that the funding by Qatar of the channel is ‘Gulf money’; therefore coverage was much less than for other countries. This view requires further investigation as others such as the former Director General, Khanfar explained, the channel was one of the first to rush and cover the uprisings, but Bahrain did not permit them to work inside the country. It was subsequently clarified that Bahrain’s uprising was not as widespread as other countries such as Egypt and Syria. *The Guardian*’s Ian Black (2011) stated that Bahrain protested to its neighbour, Qatar, about a film produced by AJE, highlighting continued anti-government protests by Bahraini Shi‘ites.

Based on the analysis, AJA’s alignment with Qatar in covering the Egyptian uprising was evident. Both AJA and Qatar were criticised over their support for the MB. The answer to the question of whether AJA’s editorial policies were aligned with Qatar in covering Egyptian affairs, is yes. Is this alignment between Qatar and AJA evident in all countries and events? The answer to this question is open for debate, but it may depend
on Qatar’s foreign policy and the extent of Qatar’s involvement in one country or another. The channel’s ownership remains in the hands of the Emir. It was evident that the decision to open and close a channel – such as AJ’s *Live Egypt* – comes from the Qatari foreign office, therefore it will be no surprise that the Emir of Qatar one day may decide to shut down AJA if he thinks it might cause serious ‘trouble’ between Qatar and other neighbouring countries - and why not? Qatar on December 2014 launched a new pan-Arab television network based in London called *Al-Araby Al-Jadeed*, which might be seen as an alternative venue for AJA. The channel forced Qatar to lose political and media prestige created over almost 20 years (Kilani: 2014; Keys: 2014).

**10.4 AJA journalists: changing perception in a changing Arab world**

Have AJA journalists re-assessed their journalistic values and practices following the Arab uprisings? The perception of most journalists interviewed explained that the political paradigm in the Arab world changed since the breakout of the Arab uprisings, hence journalists themselves also changed. The former Director General of AJA, Waddah Khanfar, explained to this researcher that the motto and the vision of AJA needs to be revisited, largely because the whole situation in the Arab world has been transformed; according to him, the internal Arab affairs are widely polarised and AJA needs to cope with such changes.
It was evident that AJA journalists had become more active in presenting their subjective views and political positions which largely affected the image of the channel and its claimed place of impartiality. Journalists in AJA did not see themselves as ‘machines’, according to their arguments, as they had feelings and views. Social media, therefore, gave them the platform to more vividly express their views, and sometimes quite harshly. Their personal opinions in relating events, for example, on the Syrian and the Egyptian political situations, were difficult to forbid, according to Mohammed Krishan.

The current journalists of AJA interviewed were deeply convinced that the MB, as a political and Islamic movement, was a victim and that they should not stand neutral; rather, they should provide a platform to communicate its views, equally with other parties, and provide it with a voice - ‘a voice for the voiceless people’ as the motto goes, and in the Egyptian case, the MB and its members were the voiceless.

It can be argued that the channel’s journalistic values have indeed changed alongside the Arab political scene, according to the accounts of the AJA journalists. The channel’s construction of its place in the Arab world has shifted towards one side, (Islamists: the victim) which is seen as biased. The moral stand in supporting the MB which the channel took is open to interpretation. This interpretation is widely determined by the readers’ political views and understanding of the complex political scene; if
someone is sympathetic towards the MB as the victim of a political coup then he or she would find it permissible for AJA to stand alongside the MB, whereas if someone is against the MB and its policies, then AJA’s coverage of the MB is unjustifiable.

It can be argued, generally speaking, that although the focus of this research is about the study of AJA and the MB in Egypt, the channel has played a significant role as a pan-Arab organisation. The question of whether AJA played a pan-Arab role or a pan-Islamist role in covering the Egyptian uprising is also noteworthy. The channel evidently covered the Egyptian uprising and its Islamic movement, the MB, on the basis that Egypt is a key player in the Arab world, and therefore, it placed the Egyptian 2011 uprising at the heart of its coverage. The assertion made that the channel had a pan-Islamist role is also true.

The language used in its programmes by not only showing empathy towards the MB but also offering a platform for the MB’s leadership to express its political views was evident in the analysis of the programmes. The accounts of AJA journalists that the MB is a predominant movement and should be given a chance, reflects, furthermore, on their strong belief in supporting the victims, in this case the MB. The MB movement was depicted as the carrier of democratic values and able to bring the change that people desired.
Based on the text analysis of AJA TV programmes, and reading through some of their journalists’ social media contributions, the language incorporated suggests overt support towards the MB’s ideology and its members, not only because they are the victims and proponents of democratic values but also because some of the presenters themselves (Ahmad Mansour) had an Islamic background and was said to be a member of the MB. Al-Qassem’s language, on the other hand, reflects more the notion of pan-Arabism than pan-Islamism, as it does not seem driven by Islamic values like Mansour. It can be further argued that although favouring the MB against the Mubarak regime and the military, Al-Qassem’s position is based on the MB being an opposition movement, seeking to replace the authoritarian (Mubarak) regime.

Some of the AJA journalists acknowledge – revealed to this researcher - the fact that the channel was (and is) working in an Islamic culture. They also repeatedly emphasised that Islamists are the most popular and are capable of bringing about change as an alternative to authoritarian rulers.

The channel’s code of conduct and editorial guidelines clearly stands up for the values of democracy, universal freedoms including freedom of expression. The important question here is the reflection of the channel on democracy and whether or not AJA considered it as compatible with political Islam. Political Islam and democracy, as this research argues, are possibly seen as harmonious. Islamists such as the MB approved of the
role of democracy, respected the term and then were overthrown in a military coup.

The two TV programmes: Opposite Direction and Without Borders, promote the value of democracy but limit it to the ballot boxes; for AJA, the Western democracy model can be implemented in the Arab world, namely Egypt. The channel promoted the idea that the MB was committed to democratic values as it was ready to cooperate with other opposition parties, welcoming women’s participation in the political field, able to work together with other ethnic groups, including the Copts.

10.5 Summary

AJA representation of different political actors and ideologies in Egypt, particularly the MB’s Islamic movement and the Mubarak’s secular party, was discussed in this chapter. The texts from two TV programmes (Without Borders and Opposite Direction) were also discussed, as well as some exclusive testimonies from predominant AJA and AJE TV presenters. It was argued by this researcher, in answer to this research’s main question that AJA was in favour of the MB during different electoral moments, before and after the fall of Mubarak in 2011.

The Islamic political ideology of the MB was largely represented in the texts of the two programmes inspected. It was noted that the
representation of the MB was positive, whereas it was negative regarding the Mubarak regime and its secular ideology. The Islamic movement, the MB, was projected as committed to democratic practices and enjoyed a grand political vision and offered a comprehensive Islamic awakening project. Such representation, as this researcher argues, was aimed at endorsing the very idea that political Islam and democracy are compatible.

The ideological square by nature is divisive between (‘we’ the right) and (‘them’ the wrong). Such separation was regularly emphasised, based on different actors’ political stance, between those supporting the MB (‘in-group’) and others supporting the Mubarak regime or the military (‘out-group’).

The study of media and religion, by and large, was beneficial to this research, helping to understand how and why a social force like religion (political Islam ideology) interacts with the other primary social forces of the day, to shape people’s perception regarding a particular political event or action through media. This has been a very helpful vehicle for ideologies such as the one of political Islam. The references to the words of the Hadith and Qur’an by the MB leaders, for example, can explain how the movement tried to gain political support by touching on a very sensitive but solid foundation implanted in the people’s belief (Islam). AJA was the ideal platform for the MB to communicate its political ideologies.
The next chapter is the final one in which the overall research will be summarised and the main argument(s) and contribution will be outlined. The research implication and future research recommendation will also be presented.
It has been widely reported that the immolation and death of a Tunisian in December 2010, instigated a series of protests in North Africa and the Middle East, changing the geo-political scene in the region. Rebellions erupted in Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Bahrain, demanding changes to living conditions and of dictatorship regimes. People demonstrated against Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and his 23-year-old regime, forcing him to step down and hand over power to the Military Council. Libya’s Muammar Khaddafi was ousted and killed by his own people. The Yemeni President, ‘Ali Abdullah Saleh, stepped down after what seemed to be a political compromise. This later turned into a more difficult political scene. A peaceful protest against President Bashar Al-Assad in Syria resulted in a fierce civil war between the rebels and the president and the on-going crisis in Syria and many other countries has caused not only regional but also international turmoil.

Al-Jazeera (Arabic) (AJA), which, for a long time, had been seen as representing Arab identity and had managed to capture the ears, eyes, and minds of Arabs, began to receive widespread criticism. It was accused of being sided towards Islamists, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood (MB’s ideology) in Egypt, and against other opposition parties. This
research has examined AJA Satellite television’s coverage of the Arab uprisings. The main focus of this research was how AJA reported on the Egyptian uprising, particularly regarding its relationship with the MB, before and after the uprising. Critical discourse analysis was primarily used to scrutinise the language of AJA, aimed at understanding the shift of the channel’s construction of its place in the Arab world, following its coverage on the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, particularly in Egypt.

This research has also studied the theoretical framework of media and religion framing together with media and ideology. The study of media and religion benefited the understanding of the intersection between AJA, a media organisation, and the MB, an Islamic political movement. Media bias theory (particularly John Street’s categories of bias) was presented to assist in answering the main research question: whether or not the channel was in favour of the MB’s ideology. The examination of media and ideology led to the discussion on Pier Robinson’s concepts of framing.

Existing literature on AJA and the little academic discussion surrounding its coverage and relationship with Islamic political parties were reviewed. An overview of the MB’s historical background and its changing political place was examined. The existing debates on AJA coverage of the MB in Egypt were principally driven by media reportage and opinion pieces - little academic work exists representing this gap in the literature. This research has contributed towards filling that gap.
Multiple data were obtained and inspected from two of AJA’s television programmes, *Without Borders* and *Opposite Direction* and interviews with about 10 AJA current and former journalists. Critical discourse analysis, a qualitative approach and interview technique method were useful in the data analysis. The application of the qualitative approach assisted this research in examining what stands behind the language used in the programmes and the effect it had on their audiences. The interview technique played a key role in this research in acquiring and rationalising data which could not be collected from the analysis of AJA’s actual texts. This research also adopted the interpretist (constructionist) approach in ontology and epistemology, taking into consideration the realist approach.

The selected data from AJA’s two programmes was primarily around four electoral moments in Egypt: two before (2005 and 2010 elections) and another two (2012 and 2014 elections) after the fall of Mubarak. Three themes emerged from utilising *a priori* and inductive methodologies (existing literature review and the reading of the actual texts): victimisation versus criminalisation; democracy versus dictatorship; and Islamic versus secularist.

This researcher interviewed 10 high profile AJA TV presenters, both current (at the time of writing) and former. The interviewees were asked semi-constructed questions on various themes, based on *a priori* and
inductive approaches. For instance, the questions included AJA, its ownership and independence, the channel’s coverage of the Arab uprisings particularly in Egypt, the alleged relationship between the channel and AJA, and its place in the Arab world.

Different techniques were applied in the analysis in order to extract as much relevant information: Van Dijk’s Ideological Square, Pier Robinson’s Framing Models, and Chouliaraki’s three Rhetorical Strategies (verbal mode, agency and time space). The representation of verbal mode of different groups in different times was inspected in the analysis of the two television programmes.

The extent to which the AJA satellite television provided a platform for the MB and opposition voices in Egypt, during its coverage of four key electoral moments - before and after the fall of Mubarak in 2011 - was essentially the focus of this research. The Qatari-funded Arabic channel, AJA, was subject to criticism of being in favour of the MB. The foundations of such allegations were scrutinised.

The significance of AJA in the Arab world, the questions of the channel’s independence and ownership in relations to Qatar, and the channel’s coverage of Islamic theology and political Islam - including the MB - were discussed.
The MB’s ideology was positively framed in AJA’s two TV programmes. The principle ideas of victimisation, democracy and Islamic were emphasised in favour of the MB (positive). The Mubarak regime, the Military Council and Al-Sisi were equally represented through distance framing in which they were depicted as villains, dictators and secular (negative).

It was evident from the analysis of the findings in this research that AJA’s language (verbal selection), according to the texts and interviews examined, was indeed in favour of the MB, especially during four key electoral moments, before and after the ‘revolution’. The representation of the MB and its ideology was emphasised as ‘us’ – good, while the ‘us’ - bad was de-emphasised, in order to predominantly reflect a positive picture.

The role of actors changed at different times in accordance with the actors’ political position; when the actors, such as the Egyptian people and opposition powers, were supportive of the MB, then the representation of these actors was either neutral or positive (‘in-group’). This was apparent during the two electoral moments before and after the fall of Mubarak; however, when the actors changed their position and became critical of the MB’s policies and ideology, they were represented negatively (‘out-group’).
The AJA presenters who were supposed to stand as balanced moderators, advocated principle ideas that the Islamic movement and the MB were the victims ‘of all time’, although they proposed a grand political vision and a willingness to work together with other political parties, ethnic groups and women. The MB’s political incompetence during its one year rule led to the ousting of President Mohammed Morsi in a military ‘coup’ in July 2013. This was de-emphasised in the two TV programmes (Without Borders and Opposite Direction) by blaming the Mubarak regime, its ‘remnants’ (فلول) and the military coup as ‘persecutors’.

The language choice made in Ahmad Mansour’s Without Borders, for example, during the four selected electoral periods in Egypt, showed that Mansour was overtly favouring the MB’s ideology, before and after the 2011 uprising. The nature of the rhetorical strategies (verbal mode, agency and time space) in his programme, after the uprising, was punitive, daring, and critical compared to before the uprising. This research also notes that Mansour consistently and overtly criticised the Mubarak regime, the military (General Al-Sisi) and their respective supporters. He frequently defended the MB’s political practices, and repeatedly blended his subjective views with facts in an attempt to show his position as an ‘objective’ moderator, of which there was little evidence in the analysis of his programmes.
The structure of the questions posed to the guest(s) by AJA presenters may have seemed challenging on the surface, but in substance, it was largely indicative that he was aiming to promote and protect the MB’s political position, while denouncing opposition parties, the military, Al-Sisi, and Mubarak’s regime.

The narrative of the presenter’s introductions and the set of his questions, furthermore, showed evidence of both his overt and covert empathy towards the MB, ‘the all-time victim’. Mansour repeatedly allowed the MB leaders’ views to be expressed with minimal or no interruption. The technique of moving between different times in the programmes often involved travelling back in history to emphasis the anguish it had been through since the establishment of the movement.

The fall of Mubarak, for example, and the short period under the MB rule, encouraged Mansour to often pose (arguably leading) questions to the leaders of the MB such as Morsi (at that time the Egyptian president) and Hisham Qandil, the Prime Minister, regarding their vision about ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’ as well as their view of various groups and communities in Egypt - questions that have indeed attracted on-going debates both in the West and in the Arab world. The positive role of Islamic parties regarding ‘democracy’, ‘women’, and ‘Copts’ were some of the issues he raised, and how Islam was compatible with these issues. This research, nonetheless, ascertains that Ahmad Mansour’s message
(through his own or his guest’s words) that Islam and Islamic parties - such as the MB – were committed to the value of democracy and freedom of expression, whereas the Mubarak and Al-Sisi regimes were dictators and had no respect for such values; they had conspired against ‘democracy’ by perpetrating a military coup against the democratically-elected Morsi government.

Al-Qassem’s *Opposite Direction* has a different structure and presentation to Mansour’s one-to-one programme. His language position was more aggressive than Mansour’s. The verbal mode in *Opposite Direction*, this research argues, is widely over-stated, loaded and sometimes improbable as he usually applied a catalogue of unsupported, subjective, and inflated views and strong language during his role as a ‘moderator’. The programme, as this research finds, was also supportive. Al-Qassem regularly showed empathy and positive language towards the MB, while using negative and distance language against the Mubarak regime, the military, secular and other political parties opposing the MB and democracy.

The structure and the nature of this programme of inviting two guests with strong opposite views may seem balanced, but the essence of the debate and nuance of his language (verbal mode) clearly leans towards supporting the opposition (MB in this research) and to authoritarian regimes (Mubarak and the Military Council) is evidently partial. Through
the analysis of the texts in his programmes and the implication of his language, it is not difficult to observe that Al-Qassem forced his own political views into the discussion. He provided an unbalanced set of questions and unfair distribution of time, therefore his stand as an ‘objective’ moderator is largely problematic and unsound.

The opening introduction with a set of questions which Al-Qassem read at the beginning of each episode is worthy of comment. This research argues that the presenter’s stance was rapidly identified by the set of questions and nuance of language. It was extensively ‘cherry-picked’, subjective and sometimes unrealistic. Based on the text analysis, he usually positioned himself on the side of the MB, not only on the grounds that the movement was an Islamic one, but more importantly, on the fact that it is an opposition movement standing against undemocratic regimes (Mubarak and Al-Sisi).

It can be concluded from the interview chapter and by reading through AJA journalists’ accounts that AJA’s journalistic insight and construction of its place had radically changed, as had the transformation of the Arab world, following the outbreak of the Arab uprisings. The journalists of AJA believed that audiences as well as the Arab political scene had become polarised; according them, they should stand on the side of the ‘victim’ and ‘democracy’ against the perpetrators of ‘injustice’ and ‘dictatorship’. The victims in Egypt were the MB and its members, and the offenders were the
Mubarak regime and the Military Council (represented by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi).

The question of AJA’s editorial policies, and its alignment with Qatar (the founder, the host and financer of the channel), was also uncovered in this research. It is noted that the foreign and editorial policies of both Qatar and AJA were widely matching in the case of Egypt especially after the fall of Mubarak, due to the country’s support of the MB and for hosting the critical voice against the Al-Sisi regime by AJA.

Some AJA journalists, furthermore, accepted that the channel’s vision and practices should be revisited, as Arab opinion was fundamentally divided and no longer represented one voice, hence, the channel’s motto of ‘opinion and the other opinion’ is contested as being no longer applicable.

11.2 Research Implications

The interrelation between media and religion, from a theoretical point of view, is that AJA as a media organisation, and the MB as an Islamic organisation, was marked. Media remains a desirable vehicle to promote religious messages to a wider audience; in the case of AJA, although the Islamic theology was briefly offered, the political Islamic ideology was positively endorsed.
The main research questions in connection with AJA and its relations with the MB have been answered; the findings in this research have a wider research implication in the field of media. Media can play an active role in promoting religious ideologies such as political Islam, as in the case of AJA.

The media can be a platform for stability as well as a tool for chaos during political polarisation. The media can easily fall into the eye of the political storm and become the news itself rather than a source of news when covering complex situations. Those media services which stand as a mouth-piece for their parent country, for example, can often be criticised, and their ‘objectivity’ be widely contested, even if they attempt to prove otherwise. The media is deemed to be an effective vehicle for promoting religion as a theology as well as supporting politics.

11.3 Future Research and Recommendations

The study of AJA and the MB, in the case of the Egyptian political scene, has opened some doors for further academic research on AJA. Additional research can be made into the general news output of AJA and its representation of different ideologies. How the Egyptian people, for example, perceived AJA TV coverage of the Egyptian uprising, before and after the fall of Mubarak, is a significant opening for audience research and requires further investigation. It is also important to understand how
AJA satellite television covered internal Qatari foreign policy affairs, which has been contested among academics for some time. How AJA covered the Bahraini uprising, as well the Saudi secret uprising, are important issues that warrant further examination. Comparative studies on the similarities and differences between the editorial coverage of AJA and AJE, in relation to the Arab Spring countries, would be significant. The primary aim to uncover how the network addressed similar topics for different audiences and cultures would also be useful.


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**APPENDIX**

**Appendix (1):**
*A* Ahmad Mansour’s *Without Borders*

### 1.1 List of selected episodes from *Without Borders*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Translation</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>الدور السياسي المرتقب للإخوان في مصر</td>
<td>The expected political role of the MB in Egypt</td>
<td>26.10.2005</td>
<td>EP1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>مآخذ القضاة على انتخابات الرئاسة المصرية</td>
<td>Judges’ remarks on the Egyptian presidential election</td>
<td>2.11.2005</td>
<td>EP2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>حجم المعارضة المصرية في الانتخابات البرلمانية</td>
<td>The size of the Egyptian opposition in the Parliamentary election</td>
<td>9.11.2005</td>
<td>EP3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>الانتخابات البرلمانية في مصر</td>
<td>Parliamentary election in Egypt</td>
<td>10.11.2010</td>
<td>EP4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>مراقبة الانتخابات البرلمانية في مصر</td>
<td>Monitoring the Parliamentary election in Egypt</td>
<td>17.11.2010</td>
<td>EP5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>أسباب مشاركة الإخوان في الانتخابات البرلمانية</td>
<td>Reasons for the MB’s participation in the Parliamentary Election</td>
<td>24.11.2010</td>
<td>EP6</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>رؤية الإخوان المسلمين لتشكيل الحكومة في مصر</td>
<td>The MB’s vision in forming a government in Egypt</td>
<td>25.1.2012</td>
<td>EP7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>هشام قديل – رؤية لمستقبل مصر ج1</td>
<td>Hisham Qadil (PM) – A vision to Egypt’s future – Part 1</td>
<td>21.11.2012</td>
<td>EP8</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>ندا: السيسي ليس مهتمًا بالحكم والإخوان لن يستسلموا</td>
<td>Nada: Alsi is not qualified to govern and the Muslim Brotherhood will not give up</td>
<td>9.4.2014</td>
<td>EP10</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>انتفاض مصر سيكسر من داخل الجيش</td>
<td>Egypt’s coup will breakdown from within the military</td>
<td>16.4.2014</td>
<td>EP11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>تحالف جديد ضد الانقلاب... هل يشكل</td>
<td>A new collation against the</td>
<td>7.5.2014</td>
<td>EP12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.2 Extracts from the selected episodes:

In the below table, each extract (in Arabic) is translated in English and is given a code and episode number:

(EX = Extract / EP = Episode)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>أحمد منصور: بدأ العد التنازلي للانتخابات البرلمانية المصرية التي من المقرر أن تبدأ مرحلتها الأولى في التاسع من نوفمبر القادم وذلك وسط منافسة حامية الوطيس بين الحزب الوطني الحاكم من جهة والإخوان المسلمين وقائمة الجبهة الوطنية الموحدة المعارضة والمستقلين والمنتقليين عن الحزب الحاكم من جهة أخرى، غير أن الإخوان المسلمين الذين يوصفون رسميا بالجماعة المحظورة هم أكثر القوى السياسية إثارة للجدل في المجتمع المصري، فرغم الضربات الأمنية القاسية التي تتعرض لها الجماعة منذ اغتيال مؤسسها ومرشدها الأول حسن البنا في الثاني عشر من فبراير عام 1949 إلا أن المراقبون يعتبرونهم القوة الأكثر تنظيما وتأثيرا في المجتمع المصري. في هذه الحلقة نحاول التعرف على مخطط الإخوان لخوض الانتخابات البرلمانية وتحالفاتهم مع القوى السياسية وحقيقة الصفقات السرية بين الإخوان الوطني الحاكم والأقباط و.sock in حوار مباشرة مع الرجل الذي يوصف بأنه رجل الصفقات السرية في الإخوان محمد خيرت الشاطر نائب المرشد العام للإخوان المسلمين.</td>
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</table>

Ahmad Mansour: The Countdown has started for the Egyptian parliamentary election as planned on 9th February amid fierce competition between the National Ruling Party and the Muslim Brotherhood on one hand, and between the National Unity Front and independents and defected personnel from the Ruling Party from another. The Muslim Brotherhood, officially described as a banned group, is the most controversial political power in Egyptian society. Despite the cruel security strikes they have had since the assassination of its first founder and mentor, Hassan Al-Banna, on 12 February 1949, observers consider them to be the most organised influential political group in Egyptian society. In this episode, we try to understand the MB’s plan in participating in the Parliamentary Election, their coalition with other political powers, their secret agreements between them and the National Ruling party and Copts. Such questions will be discussed live with the man who is described as the man of secret agreements in the MB. He is
Moha mmed Khirat El-Shater, Deputy head of General Supreme Leader of the MB.

**E1, EX2**

أحمد منصور: إلى متى ستظلوا تعملوا بشكل سري وكمنظمة سرية؟

الشاطر: نحن جماعة مطاردة قانونا في مصر ... إخنا أفرادنا يدخلوا كمحتاجون لا يبقى عندها حزب أو عدنا جمعية أو جماعة رسمية تعرف بها بشكل واضح ممكن نازل قولنا بشكل جماعي ...

الشاطر: نحن على استعداد لإعلان كل أسماء الإخوان المسلمين على شبكة الإنترنت إذا ما أمننا، إذا ما توقف النظام وتوقفت الدولة في سياسة الاعتقالات والتمييز والملاءة وليس فقط الاعتقالات والمطاردة والسجون ولكن أيضا محاربة الناس في وظائفهم وتحويل المدرسين إلى وظائف إدارية، بمنع تعيين الناس المنضوين في الجامعات. يعني فيه وسائل تمييز ومطاردة كثيرة وبالتالي ده اللي يمكن بيدفعنا أحيانا إننا لا نعلن عن كل إيه أفرادنا وكل ناسا ولكن لو شعرنا بالأمان وأصبح فيه حياة سياسية مستقرة في البلد فنحن على استعداد لوضع كل أسماء الإخوان المسلمين بلا استثناء على شبكة الإنترنت لبعضها الجميع وهي معظمها الآن معروفة.

**Translation**

Ahmad Mansour: Until When you will be working secretly and as a secret organisation?

Al-Shater: We are a legally wanted group in Egypt ... For that our members are independent candidates. When we become a [legally recognised] party or an institution or a movement then we can go to the election with a collective lists...

Al-Shater: We would publicly list all the names of our members online if we have assurances. Until the regime stops the policy of arrests, harassing and chasing [members]; not only that, but also irritating citizens [in] their jobs and transferring the jobs of teachers to [governmental] administrative jobs and banning the appointment of distinctive university students [in governmental jobs]. There are so many harassment practices used against us. Such practices, sometimes, stop us from going public. If we [members and families] feel safe and the political life becomes stable in this country, we would be ready to announce all the names of our members online [publicly] without any exception.

**E1, EX3**

الشاطر: فإحنا الآن داخلين في معركة انتخابية، إحنا رصيدنا وتجاربنا وخبراتنا في المعارك الانتخابية الماضية كنا إدا كنا غادي، ينتمون إلى انتخابات وإلى تمييز، فنحن لا نريد أن نعرض المرأة إلى مثل هذه التحديات...

**Translation**

Al-Shater: We are going into an electoral battle. Our past experiences in such electoral battles have been tough for us and it requires extraordinary effort. We normally get subjected to arrests and harassments. We don’t want to expose women candidates to such challenges.
أحمد منصور: السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته، على اليواء مباشرة من القاهرة ومن الهواء الطلق، يكن
قبل أن أبدأ الحلقة أود أن أتقدم ببلاغ على الهواء مباشرة إلى السيد وزير الداخلية.. فقد تم الاعتداء عليَّ بالضرب المبرح تحت.. أمام عمارة قناة الجزيرة هنا من شخصين اقتربا مني في شكل اتضح إنه كمين واعتديا عليَّ بالضرب المبرح
أمام الناس جميعا، كُسِرت نظارتي وتحولت إلى فتات وأُصبت بكدمات في وجهي ونزف الدم من هنا من خلف أذني
وعندني تودع شديد هنا ولاذا بالغارة في سيارة كانت تنتظرهما فيما اتضح إنه كمين، كنت أقف لانتظار الدكتور نعمان جميلة حتى أصحبه إلى الأستوديو فاقترب مني شخص وقال لي هل أنت أحمد منصور؟ بمجرد أن قلت له نعم ضربني
بقوة شديدة في شك أن intention الواضح أن يسبب لي عاهة وليس ضربا بسيطا فيما كان شخصا آخر خلفه انهال علي
الآخر بالضرب أيضا، لكني والحمد لله قمت، إذا كان الهدف هو إسكاتي عن قول الحقيقة فلن أتوقف عن قولها
وأرجو من السيد وزير الداخلية أن يتم هذا البلاغ قاصرة أو أن تبت أبناءه لاسيما الشرفاء منهم.

Translation
Ahmad Mansour: [Full Islamic Greeting: In the name of Allah, the most compassionate and the most Merciful], I welcome you live on air from Cairo, from this open location [outside studio]. Before I start this episode, I would like to file a complaint – live on air – to the Minister of Interior.

Today, I was assaulted below the Al-Jazeera building, two men approached me and asked me if I'm Ahmad Mansour, the moment I said yes, they brutally beaten me aiming at what they seemed to want to cause an enduring disability [the groin]. If the aim of this attack was to shut me up from saying the truth, I will not stop. I appeal to the Interior Minister to act on this incident...

أحمد منصور: السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته… دخلت الحرب الكلامية والصدامية بين جماعة الإخوان المسلمين أو الجماعة الحزبية فيما يسمى النظام الحاكم في مصر وبين الحزب الوطني الحاكم وأجهزة الأمن مرحلة جديدة بإهمال رئيس الكتلة البرلمانية للإخوان المسلمين في مجلس الشعب المتقدم وابن الكولن سعيد الكولن لإخوان الحزب الوطني الحاكم في ألمانيا بجولة غامضة في الوقت الذي باول فيه بعض الإخوان من الإخوان اعتقلهم في مجلس الشعب احتجاجا على اسماعهم عن استبعادهم من التشريع من اعتقالات وما عنهم من الاعتداءات والمعنوية.

الانخراطة وذلك فعل أيام من الإخوان الانخراطة المحذرة أن تجري يوم الأحد القادم، وفي الوقت الذي طالب فيه كثير من الإخوان المسلمين بتعليم قيادات في مصر والخارج جماعة الإخوان بالإسحاق من العملية الإخوانية احتجاجا على ما يحدث وفقا للمشروع الذي قاد الإخوان قررت أن تواصل المعركة إلى النهاية رغم إعلانها أن الإخوان لم يتوصلوا بها على أهدافها، فإن قيادة الإخوان قررت أن تواصل المعركة إلى النهاية رغم إعلانها أن الإخوان لم يتوصلوا بها.

قبل أن تبدأ وذلك وسط تكهنات كبير من المعارضين بأن الإخوان القادمة ربما تكون الأصفح خلال العقود الأخيرة لا سيما بين الإخوان والحزب الحاكم وأجهزة الأمن، بل حتى أعضاء الحزب الحاكم المناقصين ضد بعضهم البعض.

في كثير من الدوائر حيث قبل أزعة من أصوات الرشيجين حي الالية.

Translation
Mansour: [Full Islamic Greeting], The battle of words and confrontations between the MB or the banned movement – as described by the National...
Ruling Regime [Mubarak’s] and his security services, have reached a new phase as the head of the Parliamentary Block of the MB, Dr Said Katatni has accused the National Ruling Party’s candidate for Al Minia constituency of attempting to assassinate him. In the meantime several Parliamentarians [from the MB] are on strike protesting about their exclusion from running as candidate [in the coming Parliamentary election]. The MB has announced that hundreds of its supporters were arrested and their electoral campaigns were banned just days before the start of the Parliamentary election, which was planned to take place this Sunday. Several members of the MB - including some of its leaders – inside Egypt and outside, have appealed to the MB to withdraw from the election in protest of what is happening [referring to the arrest and ban] and to spare bloodshed. Yet, the MB leadership has decided to take part in the election and continue its electoral battle until the end, regardless of the fact that they [the MB] have declared that the election was fabricated before it started. Observers expect that this coming election will be the most fierce one in the past decades between the MB, the ruling National Party, and even within the members of the ruling National party themselves; battling for some constituencies. So far, four of their [the National Ruling Party] supporters were killed.

Translation

Mansour: And the fear that people are living under for dozens of years?
Badei: We are not the cause [of this fear]. The cause is the corrupt regime [Mubarak] which uses security methods to terrify people. The name of security services should have provided security and safety among Egyptians. Until now, we are facing great injustice by its looting properties, closing companies, jailing our brothers […]
Translation
Mansour: [Full Islamic Greeting] I welcome you all live on air from Cairo in a new episode of *(Without Borders)*. Today, Millions of Egyptians have taken the streets and squares to celebrate the first anniversary of 25th January revolution, which has begun to bear its fruit. For the first time in Egypt since the military has been in control from July 1952, a first Parliamentary Council has been formed through free election. Dr Saeed El-Katatni, the Secretary General for the Freedom and Justice Party, the political wing for the MB, has been elected as the Parliamentary President. This step stands as a defining mark in the history of Egypt and the MB organisation, which was described before the revolution as a ‘banned organisation’. However, this banned organisation, as it used to be named during Mubarak’s regime, has become the choice of the people who voted with a majority for the MB. They’ve [the MB] secured almost half of the parliamentary seats, which means that they will form the coming government and therefore play a central role in making Egypt’s future following the revolution.

E12, EX8
Ahmad Mansour: [Full Islamic Greeting] Greetings from Paris. After a heroic persistence of a wide sector of the Egyptian people who refused
the military coup led by the Defence Minister, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, in July... such a coup was met with sacrifices of thousands of martyrs, and tens of thousands injured and imprisoned. Today from Paris, I announce the birth of a national document calling on all those who took part in the 25th January revolution, to participate in restoring the revolution from those who have abducted it. The document is calling to unite all Egyptian national political colours; a wide spectrum of Egyptian national and revolutionary powers has announced its acceptance of the content of the document, which announces the birth of a national and revolutionary entity, which will work to abort the coup and its plans [...]

E6, EX9

أحمد منصور: لكنك أصدرت بيانا أول أمس قلت فيه إن الانتخابات قد بدأ تزويرها قبل أن تبدأ، لماذا تشاركون في انتخابات كما وصفتها أنت مزورة؟

محمد بديع: نعم، المؤشرات التي ظهرت حتى الآن تؤكد أن هذا النظام وهذا الحزب (الحزب الوطني) مصابة بالتمزاز لانه لا يستطيع

منافسة حرة شريفة مع حزبين السياسيين، فلا يوجد حزب في الدنيا يصوم له أموات، ولا يوجد حزب في الدنيا يقوم على مفعول واحد من خمسة مشجعين لا يوجد حزب في الدنيا يقوم بهذه الإجراءات تجاه حزومه باعتقال ومداهمات المنازل واستيلاء على ممتلكات وتصادرات شركات ملكية خاصة واعتدامات لقرارات وقوانين ودستور

اقسموا عليه أن يتحروا، وكذلك إصدار قضايا محاكمة فاصل، وما زالت تصدر حتى هذا اليوم. رغم كل هذا نحن نرى أنه لا يوجد إلا مجال النضال الدستوري القانوني كي نحصل على حقنا وعلى حق هذا الشعب المصري المضطرب المضطرب والمضطرب.

Translation

Mansour: You issued a statement two days ago stating that the fabrication of the election had started before it began, why do you participate in an election you’ve described as fake?

Badei: Yes, there are indications that confirm that this regime [Mubarak] and this party (ruling National Party) is addicted to fabrication because they are unable to compete with his political opponents in an honest and free method... There’s no party in this world that takes such procedures towards their opponents by making arrests, attacking homes, looting properties, confiscating private and public companies, disrespecting legal and constitutional articles which they’ve sworn to respect, wasting the verdicts of courts issued, and still being issued, up to this date. Despite all this, there’s no way out but the way of using a legal and constitutional struggle to restore the Egyptian people’s stolen rights.

E8, EX10

أحمد منصور: السلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته أحييكم من مجلس الوزراء من القاهرة وأرحب بكم في حلقة جديدة من برنامج بلا حدود. ليس محظوظا على الإطلاق من يتولى قيادة دولة بعد قيام ثورة، فهما فعل لن يستطيع رق
الخروق التي حولت ثوب الدولة إلى قطع بالية وبعد الثورات تتحول الحرية إلى شكل من أشكال الفوضى ولا يرضى الناس عن أحد فناجاحهم في إزالة الطاغية يشعرون دائما بكم من حبه ومكانه حتى لو كانوا هم الذين اختاروه وهذه حال مصر اليوم حال من يحكمها مع شعبها، الشعب الذي خضع للسلاطين والطاغين طيلة 60 سنة حق قام بتقوية لا يريد أن يحل الحاكEMS أو آخر أو سنوات حق يفكر كيف يعيد صناعة ثوب جديد لن يقبل به أحد من يحكمهم مهما بلغ حجمه أو مكانته حتى لو كانوا هم الذين اختاروه وهذه حال مصر اليوم وحال من يحكمها مع شعبها، الشعب الذي خضع للسلاطين والطاغين طيلة 60 سنة حق قام بتقوية لا يريد أن يحل الحاكEMS أو آخر أو سنوات حق يفكر كيف يعيد صناعة ثوب جديد لن يقبل به أحد من يحكمهم مهما بلغ حجمه أو مكانته حتى لو كانوا هم الذين اختاروه وهذه حال مصر اليوم وحال من يحكمها مع شعبها، الشعب الذي خضع للسلاطين والطاغين طيلة 60 سنة حق قام بتقوية لا يريد أن يحل الحاكEMS أو آخر أو سنوات حق يفكر كيف يعيد صناعة ثوب جديد لن يقبل به أحد من يحكمهم مهما بلغ حجمه أو مكانته حتى لو كانوا هم الذين اختاروه وهذه حال مصر اليوم وحال من يحكمها مع 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Translation

Mansour: [Full Islamic Greeting] Greetings from the Council of Ministers in Cairo. It’s extremely unlucky for any party to lead a nation, following a revolution. Whatever this party does, it will not be able to sew the holes which have turned the state dress into a mess; following the revolution, freedom has become a form of chaos. The success of removing the tyrant made people feel that they were bigger [grander] than anyone who governs them, regardless of his size and status - even if this person has been chosen by them. This is the reality of the people in Egypt today. The people who have been under dictatorship and corruption for more than six decades do not want to give their ruler a few weeks, months, or years to think about how to re-knit a new dress for the country, after electing the first civil president in its modern history.

E12, EX11

أحمد منصور: إزاي ينكسر ويندحر في ظل الدعم الدولي الموجود الآن، السيسي الآن يعمل الديمقراطية الشكلية إلي الغرب طالبا منه. الاتحاد الأوروبي سيبعث مندوبين لتفتيش النظام في مصر كجزء من سلطة الانتقال. الشرعنة السيسي الأولى لم تتفق على مشروعها حتى الآن. أمريكا والمجلس الأوروبي هما الرافضين لتدخل مصر في الانتقال أيضاً سوف يرسلون مراقبين في الأسابيع القادمة.

ثروت نافع: الشرعنة ليست شرعية، الشرعنة هي محاولة للشرعية ومحاولة باطلة وما يأتي من طاغيه يراعي نص مادة 387 من الدستور، بينما سيستغل السيس لمبادئ الانتقال. هذا ليس شرعية.

أحمد منصور: بعدما يبقى السيسي رئيساً، سيعترف السيس بمجلس الوزراء.

ثروت نافع: أعتقد أن هذا يكون الشرعية، لأن الانتقالي الأمريكي يستغل الانتقال لشرعنة السيسي، ولكن إذا كان الغرب يدعم السيسي، يعتبر أن هذا يشكل شرعية.

أحمد منصور: كلاً، السيس ليس لديه القوة للشرعنة.

ثروت نافع: يعني تشغيل الشرعنة يمكن أن يؤدي إلى شرعنة السيسي، ولكن السيس ليس لديه القوة للشرعنة.

أحمد منصور: كيف يمكن شرعنة السيسي؟bias

Translation

Mansour: How would it [the coup] break with all international support now?

- Al-Sisi is building a false democracy, approved by the West. The
European Union will send observers to monitor the electoral process, which is sort of legalising the coup and legalising Al-Sisi […] Al-Sisi, in a few days’ time, will become a legal president.

Nafa’a: Legalising doesn’t mean legal. What is built on falsehood is false. I totally agree with you, that there are strange hands drawing such a scenario, but remember, until now only six countries have recognised…

Mansour: When Al-Sisi becomes president, all will recognise him.

Nafa’a: I think this is one of the possibilities and this is the legitimising idea which they are trying to do, but does this give him the legitimacy? No it won’t give him legitimacy.

AMansour: Will you be able to thwart Al-Sisi’s final steps, a few days before the election?

Nada’a: We count on the ability of the Egyptian ‘street’, as we count on the regime falling from inside, not from the outside, and by the hands of the Egyptians, as they have done with even stronger, greater and brutal regimes

E1, EX12

الشاطر: نحن لا نغطي ولا ننكر ولا نفصل من هويتنا الإسلامية، نحن أصحاب مشروع إسلامي، مشروع لنبيضة مصر على أساس المرجعية الإسلامية ودعا قائدتنا ودي عقيدتنا ودي مهندنا وبالتالي نحن لا نجد خضاعية في أن نصف أنفسنا بهذا الوصف أو نرفع هذا الشعار ونسوق له ونروج له ونتحصد الأنصار حوله ونبنه الآفة إلى إنه الجل هو ينتمي في الإسلام وإنا ما نبتكر كشر، مرشح الحزب الوطني في أحد الدوائر بالأمس قال الإخوان يقبولوا الإسلام هو الحل أنا يقول الفراغ هو الجل

Translation

Al-Shater: We do not hide our Islamic identity, we have an Islamic project; awakening project for Egypt based on Islamic values. This is our belief and approach. We do not find any problems describing ourselves as such or loudly market this slogan (Islamic identity)...I say not only Islam is the solution but also the Qur’an is the solution.

E1, EX13

الشاطر: كل مسألة الاتهام محاولة من بعض الصحف الصفراء المعروفة التي لا تتورع باستمرار عن محاولة تشويه ليس الإخوان فقط ولكن الإسلام ذاته

Translation

Al-Shater: The accusations from some tabloid media, not only hesitate to distort the image of the MB but also the image of Islam itself.

E1, EX14

الشاطر: نحن لا نسعى للحكم ولكن نسعى لتحقيق نبيضة مصر النهضة دي يبدأ بالقرد السلام والبيت المسلم والمجتمع المسلم والنواة بمؤسساتينا بشكل إسلامي والحرص والسعى للوحدة الإسلامية

Translation

Al-Shater: Our aim is not to rule but to achieve awakening for Egypt.
Such an awakening starts from the Muslim individuals and institutions, Muslim family, Muslim society and Muslim state, and to seek an Islamic unity.

**E6, EX15**

Badei: Do you imagine that this is something we shouldn’t do anything about? We stand to say to the oppressor [Mubarak] that he is the oppressor. We are encouraged to stand against that, as described and advised by the Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) when he said: “The best *jihad* is a word of truth about an oppressor Sultan”; and we say as the Prophet once said: “the fear of people should not stop you from saying the word of truth when you acknowledge wrong-doing because this won’t change your divine livelihood.

**E6, EX16**

Mansour: You [the MB] are accused of stoning the security and hurting police officers…

Badei: Throughout the history and life of the MB, this has never been done. However, I say that those who are used to fabricate and lie, it is not unusual to hear them saying fabricated accusations. We were imprisoned and sentenced in military courts. Some people were killed and buried and then fabricated accusation arose that these people tried to escape. Several regimes are profession liars; they lie to their own people. One day, Judgment Day will come and they will be punished. Allah’s wrath will be harder on them.

**E7, EX17**

Ahmed Mansour: This is a challenge to the public freedoms, the arts, and creativity and the MB has misled all people with lies and...
Mansour: There are real concerns from people about public liberties including art and creativeness, as if the MB will force people to wear veils, grow beards and Islamic dresses?

Morsi: No one wears anything with force; this is not lawful, not constitutional and legitimate. The Creator of people gave them the right to believe on him [God]. People are free to choose their own beliefs and faith but the freedom that does not harm the societal boundaries in accordance with law and the constitution that exists and has been agreed upon.

Mansour: Are you willing to open a dialogue with Al-Sisi or coup leaders?

Nada: No one has the right to open a dialogue with anyone except the legitimate president. We are calling for legitimacy, and legitimacy came through election and the people have brought Morsi, not us. No one has the right to speak except through legitimacy and we're calling for the return of legitimacy. We can be mediators but not….

Mansour: What form of mediation are you willing to do?

Nada: Dialogue with Morsi.
**Translation**

**Al-Shater:** We urge the government [the regime] to start the reform process. We would accept the reform to start gradually but a serious one, clear and specific in order to accomplish a true reform in this country. This esteemed nation [Egypt] who built civilisations around history, deserves [reform] as we are no less than other nations such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Nigeria. These countries have got democratic elections, diversity, and devolution of power. As everyone knows, freedom is central for development, *Nahda* (awakening). No freedom would mean no hope for real development.

**E1, EX20**

**Translation**

**Al-Shater:** Our door is open for honest political powers in Egypt which work on the basis of moving the political life forward in Egypt and attempt to reach political and constitutional reforms. We are ready to collaborate with all political powers, especially those from the Egyptian Front as well as independent political figures.

**E1, EX21**

**Translation**

**Al-Shater:** Because the ruling National Party [the Mubarak regime] has its own political programme, we - alongside other political powers - see this party [the Mubarak party] is responsible for political stagnation and for the political blockage in Egypt.

**E7, EX22**

**Translation**

**Morsi:** We are serious and the Egyptians are serious in their choice. We will be moving forward towards stability and development. Our objective is to have a new and stable Egypt, modern Egypt, based on democracy and modern a constitution. We all seek to achieve this goal; development is a big objective and is the first step on a long road, which will be...
Ahmad Mansour: (Introduction for Al-Shater): He was born in Doukaliya [east of Egypt] in 1950. He obtained his Bachelor degree in Engineering from Alexandria University in 1974. He was appointed as teaching assistant, following his Master’s degree from Al Mansoura University in 1981. Then, he secured a large number of academic certificates including Diploma in Sociology from Ein Shams University, Diploma in the Islamic Studies from Islamic Studies Centre, Diploma in Civil Society and NGOs from Economics and Political Science from Cairo University, Diploma in Business Administration from Ein Shams University, Diploma in International Marketing from Helwan University. He became involved in Islamic work in 1967 and later joined the Muslim Brotherhood in 1974. He was arrested four times. The first was in 1968 under Abdel Nasser’s regime because he was taking part in the famous student protests in 1968. The second imprisonment was for one year in 1992 [as part of the Salsabil cause]. The third was in 1995, in which he was sentenced for five years, for one of the MB accusations which was looked at by a military court. The fourth one was in 2002, for almost one year.

Translation

Mansour: This means that Morsi is not Mubarak and Qandeel is not Ahmad Natheef [Mubarak regime’s Prime Minister who’s known for his
Qandeel: I assure you that there's an elected president, and the elected president can be changed through a ballot box.

Ahmed Mansour: (Introduction to Badie) The General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, Dr. Mohamed Badie Sami Abdul Majid, was born in the big city of Mahalla in 1943, graduated from the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine and received his doctorate in 1979; he was appointed a teacher at the College of Veterinary Medicine at Zagazig University. He obtained a professorship of Veterinary Medicine at the Faculty of Medicine, Cairo University, Beni Suef department in 1987, then became head of the Department of Pathology for both, then the head of the School of Graduate Studies for one semester. He supervised 15 Master's and 12 Ph.D. papers and dozens of scientific research projects in his field. He became Secretary General of the Association of Veterinarians in Egypt for two tenures. His name was included in the Arabic scientific encyclopedia, issued by the Egyptian State of Information Service in 1999, as one of the top one hundred Arab world scientists. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood and was arrested in 1965 […] He was sentenced to 15 years in prison; he spent 9 years in jail and then was released in April 1974. He was then arrested for the second time in 1998 and spent 75 days behind bars; then, in 1999, he spent 3 years in prison, and in April 2008, he was jailed for one month. He was selected as a member of the High Guidance Office in Egypt in 1996, then a member of the
International Movement of the Muslim Brotherhood in 2007, and then appointed as General Guide for the movement, last January

Ahmed Mansour: In this episode, we try to introduce the MB’s vision for Egypt’s future and their project to evolve it [Egypt] through our dialogue with Dr Mohammed Morsi, the president of the Freedom and Justice Party. He graduated from Engineering Colleague, Cairo University in 1975, got his Masters in Filzat Engineering from Cairo University, and a Ph.D. from South California University in 1982. He worked as assistant professor in North Ridge University in the U.S. in California between 1982 and 1985. He worked as a lecturer and head of Filzat Engineering department in Zagazeeq University from 1985 until 2010. He was a member and a president in the parliamentary block for the MB in Parliament between 2000 and 2005. He was selected as the best parliamentarian in the world due to his performance…Welcome Dr.

Al-Shater: The process of the parliamentary election is exaggerated and depicted as a gate for Egypt to access a new democracy. I do not think that the picture painted in the media and in the different security services [the Mubarak security services] is correct. There are so many things that need to be done outside the Parliament. We want a campaign to advocate for political participation’s culture, diversity, accepting the others, and devolution of power.
أحمد منصور: الدكتور ما الذي جمع فلول الناصريين واليساريين والانتصاريون والفنانين والرقصين والطبالين عدنا كلها اللي خرجت في ميدان التحرير معفلول. في هذا التحالف ضد الحكومة. وهم كله من تحالفوا مع بعض ضد الحكومة ضد الرئيس وهم يتابعون المشهد ولا ينضموا. هشام قنديل: أنتospital أحمد الديمقراطية، الديمقراطية إن يكون فيها معارضة إن يكون فيها رأي آخر.

Translation

Mansour: Dr Qandeel, how come all ‘the remnants’ of the previous regimes: Nasserites, leftists, communists, artists, dancers, drummers, are in coalition against the government? Do you follow the political scene or not?

Qandeel: Democracy - democracy has opposition and opposite views.

محمد خيرت الشاطر: لو بحثت في التاريخ المصري الحديث لن تجد قوة سياسية تحالفت مع قوة أخرى ونسقت معها قدر الإخوان، الإخوان نسقوا مع الواحد 1984، تحالفوا مع العمل والأحرار سنة 1987، والآن قبل انتخابات الرئاسة وبدايات الحراك السياسي في أولنا لنا للعديد الناصري وقلبوا كتلة للوحدة للوحدة للوفد، ووعينا عليهم إن إخنا نعمل لجنة حسبنا وتحاول صياغة مشروع لإنقاذ البلد مما هي فيه والإصلاح السياسي والدستوري.

Translation

Al-Shater: If you look at Egyptian modern history, you would not find any political power has collaborated with other powers as much as the MB. The MB has coordinated with Al-Wafed party in 1984, had a coalition with Labour and Free party in 1987. Now and before the election, with the start of political dynamics and before, we have approached Al Arab Nasirate Part, Unity Part, and Wafed Party and offered them to form a committee to draft a political project to save this country [Egypt] and establish political and constitutional reforms.

محمد بديع: أنا أقول إننا التقينا بقيادات مصر السياسية في ثلاثة لقاءات كله كان همهم أن مصر الآن في مفصل

Translation

Badei: We have met with Egypt’s political leaders on three different occasions. All of them were deeply concerned about the change and agreed that the change can only happen by peaceful means and through ballot boxes. Those who boycott the election, they boycott it because they know that the election will be fabricated not because of the election
approach *per se* ... I would say to everyone [from the opposition] who advised us not to go through with the election - thank you! We have consulted with Al Shoura Council and the result was 98 per cent not to boycott, despite all the awareness of what the security services may do [to us].

E7, EX31

أحمد منصور: الآن يا دكتور أنتم حصلتم على 47% تقريباً من نسبة عدد أعضاء المجلس أنتم بحاجة إلى أن تعطوا 50% حتى تشكلوا الحكومة وبحاجة إلى التفاهم حتى تستطيعوا تمرير التشريعات التي تريدون تمريرها أو القوانين أو التعديلات التي تريدون تمريرها في البرلمان. أنتم بحاجة إلى تحالفات داخل البرلمان مع الكتل والأحزاب الأخرى. مع من ستتحالفون؟

محمد مرسي: الآن يوجد اتفاق على تشكيل البرلمان بين عدد من الأحزاب الحرة والعدالة والتنمية والإصلاح والتنمية والإصلاح والتنمية هناك عدد من الأحزاب اتفقنا على أن يكون تشكيل البرلمان تشكيلاً متوازناً ومبايناً أيضاً عن نسب المقامات.

Translation

Mansour: Now, you [the MB] have secured 47 per cent from the overall parliamentary seats, you need 50 per cent in order to form a government and to be able to pass legislation that you would want to pass or make laws or make amendments to the existing laws. You require coalitions with other parties, with whom you would make a coalition?

Morsi: There is an agreement to form the parliament between number of parties including Freedom and Justice party (the MB), Al-Nour, Development and Reform Party and others. We have agreed to form a balanced parliament and represent all parties on a percentage-based distribution.

E1, EX32

الشاطر: لدعم الناس للدخول في المشاركة السياسية في حد ذاتها، عايزين انتخابات للعمد، عايزين انتخابات نحو البلد، عايزين انتخابات للصحة، عايزين انتخابات للاتحادات الطلابية، لأنه كل هذه المسائل بنصب في اتجاه تحرير واستكمال مقامات البنية الأساسية للبيئة السياسية.

Translation

Al-Shater: We work to support people for political participation. We [the MB] ask for elections for county chiefs, mayors, colleges, syndicates, student unions. All these practices would complement the political infrastructure’s establishment and political environment.

E6, EX33

أحمد منصور: لن تتراجعوا؟

محمد بديع: لن نتراجع وإذاً الله...

أحمد منصور: سنواصل؟
Badei: The Egyptian people (if Allah wills it), will stand by the MB's side until they take back their stolen rights.
as the MB, it has a positive attitude towards women, or do you have other female candidates?

Al-Shater: We, thanks to Allah [God], we have many female candidates. We have a track record for working with women. Sisters in the MB have are recognised for their work. We have so many committee and institutions [for women] in the Egyptian political and social spectrums. We believe in gradual work. We are going into an electoral battle. Our past experiences in such electoral battles have toughened us and requires extraordinary effort. We are normally subjected to arrests, harassments. We don’t want to expose women candidates to such challenges. In this election, we will present one woman, but [if God wills it] in the coming election, once we make sure that the government [Mubarak] is serious and has the will to run a transparent election, then we would be ready to present more women candidates.

E1, EX36

Mansour: In relation to the Copt candidate, what is the nature of the coalition between you the Copts?

Al Shater: Regardless of religion, We strongly believe that the representation - as much as other political parties - of Copts in the political life is inevitable. We talk about Egypt and its awakening and progress following its status of extreme backwardness; in the wake of the triangle of backwardness, corruption, and oppression [referring to the Mubarak regime] we have been living under, we believe that all political power must exist and be represented. Our relationship with Copts is healthy and continuing. It does not exist because of the election only.
<table>
<thead>
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<th>Arabic</th>
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| أحمد منصور: وطبيعة علاقتكم بالكنيسة الآن؟  
محمد خيرت الشاطر: العلاقة طيبة في السنوات.. موجودة بصفة عامة ندعوهم لأحفالنا ويدعونا لأحفالهم وعلاقة طبيعيّة طيبة.. يعني لا يوجد ما يعكرها. | **Mansour:** the nature of your relationship with the Church now?  
**Al-Shater:** In general, the relation is good and existing! We invite them to our celebrations and in they invite us to theirs. The relation is natural and good and there's nothing ruining it. |
| هشام قنديل: أولا مصر ليست غابة، مصر لا زالت أم الدنيا زي ما نقول... تؤكد لنا أن العالم يراeenنا بمنظور غير اللي يظهر في الإعلام المصري أو يمكن هم ما يشوفون الإعلام المصري. | **Qandeel:** Egypt is not a jungle. Egypt is the mother of this universe. The outside world see us differently from the picture [negative] which is painted by the Egyptian media ... |
| الشاطر: يعني تستحضر تاريخ الإخوان وعلاقتهم مع النظام في الدورات الانتخابية الماضية، إحنا في كل حملة انتخابية بمرشحينا بيعتقل عدة آلاف ... إحنا نتيجة الضربات الأمنية الكثيرة في السنوات الماضية... | **Al-Shater:** When referring to the history of the MB and its relations with the regime [Mubarak’s] in the past electoral periods, with every electoral campaign, thousands of us get arrested...we have been subjected to security strikes in the last few years. |
| الشاطر: يعني النهارده الإخوان موجودين من أكثر من سبعين سنة ومن الناحية التاريخية هم أقدم من الحزب الوطني ... وتعتبر أن شرعيتنا القانونية والدستورية موجودة وثابتة وراسخة، شرعيتنا التاريخية موجودة | **Al-Shater:** The MB has existed for more than 70 years. Historically speaking, they [the MB] are older than the ruling National Party. Our legitimacy exists, well rooted and historic. |
| بديع كما علمنا رسول الله صل الله عليه وسلم إذ أخذنا على أيديهم نجونا ونجوا معنا ولن نتركهم يفسدون هذه السفينه ولن ت تركهم يفسدون هذا الوطن الذي صاحب التاريخ العريق. أما أيهم يقولون لنا إننا محظورون فنحن نحنكم إلى شعبنا المصري وهو صاحب القرار الوحيد يا من تدعون الديمقراطية والمواطنة. سلوا شعبكم ما موقع الإخوان المسلمين ليس فقط من أصواتهم بل من قلوبهم وحيم. | **Badei:** As our Prophet (PBUH) taught us that if we support them [the Egyptian people] we will survive together. We will not let them corrupt this ship and this precious country that has ancient history. They [the
Mubarak regime] can describe us as banned, but we always leave the people to judge us, as they have the final word. For those who claim to be democratic and nationalists, ask your people about the place of the MB not only by counting their votes but also from deep inside their hearts and love.

E11, EX43

أحمد منصور: الإخوان طوال الستين السنة الماضية يتعرضون لمحن وابتلاءات كثيرة في مصر في سوريا في العراق في دول كثيرة لكن المحن التي يتعرضون لها في مصر الآن هي تعتبر الأكبر في تاريخهم في مصر أليس كذلك؟

يوسف ندا: لا.

أحمد منصور: في مصر.

يوسف ندا: لا.

أحمد منصور: طلب انت تعرشم لمحنة أكبر من دي مي؟

يوسف ندا: آخ أحمد أنا بكلمك واحد مسجون سابق.

أحمد منصور: أستاذ يوسف هذه الأعداد التي استشهدت وقتلت والأعداد التي في السجون والذين يطاردون أكبر عدد في تاريخ الإخوان.

يوسف ندا: هده تمام.

أحمد منصور: صحيح.

يوسف ندا: صحيح.

Translation

Mansour: The MB, during the last sixty years, has faced lots of crises in Egypt, Syria, Iraq and many others places; in Egypt, this crisis they’re facing… in Egypt now… is the biggest in their history, isn’t that right?

Nada: No.

Mansour: in Egypt?

Nada: No.

Mansour: Tell me, have you been in a crisis bigger than this?

Nada: I’m speaking to you… and I was in jail before.

Mansour: Mr Yusif, the number of people martyred and killed, and the number of people in prison, and those being chased, is the biggest number in the history of the Brothers?

Nada: That is correct.

Mansour: Correct?

Nada: Correct.
# List of selected episodes of Opposite Direction

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2.2 Extracts from the selected episodes of Opposite Direction

Translation

Al-Qassem: Isn’t it true that Islamists won a massive percentage of the Egyptian parliamentary seats, in spite of all the pressure, fabrication and bullying? an Islamist asks. What if the elections were free and fair? Islamists could have won more than 90 per cent of the seats, [...] Aren’t such elections in most Arab states proof that Islamists are the number one power in the Arab street, in spite of persecution, oppression, pursuit and uprooting by Americans and Arabs? [...] but on the other hand, didn’t the voters who vote for the Islamists tend to reflect ignorance and lack of democratic maturity? Did the Egyptians really vote in the MB or was it a protest vote because they hate the regime? Who said that Islamists are oppressed by Americans and Arabs? They would not have participated in the election without American blessing.

EP14 / EX1

Fiصل القاسم: تحية طيبة مشاهدي الكرام، أمَّن يُفتر الإخوان المسلمين بنسبة هائلة من مقاعد البرلمان في مصر بالرغم من كل الضغوط والتزوير والبطلجة؛ يتساءل ناشط إسلامي، كيف لو كانت الانتخابات حرة ونزيهة لفاز الإسلاميون بأكثر من 80% من المقاعد بينما فازت الجبهة الإسلامية للإنقاذ في الجزائر بأكثر من 80% من الأصوات ؟ ألم تثبت الانتخابات في معظم الدول أن الإسلاميين هم القوة الأولى في الشارع العربي بالرغم من اضطهادهم وقمعهم وملتهما واستئصالهم أميركياً وعربياً ؟ أليس أيضاً يسيطر الإسلاميون على المشهد العراقي؟ هل ليبراليون والعلمانيون العرب أي مكانتهم في المقام من الإصلاح لا في مجلس مجلور ؟ ألم ينضوي الليبراليون العراقيون تحت مظلة المرجعيات الدينية كي يصلوا إلى الجمعية الوطنية ؟ ليس هناك صحة إسلامية عظمى من حاكم إلى عمان إذ لا يحلم الذين يتشدقون بالديمقراطية إرادة الشعب عندما تختار الإسلاميون ؟ إذ يصبح الشعب ينتخب عندما يصوت الناس لفازت حركة إسلامية ؟ لكن في القالب أليس تصويت الناخبين للثوار الإسلامي دليل على تخليق وعدم نضجهم الديمقراطي؟ يتساءل آخر، هل يحكم على الأمريكي والجاهلي، هل صوت المصريون حباً في الإخوان أم كراً في النظام ؟ من قال إن الإسلاميين مظلومين أميركياً وعربياً؟ نعم كانوا سيشاركون في أي انتخابات لولا المباركة الأميركية.

EP14, EX0

Fiصل القاسم: تحية طيبة مشاهدي الكرام، أمَّن يُفتر الإخوان المسلمين مرة أخرى إلى الواجهة السياسية في مصر بالرغم من كل الضغوط والتزوير والبطلجة؛ يتساءل ناشط إسلامي، كيف لو كانت الانتخابات حرة ونزيهة لفاز الإسلاميون بأكثر من 80% من المقاعد بينما فازت الجبهة الإسلامية للإنقاذ في الجزائر بأكثر من 80% من الأصوات ؟ ألم تثبت الانتخابات في معظم الدول أن الإسلاميون هم القوة الأولى في الشارع العربي بالرغم من اضطهادهم وقمعهم وملتهما واستئصالهم أميركياً وعربياً ؟ أليس أيضاً يسيطر الإسلاميون على المشهد العراقي؟ هل ليبراليون والعلمانيون العرب أي مكانتهم في المقام من الإصلاح لا في مجلس مجلور ؟ ألم ينضوي الليبراليون العراقيون تحت مظلة المرجعيات الدينية كي يصلوا إلى الجمعية الوطنية ؟ ليس هناك صحة إسلامية عظمى من حاكم إلى عمان إذ لا يحلم الذين يتشدقون بالديمقراطية إرادة الشعب عندما تختار الإسلاميون ؟ إذ يصبح الشعب ينتخب عندما يصوت الناس لفازت حركة إسلامية ؟ لكن في القالب أليس تصويت الناخبين للثوار الإسلامي دليل على تخليق وعدم نضجهم الديمقراطي؟ يتساءل آخر، هل يحكم على الأمريكي والجاهلي، هل صوت المصريون حباً في الإخوان أم كراً في النظام ؟ من قال إن الإسلاميين مظلومين أميركياً وعربياً؟ نعم كانوا سيشاركون في أي انتخابات لولا المباركة الأميركية.
واجتماعياً؟ ما العيب في أن يتحاور الإخوان المسلمين مع أميركا؟ وهل هذه تهمة؟ ألم يصل الإسلاميون إلى السلطة في العراق؟ ألم تدخل حركة حماس الإخوانية في اللعبة السياسية الفلسطينية؟ ألم تدخل واشنطن عن خشيتها من وصول الإخوان إلى السلطة؟ ألم يتحاور حركة الإخوان المسلمين وسواها بالرجعية والأخلاق كتبة كبرى لا يمكن أن تنطلي على أحد؟ تنتني على أحد؟ لكن في الأتجاه الآخر كالأنا مقترح الإخوان المسلمين إذا كان وزير الداخلية السعودي قد اعتبرهم أصل البلاد في العالم العربي؟ ألم تقل السعودية التي رعتهم وحضنتهم إن كل مشاكلها وإفرازاتها جاءت من الإخوان المسلمين وماعند أهلهم للملكة كبر؟ ثم هن نغمر الإخوان حقا أمهم كالأفعى التي يمكن أن نغير جلدها لكن لا يمكن أن نغير غريزتها؟ أليس الفكر الإخواني أخطر أنواع الفكر السياسي الإسلامي؟ لا يعتمد على الانتهازية، بسامل آخر، أما يحتاج الإنسان إلى بناء كيف يعرف جهاز الإخوان من هذه القضية أو تلك؟ لا يضيف ما فهمه لم لا نريد حكماً دينياً يحكم على قلبة العلم والثقافة؟ ألا زواي يعتقدون أن الحاكمية ليست للبشر؟ آلم يصفهم كتاب أخر بمجمعة العيون المسلمين في الدين والسياسة لأهم خططوا الدين ورهنوه عندهم مقابل الوصول إلى كابسية سياسية؟ فمتي يكف الإخوان عن العبث بالعالم العربي؟

Translation
Al-Qassem: The MB is back on the political frontline in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and Jordan, and so on, calling for reform and willing to participate in the political process. This is the revival of the Brothers. So what is wrong if the MB, such a historical movement, wishes to employ internal and external factors in order to enforce its political position? Isn’t it the only social and political power that stands against the ruling regimes and controls the entire Arab street? Isn’t it the MB’s right to be part of the political arena after it has denounced violence, accepted democracy, and respected human and women’s rights? Isn’t it the better alternative to most of the Arab governments that have led their own people to rock-bottom, politically, economically and socially? [...] But in the other direction, why such a rush to support the MB, which was described by the Saudi Interior Minister as the source of the curse in the Arab world? Wasn’t it said by Saudi Arabia that the MB, which they have hosted and cared for, is the reason behind all its problems, as it [MB] harmed the Kingdom too much? Isn’t the Brotherhood’s ideology the most dangerous type of political Islamic ideology? When will the MB stop messing with the Arab world?
ولقد مرت بمراحل تجاهل متكررة، التي تصب على حركة الإخوان. الإخوان المسلمون ليس مشروع البارحة واليوم. المشروع الإسلامي مشروع تربوي ثقافي سياسی اقتصادي.
فُجِّر القاسم: تاريخي.

**Translation**

**Fateh Al-Rawi (Islamist):** The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement was a natural extension of the spread of people and (Ummah)'s awareness, this is the reality of the Islamic awakening; based on education, culture and realisation [...] The MB is approaching its first century since its establishment and it is the oldest movement in the Arab world. Through history, the movement (the MB) had been living in difficult times. The MB is not today or yesterday's project, it is an Islamic, educational, political and economic project.

**Al-Qassem:** Historic

**Translation**

**Al-Qassem:** Some people paint Islamists as oppressed, excluded... others say that Islamists have a coalition with lots of Arab regimes and they are an integrated part of such corrupted regimes (....) so why do you play the role of the victim?

**Translation**

**Rafeq Abdelsalam:** In spite of the MB, alongside other Islamic movements, being banned and subjected to pursuit and oppression, its electoral performance has been better than all political opposition parties. The MB are much more organised and accepted than other social powers in the Egyptian scene... they (the MB) have managed to organise themselves and extend into the depth of the Egyptian society as well as...
many other Arab countries.

Rafiaq Abdelsalam: The Islamic scene is not limited to Bin Laden or the MB. The MB is widespread, diverse, and includes different social layers... It a mistake to limit such a movement to one view.

Rafiaq Abdelsalam: This is Islamic awakening. There is an Islamic awakening happening in different forms among Islamic nations not only Egypt.

Al-Qassem: Islamists are the only alternative...

Rafiaq Abdelsalam: It’s a key party, not the only party, which cannot be ignored or deleted.

Kamal Gurbal: the MB does not represent Islamic awakening. They (Islamists) deceive people [...] The slogan of ‘Islam is the solution’ stands as if they are the guardian of Islam... they deceive people that the separation between religion and state means separating life from Islam...

Ali Abdel Fattah: The slogan of ‘Islam is the solution’ is not a religious
slogan and does not contradict the principles of the constitution, it does not urge violence or sectarianism... I want to say that the slogan of 'Islam is the solution' is a civilised one and aims to enforce the flag of nationality without discrimination. We don’t force anyone to change his or her religion or beliefs.

**Translation**

Fateh Elrawi: the Islamic project, which is not only the MB’s project, is one of the most confrontational with the Western project, which is based on materialism. The Islamic project gave birth to Hamas, Jihad, Hezbollah, and the resistance. Anyone has the idea of defending his honour and country means that he’s an Islamist.

**Translation**

Fateh Elrawi: during the 70 or 70 years this movement have been subjected to torture and injustices. We have been subjected to the culture of torture and harassment.
Al-Qassem: Has the Arab world started to depart from the era of Bia’a (appointments) to Presidential election and diversity such as what has happened in Yemen, Tunisia, Mauritania and Sudan, and soon, will happen in Egypt? Or are such elections largely a lie? Should not the Arab presidents stop treating Arab people as stupid? Isn't it ridiculous to call it an election just because the president chooses some clowns to compete with each other in the election so he can win with more than 90 per cent of votes? How do we call it democracy if the presidents control media services, security services and all state means? It is silly to describe it as an election if the opposition party (MB) is banned from electoral campaigns in universities and public places? Isn't better to save such millions spent on silly Presidential elections to build a hospital, school, or feed poor people?, said another.

On the other side, aren't elections a respected development? Isn't it the right step in the right direction? Would millions of people go out to vote if they knew it is just not real?

EP17, EX12

Translation

Al-Qassem: Why Arab nations are proudly speaking about honour and dignity while they are the most suppressed, living with injustice, oppression and dictatorship? Isn't the case of our people as a man who proudly talks about his adventures with women while he is (sexually) impotent? Why do we fake manhood while we are just rats who fear our own shadows? Why do we fake heroism while we are a nation of cowards? Why do we speak courage while we are the weakest of the universe's nations? Have Arab leaders not sinned against their own people? Does an Arab nation revolt against its oppressor only in his dreams?
On the other side, did not Arab nations shake the earth beneath Arab dictators in Sudan, Yemen, and Egypt? Someone asks! Does it not mean that tightening the security grip in the Arab world is an indication of fear by dictators from their people who are starting to wake up? Isn’t dignity and honour a significant component of Arab identity? Isn’t it true that Arabs reject injustice? Are they (Arabs) facing internal and external enemies at the same time? Aren’t the U.S. and Israel ready to protect any Arab ruler in case he faces uprisings? Aren’t the jets of the U.S. and Israel prepared to strike any Arab uprisings standing against Arab leaders to protect their agents (Arab leaders)?

Translation

Al-Qassem: How laughable what is happening in Egypt but such laughs leads to tears. Did the great Egyptian people revolt in order to replace the tyrant with one of its tails? Is it better in this situation to re-elect the head [Mubarak] instead of one of his foloul [remnants]? In the old times they used to say: cut the head and wolf the falls; in Egypt the head [Mubarak] was cut but the tail has risen, as if nothing has happened. Isn’t it a waste of time to try something twice? Is it logical for the Egyptian people to elect the corrupt and those wanted for injustice such as Ahmad Shafeq [opponent Presidential candidate for Morsi], says an opposition Egyptian. Did not people know that after all what they had suffered through economic and security chaos was made up – during the transitional period – by the Military and foloul in order to wish for the return of Mubarak’s era? Did not the Military Council transform the transitional period to a period of
revenge? Isn’t voting for Shafeq because of hate for the MB?
On the other side: Wasn’t the latest election transparent and free? Isn’t it better to go to the ballot boxes instead of streets? Isn’t it best for the old regime to respect the will of the voters? Isn’t it unjust to describe Shafeq as *foloul* of Mubarak? Did not promise to respect the revolution? … Why would Safeq go for the election if he were corrupt, wanted for injustices and accused of killing and corruption? Why protest against him [Morsi??] if he won the election? Isn’t that a coup against democracy?

EP18, EX14

Ahmad Barakha (MB): The Military control is widespread in Egypt - for 60 years, what did they give us? Poverty, backwardness, ignorance, diseases, dictatorship, corruption, looting resources, and so on...until we need a revolution.

Al-Qaseem: briefly, do you want to say that voting for one of Mubarak’s *foloul*, Ahmad Shafeq, is a result of intentional smearing of the revolution in Egypt for more than a year, which made transforming the transitional period to...

Ahmad Barakha: revenge.

Al-Qassem: revenge against the revolution, is that possible?

Ahmad Barakha: without a doubt! This is the simple reality, which the Egyptians, Arabs and the world are aware of.

Translation

Ahmed Barakha (MB): حكم العسكر في كل الدنيا، انظر فيه، في مصر، ستين سنة، ماذا خلّفت؟ فقر، تخلف، جهل، مرض، استبداد، فساد، تأثيات، إلى آخره حتى احتجنا إلى ثورة.
فيصل القاسم: يعني باختصار تريد أن تقول، إن هذا التصويت لأحد فلول مبارك، ألا وهو أحمد شفيق هو نتيجة التشهي المتعمد للثورة المصرية على مدى أكثر من عام، هو بسبب تحويل المرحلة الانتقالية إلى...
أحمد أبو بركة: مرحلة انتقامية.
فيصل القاسم: انتقامية من الثورة، هل يعقل هذا الكلام؟
أحمد أبو بركة: بكل تأكيد، لا أصدق من حديث الواقع حين يقع، وهذا هو حديث الواقع يتبينه البساطة الذي يدركه المصريين في كل أصقاع مصر، ويدركه العرب، ويدركه العالم أجمع.

EP18, EX 15

فيصل القاسم: في الواقع الكثير يقولون عندما المصريون شعروا بالفرق فعلا خلال المرحلة الانتقالية، هم كانوا يعتقدون أن الثورة ستتحقق، أو ستنتقل بهم إلى النعيم بكبسة زمر، لكن المرحلة الانتقالية كانت كما يقال مرحلة انتقامية.
Translation

Al-Qassem: In fact many Egyptians were thinking that this transitional period would be supportive of the revolution, will take them to heaven, but it turned out that this transitional period became revenge.

Nabil Sharaf Aldine: who’s responsible?

Al-Qassem: the Military Council is responsible.

Nabil Sharaf Aldine: not true!

Al-Qaseem: Mubarak's foloul

Nabil Sharaf Aldine: not true.

Al-Qassem: the tail of Mubarak made the Egyptians extensively vote for Shafeq

EP18, EX 16

Ahmad Barakah: The MB’s history is known for more than the 1928; a system standing against dictatorship, corruption, aiming to liberate homelands, achieve independence, organise the relationship between the people and those who govern them,

Al-Qassem: OK.

Ahmad Barakah: they [the MB] have been subjected to execution and imprisonment…nothing but freedom for this great nation [Egypt], therefore, no one can sacrifice this long history for a parliamentary seat.…

Al-Qaseem: OK

EP18, EX17
Nabil Sharaf Aldine: not true!

Al-Qassem: Shafiq is the killer of revolutionaries...

Nabil Sharaf Aldine: this is not....

EP18, EX18

Al-Qassem: Haven't the Egyptian people revolted against Shafiq? Why do you want him back?

Nabil Sharaf Aldine: the Egyptian people have voted for him

Al-Qassem: now many votes did he get? 20, 25 or 24 per cent, the Egyptian people are 87 million...

Nabil Sharaf Aldine: what the percentage of those voted for Morsi?

EP 18, EX19

Al-Qassem: why do the Egyptian not try the MB for a few years, if they don't succeed then people can remove it...

Nabil Sharaf Aldine: this would be difficult... I can remove Shafiq but won't be able to remove Morsi because he has a desire to control the legislative and judicial powers. This reflects this desire for power and this scares people. They have employed Islam in their favour....

EP19, EX20
Egypt’s Colonels made a coup against the revolution!

In his piece, Al-Qassem asks: Why do some still attack Islamists and warn that their arrival means power, in spite of the fact that they [Islamists] arrived to the chair of power via ballot boxes, not tanks. Have they won democratically in Tunis, Morocco and Egypt? Isn’t it better for the Islamists’ opponents to respect the wish of the people? Do we need to create nations that fit the ideology of seculars? Isn’t the fear of dictatorship by Islamists unjustifiable? Aren’t people capable of electing whomever they want and remove those who are not fulfilling their promises? Aren’t Islamists pledged to be rulers for all people not only for their followers? Didn’t Morsi appoint a Copt as his deputy? Isn’t the government formed from technocrats? Isn’t it silly and unfair to say that Islamic regimes, democratically-elected, are similar to Taliban?

On the other side: Isn’t it right that some people fear Islamist rule after the experience in Sudan, Iran and Gaza? Did they not try to control those countries under fake democracy? Can anyone remove the Islamic rule in Sudan without force? Didn’t the Islamic experience to rule fail in more than one country? Haven’t many Islamists voted solely on a naïve spiritual basis? Isn’t it too early to celebrate the successes of Islamists in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere?
فيصل القاسم: في الديمقراطية.

طلعت رميح:

إنه الإسلاميون الآن قلب جوهر فكرة الديمقراطية والتطور والتقدم والتحرر الوطني...

فيصل القاسم: وصلت الفكرة.

القصة باللغة العربية:

فيصل القاسم:

الشعب تحررت من الاستبداد، تحررت من الخوف، العولمة الإعلامية الآن، شعوبنا بالمناسبة أفهم وأذكى بألف مرة من الشعوب الغربية التي تصوت، ماشي، الآن هذه الشعوب تتحررت وانزاحت الإسلاميون، يا سيدي، لماذا لا تدعم الإسلاميون برامج وخطط استراتيجية، تعرف محمد مرسى مقدم خطة برامجية لسنوات طوال...نحن الآن أمام بداية تطور وتطور كبير لهذه الأمة. يفدو من...

يمسك القاضي:

إن الإسلاميون الآن قلب جوهر فكرة الديمقراطية والتطور والتقدم والتحرر الوطني...

القصة باللغة الإنجليزية:

Al-Qassem: In Democracy.

Tala'at Rameh: in democracy, they [Islamists] stand for democracy...Seculars and their supporters, all of them are now reproducing the Mubarak regime through the Military Council. They are the ones who encouraged the military coup against Islamists. Islamists are now at the heart of democracy, progress, and national liberation.

Al-Qassem: got the idea!

القصة باللغة الإنجليزية الأخرى:

Al-Qassem: People become free from dictatorship, fear, media globalisation...By the way, our nations are a thousand times smarter than Western nations. Those people have voted for Islamists, why don’t you leave Islamists to govern for 4 years and then judge them, based on their records and achievements; if they reach these achievements, vote for them again, if not, act. One of the Egyptian’s once said, let even the devil govern us, if it brings us any good, fine, if not, then we will go to the streets another time and remove Islamists...just give them a chance.

القصة باللغة الإنجليزية الأخرى:

ـ طلعت رميح: أشياء أحرض عليها من كل أحد أختار بينها بحجة. لأنهم أصحاب مشروع، لأنهم طلعت نبهب دولة مديدة. ليس من قبل أن ترى كل الاتجاهات الإسلامية قد يتم برامج وخطة استراتيجية، تعبر محمد مرسي مقدم خطة برامجية لسنوات طوال تدفع...نحن الآن أمام بداية تطور وتطور كبير لهذه الأمة. يفدو من...

يفدو مواجهة للاختلال العنصري العايش في فلسطين والعراق وغيره.
Translation

Tala'at Rameh: Freedom for Islamists is essential because they want to adopt the awakening project. They want to adopt a developing project to build a modern state... is it not unusual to see all Islamists offering strategic programmes and plans?... Do you know that Morsi has offered a plan for years to come to push this country towards development. We are witnessing a start of development and revival for this Ummah, aiming to confront the occupation and aggression in Palestine and Iraq and elsewhere...

Al-Qassem: Popular Islamist.

Tala'at Rameh: This is to build Ummah, build the economy and societies...

EP20, EX25

Translation

Al-Qassem: Your problems [talking about seculars] that you want sex, drink alcohol... go and have sex and drink.

Nabil Fayad: who said that we want sex ... who said that...

Al-Qassem: this is what is happening in Syria.

Nabil Fayad: who said that secularism is about sex and sugar....?

EP20, EX26

Translation

Tala'at Rameh: We have lived under corruption, killers and oppressive regimes. They did not only kill the general public’s opinion but also killed the principles of culture, identity and diversity. Killed so many things, so it’s normal to objectively say that the election is the right thing.

EP22, EX27

العذر شرياني: الديمقراطية ليست هي الصندوق، الديمقراطية هي حكم الشعب، واتى واحد من أهل السياسة
عرف الديمقراطية بأنها الصندوق، من أين جئتم بكل هذا الكلام الفارغ الذي تتنازون به، تاجرتم بالدين وتجارتم بالثورة، والآن تتجارون بما كان مبارك يقوله إما أنا أو الفوضى، وأنت تقولين إما نحن أو الإرهاب. الشعب المصري ركل مبارك وسيركلكم ارحل.

Translation
Abdelaziz Shurbasi: Democracy isn’t ballot boxes. Democracy is the rule of the people. I don’t know from where you’ve come with such nonsense. You’ve used the name of religion, the name of revolution and now you’re using the name of ballot boxes, and Egypt...Mubarak used to say: ‘me or chaos’ and you [the MB] say ‘us or terrorism’. The Egyptian people have kicked Mubarak out and they will do the same to you!
Al-Qassem: what are you saying? That I’ve called most of the opposition party the Destructive Front instead of the Salvation Front? These are not my words, all of them refuse to take part in the programme with the MB. There are at least 15 million Morsi supporters, what do you think? You should kill them so you can be satisfied… you are a group of destroyers, what do you think we kill them all?… you don’t want a dialogue with Morsi although he offered you a hand, he offered Sabbahi [an opposition Leader] to be the deputy president… the opposition don’t want him, don’t want to talk to him… this is shit-democracy not proper democracy, what do you say?

Abdelaziz Shurbasi: notice you tone and your face - all of it is biased.

Attya: Egypt was subjected to a great conspiracy as much as other Arab countries in the region.

Al-Qassem: Great conspiracy?

Attya: Of course.

Al-Qassem: Universal, right?

Attya: It is not universal, no.

Al-Qassem: I thought you had taken it or were stealing it from Bashar [Syria].

Attya: Bashar has nothing to do with this.

Al-Qassem: Possibly, stealing it from this person [Bashar] who uses the word ‘universal’ as though the whole world was conspiring against him.
محمد القدوس: إيجاد.. ما هو الرجل في فكرة معروفة في السياسة في الدنيا كلها اسمها الإدارة بالأزمة، أن تخلق أزمة، وأن تخلق عدوا، هتلر عمل كده، كل الحروب اللي...
فيصل القاسم: يعني القيادة المصرية الجديدة تقلد هتلر.
محمد القدوس: تقلد هتلر بالضبط... قيادة جديدة بدون رؤية ولا برنامج.

Translation
Mohammed Qudousi: In politics there is a known idea called ‘management of a crisis’, in which someone creates a crisis and an enemy, which is what Hitler used to do.
Al-Qassem: This means that the new Egyptian leadership imitate Hitler?
Mohammed Qudousi: Imitation of Hitler exactly... this new leadership has no vision and no programme.

فيصل القاسم: الشعوب العربية وخاصة في مصر تعاني تحت شعارات وهمية كاذبة منذ أكثر من ستين عاما... أربعين سنة خمسين سنة تحت أحذية العسكر وبيادة العسكر ماتى، الآن ن Organizer للأعمال المصري الآن عدد نفس الهمة.

Translation
Al-Qassem: For more than sixty years, Arab nations, especially Egypt, have lived under the impact of illusory slogans and lies, only the sound of battle has been heard. They have been living for the past 40 to 50 years under the shoes of the military. Now, the Egyptian people have revolted and then returned to the same story: national security and fighting terrorism. Many have said that such military generals are not able to acquire any political, economic or popular gains, so they create the scarecrow of terrorism and fighting terrorism, and therefore use the ‘protection of national security’ as a reason. They [the people] say democracy does not work for us because of security […]
Attya: This is....[interrupted].
Al-Qassem: Every time two police officers are beaten, you tell me national security [...]

### Appendix (3): Interview Guide:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Questions in Arabic</th>
<th>Translation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>باختصار، هل يمكنك أن تعطى عن نفسك (الدراسة، الجنسية، الخبرات...؟)</td>
<td>Briefly, can you please introduce yourself (education, nationality, experiences and so on?)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>متي بدأت العمل في قناة الجزيرة؟ ولماذا التحقت بالعمل في القناة؟</td>
<td>When did you start working for AJA? Why decided to work for this channel?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ما هو فهمك لرسالة ورؤية قناة الجزيرة وتأثيرها على المشاهد العربي؟</td>
<td>What is your understanding of AJA’s vision and its influence to Arab viewers?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كيف ترى الخط التحريري للقناة؟ يعني هل هناك توجيهات معينة للفناء؟ ولماذا؟</td>
<td>How do you evaluate the editorial line to AJA? Meaning – are there any particular alignments? Why?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>قضية استقلالية وتمويل القناة وارتباطها بخطر مسألة مثال النقل</td>
<td>The matter of channel’s independence and ownership has been a topic for discussion for a long time, do you think that AJA’s policy aligns or contradicts Qatar’s policy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ما هو رؤيتك لانتفاضات أو الثورات العربية؟ البعض يقفز على تسميتها (ثورات) ويطالع عليهاسميات أخرى مثل (انتفاضات)، ما هو تصورك، ولماذا؟</td>
<td>What is your view on Arab revolutions or uprisings? Some call it ‘revolutions’ others call it ‘uprisings’, what do you think?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>المتابعين لقناة الجزيرة يروا بأن لقناة الجزيرة دور في الانتفاضات العربية من خلال عملك، ما هو الدور الذي لعبته قناة الجزيرة؟</td>
<td>Some people view that AJA has played a role in the Arab uprising? Through your work with the channel, what role has AJA played?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ماهو تقييمك لقناة الجزيرة في تغطية هذه الانتفاضات العربية؟</td>
<td>What is your general evaluation of AJA’s coverage of the Arab uprisings?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>هل اختلعت الرؤية والسياسة التحريرية للقناة في تغطية الانتفاضات من دولة إلى أخرى؟ يعني هناك من يعتقد بأن قناة الجزيرة لم تركز على تغطية الانتفاضة البحرانية على سبيل المثال في حين تغطت في تغطية الانتفاضة المصرية والسورية على وجه الخصوص، ماذا تقول في ذلك؟</td>
<td>Do you think there are any differences on the channel’s editorial practices in covering one country or another? In other words, there are voices saying that AJA did not focus enough on covering Bahraini’s uprising, for example, but dedicated most of its airtime covering the Egyptian or Syrian uprising, what do you think?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>كيف تقيم تغطية القناة للانتفاضة المصرية من بدأها (من مرحلة نشوب المارك، مرورا بانتخاب مرسى إلى سيطرة المجلس العسكري)؟</td>
<td>How do you evaluate the Egyptian uprising from the start until the control of the military council?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why did AJA label what happened in Egypt as a ‘coup’ not a ‘revolution’?</td>
<td>لماذا ازدادت الجزيرة تنسيقية ما حدث في مصر مؤخرا ب(الانقلاب) بدلاً من تصميمها (ثورة).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What is AJA’s vision of the rise of Islamists following the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and elsewhere? Do you think AJA has given the platform to them more than others?</td>
<td>ما هي رؤية قناة الجزيرة مع دعم الإعلام المسلمين والثنائيات الإسلامية الأخرى كما قناة العربية توجه (كما يقول) بدعم النسرين والمجلس العسكري؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does AJA support the MB and Islamic movements, as allegedly Al Arabiya TV supports the liberals and the Military Council?</td>
<td>هل هناك رسالة معينة تحاكي قناة الجزيرة تمريرها بخصوص الانضباط في مصر، أو في المصراع السياسي القائم بين اللبراليين والعلمانيين من جهة والإسلاميين من جهة أخرى؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What kind of message does AJA want to convey, regarding Egypt, or on the relations with the on-going dispute between seculars and Islamists?</td>
<td>هل خسرت قناة الجزيرة من خلالها تغطيتها للاندماج المصري؟ ما الذي خسره؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Has AJA lost from its coverage of the Egyptian uprising? What did the channel lose?</td>
<td>لماذا يوجد تصور سائد في مصر بأن قناة الجزيرة تدعم الإسلاميين بالتحديد الإخوان، ضد (الفلول) والانقلابيين النشطين والعلمانيين؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why do you think that there is a perception in Egypt that AJA supports Islamists, particularly, the MB, against the ‘foloul’, or the ‘coup’ or liberals and seculars?</td>
<td>هل هناك توجه للجزيرة ينتمي مع قطر بدعمها للإخوان كما قناة العربية توجه ينتمي مع السعودية الداعية للعسكر؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think AJA is aligned with Qatar on its support of the MB, as there is alignment with Al-Arabya with Saudi Arabia on its support of the military?</td>
<td>هل ترى بأن قناة الجزيرة تستعمل لغة تعاطف مع الضحية ضد الجلاك؟ إذا نعم، من الضحية ومن الجلاء في حالة مصر؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think AJA uses empathy language towards the victim against the villain? If yes, who is the victim and who is the villain in Egypt?</td>
<td>المتابع لنفس قناة الجزيرة، بى بأن هناك لغة تعاطف لدعم الإخوان المسلمين ضد المجلس العسكري والثوار، هل الإخوان هم الضحية والثوار الآخر هم (الجلاء)؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AJA’s viewers may notice an empathy language supporting the MB against the Military Council and liberals, are the MB the victims and others the villains?</td>
<td>هل تعتقد بأن قناة الجزيرة دور الحكم أو الفاعل لتعريف وتفعيل المشاهد بما هو صائب سياسياً؟</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you think it is AJA’s role to judge or to educate people of what is politically correct?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
منذ نشأتها، عرفت قناة الجزيرة بجرأتها في طرح القضايا المختلفة وعبادة الخطاب الإعلامي لديها. هل تعتقد أن قناة الجزيرة تستخدم لغة ثورية حماسية لدعم الديمقراطية في الوطن العربي ضد الدكتاتوريات؟

Since inception, AJA was said to be daring in addressing different topics and in using fiery language, do you think that AJA uses revolutionary language to support democracy in the Arab world against dictatorships?

هل تعتقد بأن الإسلام السياسي هو البديل لقيادة مرحلة ما بعد الدكتاتوريات؟ لذا تتعاطف مع الإسلاميين دون غيرهم؟

Do you think that political Islam is the alternative to lead post-dictatorship eras? Is that why AJA sympathises with Islamists not others?

هل تعتقد أن توقعات جمهور قناة الجزيرة تغير مع الانتفاضات العربية؟

Do you think that the expectation of audiences has changed alongside the Arab uprising countries?

المراقبين لقناة الجزيرة، يروا بأن جمهور قناة الجزيرة قد تخافت بسبب موافقتها وتغطيتها للانتفاضات. لماذا برايك؟

Observers see that AJA's viewership has been reduced due to its position and coverage of the Arab uprising, what in your view?

كيف تقيم شعار قناة الجزيرة (الرأي والرأي الآخر) بعد الثورات، هل لا زالت القناة تحتفظ بمكانتها؟ أم أنها تغيرت؟

How do you evaluate AJA's motto 'the opinion and the other opinion' following revolutions? Do you think the channel still occupies the same place or has it changed?

هل هناك أي شيء آخر تود اضافته؟

Anything you would like to add?