Title  South Asian Muslims: Adjustments to British Citizenship

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SOUTH ASIAN MUSLIMS: 
ADJUSTMENTS TO BRITISH CITIZENSHIP

By

Ambreen Shah

A thesis submitted to the University of Luton, in fulfilment of the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
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For Abu Ji
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PhD? Me? How could I turn down this opportunity? I couldn’t. Little did I know that the roller-coaster of the high and lows of doing a PhD would last six years. Six long years, when there were many times when I was ready to give it all up; times when my confidence was so low I used to hide from everyone in the hope nobody would ask me the dreaded question ‘How is your PhD going?’; times when I had finished reading something and needed to talk through the idea, or just talk at someone; times when I just needed to relax – it is at these crucial times that I could not have done without my colleagues, friends and family.

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I couldn’t have done it without you all!
DECLARATION

I declare that this thesis is my own unaided work. It is being submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Luton. It has not been submitted before for any degree or examination in any other University.

SOUTH ASIAN MUSLIMS:
ADJUSTMENTS TO BRITISH CITIZENSHIP

ABSTRACT

Over the last twenty years there has been growing evidence of a distinct Islamic identity emerging from within the Western world, an identity that has been portrayed as incompatible with Western ideals. This thesis is based on a small-scale qualitative study of the reality of this identity, as experienced by twenty-three South Asian Muslims living in the south of England, and the impact on notions of citizenship and the rights and obligations this infers.

The thesis contrasts Western notions of citizenship with Islamic thinking. It recognises that although there are points of convergence between the two, a fundamental difference remains. It is argued, where Western notions of citizenship give priority to individual sovereignty, Islamic notions place sovereignty in God and as such define citizenship as the relationship of the individual not to the state, but to God via the state. The thesis explores how this Islamic ideal is made relevant by South Asian Muslims living in Britain.

Theoretically the thesis explores the way in which Muslim identity is universal, group centred and individual. It is argued that, despite differences, as humans we do share some universally shared values that give us a ‘common human identity’. However these shared values are culturally embedded and experienced through distinct (albeit complex) ‘cultural communities’. It is argued that just because people have, in certain circumstances, a group identity, it should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that everyone in that group will experience that identity in the same way. As such identity is simultaneously individual.

Results of the research suggest that for South Asian Muslims of Britain assimilation is impossible and largely undesirable. However, they suggest that this does not mean that most Muslims do not want to be an ‘integrated’ aspect of British life. However integration does not mean ‘being the same as’. There is a strong recognition that Muslims are different and there is to a large extent a desire for this difference to be maintained.

Final analysis, of the data generated, indicates that there are four ideal typical strategies employed by British Muslims in making sense of their faith in the British context. These are identified as:

- That of ‘Lapsed’/ambivalent Muslims where Islam is deemed important in that is provides a ‘moral code’ by which to live life but is, in the main, relegated to the private sphere.
• That of **Selective Muslims** where being a Muslim is of importance but for whom Islam does not impact on their lives in any substantive way.

• That of **'Traditional' Muslims** where being a Muslim is very important but of equal importance is the ethno-cultural similarities they have with other Muslims.

• That of **Engaged Muslims** where there is an active engagement with Islam and a conscientious effort to implement Islam in all aspects of life

Three levels of engagement with British society are also identified (although it must be recognised engagement with Islam does not necessarily lead to (dis)engagement with citizenship/the public sphere): engagement, partial engagement and disengagement.

The thesis recognises that a multiculturalist paradigm has encouraged difference to be seen as static and unchanging, rather then fluid and dynamic as it is in reality. In this context Muslims’ desire to keep to their faith (even if it is variously expressed), and retain (certain) social differences can be misunderstood as an unwillingness to ‘integrate’. An ethnic notion of citizenship has made it hard for Muslims to be equal citizens contributing to their sense of being an ‘outsider’. This thesis argues for a more inclusive definition of citizenship that understands that citizens will have multiple loyalties and responsibilities. Essentialist notions of Islam have perpetuated the misconception of Muslims as different with no commonalities with majority society. This is at the expense of historically rooted social and economic deprivation, and continuing (albeit not as obvious) prejudice and discrimination that many Muslim communities experience.
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CHAPTER ONE

Whoever determines the nature of the concept of the citizen determines the political and human shape of society (Clarke, 1994:28).

INTRODUCTION

The global image of Islam, the social and economic conditions in which many South Asian Muslims find themselves in Britain, and the questioning of what it means to be a good citizen, provide the context in which this study was undertaken. More so, why it is deemed important to understand how South Asian Muslims are ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship.

BACKGROUND TO THE THESIS

When I began this thesis, in 1996, there was growing evidence of a distinct Islamic identity emerging from within the Western world, an identity that was being portrayed as incompatible with Western ideals. In Britain, the events that unfolded during the Rushdie Affair in the late 1980s, were evidence of this. Not only did these events mark the emergence of a more politicised Muslim ‘community’ (Nielson, 1997:137), but they led to the presentation of Muslims (through the media) as ‘uncivilised’, ‘intolerant’, as the ‘anti-modernist enemy within’ and, as such, a grave threat to Western civilisation and democracy, (see Lewis, 1994, Parekh, 1990, Vertovec and Peach, 1997). This image was reconfirmed in the public imagination during the Gulf War of 1990-1991. As Vertovec highlights,
Because they [Muslims] were portrayed generally as somehow linked to a world-wide anti-West Islamic fundamentalist movement, the loyalty of British Muslims to the allied cause against Iraq was questioned (1996:172)

Not only was it questioned if Muslims could be good British citizens if they questioned the wisdom of Western intervention, but on a more global level, as Keane (1993) highlights, the Gulf War affirmed in the minds of many the idea of ‘Islam-as-fundamentalism’. In this context it became apparent that a greater understanding was needed about what it means to be a Muslim living in the West.

This ‘closed’ view of Islam - which sees it as, amongst other things, monolithic, separate, inferior, and as the enemy - has since been defined as the basis of a phenomenon now known as Islamophobia. The term Islamophobia, which implies the ‘dread or hatred of Islam’ (Runneymede Trust, 1997: 1), was coined in the late 1980s at about the same time as the Rushdie Affair, and in Britian has been recognised most notably by the Runneymede Trust in the publication Islamophobia: a challenge for us all (1997). Unfortunately, this anti-Muslim prejudice has not abated since the events of the late 80s and early 90s. Most recently the two key events that have brought Muslims back into the headlines, in this negative way, have been the summer riots of 2001 in the Northern towns of Oldham, Burnley and Bradford, and shadowing these events on a more global level, the attacks on America on the 11th of September 2001.
The summer riots were the consequence of a number of inter-related factors. Key to what lead up to them however, was the presence of right wing groups taking advantage of the desperate economic hardship in areas where 'racial tensions' were already running high and, most importantly, where the police were seen to be doing little to help. In fact, right wing groups were claiming that Muslims were the real problem. As the Cantle report highlights,

Islamophobia was also identified as a problem...and for some young people was part of their daily experience. They felt that they were being socially excluded because of their faith and that this was not being recognised or dealt with. (2002:40)

Public opinion can be quick to demonise Muslims, while at other times ignoring them, either way, making them feel like second class citizens. The events that have unfolded since September the 11th have again made Muslims around the world think about their 'Muslimness' and what this means, especially when living in a non-Muslim country. It is in this context that it becomes all the more important to understand the multi-various ways in which Islam is adopted by Muslims whilst living in Britain. As Professor Khan reflects in the Cantle report, post-September the 11th 'Understanding Islam and differences within Islam, has become an imperative for political negotiators and community mediators alike' (2002:62). This view is supported by Halliday (1997b). Halliday argues that, it is because of the diversity inherent in Islam and amongst the way Muslims adopt Islam in their everyday lives, that it becomes all the more important that any study
of Islamic communities involve a sociology of how religion interacts with other ethnic, cultural and political forces.

The empirical data and much of the analysis for this thesis occurred before the above mentioned riots and the attacks on America. Despite this, the results by providing insight into the diversity inherent within Islam and the many ways in which Islam is adopted, can provide greater understanding of how faith impacts on the way Muslims might 'adjust' to living in Britain, a non-Muslim country, and indeed British citizenship, and all the rights and obligations this infers.

It cannot be denied that there are aspects of Islamic thinking that are potentially inimical to Western ideas about citizenship. As explained in chapter two, where Western notions of citizenship place paramount importance on the sovereignty of the individual, Islam does so on the sovereignty of God (via the state). For some Muslims this may cause tensions especially when citizenship is increasingly predicated on the contractarian notion of the 'active citizen', where rights are inalienably linked with responsibilities.

In Britain the idea of the 'active citizen' has been apparent, in various guises, for many years. The 'active citizen' was popularised under the Conservative government in the late 80s early 90s as the depoliticised, voluntary worker who was involved in initiatives to improve education, housing and crime prevention (see Oliver and Heater 1994, Yuval Davis, 1997b: 16). More recently, New Labour has revived this notion of the 'active citizen' in their 'education for
citizenship’ programme in the national curriculum, (something which has been debated and discussed since the early 1990s - see Oliver and Heater, 1994: 163) with emphasis on social responsibility, community involvement and political literacy (Crick, 1998, see also Potter, 2002). Here, tensions can arise for those whose understanding of Islam leads to the conclusion that their duties to God come before any that are laid down by Man and that the Muslim’s primary duty is to the world-wide Muslim ummah, over and above any anyone else (see Chapter Two). Having said this, what must not be forgotten is that tensions can and do arise, more often than not, because Muslims, and in particular those of Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin, find themselves in a position where they are unable to be ‘active citizens’ because they lack the education, skills or the opportunity to participate fully in the social, economic and political life of Britain.

As reflected in the living conditions of those who rioted in the summer of 2001, South Asian Muslims of Britain make up some of the most disadvantaged communities of Britain. In particular, and as evidenced in the Chapter Two, the Pakistani and Bangladeshi population are the most consistently disadvantaged when compared to white people, and often, with respect to other minorities (see also Modood & Berthoud et al, 1997). Whilst being citizens of Britain, in the formal passport holding sense, it has to be recognised that, for a number of reasons, Muslims can find themselves to be economically, socially and politically disadvantaged and excluded. In this respect, Muslims may feel that substantive rights are being denied to them.
What needs to be understood therefore, is that whilst this thesis is exploring how Muslims, as a religious people, ‘adjust’ to British citizenship, and hence ethno-cultural and religious identity, it does recognise the fact that ‘other groups and associations also shape habits, interests, preoccupations and frames of interpretation and categorisation that define an individual’s identity’ (Templeman, 1996: 12). The understanding on which this thesis is based is that while for some groups or individuals, in certain contexts, recognition of ethno-cultural/religious identity may be important, in other contexts and for other groups or individuals it may not be. Priority of ethno-cultural/religious identity is not assumed, but the focus of this thesis is on this particular aspect of identity in order to understand in what way it influences and impacts on the lives of those living in Britain. This is particularly relevant to those who identify themselves as Muslim, because as this and other research confirms, being a Muslim is important to those who identify themselves as such. As Modood found in the Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities (to be referred to in the rest of the text as the PSI – Policy Studies Institute- report), for the Muslims in the sample, their faith was very important to how they led their lives, with two-thirds of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis aged 16-34, compared to only 5 per cent of whites, holding this view. This survey also found how being a Muslim can impact on the way in which ‘adjustment’ to British citizenship occurs. As Modood states,

On a range of issues to do with religion, arranged marriages, choice of schools and Asian clothes, the latter group [Muslims] take a consistently
more 'conservative' view than the former [Sikhs and Hindus], even when age on arrival and economic position are taken into account (1997:356).

Having said this we should acknowledge that a Muslim identity is not a homogenous, monolithic identity. People experience their identities in different ways and this is no different for religious identity. Thus, when talking of tensions that may be experienced by Muslims living in a non-Muslim country like Britain, what has to be understood is that these tensions will not be experienced by all Muslims in the same way; what may be a problem for one Muslim may not be for another. What this thesis attempts to do is to highlight the diversity of Islam and the different ways in which Islam is adopted in the lives of British South Asian Muslims. It is in this context that it becomes important to recognise the distinction between Islam and Muslims.

Islam is the faith that Muslims adhere to. Islam may be a prescribed faith as laid down in the Qu’ran and sunnah (the teachings and way of life of the Prophet) but within this faith exists diversity stemming from the fact that religious scholars have interpreted the Qu’ran in different ways over time. However there is not only diversity and difference within Islam but also great diversity in the way Islam is adopted in the lives of Muslims (see Chapter Four). The dangers of conflating the actions of Muslims and Islam, as if one were synonymous of the other, are all too obvious in the misunderstandings that are caused - the most re-occurring being about the rights of men and women in Islam, and the perception of how Islam promotes the rights of men over women (see also Hussain, who
illustrates how cultural characteristics of Muslims are problematised because they are often presumed to have their roots in religion, 2000:108). Consideration needs to be given to the fact that many of the practices of Muslims are influenced by a whole host of factors not least cultural practices as adopted over time from areas of migration and those that have been adopted by living in Britain. The relationship between religion and culture is complex but key is understanding that while many of the practices of Muslims may be rooted within Islam, they have been subject to change, interpretation and adaptation over time, not least through the eyes of men. In this way what is recognised throughout this thesis is, without denying the existence of a Muslim identity and a sense of self, that there are in fact many voices that make up the Muslim voice.

As stated in Chapter Four, ‘differences do exist amongst human beings, they are subject to different historical experiences, heirs to different traditions, think different thoughts, speak different languages and create different ‘cultural communities’ – ‘cultural communities that are themselves made up of several complex and at time over-lapping ‘cultural communities’. Thus when talking about Muslims of Britain, even when just looking at South Asian Muslims in particular, what has to be recognised is that their identity is multi-layered – both horizontally and vertically. The other aim of this thesis therefore is to explore the complex relationship between religion, culture and ethnicity in order to understand how this may impact on the ways Muslims ‘adjust to British citizenship.
In trying to give Muslims a voice what is done throughout this thesis, where deemed relevant, is to use quotations from interviews conducted during the empirical investigation that informs this thesis to illustrate points that are being made. However, one technique used to make more transparent the horizontal differences that may exist amongst Muslims, namely stage in lifecycle, has been to make a distinction in the way in which the different people who make up the sample are referred to. In some instances reference to members of the sample will be made by a first name, in others as Mr or Mrs X, (to protect the identity of the respondents, the names used are not their real names). The reason for doing this is to make the distinction between those who are British born and/or have spent the formative years of their lives in Britain and those that were born in their country of origin and/or have spent the formative years of their lives there. Though it would probably be easier to refer to generations, it is felt the concept of generations is too imprecise to be useful.

The concept of generations is usually called upon to discuss continuities and discontinuities in thoughts, lifestyle, culture, faith, etc. between generations. In the context of South Asian Muslims in Britain, the first generation is often assumed to be those initial migrants who came to Britain in the post war boom, the second generation as those who are British born or at least those who have had the majority of their schooling in Britain and, the third generation as the grandchildren of the migrant generation (see the PSI Report, 1997). However people migrated to Britain at different stages of their lives and it is not always easy to make these distinctions. For instance which generation would the
Pakistani born and schooled husband of a ‘second generation’ woman be? Also what about those who came to Britain in their early to mid-teens? According to the above categorisations they would be considered the first generation as they were born in their country of origin and had the majority of their schooling there. But then their parents are also considered first generation. In this way the whole generational debate can become confusing and often needs qualification according to context. In order to avoid this confusion the sample in this study, as mentioned above, is referred to as those who had the formative years of their life in their country of origin and those that have had the formative years of their life in Britain. In the main, when referring to the respondent as Mr or Mrs this is an indication that they belong to the former group, and when referred to by their first name, in the latter. This is also in keeping with the respect that is afforded to those who are considered one’s elders. It is customary amongst South Asians generally, and Muslims in particular, not to address one’s seniors by their names but instead as uncle or aunt or bhaijaan (brother) or baji (sister) which for the sake of the thesis has been translated to Mr and Mrs XX. Before going on to map this thesis, two further points need to be clarified: the title of this thesis and the how the key concept of citizenship has been defined.

The title of this thesis, ‘South Asian Muslims: adjustments to British citizenship’ on first reading could be misleading, as it could be assumed that the premise on which this thesis is based is that the ‘adjustment’ is the responsibility of Muslims alone. This is not the case, ‘adjustment’ should be considered a two-way process. From the state there has to be a commitment to being inclusive of difference,
a commitment to 'integration' in the vein that Roy Jenkins, the then Home Secretary, declared in 1968, as

Not a process of flattering uniformity but of a cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance (cited in Rex, 1996:236).

In the context of Muslims of Britain and citizenship, there is a need to recognise, accept and promote, not the assimilation of Muslims to Western citizenship, but a normalisation of difference where assistance is available to help Muslims accommodate to the practical realities and constraints they may face. The state has to recognise that its citizens draw from many cultures, faiths and traditions, and that difference and diversity is here to stay. In this respect this thesis will also cast a critical eye over modes of incorporation that have been adopted by Britain. From the individual Muslim’s perspective, there needs to be an understanding that being a citizen will confer certain rights and responsibilities. This thesis will endeavour to understand how these rights and responsibilities have been translated into their lives.

With regard to the concept of citizenship, it is recognised that in the British context one could question whether the British are citizens at all. As McCrone and Kiely point out, prior to the 1948 Nationality Act, ‘inhabitants of the British Isles and the British Empire were formally “subjects” of the crown’. Moreover the ‘shift from being subjects to citizens [only] came about because independent
states such as Canada and India wanted to define citizenship for purposes of immigration (2000: 26). At this time it was in the interest of Britain to retain a ‘rather loose and non-ethnic sense of Britishness’ as amongst other benefits it allowed in-migration to Britain in the post-war period. As explored in Chapter Three, this ‘rather loose’ definition has been defined over years to favour a more exclusive ‘ethnic’ definition. What remains however, is a ‘fuzzy’ boundary between the notions of subject and citizen. Whilst the language of citizenship is employed, the absence of any written constitution or bill of rights means that in many respect the British remain ‘subjects’ of the Crown (see McCrone and Kiely, 2000).

Whilst recognising the above contradictions in the notion of British citizenship, for the purposes of this thesis it will be taken as read that those who have the right to carry a British passport are British citizens – as least in the formal legal sense of the word. According to this definition therefore the majority of South Asian Muslims in Britain are citizens of Britain. Having said this, it is also being assumed that having the right to carry a specific passport, and hence membership of a state, is also the minimum requirement of citizenship. It is argued, that to address citizenship in a much broader, fuller way it has to be defined as ‘referring to membership, rights and duties within a political ‘community’’ (Baubock, 1991:27). ‘Membership’ is the key word here in many respects. Here reference is being made to creating an atmosphere, a space where people feel ‘safe’, ‘at home’, and where they feel a sense of belonging. By space, reference is not being made to merely a physical location but ‘rather... represents a multiplicity of
socio-material concerns', physical location and 'simultaneously ...existential freedom and mental expression' (Flores & Benmayor, 1997:15). This is particularly important in light of the fact that 'racially', culturally, religiously and linguistically distinct groups who are considered immigrants, a category into which even British born Muslims are often subsumed, often feel rejected as full and equal citizens. At a formal level citizenship may espouse universality but it is recognised on a substantive level there are many exclusionary and marginalising practices that make Muslims (and other minorities) feel they are not wanted, welcomed, or, accepted by wider British society. Whilst recognising the importance of citizenship rights in redistributing resources in order to address social, economic and political hardships, this thesis will concentrate on the role citizenship has to play in issues of recognition, responsiveness and unbiased treatment. Factors that govern the level at which Muslims can feel they are full and equal members of society.

Finally, it is widely accepted by Muslims that Islam is a way of life. For some Muslims however this means Islam is not a religion but rather an ideology. In recognition of these debates, unless quoting others, this thesis will refer to Islam as a faith.

The focus of the study on which this thesis is based is South Asian Muslims who live in England and have British citizenship. More specifically the sample for the study has drawn from two towns in the South of England, Luton and High Wycombe. Although attempts will be made to understand from there experiences
how South Asian British Muslims generally are ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship, it has to be recognised that in the main this thesis is about the 23 people who were interviewed to inform this thesis.

MAPPING THE THESIS

Chapter Two ‘The Trouble with Citizenship’ explores Western and Islamic notions of citizenship. The aim of this chapter is two-fold. The aim is to explore traditions of Western citizenship and critically to examine what protections (if any) such notions offer minorities, and then to ground these debates in how South Asian Muslims in Britain experience their civil, political and social rights. The second aim is to explore what alternative, Islamic conceptions of citizenship are available for Muslims to draw from. The chapter will argue that where Western notions of citizenship give priority to individual sovereignty and as such define citizenship as ‘an overall concept which sums up the relationship between the individual and the state’ (Yuval Davis, 1997a:68), Islamic notions of citizenship place sovereignty in God and as such define citizenship as the relationship of the individual to God via the state. The chapter will explore how this Islamic ideal is being made relevant for Muslims who live as minorities in non-Muslim lands.

Chapter Three explores ‘Who are the Muslims?’ This chapter contextualises the presence of South Asian Muslims in Britain by examining the history of migration and settlement. Concentrating on post-war migration and settlement, this chapter explores why Muslims migrated to Britain and offers explanations for their patterns of settlement. The fact that many Muslim communities are concentrated
in certain locales in cities and towns is often cited as evidence of how Muslims, despite being British, do not want to ‘integrate’ into wider society. This chapter will show how settlement patterns are in fact a result of, choice certainly, but also of historical ‘constraints’ including financial, migratory and discriminatory. The chapter will go on to argue how settlement in the British context has also occurred during a time when British (immigration and race relations) policy has problematised the presence of Black people in general and Muslims in particular, conditioning the acquisition of citizenship over time. It will illustrate how notions of citizenship and nationality have been subsumed into one distinct category to create an exclusive image of what it means to be British, one that certainly excludes those that are seen to be ‘racially’ culturally/religiously different from the majority. It will illustrate how, in this context, Muslims have been constructed as the ‘enemy within’ unwilling to ‘adjust’ to British society.

Chapter Four explores in more detail the relationship between ‘Identity and Citizenship’. At one level Muslims are presented as living their lives following different norms and values from the rest of society. This sentiment is proposed by Muslims and non-Muslims alike, albeit for different ends. In this way Muslims are presented as different. On another level Muslims, and certainly Islam, is also presented as homogenous or monolithic: according to this argument Muslims are not only different from ‘us’ but they are also all the same. What this chapter tries to illustrate is that Muslims, like any other group of people are simultaneously universal, group centred and individual. The chapter will argue that, despite differences, as humans we do share some universally shared values which give us
a ‘common human identity’ (Parekh, 1996). In this way Muslims want the same rights and responsibilities as any other British citizen. However these shared values are culturally embedded and experienced through distinct ‘cultural communities’. As such there are times at which Muslims may express their group identity and make claim to some sort of ‘group rights’. What this chapter argues, however, is that ‘cultural communities’ are complex. It illustrates how there has been the emergence of a specifically Muslim identity within the British landscape, and indeed how Islam can be a unifying force, but also how inherently diverse Islam and Muslims can be. Finally the chapter emphasises how Muslims are also individuals, practising Islam in different ways with different levels of importance. Identity in this way is negotiable, developing and changing in accordance with life experiences and circumstances.

Chapter Five explores the methodology employed in ‘Researching Citizenship’. In particular this chapter reflects on the issues that arise from being a ‘partial insider’. For the purposes of this thesis, an ‘insider’ because it is a South Asian Muslim interviewing and writing about South Asian Muslims but only ‘partial’ because of the [gender, class, ethnic] differences that, at times, made the researcher an ‘outsider’.

Chapter Six unpicks some of the findings of this research. After providing a brief summary of those that were interviewed, this chapter further explores the ways in which Western notions of citizenship have been internalised by the Muslims in this study. It explores how the concept of rights are articulated, detailing in which
ways Muslims draw from both the contractarian and solidaristic notions of rights; how they talk about the importance of having the same rights and equal freedoms, as well as being treated in a reasonable and just way. The chapter explores how Muslims in the sample expressed their identity, in particular how faith and culture were conceptualised and how important they were deemed to be in their everyday lives. From this four dominant discourses are identified around Islam, an individualistic expression of Islam as well as a more solidaristic expression, epitomised by reference to the ummah, and of Islam as negotiable and hence open to change in contrast with Islam being viewed as fixed and immutable. The chapter discusses how culture is either received as a given or deemed to be constructed and, depending on whether it is seen as one or the other, or both, four strategies are adopted towards culture. These are: wanting to preserve group identity; viewing oneself as 'cultureless'; seeing culture as socially contextualised, that is subject to change but only within acceptable boundaries; or as self-defining.

Chapter Seven further explores how the discourses and strategies identified in the previous chapter inter-relate to each other, articulating which ideal-typical strategies are adopted towards Islam and with what consequence for Muslims' lives in Britain. The chapter argues, from this research, that four deal typical strategies can be identified. 'Lapsed'/ambivalent Muslims typified by 'What do I personally believe and what I...do is different..., [I] don't follow through....' (Naveed); Engaged Muslims typified by '[Islam] affects everything I do' (Amin); Selective Muslims typified by 'I don't pay much attention to my
religion'...[but] I respect it,... I'd never say anything bad against it’ (Khalida); and ‘Traditional' Muslims typified by ‘[Islam] when it does affect then a person will do no wrong things’. Each ideal strategy reflects how Muslims perceive themselves in relation to their faith and culture, i.e. their personal ontology.

Chapter Eight, by exploring how personal ontology impacts on public engagement, goes on to explain what consequences each of the ideal typical strategies identified in Chapter Seven have for adjusting to British citizenship. The chapter concludes that Muslims want to retain their difference, but this does not mean they do not want to participate in wider society. It argues the majority of Muslims adopt a strategy of ‘partial engagement'. For these Muslims difficulties experienced in participating fully in the social, economic and political life of Britain, are in the main a result of years of racism and prejudice which has perpetuated a feeling of being an ‘outsider’ - irrespective of age, gender, how much contact they have with wider society, or whether English is their main language. The chapter recognises there are a small number of Muslims who choose to disengage from wider society but reflects, how in reality even these Muslims are fulfilling some of their basic responsibilities as citizens. The key difference between those who claim to disengage from wider society and those who do engage, is that the former perceive less problems with their status as ‘outsider’.

1 On September the 11th two hijacked airliners flew into the twin towers of the World Trade Centre in New York. A third hijacked plane hit the Pentagon in Washington, and a fourth crashed in Pennsylvania. As a result the WTC towers collapsed. Final estimates of the numbers killed as a result of these attacks, including some of the first service men and women on the scene, are around
the 4000 mark. The blame for these terrorist attacks almost immediately fell on Saudi-born Osama bin Laden, and were seen as attacks on ‘freedom and democracy’. Almost a month later on the 7th of October 2001, after a coalition had been formed, the ‘war on terrorism’ began with air strikes on Afghanistan, as the country sheltering bin Laden.
CHAPTER TWO

THE TROUBLE WITH CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship has become very popular over the last few years, both as a normative as well as an analytical concept. This is epitomised by the introduction of ‘education for citizenship’ in schools (see Pearce & Hallgarten, 2000). This could be regarded as a positive phenomenon as citizenship, it is argued, can provide a yardstick against which progress can be measured, or in the words of T. H. Marshall, ‘against which achievements can be measured and towards which aspirations can be directed’ (1950: 29). In this way citizenship can be a potent weapon in the hands of disadvantaged and oppressed individuals and groups. However, although politicians, academics and others in the public sphere engage in the language of citizenship, there is little evidence to suggest that people speak the language of citizenship – except in the formal passport-holding sense - in their everyday lives. More significantly, although it is recognised that citizenship, broadly defined, refers ‘to membership, rights and duties within a political ‘community’’ (Baubock, 1991:27), the reality is that within this broad definition, citizenship can mean different things to different people. Citizenship can be as much a tool for empowerment and inclusion, as a tool for dis-empowerment and exclusion. It is for this reason that defining citizenship has to be the starting point in any exploration of Muslim ‘adjustments’ to British citizenship.

DEFINING CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship, as mentioned, is not a concept that is simple to define. As Derek Heater states,
From very early...the term [citizenship] already contained a cluster of meanings related to a defined legal or social status, a means of political identity, a focus of loyalty, a requirement of duties, an expectation of rights and a yardstick of good social behaviour (1990:163)

It is for this reason that it has come to be defined and applied in many different and often contradictory ways. Over time, citizenship has referred to obligations as well as rights, as identifying with the state, and as having a sense of belonging to a whole. It has defined membership of equals, and allowed entitlements to make a claim against the state; been seen to be active and passive (Turner, 1990), as a tool for political mobilisation (when seized by people from below) and, conversely, a means of depoliticising the population (when imposed by rulers from above, or as was the case with the introduction of the Citizens Charter in 1992, which promoted the ‘consumer citizen’ – see Yuval-Davis, 1997b). It has been, individual and communal, inclusive (through the re-allocation of resources) and exclusive (through building identities on the basis of a common/imagined identity, Turner, 2001:192) defined in the realms of the public and private (Lister, 1997).

As Yuval Davis states,

It has been constructed in different ways in different societies and has undergone historical shifts within the same state and society. It has been subject to contesting ideologies from the left and right (1997a:67).
The context in which citizenship is defined and applied is critical in forming its
definition and by implication the very kind of society to which we aspire. In
exploring notions of citizenship therefore it is necessary to explore Western
notions of citizenship, Islamic notions of citizenship and how these are applied in
the British/Western context.

Western notions of citizenship

Historically two overarching traditions of citizenship have dominated the
language of Western citizenship. Both traditions conceptualise ‘the nature of the
individual and the character of the social bonds that exist between individuals as
citizens’ (Oldfield, 1990:177). These can be identified as the liberal ‘social
contractual’ (Dean with Melrose, 1999) or ‘liberal individualist’ (Oldfield,
1990:177) tradition, and the classical ‘social solidaristic’ (Dean with Melrose,
1999) or ‘civic republican’ tradition (Oldfield, 1990:177). The two traditions
entail different understandings of the relationship between rights and
responsibilities (see also Lister, 1997)

The social contractual tradition holds the individual as sovereign and conceives
citizenship to be a ‘status’ in which civil and political ‘rights’ are the means by
which the individual can ensure his/her freedom and formal equality is not being
eroded by the state. Citizens have no responsibility to wider society, other then a
duty to respect other individuals as sovereign and autonomous citizens and the
minimal civic duties of keeping the state in being. Any social bonds that do exist
are contractual. The world is therefore seen to be ‘composed of strangers to
whom, as Aristotle put it, one can feel “goodwill”, but no more.’ (Oldfield, 1990:180). Opposing poles exist within this tradition represented by Hobbes’ essentially authoritarian state preventing the ‘war of all against all’ (1651) and Rousseau’s more egalitarian state representing the ‘general will’ (1972) (see Dean with Melrose, 1999:74). This conception of citizenship, although it has had a secure place in Anglo-American political thinking, has been criticised on two main accounts: first for its universal conception of citizenship which, it is argued, fails to recognise the political relevance of difference and diversity; and secondly for regarding citizens as autonomous individuals without much regard for any form of group identity. It is for this reason that much current writing on citizenship has also called upon the classical, social solidaristic conception of citizenship.

Social solidarism (or the communitarian discourse of citizenship as it is also known) has its roots in classical Greece in which citizenship is seen not as a status but as a practice, where political participation is seen to be a civic ‘duty’ and deemed not only an expression but also a condition of citizenship. As such this conception advocates that only a shared commitment to the practice of citizenship makes individuals into citizens. Where social contractarianism stresses rights, social solidarism stresses responsibilities and rather then being pre-occupied with liberty, emphasises ‘fraternity’, fellowship and solidarity (Dean with Melrose, 1999). The individual therefore comes second to society since only if society is sustained can the practice of citizenship be ensured. As Oldfield states, ‘It is a communally based conception of citizenship: individuals are only citizens as
members of a community' (1990:183). The 'private citizen' can only exist within the bounds of the responsibilities they owe on the one hand to the collectivity, and the responsibility the collectivity owe to the individual on the other. Individuals do not only conceive of themselves as bearing rights, nor is their posture to forms of collective life solely instrumental. Instead, individuals recognise they have duties, duties beyond the minimally civic and respect for others associated with the liberal tradition, to duties which are associated with the fact that they identify themselves socially '.... As members of a class, a religion, or a “race”' (Oldfield, 1990: 4). Social bonds are therefore based on sharing and determining a way of life, and only through this shared commitment to the practice of citizenship will social solidarity be created and maintained. As with the liberal perspective both a non-egalitarian and an egalitarian approach can be applied within this tradition with the former promoting commitment to the collective interests of particular social groups and communities, while the latter emphasises formal or procedural equality of all citizens in society (see Dean with Melrose, 1999:78).

No one has held exclusively to either the contractarian or the solidaristic traditions. As such citizenship in the Western world has, in very broad terms, come to be made up of notions of both rights and responsibilities however differently conceived. There is an assumption that these rights and responsibilities are universal, in that anyone who has citizenship status can expect to be treated equally. Key however is that citizenship is regarded as ‘an overall concept which sums up the relationship between the individual and the state’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997a: 68).
Islamic notions of citizenship

To focus on Islamic notions of citizenship is to acknowledge the fact that Westocentric notions of citizenship dominate debate to the exclusion of any alternative. It is also an acknowledgement that, despite living in Britain, Muslims may draw from what Islam has to teach them about living in society and the rightful relationships that should be fostered amongst its members. In order to understand what these ideas may be it is necessary to explore the context in which citizenry rights and duties are expected to be played out, i.e. in an Islamic state. In this way insight can be gained into some of the key ideas that Muslims of Britain may be drawing upon in ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship in addition to gaining an insight into Islamic notions of citizenship. Before proceeding, it must be recognised that in the main, this debate will be exploring the theory, the “ideal” of Islam, with the full acknowledgement that often this theory has not been lived up to in practice. As such, it is recognised that an “ideal” Islamic state is a counterfactual entity (i.e. there is no example of such a state currently in existence).

The first Islamic state was created by the Prophet Mohammad after his migration (hijra) from Makkah to Medina. It was established in the first year of the hijra, or 622. As Esposito states,

Muhammad’s move to Medina signalled a major transformation in history from a pre-Islamic pagan past to a divinely guided and centred world in
which tribal kinship was to be superseded by membership in a community 

In conjunction with the era of the Prophet Muhammad, the Islamic polity as
governed by the four Rightly Guided Caliphs at Medina – Abu Bakr, Umar,
Uthman, and Ali (632-661) consolidated the Islamic state producing and evolving
what is considered to be the ideal paradigm of an Islamic State i.e. one based on
the injunctions of the Qur'an and the practice of the \textit{Sunnah} (the teachings and
way of life of the Prophet).

Although it is acknowledged that the Prophet did not leave behind a detailed set of
administrative directives, what relationship Muslims should have to each other
and society can be determined through the \textit{shariah}. The \textit{shariah} (divine law)
encompasses the precise body of laws which outline the whole sphere of human
life in all its aspects - spiritual, physical, individual, social, economic and
political. It therefore not only gives guidance for actions of purely individual
concern like personal morality and duties to God (e.g. worship, fasting,
pilgrimage), but also prescribes directives for collective life as well (civil,
criminal and family laws). Thus it is through the \textit{shariah} that the rights and duties
of citizens in Islam are prescribed\textsuperscript{2}. As Mawdudi states,

\begin{quote}
The \textit{Shariah} is a complete scheme of life and an all embracing social order
where nothing is superfluous and nothing lacking" (1967: 57)
\end{quote}
The *shariah* has two main sources, the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* (the customs and norms of the Prophet as embodied in the *hadith*). However it is widely recognised that these two sources by themselves are not sufficient to encompass all possible legal situations and therefore amplification of the *shariah* by means of deductive reasoning is necessary, i.e. *fiqh* (jurisprudence). Indeed Ayubi suggests, in the way that Greek civilisation can be defined as a civilisation of philosophy and the European as one of science, that Islamic civilisation can be defined as a civilisation of *fiqh*, a *fiqh*, he argues, by which the Islamic *shariah* ‘overides all that preceded it, making *fiqh* a highly “autonomous” body of knowledge’ (1991:11)\(^3\). Despite this, the only aspects of the *shariah* that are not subject to conflicting interpretations, because they are self contained and unambiguous in their wording, are ordinances that are described as *nusus* (singular, *nass*). This fact leads Asad to conclude,

> It is the *nusus* of Qur’an and *Sunnah* - and only these - that collectively constitute the real, eternal *shariah* of Islam (1980: 13).

What God, the Law-Giver, has left unspecified, neither making obligatory (*fard*) nor forbidding (*haram*) them in *nass* terms, must be regarded as allowable (*mubah*) from the *shariah* point of view.

For all Islamic scholars and theologians it is this fact, that the Qur’an’s legal principles are not comprehensive that makes the *shariah* dynamic and open to change. As Asad points out,
The Law-Giver...intended no more and no less than to stake out, as it were, the legal boundaries within which the community ought to develop, leaving the enormous multitude of ‘possible’ legal situations to be decided from case to case in accordance with the requirements of the time and of changing social conditions (1980:12)

Indeed Ayubi illustrates in his book *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab world* (1991), much of what has come to be known as *shariah* has in fact evolved over time as a consequence of historical and political conditions. According to Ayubi, for instance even ‘The theory of the “Islamic state” is little more than an elaborate *fiqh* presented as though it were pure *shariah*’ (1991:17), it is just that certain concepts and beliefs have been elaborated upon and repeated and reiterated, in volume after volume that they have come to represent to subsequent generations not simply an ideal that should be aspired to, but a reality that is believed to have existed. Indeed Sardar writes ‘the days of the individual “Islamic state”, akin to the Western nation-state are limited’ (1985: 149), suggesting the Islamic state is not a ‘new invention’ as Ayub claims, but one that is rooted in the past. Taking into account that even some of the basic concepts within Islam are disputed by the likes of Ayubi, below will be a exploration of how Islam and the society to which it aspires has come to be understood in more recent times despite these differences, in the hope of understanding what is being put forward as the rightful relationship that members/citizens of a society are expected to have with each other and with the state.
Key in any Islamic society is the sovereignty of God over and above the sovereignty of humans. The practical meaning of this is that God and not Man is the source of law, thus the Imam, Caliph or Amir (the names by which the leader of an Islamic state is known) does not hold his position is his own right but rather as an administrator or trustee of the *shariah* and as such, every issue of law in an Islamic polity must be referred back to the will of God by reference to the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* as the ultimate authorities. There can be no legislation independent of his will and no one can change what God has decreed. No person, therefore should be allowed to pass down orders in their own right, and no one should be obligated to obey such orders if they are given. For Qutb (see Haddad, 1983), the confession of faith reiterated daily by Muslims, 'there is no God but God' is a revolution against human sovereignty of any shape or form. In this context it is not the will of the people that is paramount (as in the West) but the will of God - the Islamic doctrine of *tawhid* affirms this.

The doctrine of *tawhid* (unity of God), which forms the ideological foundation on which an Islamic state is based, affirms that in Islam God is one and also that His relationship to the world is also one. He is the Creator, sustainer and judge of all of His creation and as such it is His will or law that governs every aspect of life. For Qutb therefore, the only relationship between Creator and creature is that of creaturehood. In this way it can be argued that within an Islamic state the relationship of the individual is not with the state *per se*, (i.e. that of citizen, subject or denizen) but with God *via* the state. For this reason all humans, whether
rulers or ruled, are equal before God and therefore share the same status: that of creaturehood.

Moreover, it is because God is sovereign and the source of all being that God’s will must be realised in every area of life, both private and public. Therefore in Islam, it is the function of life to pursue the service of God as expressed in a concrete way in the shariah. Indeed this was the case in the first Islamic state in Medina. The Medina state reflected the integral relationship of religion and state in Islam and as such was seen as a religiopolitical community, one that is rooted in and united by a religious vision or bond. Division of life into two separate spheres of the public and private therefore is seen as the antithesis of Islam, as Qutb says

Islam is a unity that is indivisible. Any one who divides it into two sections is outside this unity, in other words, he is outside this religion (cited in Haddad, 1983:76)\textsuperscript{5}

This is not to say that Islam does not recognise the varying nature of human activity. As with Western traditions Islam does recognise that human activity is divided into two spheres, ibadat or acts of worship and mu’amalat or human relationships. However unlike in the West where it has, over time, come to be expected that there should be separation between religion (deen) and state (dawlah) thus private and public, Islam makes no such distinction. It is for this reason that many Muslims today do not regard Islam to be a religion, but rather an ideology. A religion it is argued refers to personal worship whereas Islam like an
ideology is more comprehensive (shumul) than this, defining not only your relationship to God, but like other ideologies, prescribing how people should be governed politically, socially as well as economically.\textsuperscript{6}

The fact that God is sovereign does not, however, mean that the people are disregarded in any decision making process. The Islamic state is based on the principle of mutual consultation (shura), therefore there must be co-operation and consensus (ijma) of the community. In fact Islam insists that all people concerned in a decision must be consulted, either directly or through their designated representatives whom they trust. This consultation must be completely free and impartial without duress of any kind and must take effect immediately. According to Mawdudi this consultative body (or majlis-i-shura as it is known), not only safeguards against dictatorship, monarchy or despotism in the Islamic context but it deprives the ruler of the power to set aside the constitution at his own will\textsuperscript{7}.

The doctrine of tawhid, that is the ‘unity of God’ and of human life as a comprehensive and exclusive program of worship, also dictates that the Islamic state is not a nationalistic state. This is because ultimate allegiance is owed to God and thereby to the community of all believers - the ummah. As Esposito neatly summarises

> The inner cohesion of this community comes not from geographic or ethnic unity but from the unity of its political and religious ideal. Membership or citizenship is based upon a declaration of ‘like-mindedness’ which
terminates only when this condition has ceased to exist. Territorially, the Islamic polity is transnational, embracing the whole world. (1983: 183)8

Therefore tawhid is the principle that brings the community together, the source of its equality, freedom and solidarity. For Iqbal, such is its force that the community of believers is as a brotherhood of equals regardless of race, national or geographic origin ‘sharing in one speech, one spirit and one heart’ (1968: 147) thus unified through common faith and conviction. He argues that

The essence of Tauhid as a working idea is quality, solidarity and freedom.
The state, from an Islamic standpoint, is an endeavour to transform these ideal principles into space-time forces, as aspiration to realise them in a definite human organisation (see Sheikh, 1986: 122)

In fact justice, freedom and equality are deemed to be essential tenets of an Islamic state. As Muhammad Asad explains,

To make the law of Islam the law of the land in order that equity may prevail; to arrange social and economic relations in such a way that every individual shall live in freedom and dignity, and shall find as few obstacles as possible and as much encouragement as possible in the development of his personality; to enable all Muslim men and women to realise the ethical goals of Islam not only in their beliefs but also in the practical spheres of their lives; to ensure to all non-Muslim citizens complete physical security
as well as complete freedom of religion, of culture and of social development; to defend the country against attack from without and disruption from within; and to propagate the teachings of Islam to the world at large: it is in these principles, and in these alone, that the concept of an Islamic state finds its meaning and justification (1980:113)

As seen from Asad's commentary above, Islam does make a distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims (dhimmis) as 'citizens' of an Islamic state. Although there is no complete agreement to what extent rights afforded to Muslims should be afforded to non-Muslims what is undisputed is that the Islamic state does have a duty to guarantee the protection of minorities, protection of life and limb, property and culture, faith\(^9\) and honour (Mawdudi 1967). As al-Turabi states,

Muslims have a moral obligation to be fair and friendly in their person-to-person conduct toward non-Muslim citizens, and will be answerable to God for that. They must treat them with trust, beneficence, and equity (1983: 250)

There is not the space here to go into detailed analysis of the rights and duties expected of dhimmis, key however is that there are precedents within Islam of how minorities should be treated (For further information on the rights and duties of non-Muslim citizens see Adams 1983, Kasim 1992).
In reference to Muslim citizens of an Islamic state, according to Mawdudi, full responsibility for the conduct of the state falls upon them, for they alone fully believe in it. As ‘citizens’ of the state it is they who must assume the obligations that Islam imposes. A key duty of every ‘citizen’ is to defend Islam and as a consequence the Islamic state, as Qutb highlights,

1) It is the duty of Muslims to protect the believers that they do not stray from the religion, permitting the use of force to repel force. 2) Islam must be guaranteed freedom of propagation, otherwise it becomes incumbent on Muslims to ‘eradicate’ any oppressive powers on the earth which impede the *dawah* of Islam. 3) Muslims must be able to affirm God’s sovereignty on earth and remove those who usurp this sovereignty by legislating laws. 4) Muslims must be free to establish the great justice that all people may enjoy its benefits (Haddad, 1983:84)

Death while defending the Islamic State is seen as the ultimate obedience to the will of God.

In return for the duties expected of Muslims, they have the right to be members of an Islamic states’ Parliament, to vote in choosing the Head of State, and to be appointed to key posts where state policy is laid. ‘Citizens’ are also guaranteed the basic necessities of life, (i.e. food, shelter and clothing); personal liberty (i.e. not be incarcerated without a just cause in law and due process); and freedom of opinion and belief (i.e. as individuals or groups, to hold such views as they will
and peacefully to practise them so long as they do not disrupt the life of the state or attempt to impose their ideology on others by force) (Mawdudi, 1967).

Therefore like Western notions of citizenship Islam also espouses notions of rights and duties in exercising citizenship. Like Western notions of citizenship it values the principles of equality, justice and freedom. However unlike Western notions it makes no distinction between the private and public, it does not recognise individual sovereignty, nor does it recognise rights and duties as defining the relationship between the individual and the state. Instead God is sovereign, and rights and duties are regarded as defining the relationship of Muslims to God via the state.

THE BRITISH CONTEXT
This section will attempt first to understand how Islamic principles could be translated in the British context and will go on to explore the key issues for Muslims in reference to Western notions of citizenship.

Islam, citizenship and the West
Muslims today live all around the world, not only in Muslim countries, as is the case in Britain, but as minorities in non-Muslim lands. Shadid and van Koningsveld estimate that ‘one third of the total number of Muslims in the world today are living in a minority situation’ (1996: 97). Thus roles and responsibilities that are incumbent on Muslims in an Islamic state, as described above, are being made meaningful in a very different context from that in which
they were espoused. This section therefore, will endeavour to understand how Muslims might translate some of the above ideals to the reality in which they are living, that is living as a minority in a non-Muslim Western society.

It was never envisaged that Muslims would voluntarily move to non-Muslim lands (dar al-kafir), and as such how Muslims should behave when in such a situation is not specified in the Qu'ran or Sunnah. However, as Shadid and van Koningsveld point out,

Through various periods of the history of Islam, specific events have provoked a series of discussions among legal scholars of Islam about the attitude to be adopted by Muslims who were, for one reason or another, living in an area ruled by a non-Muslim government (1996:88-9)\textsuperscript{10}

It is acknowledged that great diversity of opinion emerged at this time and, obviously, the circumstances in which Muslims found themselves as a minority being ruled by a non-Muslim government were different\textsuperscript{11} (for the most part, they did not voluntarily migrate). However Shadid and Koningsveld argue, these discussions, were crystallised as precedents in Islamic jurisprudence and it is to this that reference is made in contemporary Islamic discussions concerning the position of Muslims living in the West. In very crude terms, Islamic legal scholars fell into two main camps: those who felt Muslims were allowed to live under non-Muslim rule and those who did not.
Some believed Muslims could live under non-Muslim rule on condition that they were able to perform overtly the basic religious prescriptions of Islam (Prayers, fasting, collecting and distributing alms, etc.) and that their own safety as well as that of their family was not endangered. If such Islamic religious rites and observances were allowed to be practised, some Islamic scholars went as far to argue that *dar al-Harb* (territory of war) would become *dar al-Islam* (Territory of Peace). In these circumstances Muslims did not need to emigrate to *dar al-Islam*. This view as Shadid and van Koningsveld point out was supported by Rashid Rida (who in Esposito’s terms is described as a modernist – see below), who stated,

> Hijra is not an individual religious incumbency to be performed by those who are able to carry out their duties in a manner safe from any attempt to compel them to abandon their religion or prevent them from performing and acting in accordance with their religious rites (cited in Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1996:90)

In return, some Islamic legal scholars have argued, Muslims were obliged to obey the laws of the land in which they were living as well as having a duty to respect the condition under which the non-Islamic state granted them (*aman*) safety. These arguments, Shadid and Koningsveld believe are not only ‘tantamount to legitimising the existence of Muslim communities under non-Muslim rules under certain conditions’ which, as they say, is ‘directly relevant to the present situation
of Muslim minorities in the West' but also form the basis ‘for modern Islamic discussions on respecting the rules of visas issued by Western states’ (1996:89).

In contrast to the above, others have argued that if Muslims could, they should leave their dwelling places and emigrate to ‘dar al-Islam’ rather than commit the offence of assimilation to the Infidels. It is those who hold such views that objected to Tunisian and Algerian Muslims accepting French nationality and the full rights of French citizenship when the Laws of Naturalisation were introduced by the French authorities in 1923 and 1927. As Shadid and van Koningsveld point out,

The scholars of the Zaytouna in Tunis issued a fatwa which qualified the person who adopted French citizenship under the said law as an apostate. (1996:93)

Shadid and van Koningsveld also highlight how it is such arguments that have been repeated ‘in several recent discussions published in France and the Netherlands concerning the subject of naturalisation within the wider context of the integration of Muslim immigrants into Western European Societies’ (1996:94)

Influential in reflecting these debates in the South Asian sub-continent were the writings of Muhammad Iqbal (d.1938) a dominant and influential figure in twentieth-century Islam, Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966) who was particularly associated with the Islamic organisation, al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun (the Muslim Brotherhood),
and Mawlana Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (d. 1979) who founded the Jamaat-i-Islami (the Islamic Party). These organisations served as catalysts for Islamic revivalism in the middle decades of the twentieth century and have had a major impact on the interpretation and implementation of Islam in recent years. Esposito (1991) refers to these writers as part of the Islamic revivalist movement, which aimed to address the stagnation that Islam had been facing since the eighteenth century. What must be noted however is that where Iqbal is seen to be a ‘modernist’, not afraid to borrow and assimilate new ideas and values from the West, both Qutb and Mawdudi are described as ‘neorevivalists’ condemning the West, while advocating total self sufficiency of Islam.

Qutb, adopted the word jahiliyyah\textsuperscript{14} to include what has been referred to as dar al-kufir (that is, part of the ‘Territory of Unbelief’). As Haddad explains, it is used ‘as a pejorative term to designate all that one considers to be alien to Islam’ (1983: 85). Confined to the role of jahiliyyah is any system that relegates God and religion to the private sphere, or as Qutb puts it, any system that fails to understand that ‘the source of power is God, not the “people”, not the “party” nor any human being’ (cited in Haddad, 1983:87). Qutb includes not only non-Muslim systems and countries (which would include Britain) as jahili systems but also all those societies that claim to be Muslim because they accept alien ideas and incorporate them into the Islamic framework. Despite this, however, the fact that he goes on to explain how Muslims should act and behave under such systems gives us some indication of how Muslims should act and behave as a minority in dar al-kufir.
According to Qutb the only proper relation to a jahili system was total rejection. He believed that Islam and jahiliyyah could not coexist. Qutb argued that if adherents of Islam continued to live in a jahili system they would compromise Islam’s existence by consciously or inadvertently exposing it to outside threats. Thus the only solution was to separate from the prevailing social order. Qutb adopted the idea of hijra to explain what he means. Historically the term hijra is used in reference to the emigration of the Prophet and his followers from Makkah to Medina in 622. Qutb however did not see the goal of this hijra as the establishing of the Islamic state but as the eradication of the jahili system in Mecca. Thus he felt hijra (to separate oneself from the existing social order) was a necessary phase in the process of Islamising society. Translated to Muslims living in Britain, for instance, we could take from this analysis that Muslims can not practice Islam in its true nature under a capitalist system and therefore Muslims need not be concerned with making their life better, setting up institutions and fighting for rights, but should separate themselves from the existing social order with the sole aim of promoting Islam until such a time that an Islamic society can become a reality. Indeed a Muslim can not expect to be any more than a ‘lost or persecuted individual in a jahili society’ (Haddad, 1983:89).

For Qutb the only way to fulfil one’s citizenry duty of promoting, and as such defending Islam, was to set up the Islamic state through the establishment of the jamaah; that is,
The coalition of committed individuals who become a vital organic cell of Muslims dedicated to the materialisation of the true Islamic society, one in which the teachings of the Qu’ran and the Prophet Muhammad impact all aspects of life: political, economic, legal, as well as cultural, (Haddad, 1983: 87).

The *jamaah* was seen to be the ‘dynamic nucleus of the Islamisation process.’ (Haddad, 1983: 87)\(^{15}\).

Mawdudi talked of a similar need for a central group which can act as the vanguard. Rather then referring to the *jamaah* however, he referred to the need for the emergence of the *Salih Jammat*. His ideas were set in the context of Muslims as a minority in India. He believed that Muslims in India needed to become better Muslims. Only by doing this would they be able to achieve organisation and the eventual transformation of India into *dar al-Islam* (Abode of Peace). He saw this Muslim minority as a group or party characterised by a clearly defined ideology and as Qutb argued, only through such an organisation could Islam be realised.\(^{16}\)

From the above therefore, it can be argued that Muslims living as minorities or as Qutb would say, in *jahili* systems, need to organise themselves according to the dictates of Islam. They need to live and breathe Islam, looking beyond the problems they face in *jahili* systems to striving to advance the principles and theory of human life according to the Islamic ideal. And indeed it could be
argued this is what some groups of Muslim minorities in Britain and elsewhere have applied their life in doing. Not only do they try to exemplify through their own lives the Islamic ideals, but see their main role as da’wah (call to Islam) carriers, spreading the word of Islam (in the main to Muslims, in the hope of reverting them back to Islam) with the hope that one day that there will be enough Muslims, with the strength of will, to implement God’s will on earth (i.e. the Islamic state).

In contrast to Qutb and Mawdudi, Iqbal, rather then rejecting the West and relying on the total self sufficiency of Islam to renew Muslim society, actually borrowed and assimilated new values from the West, relying on reform rather then revolution. Iqbal went as far as to provide Islamic rationale for the appropriation of Western learning. For Iqbal, the very qualities that were associated with the power of the West were already present in Islam. All that was needed was to reclaim the past when Islam was both dynamic and creative. For Iqbal therefore assimilation of modern science and technology was not against Islamic rationale and, in fact, aided in the social transformation or modernisation of Islam. Translated to Muslims living in Britain it could be argued that Muslims do not have to separate themselves from the existing social order, but rather engage with it. For Iqbal, Muslims should look back at history, to the Dark ages of Europe when an active process of Islamisation took place. One should be open to change rather than looking at the West as a threat.
Unlike Qutb and Mawdudi, Iqbal did not think Islam needed to be promoted through a nucleus of committed individuals but argued for reform, or more specifically, *ijtihad* (reinterpretation and individual investigation). *IJtihad* is seen not only as the basis for the Islamic state but also the most important instrument for the modernisation of Islam – it is ‘the principle of movement in the structure of Islam’ (Iqbal in Sheikh, 1986:117). For Iqbal it was the blind imitation of Islam, an Islam that had been influenced by the conditions of society at the time of it’s development, and the refusal to accept any possibilities of change, that led to it’s eventual stagnation. What was needed was to recognise that the relationship between Islam and society was one of both permanence and change. The *shariah* although containing permanent eternal principles was also subject to change through the process of *ijtihad*. The classical interpretations of Islam developed by the schools of law were not fixed and sacrosanct, as it had been regarded for centuries, but could still be subject to change. Iqbal believed

> If the renaissance of Islam is a fact... we... will have to re-evaluate our intellectual inheritance (in Sheikh, 1986:121).

Indeed the ‘reconstruction’ of the sources of Islamic law through the process of *ijtihad* was seen to be the key to the restoration of Islamic vitality. Iqbal felt that the *ulama* had stopped the process of reinterpretation and reapplication of Islamic principles to new situations, in effect closing the doors of *ijtihad*. However, there was in fact an urgent need to reinterpret and reapply Islam in the light of modern thought and experience. This is not to say that ‘neorevivalists’ like Qutb did not
agree to the process of *ijtihad*. While Qutb advocated *ijtihad* to reclaim and implement authentic teachings of the Qur’an while purging Islam of un-Islamic practices in law, Iqbal took *ijtihad* a step further. Iqbal, and indeed other ‘modernists’, also felt free to suggest that many practices acceptable in the past were no longer relevant. As Esposito summarises,

They [modernists] claimed the right and necessity to formulate new regulations. Instead of simply engaging in a restoration of the practice of Muhammad and the early community, they advocated an adaptation of Islam to the changing conditions of modern society. In effect, this meant new laws and attitudes toward religious and social reforms. (1983: 143).

Although traditionalists like Qutb would criticise such changes as ‘unwarranted innovation’ and as ‘deviations from Islam (*bida*)’ (Esposito, 1993:142), the use of *ijtihad* is slowly being accepted by Islamic scholars. 17

From the above, it could be argued that the Muslims who are living in non-Muslim lands, rather then isolating themselves from the wider infra-structure around them, need to engage with it. From Iqbal’s perspective, Muslims in Britain need to go back to the Qur’an and the *Sunnah* and reapply Islamic law to the modern realities they face. What is required is not a blind imitation of Islam, an Islam dealing with the issues and tensions faced by Muslims who live in Muslim lands, but a reapplication of Islam to meet the need of Muslims living as minorities in non-Muslim lands. As Iqbal so succinctly puts it,
The teaching of the Qur'an that life is a process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own problems (in Sheikh, 1986:134)

It is accepted that the ‘modernist’ and ‘neo-revivalist’ perspectives represent two broad ends of the spectrum. As Shadid and van Koningsveld recognise, in reality the division between the above views is subtler, especially when reflected in contemporary Islamic discussions on the position of Muslim minorities in Western countries. Such contemporary opinions, they argue, fall into four perspectives: the pragmatic, the idealistic or utopian, the reinterpreting ('the most widely spread attitude'), and the traditionalist ('occupies the marginal position' Shadid and van Koningsveld 1996, 95-98). These distinctions are potentially important and as we shall see in Chapter Seven, have resonance with the findings of this thesis.

Apart from the traditionalist perspective, all the others accept that under certain conditions Muslims can reside as a minority under non-Muslim rule. There is not the space here to go into detail. However a broad summary of the debates, as outlined by Shadid and van Koningsveld, will give a good indication of how Islamic principles have been translated in the modern context, as well as provide an indication of the opinions that may influence Muslims when thinking about how they should live their lives as Muslims of Britain.
There is general agreement that so long as Muslims can overtly defend and practice the moral values and major religious prescriptions of Islam (almsgiving, fasting, performance of the pilgrimage to Mecca, etc. as a minimum) it is permissible for Muslims to live under non-Muslim rule\textsuperscript{21}. However, some argue, that the preaching of Islam (\textit{da'wah}) in this situation becomes an additional duty imposed on Muslims (a type of \textit{jihad} by the tongue); some even referring to such non-Muslim lands not as \textit{dar al-Kufir} but \textit{dar al-Da'wah} (Territory of Preaching)\textsuperscript{22}. This means not only a duty to preach Islam to non-Muslims but, according to the Moroccan scholar Al-Kittani, it implies that Muslims need to organise and to arrange Islamic education for their children. According to Al-Kittani,

\begin{quote}
A Muslim cannot live in the Territory of Infidelity if he fosters no serious hope that Islam will survive among his children and offspring and will be spread to the non-Muslims (cited in Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1996: 100).\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

Other scholars have suggested that for Muslims to live amongst non-Muslims they must feel safe in their adherence to the Islamic faith, or in other words they should refrain from creating bonds of friendship and love with infidels, which contradicts faith. For Muslims in Britain this could signal that Muslims can not be friends with non-Muslims, or simply that one cannot participate in aspects of life which are contradictory to Islam, i.e. go to the pub as way of socialising for instance.
For others still, Muslims, while living in a non-Muslim country, need to foster an Islamic identity and culture as part of the world-wide *ummah*. This was the view of Kalim Siddiqui, the founder of the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain in the early nineties. He believed Muslims could accept protection of their life, property, and freedom by non-Muslim rulers and in return should pay taxes and abide by the laws of that state (as long as they do not conflict with their loyalty to Islam and the *ummah*). However Siddiqui also thought it necessary to create and institutionalise a unity at a national level (hence his creation of a Muslim Parliament\(^ {24}\)) as he believed only these ‘institutions and traditions ... shall protect us [Muslims] in times of need’.

In reference to the duties of a citizen, as well as abiding by the laws of the land, others have argued that there is also no harm in fulfilling the duty of military service, following the adoption of a Western nationality. According to al-Qardawi, the risk of being obliged to take up arms against Muslim brethren also exists in the Muslim world itself and is not just a fear for minorities residing in non-Muslim countries. Dr. Syed Mutawalli Darsh, from the weekly Muslim newspaper *Q-News*, also supports this, arguing that as British citizens, it is the basic duty of Muslims to defend the country in which they live. However where a situation arises which is felt to be Islamically unjustifiable, Muslims have the option of appealing to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, or particularly, the European Convention on Human Rights (and/or the Human Rights Act 1998 which has now incorporated the latter into British law) and abstain from fighting on conscientious grounds. Doi even goes so far as to argue that Muslims should
join the army in a non-Muslim state as ‘whenever the army is deployed for the purpose of keeping internal peace, a Muslim soldier can prevent atrocities against Muslims at the hand of non-Muslims’ (Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1996: 107)

With regards political participation, Shadid and van Koningsveld point to the work of Jadd al-Haqq ali Jadd al-Haqq (1995) who argue that there is no reason why Muslims can not participate in the political life of the country in which they are residing, so long as the measures they endorse as councillors or Members of Parliament are not against the faith of Islam or against the interests of Muslims. For Raza (1995) political participation is the only means to improve the circumstances of Muslims in Britain.

In reference to what Shadid and van Koningsveld call the ‘traditionalist’ point of view, the argument is that Muslims can not settle in a non-Muslim country as ‘it implies that this would require complete intermingling with the infidels and an awareness that one is a fellow citizen who is bound by sympathy and friendship and by the obligation to strengthen the ranks of the infidels as required by citizenship. Moreover, his family will be raised among the infidels. Consequently, they will adopt their manner and customs’ (1996:98). From this point of view, those who adopt the nationality of a non-Muslim country are regarded as apostates (as was the view of the scholars of Zaytouna in Tunisia identified earlier). The law by which such Muslims will have to abide is identified by Al-Khamlishi as the law identified with the tyrant mentioned in the Qu’ran to whom Muslims, by order of God, should not give their loyalty.
It can be seen that Islamic scholars vary greatly in their opinion about how Muslims should live (or not, as the case may be) as minorities in a non-Muslim country. There is a minority opinion, that Muslims, if they find themselves in such a situation, need to emigrate to a Muslim country (following in the footsteps of the Prophet of when he performed the *hijra* – see above). However for the most part, it seems that Islamic scholars are now addressing the fact that Muslim minorities are settled communities, and it is in this context that their rights and obligations need to be discussed. It is by concentrating on these discussions that some Muslims are debating how they should live as a minority whilst staying true to their Islamic beliefs and values.

**Muslims and citizenship**

Just as Muslims may translate their Islamic beliefs and values to understand their position in British society, by the very fact that many Muslims have settled in Britain (many having lived longer in Britain than they did in their country of origin), or have been born in Britain, there is the likelihood that Muslim British citizens may also draw from the Western notions of citizenship identified earlier. However, in the same way that Islamic definitions of citizenship are highly idealised, so are Western definitions. Both the contractarian and the solidaristic notions of citizenship, in reality, have been applied in a fundamentally conflictual way. It is important to explore the conflicts in these definitions and the subsequent consequence for Muslim minorities of Britain.
T. H. Marshall (1950) argued that the modern concept of citizenship consisted of three elements, the civil, political and social. Only through the inclusion of all three elements could social class inequality, which he believed to be inherent in capitalist society, be minimised and participation maximised. Civil rights referred to property rights, legal guarantees and freedoms such as the freedom of speech, freedom of movement and freedom from physical assault; political rights to the right to vote, rights of association and constitutional participation; and social rights to the entitlement to basic standards of education, health and social care, housing and income maintenance. It is these rights he believed, that would enable equality of status or ‘entitlement’ (if not provision), and provide the basis for cultural inclusion (see also Turner, 2001). As Perez-Bustillo states, as the rights of citizenship expand ‘an unequivocal sentiment of membership to a community based on loyalty to a civilisation which constitutes a common heritage’ is engendered as well (1997:101-102). However it is argued that civil, political and social rights, as espoused by both liberal/contractarian and republican/solidaristic traditions, protect certain populations in society to a greater extent than others.

Civil Rights

The classical liberal/contractarian perspective is concerned with ‘rights as entitlements’ to the individual. Human beings are regarded as being born ‘free and equal’ capable of possessing and pursuing their own goals, interests and ideals. In terms of civil rights therefore, the right to private property, legal guarantees and freedom are in the main limited to the formal, providing ‘a legitimate sphere for all individuals to pursue their action and activities without risk of arbitrary or
unjust political interference’ (Hall & Held, 1989: 177). This liberal perspective can however be criticised for promoting formal equality at the expense of substantive equality, for ignoring whether the individual has the means or the capacity to exercise their civil rights.

By ignoring particularity (that is the individuals subjective position) classical liberal traditions assume formal parity of status exists amongst individuals. History however, illustrates quite clearly that citizenship has never been applied equally to all. Access to citizenship has always been a highly gendered and ethnically structured process: ‘enjoyment of citizenship rights is affected by economic conditions: that it is harder for the poor than the rich to secure redress through the law courts; that it is easier for the well-educated and articulate to influence the course of a public enquiry; that middle class citizens have been able to make more of their equal right to participate in politics than citizens from the working class’ (Phillips, 2000:41). It is facts such as these that lead Hall and Held to point out,

The ‘free and equal individual’ is a person rarely found in practice ... existing relations between men and women, between employers and employees, between social classes, or black, white and other ethnic groups, all make a difference to notions of equality in practice (1989:178).

By encouraging a legal system that is blind to differences, it has been argued that even some of the most basic civil rights have been denied to Muslims on
occasions. One such occasion, it can be argued, was the Rushdie Affair. During the Rushdie Affair the main issue was freedom of speech, however, this was posed solely from the author's point of view with no reference to, the author's responsibilities or, more importantly, how through the media coverage Muslims' objections and their right to express themselves were being denied (Nielson, 1992a:158-164). The Runneymede report on Islamophobia also highlights how freedom of speech in the case of Muslims is curtailed.

Islamophobia prevents Muslims from being invited or encouraged to take a full part in society's moral deliberation and debates, and prevents their views from 'finding resonance', ..., in the country as a whole (1997: 10).

Moreover, a key aspect of civil rights in a multi-cultural, multi-faith society is the way they should protect any minority group in respect of their difference. However there are ample examples of how ethnic minority groups do not enjoy their rights, for instance, to freedom from racism. Prejudice, discrimination, and violence based on colour, culture and religion is still prevalent today. This has been most obvious in Oldham during the 2001 General Election. Here we have seen the re-emergence of the far right political groups, namely the National Front (NF) and the British National Party (BNP); a party which not only gained some 11,000 votes in Oldham, where the BNP leader Nick Griffin stood as a candidate for Oldham West27, but where BNP activities have managed to create a local climate that encouraged racial violence - a point acknowledged by the police and council officials in Oldham (see The Guardian 'Evil racists' blamed for Oldham
violence', May 29, 200128). Although it is still early days (at the time of writing),
and investigations are underway as to what happened in Oldham, what is certain is
that in the run up to the 2001 General Election, Oldham experienced some of the
worst 'race'-related violence witnessed in Britain for some 15 years. The riots
involved mainly Muslim youth, in the context of poverty (youth unemployment in
Oldham is 40%), with the presence of far right wing groups, a police force that is
seen not to come to the aid of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi communities living
in Oldham, and where 'Muslims are finding it harder to find their place in British
society...[with] greater misunderstanding and prejudice against their faith29, and
perhaps greater exclusion, too' (The Guardian, 'When frustration erupts', May 28,
2001).

Oldham is part of the current context in which racist violence is on the increase.
As the Runneymede report on Islamophobia highlights, between 1992 and 1993,
13 people died in Britain as a result of what are believed to be racially motivated
attacks (9 had Muslim names) (1997:40). Police statistics (which, it is widely
accepted, are a vast under-estimation because on non-reporting and as Virdee
points out because of the way the police recognise (or not) racial motivation in
incidents reported to them, 1997:262) illustrate how racially motivated attacks
have increased over time from 4,300 in 1988 to 12,000 in 1994-5, an increase of
175 %. The British Crime Survey (BCS)30, also highlights the scale of the
problem, in particular, in relation to Pakistanis/Muslims.
Since 1988 the BCS has boosted its sample of African-Caribbean and Asian respondents and has asked whether victims believed incidents to have been racially motivated. It has also reported its findings separately within the ‘Asian’ group for Indians and Pakistanis. If we take the latter group (the vast majority of whom are Muslim – see Chapter Three) as illustrative of the South Asian Muslim experience it would seem that Muslims are at greater risk of crime than African-Caribbeans or Indians. For instance, combining the data for 1988 and 1992 the BCS found that 8% of Pakistanis compared to 4% of African-Caribbeans and 5% of Indians had been victims of racially motivated incidents in the preceding year, and that Pakistanis were most vulnerable to racially motivated crimes and threats, stating that nearly a third of all incidents were racially motivated (compared with 18% of Indians and 14% of African-Caribbean victims) rising to 70% in the case of threats (FitzGerald and Hale, 1996)\(^3\).

It is impossible to say to what extent the above incidents are, in part, the result of anti-Muslim sentiment, as the BCS does not ask the victims of crime about religion but instead understands racism, in the main, in terms of colour racism. However as the PSI survey shows, when given the option, religion does form part of the explanation as to why some people feel they are discriminated against. For instance the PSI survey found that nearly half of the South Asians who complained of racial discrimination in recruitment believed that their religion was a factor in the discrimination (a view supported by the Home Office report on ‘Religious Discrimination in England and Wales’ (Weller, et al. 2001). It was
also agreed by all groups that Muslims face the most prejudice in the context of employment (1997:133).

Over recent years there has been mounting evidence that it is not just colour racism that is at play, especially in the case of Muslims. In addition, there is increasing recognition that religious discrimination is becoming an issue along with colour racism, culture and economic factors, adding to the complex picture of discrimination that Muslims may face in the British context. A recent Home Office study on ‘Religious Discrimination in England and Wales’ (Weller et al., 2001) found, for instance, that consistently higher levels of unfair treatment were reported by Muslim organisations than by most other religious groups. It also found that where visible expressions that distinguish men and women as different are religious (for example the hijab), religious discrimination was deemed as the primary reason for discrimination (See also Khanum v IBC Vehicles Ltd., Case No. 1200058/97, (Autumn 1998) 37 EOR Case Law Digest 3). As the Runneymede report of Islamophobia supports,

There is widespread anecdotal evidence in Muslim communities that an individual Muslim is more likely to be a victim of racist violence when he or she is wearing Islamic dress or symbols. This applies to white Muslims ... as well as to South Asians. (1997:41)

The Home Office also highlighted (Weller et al., 2001) the way Muslims find it hard to practice their freedom of belief/religious observance in the British context.
The report highlights, for instance, how Muslims within higher education and employment find it hard to obtain prayer facilities e.g. prayer rooms. Within the school system, the report goes on to highlight how Muslims felt that teachers actively undermine the religious beliefs and practices of Muslim pupils. As one educational development specialist is quoted as saying,

Any request to do even a small thing like make cards for Ramadan or have a party is seen as having to bend over backwards. They state that Ramadan makes children tired, and while Christmas often makes them overly excited and inattentive, they still work around this. There is no willingness to work around the results of fasting. (Weller et al, 2001:28)

This lack of flexibility was also evidenced within the working environment, ‘one employee recalled that a colleague who mentioned that a meeting scheduled on a Friday took place on the Muslim festival of Eid was told “so what?”’ (Weller et al, 2001:56)

This is not to say there is no evidence of improvement and good practice with regards to religious accommodation. What is obvious, is that examples of accommodation do not make up for the instances where basic civil rights to freedom of belief or freedom from racist violence, for instance, have failed Muslim British citizens, preventing them from ‘participating freely and fully in the economic, social and public life of the nation ... while still being able to
maintain their own culture, traditions, language and values.’ (Government policy aim, as cited in The Runnymede report on Islamophobia, 1997:41)

At present, Northern Ireland is the only place in Britain where there is explicit protection from religious discrimination (although even here the legislation is directed primarily at relations between the established Protestant and Roman Catholic communities). In the rest of Britain limited protection to some religious groups has been provided by the Race Relations Act 1976 (RRA). The RRA prohibits discrimination on ‘racial grounds’, defined as ‘colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national origins’. It is because certain religious groups can be identified as a distinct ‘racial’/ethnic group, such as Sikhs and Jews, that they are protected from direct and indirect discrimination under the RRA. However because Muslims do not belong to any one ‘ethnic group’, protection from religious discrimination is not afforded to them in any comprehensive way through the RRA. The need for such legislation is recognised, and in its absence, the Government’s Inner Cities Religious Council produced a booklet A Guide for Faith Communities and their Advisors: Challenging Religious Discrimination (1996, Department of the Environment) on how existing legislation can be used to address concerns of religious discrimination. More recently the Home Office commissioned a report, Tackling religious discrimination: practical implications for policy-makers and legislators (Hepple and Chaudhury, 2001), to look at ways in which the issue of religious discrimination could be addressed, indicating some thought by the British
Government on this issue. However, it is the European Union that is leading the way in making religious discrimination unlawful.

Although Britain is not a signatory to Protocol No.12 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) - Article 1 of which provides for a general prohibition on discrimination (including on the grounds of religion) - it has signed up to the EU Employment (and Race) Directive which was adopted under Article 13 of the EC Treaty by the UK in 2000. It is this legislation that will provide limited protection against religious (direct and indirect) discrimination and harassment from December 2003, or in other words, lay down an ‘anti-discrimination “principle of equal treatment”’ in the context of sexual orientation, religion or belief, disability and age’ within British law (see the consultation paper published by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), *Towards Equality and Diversity: Implementing the Employment and Race Directives*, 2001:6).

Although any legislation against religious discrimination is welcomed, two key limitations of the proposed adoption of the EU Employment Directive need to be noted. The first is that the scope of this Directive is limited. It does not extend to social protection, education and goods and services available to the public as contained in the Race Directive (and the RRA). Nor will the Directive provide protection against incitement of religious hatred. Aziz highlights the consequences of this.
A town hall could, for example, refuse booking to Mr Ahmed Evans from the local mosque or Muslim Association, simply and precisely on the basis that he is a Muslim (2002:6)

Under the proposed new legislation this would still be lawful. If the Muslim in question is part of the ethnicised communities, say Pakistani or Bangladeshi, then some protection may be offered by recourse to the RRA, but if they were a white Muslim, for example, this would leave them without any recourse to legal action. Aziz further points outs,

Even where the victim is covered under indirect racial discrimination, ... the offender may still not have to pay any compensation if there was no ‘racial’ motivation (2002:6)

The second limitation of the proposed adoption of the EU Employment Directive is that although it offers protection against religious discrimination at the level of entry into employment, the protection it offers once in employment is limited. The Directive, rightly so, makes it unlawful for there to be differences of treatment based on ‘sexual orientation, religion or belief, disability and age’ (except in ‘limited circumstances where sexual orientation, religion or belief, disability or age is a “genuine and determining occupational requirement”’ – DTI, 2001:9) in employment and training. Implicit in the consultation document, however, is that once in employment, treating different people in the same way advances the promotion of the ‘principle of equal treatment’. As such, the proposal states how
in relation to religious requirements that may impact on ‘diet, dress and religious observance. ... The Directive does not require employers to put specific arrangements in place'; there does not seem to be anything equivalent to the Disability Discrimination Act's (DDA) concept of 'reasonable adjustments'.

In effect, there is little recognition that, in certain circumstances, equality may be promoted through the recognition of difference, and inequality, by ignoring difference.

Further consultation and guidance notes are yet to be published in relation to the detail of what effects outlawing religious discrimination would have for business and the individual. In the mean time, it is recognised that the adoption of the EU Employment and Race Directive brings greater protection of the rights of British citizens. Despite this, there is a feeling that the proposals do not go far enough. For Muslims, a multi-ethnic religious group, the scope of protection is limited and more generally there is a danger that the law, by ignoring difference, may in some circumstances promote inequality, a criticism levied against the liberal individualist approach in general.

Young argues that, liberal individualism, by promoting structures that ignore difference, only serves to propose an assimilationist ideal,

where a person’s social group membership, physical attributes, genealogy, and so on, make no difference for their social position, the advantages or
disadvantages that accrue to them, or how other people relate to them (1995:162).

Parekh highlights how in relation to minorities of Britain, this assimilationist approach has been exerted in all areas of British life through ‘insisting on uniformity of treatment, castigating any recognition of special needs or circumstances as privileging … in favour of minority communities’ (1991:189).

One of the key arenas in which this assimilationist approach has been perpetuated (post-1960), according to Parekh, is education.

The minority communities’ languages, religions, cultures, history and so on were denied place on the curriculum; requests to celebrate or give symbolic recognition to their new year days or major festivals were contemptuously dismissed; the schools were urged to use their enormous power to Anglicise them; and even such simple demands as the exemption of Muslim girls from mixed sports, wearing shorts or swimming, or provision of halal, kosher or non-beef meat were vigorously resisted (Parekh, 1991: 189-190).

Phillips argues, treating women like men, by promising to treat Muslims and Jews the same as Christians, by promising to look beyond skin colour can serve to reinforce that difference is an oddity and perpetuate the idea that in order to qualify for equal treatment, people are obliged to discount aspects of themselves. As Phillips says,
They will be accepted into the fold, but only on condition that they highlight their similarities, cover over their differences, make themselves more like those who are already full citizens in order to be welcomed as their equal (2000:40).

This is a view shared by Dr Ghayasuddun Siddiqui, leader of the Muslim Parliament, who feels that all political parities would have Muslims ‘lose our identity and culture, and integrate into the secular society before we can be accepted as full members of the society’ (Report to the 12th Session of the Muslim Parliament of Great Britain, October 1996).

It can be argued that liberal traditions, by presenting the citizen as a ‘disembodied individual’, only serve to disguise differences, disadvantage the weak and, some have argued, perpetuate rather than undermine oppression (Yuval-Davis, 1997c) by not only maintaining but, at times, being the source of unequal outcomes (Castles, 1997:114).

In contrast to liberal/contractarian traditions, it could be argued that solidaristic perspectives do not present the citizen as a ‘disembodied individual’, as they recognise that individuals may have social bonds to other social identities that are expressive of many forms of collective life. Unlike liberals therefore, solidaristic traditions do not hold a voluntarist conception of the self, that is the belief that if individuals do come together and form collective associations, these are based on
having common interests and nothing more. While acknowledging that some social identities are chosen by individuals, the solidaristic tradition, also recognises that many are "the "givens" of their very existence: acknowledged certainly, but acquired involuntarily, and often imperishable" (Oldfield, 1990: 4). As Glazer illustrates,

religion involves not only individual choice, but in the great majority of cases faith is determined by birth, just as much as colour or mother tongue is (1995:126)

In this way difference is recognised. However republicanism also believes 'by participating in public discussion and collective decision making, citizens transcend their particular self interested lives and the pursuit of private interests to adopt a general point of view from which they agree on the common good' (Young, 1998:266). It is for this reason that Lister argues that whilst liberals present the citizen as a 'disembodied individual' by ignoring particularity, republicans do so by transcending it.

Like liberals therefore, a universalist notion of citizenship is advocated, focusing on what people have universally in common rather then their particular differences. Liberals do this by aiming to ensure that laws and rules are blind to individual and group differences, the theory being that they will apply equally to all resulting in equal treatment. Republicans advocate universalist notions by presenting the idea of the common good, which it is assumed is a vision shared, or
one that should be shared by all, despite differences that may exist between citizens. As in the liberal tradition, this ‘universalism’ is problematic.

According to Oldfield, in the republican political community what is shared is identity ‘born in part from self-determination and in part from a common history, or language, or continued occupancy of the same territory’. This identity allows us to recognise ‘both who our fellow citizens are, and those who are not members of our community’ (1998:81). To be citizens of this community, individuals have to acknowledge the community’s goals as one’s own, and maintain a relationship, at best of friendship, at least of goodwill. What is important however is that this relationship is based on respect of differences and other’s autonomy. Oldfield admits that due to the size, complexity and heterogeneity of the modern world a ‘face-to-face’ community is not possible – what is important in these conditions is a sense of belonging and commitment (1998:88). Such definitions have led Yuval Davis to conclude ‘there is no difference between republican constructions of the ‘moral community’ and the Gemeinschaft-like constructions of the ‘national community’’ (1997a:71).

Problems arise when you think about those who don’t feel even a ‘sense of belonging’ let alone a ‘shared identity’, or those who despite acknowledging ‘the community’s goals as one’s own’ are not respected, living in part or fully in ‘the marginal matrix of society’ (Evans, 1993). There are those who feel they do share in the myth of common origin but do not share important hegemonic value systems with the majority of the population in religious, sexual and other matters
and therefore are not wholly part of the community; there are 'old' and 'new' minorities, and in settler societies also indigenous people who are not part of the hegemonic national community (Yuval Davis, 1997a:71). As Lister summarises,

In a world where significant minorities do not share in the 'national heritage' of the country in which they live and where cultural diversity is the norm, a tension arises between the notion of a common cultural standard, implicit or explicit in traditional formulations of citizenship, and the realities of a pluralist society (1997: 50).

For Muslims living in Britain the idea of a 'common good' could be particularly problematic. There are issues of ethnicity, culture and 'race' that could prevent Muslims from feeling that they share an identity with wider society, markers of identity that have been the focus of discrimination and prejudice, or identified as a problem (see Chapter Three). In these circumstances, citizenship becomes exclusive because it does not include one's characteristics as part of the common identity.

On a more ideological level within British society the 'common good' is, in part, seen to be one in which Parliament is sovereign and citizens (as a minimum) have a duty to be loyal to the state and uphold its laws. From an Islamic point of view there may be Muslims who do not share this version of the 'common good' but instead believe (strongly) that it is God who is sovereign via the (Islamic) state, and thus, to be a good citizen may mean to prioritise duties as laid down by Islam.
over and above those expected as British citizens. It is in this situation that such solidaristic notions of citizenship are most problematic, as if you feel that you do not share a notion of a 'common good' with wider society then you are unlikely to be willing to place good above right (or the 'good' that you are willing to put above rights is not the same 'good' as espoused by wider British society). It is in this situation that Muslims may find more solidaristic notions of citizenship harder to adopt than liberal conceptions.41

To summarise, what is being argued is that liberal conceptions of citizenship do not acknowledge that rights are not guaranteed, at least not in any substantive sense, nor that humans may have social bonds and interests that go beyond individual self interest. The solidaristic tradition, although it goes some way in addressing this issue, holds a potentially problematic notion of community: one that can be very exclusive when considering the multi-'racial', multi-faith and multi-cultural society we live in today. By conflating notions of citizenship with ideas of nationality and/or group identity (see Chapter Three) citizenship becomes exclusive. Indeed it is because the republican/solidaristic tradition runs the danger of advocating an inflexible, codified form of 'universalism', by espousing a single notion of the 'common good', that it can become insensitive to difference and thereby potentially indifferent to inequality.

Political Rights

The classical liberal/contractarian notion of citizenship advocates representative democracy. As Spinner states, a liberal democratic state 'is (partly) government
by discussion... [if] some citizens are routinely ignored, they are not equal citizens' (1994:39). Therefore, the fact that there is a serious under-representation of ethnic minority groups in British political life is of concern. After the 1992 General Election only eight MPs (5 were sitting MPs) out of forty-two ethnic minority candidates standing were elected, although it was at this election that the first Muslim MP, Muhammad Sarwar, was elected in Glasgow Govan. After the 1997 General Election the number of minority ethnic MPs had increased by one to nine. At the 2001 General Election the number of minority ethnic group candidates had gone up to approximately 77, with 12 MPs elected including another Muslim MP, Khalid Mahmood for Birmingham Perry Barr.

Despite increased ethnic participation politics is still the domain of the white, heterosexual, Church of England male. It has been accepted – at least by the Labour Party – that some sort of affirmative action is needed to readdress the male/female balance of power (see Phillips, 2000:39). To date no such measures have been introduced with regard to minority groups and as Phillips argues,

> It is difficult...to think of ways of addressing the problem of under-representation that do not involve some intervention in the ‘natural’ order of things, some positive action that makes the sex, and by the same token, the ethnicity, of the candidates a matter of conscious concern. (2000:39)

In fact, evidence suggests that parties are still reluctant to select Muslim candidates (and this I would argue goes for ethnic minorities in general). For
instance, Anwar cites several examples where Asians have felt they have been banned from becoming members of the Labour Party or where problems have been created for Asians standing as candidates. With particular reference to Muslims he cites the example of Manchester Gorton in 1992 where a Muslim who challenged the sitting MP ended up with an inquiry by Labour NEC, without which, a BBC documentary concluded, there was an equal chance of the Muslim candidate winning the selection (Anwar, 1998: 177-8). At the 1997 General Election, Labour were accused of racism and unfairness in selection of candidates in Bradford West (for not selecting a Muslim candidate even when the constituency has one of the largest communities of Pakistani origin in the country) and Bethnal Green & Bow (see Runnymede Bulletin, May 1997). The Runnymede report on Islamophobia also demonstrates how in 1997, constituencies with some of the largest Muslim populations, no sitting MP, and a suitable Muslim candidate for the Labour party nomination, managed not to select Muslim candidates (1997:33). Even when selection has been made, evidence suggests that party officials are reluctant to put black and Asian candidates up in seats with small ethnic minority population. As Saggar points out,

At the 1997 General Election, nine black and Asian MPs were elected to parliament. In all but one instance – Ashok Kumar in Cleveland and Middlesborough in North East England – their constituents included large ethnic minority communities, underlining the impression that ethnic minority representatives were most likely to be viewed as electoral assets when parties wanted to appeal to ethnic minority voters (2001).
Beyond this, Saggar argues, Black and Asian candidates were seen as 'electoral liabilities'. The political right to stand for election and the right to participate in political activity can be denied in this context.

This is not to say that Muslims MPs or councillors are always seen to be effective in defending the rights of Muslims or that non-Muslim MPs can not and do not raise issues on behalf of their Muslim constituents. With regard to the former there is no guarantee that Muslim councillors or MPs will necessarily take the Islamic point of view on an issue, or even if they wished to do so, are able to do so. As the leader of the Muslim Parliament pointed out in October 1996 with reference to the Rushdie Affair,

the fifty odd Muslim councillors at the time belonging to various parties either played no part or when threatened by party whips, readily gave their assurance of good behaviour. Because, after all, they were elected to pursue the party manifesto, not a Muslim agenda. (speech to the 12th session of the Muslim Parliament)

Hewer acknowledges that is it difficult to know if councillors will further the aim of the party or their religious group (1994:7), or from a more sceptical perspective, if they are genuinely interested in protecting Muslim interests or simply interested in furthering their own political careers (Rex, 1996:231). In addition, a Muslim electorate does not necessarily believe that only a Muslim can
represent their views as indicated by the lack of support shown to the Islamic Party of Britain in the 1992 General Election (see Anwar, 1998:171-2); and the success of some ‘mainstream politicians’ in representing the interests of their mainly minority ethnic constituents (e.g. Roy Hattersley in his Birmingham constituency, see Crowley, 2001:111). As Sypnowich states, to think contrary to this is to suggest that,

Representatives are representing cultural characteristics, rather than electorates, and second, ... that one can represent another only when one shares the same repertoire of sociological characteristics (2000:541).

However, in the case of non-Muslim MPs representing their Muslim constituents, it has been suggested that not until the Muslim vote is considered critical to the party political system will the Muslim voice(s) be taken as seriously as it might by non-Muslim MPs. It is largely accepted that the majority of Muslims vote Labour (indicated by the fact that 83.5% of Asian and Black votes in the 1997 general election went to the Labour Party, Saggar, 1998; and the fact that the vast majority of all Muslim councillors in the country belong to the Labour Party, The Runnymede Trust, 1997:3345). So long as Labour is seen to be sympathetic to Muslim needs, there is an assumption that this vote can be relied upon46. Some believe it is not until political parties see the Muslim vote as key in winning or losing seats that Muslims’ priorities will be placed in any meaningful way on the political agenda.
Also in reference to the political presence of Muslims (or lack of) there are two points of principle. The first that, if Parliament is to be representative of society then Muslim presence within Parliament, as with any other group, should at least reflect their numbers in wider society. This obviously does not happen with many groups; however there is an argument that moves should be made towards better representation for all groups in this way. In the case of Muslims, it is estimated by Hewer that there needs to be a minimum of 35 MPs to justly reflect their representation in society – the fact that there are only two is ‘seen by Muslims as a token of their powerlessness’ (1994:7) Second, there is the issue of parity of representation. Currently seats are automatically given to Anglican bishops in the British House of Lords and the Chief Rabbi, Johnathan Sacks holds a personal seat, yet there are no Muslims of any equivalent status. None the less, it has been pointed out by Hewer that,

Political judgement must be exercised as to whether holders of reserved seats have any real power when contrasted to minority representatives who have achieved influence through the established parties (1994:9)

Recognising this, and the difficulties involved in representing the Muslim voice(s) (see below), issues of parity of representation, in the current context, still arise.

With only two Muslim MPs and two Muslim members of the House of Lords, Lord Ahmed of Rotherham and Baroness Uddin, and no black or Asian (let alone Muslim) representatives in the Scottish Parliament or Welsh Assembly, avenues
for Muslims to get their voice heard are limited. However, it has to be acknowledged that on a local level, Muslims have had more success. As the Runnymede Report on Islamophobia acknowledges,

Bangladeshi and Pakistani people in Britain are quite active in government at local levels. Thus to an extent Bangladeshi and Pakistani communities have a voice in Town Hall policy-making and decision-making (1997:33).

Rex also highlights how Muslims have more councillors than any other religious minority (1996:231). However as Rushanara Ali points out the number of ethnic minority councillors over all, has in fact declined in recent years from 3% in 1997 to 1.7% in 2001 (2001). Anwar points out that despite the number of Asian local councillors, their number (360) falls very short of the numbers that there should be (1300) in proportion to the number of Asians in Britain (1998:176).

Solidaristic notions of political rights are based on corporatist models whereby ‘groups from being simply associations who attempt to protect and advance their interests by influencing government policy’ change to groups who have a reciprocal relationship with the state in respect of the formation and execution of public policy (Ponton and Gill, 1982:39-40). This model of democracy advocates a more direct form of participation through freedom of association.

As can be seen in Chapter Three, Muslims have, since the 1960s, set up organisations to push Muslim priorities on the British political agenda. These
organisations, in particular those working at a local level, have been successful in raising the profile of Muslims and giving Muslims a voice where one did not exist. As Vertovec points out,

Credit must be given to them and their leaders, particularly for their role in the early days (1960s) when the local British public sphere was new to them and they to it. ...they managed to gain a number of significant concessions and accommodations including planning permission for mosques, permission to perform religious slaughter, and sites for Muslim Burial. ...Now, not only are such matters permitted routinely, Muslim organisations are regularly included in local government consultations regarding community relations matters. (1996:175)

However, local organisations, more often then not, express the needs of a specific Muslim community or individual and not Muslims generally (also see Chapter Three). As Bistolfi acknowledges,

Ensuring representation for Muslims faces difficulties rising from their membership of different national and ethnic groups, as well as their doctrinal pluralism (1995: 11).

For this reason claims can, and often do, represent the voice of some interests over others. In particular, the voice of the old over the young (although Anwar has found that young people are less critical of Asian organisations compared to in the
past - 1998:160), and the voice of men over women. As Ahmed notes of what she calls ‘representatives from the larger established Muslims organisations in Britain’, they are ‘almost exclusively male-led and dominated, self-appointed and frankly senior in years’ leading many younger British born and educated Muslims wondering who these organisations claim to represent (2002:15). Yuval Davis highlights how such ‘representatives’ can serve to increase the authority of patriarchs. She argues,

This liberal construction of the group voice, ... can inadvertently collude with authoritarian fundamentalist leaders who claim to represent the true ‘essence’ of their collectivity’s culture and religion, and have high on their agenda the control of women and their behaviour (1997c: 201).

Lister points out how this is the way the issue of single sex education, in separate Muslim schools in the UK, was viewed by some women. In a letter to The Guardian (22 July 1989), Southhall Black Sisters and the Brent Asian Women’s refuge attacked the British Labour Party’s support for separate Muslim schools as delivering them into ‘the hands of male, conservative and religious forces within our communities, who deny us our right to live as we please’. Separate schools, they argued ‘seek to control the lives of women’, leaving no space for questioning of issues around reproductive rights, domestic violence and women’s position in the family. (cited in Lister, 1997: 51). By focussing on ‘representatives’ of the group therefore, there is a danger that any heterogeneity of perspectives and
interests that exists (in particular, that which is expressed by the powerless minority) is suppressed.

On a national level, there have been calls for a centralised structure that can speak with authority to central government about issues of concern to Muslims. One such attempt has been the Inner Cities Religious Council, established by the Department of the Environment in 1992. As Rex points out, such is the desire, that there are occasions when British state and society, at a national and local level, have selected ‘leaders’ with whom they are willing to talk to, creating ethnic minority organisations themselves to represent ‘the community’ (1996:229). This was the case with Bradford Council of Mosques in the early 1980s. One suggestion has been that Muslims follow the model of the Jewish Board of Deputies. However such models have been condemned by some, namely The Muslim Parliament as a way for the British government, through the Home Office, to ‘control Muslims and set our agenda for the future’.

Over time, however, Muslim communities have attempted to organise in a more coherent fashion in the national arena. There has been the establishment of the Muslim Parliament set up to ‘promote the Muslim interest in Britain’ aiming to ensure that Muslims were living, in a meaningful way, as ‘fully integrated citizens of this country’ (Siddiqui, 1992:15). Also at the 1997 General Election the UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA) produced a document, Elections 1997, highlighting the concerns of Muslims. This year the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) have put together an agenda (Elector to Listen) highlighting
issues the Muslim ‘community’ would like to see addressed. However such endeavours are limited in their influence because, however well intentioned, they are not representative of ‘the Muslim voice(s)’, and their influence is limited. The Muslim Parliament for example, although it has had considerable success in attracting media coverage, actually holds little support amongst Muslims (see Hewer, 1994:8 and Vertovec, 1996:174). It is also questionable to what extent these groups actually influence decisions. As Hirschman points out, successful use of ‘voice is... conditioned on the influence and bargaining power... members can bring to bear within ... the organisation to which they belong’ (1970:40). This has led Vertovec to conclude,

On the whole, British Muslims are without a common, authoritative or representative voice in the public sphere (1996:175)

It can not be denied that Muslims are more visible, vocal and increasingly more organised, especially. Anwar indicates that British born generations, because of their education and employment in Britain, are becoming better equipped in asserting their rights to equal treatment (1998:161). However, there is still a long way to go before Muslims are politically represented and Muslims concerns placed on the political agenda in a fair and equal way to other citizens of Britain. Representation is limited in the current political landscape and in this way disenfranchises Muslims and in particular the weak. The corporatist model is limited in the current context, where Muslim organisations are still marginal to the mainstream of politics. More generally, even when the Muslim ‘voice’ is heard,
there is the danger that this voice excludes "the multivocality that arises from the intersections of ‘race’, ethnicity, nation and gender and the subject positions associated with them" (Phoenix, 1998:861); the plurality of voices that in reality make up Muslim opinion. In order to re-address this it is acknowledged that Muslim organisations need to change internally (become better at uniting when the need arises for instance), but this needs to happen in a context in which they are taken seriously (see Modood, 1998:395-7) and where differences amongst Muslims are understood as an integral part of ‘the Muslim community’. There needs to be an acceptance that ‘the Muslim voice’ cannot be adequately represented through one group, and as such, that any consultation that takes place needs to be with more than one group49. Also underlying this argument has been the assumption that, to an extent, the Muslims’ primary political identity is one that is based on their faith. This is not necessarily the case (see Chapter Four on identity and citizenship). This fact needs to be taken on board when considering what is the best way to represent the concerns of Muslim British citizens.

So far we have looked at the way civil and political rights, as espoused by liberal and republican traditions, could fail to protect Muslims living in Britain. Of equal importance is what Oliver and Heater (1994) call the ‘second generation’ of rights, that is social and economic rights.

**Social rights**

Social and economic rights make up the social element of Marshall’s notion of the citizenship of entitlement, discussed earlier. They cover
The whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilised being according to the standards prevailing in society. (Marshall, 1950: 11)

From the liberal perspective, each person is an end in themselves, and as such 'there is no justified sacrifice of some of us for others' (Nozick, 1974: 33). Nozick however is a libertarian and as such holds a more rigid view of social rights (including the economic right to income and to work) arguing that justice consists of voluntary exchanges and transfers alone, hence ruling out any form of redistributive policies. Generally, liberals have come to accept that some form of social rights are necessary. For Rawls (1993), for instance, what is permissible is to arrange the scheme of benefits and burdens so that the least advantaged may share in the resources of the fortunate.

In the main however, liberals favour negative (civil and political) rights over any positive (social) rights. In a negative sense economic rights refer to people's rights in the marketplace – to own property, to earn and spend money, to exercise choice in the purchase of goods and services. For liberals negative rights are enjoyed regardless of economic status. Any positive rights, to re-address any inequalities, are minimised to saving people from destitution. As stated earlier this means that formal rights are given priority over substantive, with the perpetuation of relative disadvantage.
Muslims suffer from low income, low standard of living, poor housing and poor health, factors that unless addressed can lead to social exclusion and the inability to exercise basic civil and political rights. From the work of The Policy Studies Institute (Modood, et al. 1997) it is possible to see how Muslims in Britain are faring, compared to others living in Britain, in relation to these indicators of social exclusion. The PSI research found that Pakistani and Bangladeshi people are excluded from employment, and therefore from mainstream society, to a greater extent than both white people and other South Asians ('Indian' and 'African Asian', 1997:88-91). In fact they found that both Pakistani men and women are under-represented at all levels of employment and over-represented in unemployment, with the situation being worse for Bangladeshis. A situation, in part, the result of prejudice and discrimination, as Anwar points out,

It is widely accepted in the Asian communities that finding a job is difficult because of their colour and/or religion and culture (1998:66)

Even when professionally qualified, there is evidence to suggest that Asians are not treated in an equal way to their white counterparts. For instance, a study of doctors showed that compared to the number of Asian doctors, they are under-represented in senior positions, concentrated in unpopular specialities, waiting longer for promotion, and having to make more applications for posts that their white colleagues (Anwar and Ali, 1987. See also an investigation by the CRE, 1987 into the accountancy profession, and Brenan and McGeever, 1990.).
study by Heath and McMahom (1995) concludes that the situation is no better for British born minorities. As they state ‘the second generation experienced the same pattern and magnitude of ethnic penalties\(^{52}\) in the British labour market as the first generation did’ (cited in Modood, 1997b:145) leading Modood to conclude,

for the more competitive posts, ethnic minority individuals have to be not just as good but better than their white competitors in order to get the job (1997b:145)

The PSI study also discovered that, when compared to others, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are the most disadvantaged with regard to income, housing conditions and health.

With regards to income, the PSI survey found that the average weekly income per worker for white households was £269, compared with £232 for ‘African Asians’, £222 for Indians, and only £193 for Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The researchers concluded,

Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, already the lowest on the ladder based on the total weekly income, had easily the largest families, so that they moved even further away from other groups. Pakistani and Bangladeshi households with earned income were worse off on this measure than white households with no earner (Berthoud, 1997: 157-8).
With regard to housing, Pakistani and Bangladeshi owners tended to be concentrated in terraced housing, and they were more likely than other owners to lack central heating, bathrooms and inside toilets (Lakey, 1997:222-3). The English House Condition Survey 1996 supports this finding. It describes how 35% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households live in poor housing, with the position of ethnic minority households having worsened relative to all households since 1991 (DETR, 1998). A study by Bowes et al (1997) on Pakistani experiences of housing in Glasgow found that while ‘social actor agency’ is a vital component influencing housing choice, there is still ample evidence to suggest that this ‘choice’ is limited by external factors. Bowes et al found, in their sample, ‘choice’ was constrained due to ‘deep-rooted racial prejudice’ by estate agents, difficulties in obtaining building society mortgages, feeling ‘unsafe’ in certain areas to the point of living in ‘safer’ areas which are known to have poor-quality housing, racial harassment where ‘Pakistani families are treated in a hostile fashion’ and, failure of the local authority housing to meet the housing needs of the Pakistani community (1997:80-81). The study found that Pakistanis were often offered houses not only in inappropriate areas but houses that were also of inappropriate size. In fact the Social Exclusion Unit show that 40 per cent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households live in overcrowded conditions, compared with two per cent of white households (1998).

In terms of health, the PSI survey found that Pakistanis and Bangladeshis had 50 per cent greater risk of fair to poor health than white people (1997a, Nazroo). The
1999 Health Survey for England has revealed that ethnic background and subsequent income lead to inequalities in health. In particular it found that Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups had the highest prevalence of cardiovascular disease conditions with age, that for diabetes Pakistanis and Bangladeshis of both sexes showed rates over five times higher than the general population (see also Bhopal et al, 1999). This is in the context where South Asian men have been found to be at least twice as likely as the general population to have a severe lack of social support (DOH, 1999), and where service delivery has been found to be insensitive to the needs of particular minority ethnic groups. For example, James Nazroo (1997b) found that twelve per cent of Bangladeshi women had consulted a GP with whom they had no common language. Such evidence suggests that unless a targeted approach is adopted such inequalities will only persist.

From the liberal/contractarian perspective of citizenship however, social rights are framed in terms of residual social rights, e.g. means-tested benefits ('Standardised methods of calculating relief by comparing people's subsistence needs with their assessed means'. Dean, 1996:94). Means-tested benefits in Britain include income support, working families tax credit, disabled persons tax credit, housing benefit and council tax benefit (for detailed discussion of these and other means-tested benefits see Dean, 1996). As stated above Pakistani and Bangladeshi groups suffer from low income and high unemployment and thus are eligible for many of these means-tested benefits. As the PSI survey on Ethnic Minorities in Britain states,
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis were far and away the poorest ethnic groups. More than four out of five were below the low-income threshold. Hardly any were above the high-income threshold (1997:160-1).

However, like any group who is vulnerable to poverty, the key problem with such provision of social rights is that it can lead to what is described as the 'poverty trap'. This is where a pound earned would mean the loss of more than a pound’s worth of welfare benefits and tax concessions, in effect penalising people for seeking to increase their earnings through work. According to Gal and Doron (2000), ‘the poorest segments of the population in work will find themselves actually forced to pay effective marginal tax rates higher than those paid by the highest-earning segments of the population’ (2000: 255). In this way means-tested benefits can actually serve to trap Muslims (and others who are considered poor) in poverty.

Solidaristic notions of citizenship recognise the importance of social rights in removing ‘barriers’ to citizenship. It is recognised that ‘the inability to participate in political and community life is damaging because it affects social cohesion and national identity’ (Oliver & Heater, 1994:96) which are deemed central to the proper functioning of citizenship. For this reason citizens must accept some limitation of their freedoms for the sake of the common good. In contrast to the means-tested approach that is advocated by the liberal perspective, solidaristic concepts of citizenship advocate more universal kinds of benefits such as the universal right to health care, in Britain via the National Health Service, education
and shelter. However, solidaristic notions of citizenship through their advocacy of a notion of the common good can transcend difference, and thus ignore particularisms (i.e. culture and religion) that may be central in addressing inequalities and the barriers to citizenship that exist in society. The 'one size fits all' approach to social rights can mean that specific needs of particular minorities can be ignored. For instance, local authority housing offered to Pakistani households is often of inappropriate size, contributing to the fact that a much higher percentage, compared to white households, live in overcrowded conditions. With regard to the health service, it could be argued that access is being denied because of the failure to provide adequate interpreting facilities (see Free et al 1999, Free and McKee 1998, Betancourt and Jacobs 2000, Bowes and Domokos 1998, Tuffnell et al 1994). As Free and McKee (1998) point out,

In England and Wales English language skills of ethnic minority groups are not known, but 23% of those born in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan or China are estimated to have no functional communication skills in English and 70% to have insufficient English to work and function socially in an English speaking environment—a total of almost 600,000 people.

Language and communication difficulties can not only affect knowledge of services but also a person’s ability to seek help, their understanding of health care received, and the ability to communicate with health care professionals (Free et al, 1999). Such factors can result not only in a poorer quality of service but can also contribute to increasing inequalities in health (as identified earlier). As Modood
highlights, social service provision to Muslims when it ignores the fact that they are dealing with Muslims, instead giving priority to issues of colour, can actually lead to inadequate and at times discriminatory service provision.

Same-race adoption and fostering policies which place black Muslims with black Christians, and Asian Muslims with Hindus and Sikhs; social work based on Asian needs which can lead to a Muslim being given a Hindu home-help who does not know about Muslim sensitivities...; recruitment monitoring and targeting in terms of 'Black' or 'Asian' statistics which obscure the level of Muslim disadvantage and under-representation and fail to measure whether the equal opportunity policies are making any difference to the Muslim position.... (1993:516-7)

In reality of course, not all welfare provision is either means-tested or universal; some forms of welfare provision resonate with both liberal/contractarian and solidaristic models of citizenship. The most important example of this in Britain is national insurance, which is contractarian in so far that it is premised on a notional contract of insurance between the individual worker and the state, but solidaristic in that it can provide benefits, as of right, that are virtually universal amongst those citizens who are workers, in the event of sickness, unemployment or retirement. In this way it is the concept of the 'worker citizen' that is advocated. Problems arise therefore when you consider that
social rights based on insurance principles are enjoyed by those who 'earn' their entitlement in the labour market, while citizens who have been excluded from the labour market can benefit only as dependants of those who have contributed or, alternatively, if the insurance principle in broadened... so as to admit those who are excluded by giving them 'credits' or notional contributions (Dean, 1996:96).

It is because at the core of the national insurance scheme lies the 'contributory principle: the idea that people must pay something in before they get anything out' (Dean, 1996:98) that it disadvantages all those who, for one reason or another, have not paid and/or have not been credited with contributions to a specified level for a requisite period of years. Women in particular are vulnerable to inadequate contributions (because of their concentration in part time work). The situation is worse for Black and ethnic minority women, and in particular Muslim women. As the PSI survey states,

The low level of economic activity of Pakistani and Bangladeshi women is partly a feature of Asian Muslims.

The PSI survey (1997) found from their sample that, 80 % of Bangladeshi women and 70 % of Pakistani women aged under 60 (and who were not in full time education) were looking after the home or family and thus were not economically active. Of those women who were in full time work, numbers were very small,
15% for Pakistanis, 6% for Bangladeshi women compared to 37% for White women and 38% for Indian women, and smaller still for part-time work.

This situation is exacerbated by the exceptionally high unemployment rates of their male counterparts (Bangladeshi and Pakistani rates were 42% and 38% respectively, compared to 15 percent of whites). What this means is that non-workers as a whole, were less likely to have adequate national insurance benefits and more likely to depend on the minimum safety net of income support. Therefore Muslims (like women in general and other minority groups) because they are currently marginalised from the labour market are unable to establish enough of a contributions record. For this reason they are often excluded from even those social rights that come within the full range of National Insurance entitlements.

Social rights as a means to removing ‘barriers’ to citizenship are limited especially as Faulks points out, in the current context,

Social rights have often stigmatised recipients rather than empowered them. … The administrative decisions that are associated with social rights have had negative implications for individuals’ civil rights as calls to crack down on benefit fraud mean harsher and more intrusive policing of benefits. In turn, the whole status of social rights is diminished. Social rights, as constituted in the welfare state, fail to build bridges between citizens. Instead, they cause divisions between active citizens, who are
able to exercise their market rights through employment, and ‘passive’ citizens who are constantly labelled as ‘undeserving’ or members of an ‘underclass’ (2000:117).

In this already negative arena, social rights are failing to meet the needs of minorities in general, and Muslims in particular. It is in this context that it is possible to see how Mann (1987) can conclude that ‘citizenship is a “ruling class strategy”’ to pacify the working class through promise rather than the enactment of citizenship’.

It becomes obvious that Marshall, in theorizing about citizenship, did not have (and perhaps could not have had) an understanding of how ethno-religious and ‘racial’ divisions in modern society would affect notions of (national) citizenship (for other criticisms of Marshall see Turner, 2001). However, it is in this context that it becomes urgent to explore how citizenship can be made more meaningful and inclusive, especially because we are living in a time when, as seen above, substantive rights are difficult to realise and as Turner (2001) argues, when traditional arenas in which citizenship could be expressed (family, work, war, voluntary associations) are in decline

CONCLUSION

On an ideological level, it can not be denied that there are tensions between Islam and Western notions of citizenship stemming from the fact that in the West it is individual sovereignty that is paramount while in Islam this sovereignty is placed
in God. What this means is that in the West rights and responsibilities come from the state and as such citizenship defines the relationship of the individual to the state – a state which demarcates the division of the private and public, where, in the main faith is regarded as a private matter. From an Islamic perspective, rights and responsibilities are dictated by God and citizenship (or ‘creaturehood) defines the relationship of the individual to God via the state – as such Islam, not the state, prescribes how people should be governed politically, socially and economically with no division of life into the private and public. Islamic scholars have debated, through time, how best to resolve the tensions that exist when Muslims find themselves living as a minority, these have been translated by contemporary Islamic scholars to the position of Muslims in the West. It is from these debates that it can be discerned what options, according to these scholars, Muslims living in Britain have in ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship.

It can be summarised that Muslim British citizens have one of four options in ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship. First is the option of ‘engagement’ in the form that Iqbal advocates. This is where Muslims accept the laws of the land and the rights and responsibilities that are placed on them as citizens; Muslims who value and exercise their freedom of belief (including their freedom not to believe) and practice Islam, if they so wish, in private spaces and negotiated public spaces. The principle of engagement with wider society is whole heartedly accepted even if civil, political and social rights can at times fail to protect Muslims, thus leaving them vulnerable to issues of poverty and discrimination, and limiting their engagement in certain contexts. This option is, it would seem, often combined
with what Hirschman describes as the interconnected concepts of ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’.

According to Hirschman, through voice ‘members… make an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the…organisation to which one belongs… ’ (1970:30). This, as evidenced above and in Chapter Three, is the preferred option of the majority of the organisations in Britain that are trying to make the position of Muslims more equitable with fellow British citizens. ‘Voice’ in this way has been expressed over issues such as the law on blasphemy, outlawing religious discrimination, the establishment of Muslim schools, the provision of halal meat, to name but a few. Exit from society is not an option for these organisations as Muslims are seen to be an integral and settled part of British society, as Iqbal Sacranie of the UK Action Committee of Islamic affairs states,

Muslims should not opt out of the political life of the country and voluntarily give up their social and political rights. Neither should they surrender their duty to make their opinions and advice known on matters that concern themselves and the wider society. (Q-News, 14th March 1997: 26)

The option of ‘engagement’ is also that which is adopted by those who show ‘loyalty’. That is when members, even if they join in with those who are involved in action to change the situation (voice), refuse to exit, instead choosing to ‘suffer
in silence’, confident that things will soon get better. Voice, it is argued by Hirschman, actually increases with the degree loyalty, as he states,

A member with a considerable attachment to an organisation will often search for ways to make himself influential, especially when the organisation moves in what he believes is the wrong direction (1970: 77-78)

The remainder of the three options, it could be argued, are all adopted by those who rather than seeing themselves as Muslims of Britain, regard themselves instead, as Muslims in Britain and in one way or another adopt what Hirschman (1970) identifies as the over-arching option of ‘exit’. In reference to this study ‘exit’ is typified in each case by the refusal to vote (see Q-News, 14th March 1997, No. 255-259 pp.27 which gives the views of the Muslim Parliament of why Muslims should not vote). However, it can be argued that ‘exit’ in itself is too crude a category. Exploration of contemporary Islamic debates suggests that the over-arching strategy of ‘exit’ can be sub-divided into three further options. From this it would seem that the second option that has been offered to Muslims is that of ‘engagement with separation’. That is, engaging with wider society in relation to citizenship rights and duties but also advocating the establishment of separate, parallel organisations within Britain that cater specifically for Muslims. This, it is argued is the preferred option of the Muslim Parliament. The third option is described as ‘separation’. This is the self-imposed separation from the prevailing social order in the way that Qutb and Mawdudi advocate. As evidenced with Hizb
Al-Tahrir (see Chapter Three) the aim is to ‘opt out’ of society instead focussing attention to implementing God's will on earth primarily through the act of da'wah. And finally the fourth option, is that of ‘exit’ taken to it’s logical conclusion of leaving Britain and going to live in an Islamic state (if one existed) or, as a minimum, a Muslim majority country. How these options are, or are not, adopted by Muslims British citizens in ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship is the focus of the remainder of this thesis.

1 This is hardly surprising in Britain where people have been known not as citizens but as one of her Majesty’s subjects. Indeed, as Miller points out ‘passports have only referred to their holders as citizens rather than subjects since, appropriately, their jackets have turned from blue to red’ (2000:26)

2 Although it is recognised that the caliphal state after Ali quickly transformed into a central, imperial, dynastic caliphate. Engineer even goes as far to say, 'In the metamorphosed state set up there was nothing more Islamic than the fact that the ruler professed Islam and enforced certain provisions of the Shariah in personal and criminal matters (1994: 60).

3 It is through the principles of *ijtihad* (independent reasoning) and *istislah* (public interest) that *fiqh* (law as developed from Man’s application of the *shariah*) can be changed and reinterpreted to make Islam more relevant to modern life and its changing needs and problems

4 Sardar believes it would be more appropriate to talk about the concept of ‘one ummah, one state’. Indeed he believed the evolution of a universal *ummah* state with global boundaries is the ideal solution. What would be required would be the synthesis of various Muslim nation-states into one unit through the practical realisation of the *shariah*, thus linking independent and autonomous republics into a single ‘state’ (1985:150)

5 It must be noted however that there are innumerable instances of thought and action in Islamic history in which religion and state have been sharply distinguished. See Khalidi, 1992 for details.

6 Although some would argue to refer to Islam using a Western concept such as ideology is actually the antithesis of Islam. See Sardar, 1985: 146-147 for a fuller explanation.

7 Although it must be acknowledged that scholars have, in the main, failed to address how the principle of the *shura* can be put into practice in a modern Islamic society.

8 This is the ideal vision of an Islamic society. In reality however it must be acknowledged that leading Islamic thinkers, although still committed to the pan-Islamic ideal, did in reality give way to a reluctant acceptance of political realism. For Iqbal this meant independent Muslim nations with the eventual establishment of the “League of Nations which recognise artificial boundaries and racial distinctions of reference only and not for restricting the social horizon of its members” (1968:159). Like wise both Qutb and Mawdudi focused on Egypt and Pakistan respectively while remaining committed to the eventual restoration of a world-wide community of believers.

9 According to Islamic law, Dhimmis are completely free to practice their forms of worship in their churches and synagogues. In fact Churches and synagogues must be preserved for the use of their communities without undue interference from the political authority (Kasim, 1992)

10 Discussions have ranged from whether Muslims are or are not allowed to reside in a country ruled by non-Muslims, to the issue of ‘assimilation to the infidels’, to if it is acceptable to adopt ‘Western’ dressing habits (see Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1996)

11 During the pre-colonial era these circumstances were first, individual Muslims or a small number of Muslims, who were living temporarily or for an indefinite period of time in a country ruled by a non-Muslim government, e.g. captives of war, merchants, local inhabitants converted to Islam; second was with the conquest of sections of Muslim territories by non-Muslim rulers
where, as a consequence, the original Muslim population came under non-Muslim rule, e.g., Muslim communities of Christian Sicily and Spain from the 11th through the beginning of the 17th centuries, and Bosnia at the end of the 19th century, when it was brought under Austro-Hungarian rule; third (in the main in the colonial era) was when Muslim governments were totally replaced (by force) by a non-Muslim government or subjected to it; and fourth is related to the post-colonial era and the era of Islamism (Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1996:89-95).

Those like the orthodox Maliki schooler of Al-Azhar, Muhammad Ilhayash (1802-1882) in the Middle East the modernist movement produced the likes of Jamal al-din al-Afghani (d. 1897) and his disciples, Muhammad Abduh (d.1905) and Rashid Rida (d. 1935).

The term *Jahiliyyah* was originally used in the Qur'an to refer to the period of ignorance in which the Meccans lived prior to the revelation.

The *jamaah* based on the method employed by the Prophet Muhammad in organizing the first Islamic state. The *jamaah* form a separate entity from the one they live in, translating the ideology into life itself. ‘They become the nucleus, the agents, the life, the organisation, the action as well as the evidence of Islam itself’ (Haddad, 1983:88).

Indeed it is following this logic that Mawdudi based his own party, the Jamaat-i-Islami.

For instance the Malaysian scholar Doi applies the principle ijtihad in order to develop a set of rules for the duties and responsibilities of Muslims in non-Muslim states (see Shadid and Koningsveld, 1996:95).

This view argues that Western countries which have made pacts and treaties with Muslim states are no longer *Dar al-kufr*.

This view introduces the concept of the Ummah to refer to the ideal of the transnational and universal unity of all Muslims in the world.

These scholars explicitly reject the validity of the dichotomy of *Dar al-Islam, Dar al-Harb* or *Dar al-kufr*, arguing that this dichotomy is problematic in the present day. They argue, in the present day, it is difficult to know which countries belong to *Dar al-Islam* especially when considering most countries where there is a Muslim majority Islam is not comprehensively applied. Also these are countries where Muslims live safely and practice their faith, sometimes with greater freedom than Muslim majority countries – (Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1996:97-99).

Some scholars, because they regard Muslims to be free in this respect, have even gone as far to say that Europe (including Britain) and America, can now be considered to be ‘Islamic countries’.

This is the view of the Moroccan scholar ‘Abd al-Aziz ibn al-Siddiq and the Committee for the Reflexion about Islam in France (CORIF) - see Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1996:97-8.

This concept is the view of Shaykh Faysal Mawlawi, advisor to the Sunnite High Court in Bayrout and implies that that the principle which should regulate the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims should be preaching (da‘wah) – see Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1996:97.

For the importance placed on *da‘wah* by Islamic scholars see Shadid and van Koningsveld, 1996: 100-101.

And through it the establishment of the Halal Food Authority, an Islamic Welfare System, e.g., student loan scheme, Muslim medical helpline, counselling service and a Muslim Directory – see report of the leader of the Muslim Parliament, Dr Ghayasuddin Siddiqui, to the 12th session held on 20th October 1996.

50.5% of Pakistanis and 36.7% of Bangladeshis are estimated to be British born (OPCS, 1993 cited in Anwar, 1998:24)

It has to be recognised that the concept of freedom/liberty is contested within liberal thought, as there are liberals who recognise that negative liberty is not always enough to guarantee individual freedom (see Rawls, 1971).

Nick Griffin got 6,552 votes (16.4%). Mick Treacy was the BNP candidate for Oldham East and got 5,091 votes (11.2%).

See also *The Guardian* ‘Councillor’s home suffer petrol bomb attack’ June 1, 2001.

A view supported by the fact that almost a quarter of all the white people (both young and old) in the PSI sample admitted they were prejudiced against Asians and Muslims (compared with 20% who said they were prejudiced against Caribbeans) (1997:277).

The BCS asks people about the levels of crime they have experienced over the last year and hence includes those crimes that are not reported to the police. In this way it gives a more accurate picture of the scale of the problem.
31 Even the result produced by the BCS are regarded as massive under-estimates as the PSI survey demonstrates. From it’s finding it suggests that a quarter of a million people were subjected to some form of racial harassment in a 12-month period between 1993 and 1994, compared to 10,000 incidents reported to the police and the 130,000 identified by the BCS (1997:267).

32 Weller also found that the vast majority of Muslim organisations recognised that ethnicity and race formed part of the reason for unfair treatment on the basis of religion. See also the Runnymede report on Islamophobia ‘there is frequently amongst racist offenders a seamless convergence of anti-Muslim, anti-foreigner, anti-Asian, anti-immigrant and anti-black hostilities’ (1997:41).

33 This was a case brought by an electrical engineer who felt she had been sacked from IBC vehicles in Luton because she had started to wear the hijab.

34 Discrimination on the grounds of religious belief or political opinion is prohibited by the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and the Fair Employment and Treatment (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 (FETO) – see Hepple and Choudhury (2001:1-3).

35 as they do not have a long, shared history; do not have a geographic centre; do not share a common language or a common literature – some of the characteristics used to define an ethnic/racial’ group by the RRA.

36 It is possible to use the concept of indirect discrimination to bring Muslims within the remit of the RRA. ‘Actions taken by an employer causing detriment to Muslims as a class, such as refusal to allow time off work for religious holidays, might be held to constitute indirect racial discrimination against those from an ethnic or national origin that is predominantly Muslim’ however problems arise when Muslims come from a country where Muslims are in a minority, and even if a finding of indirect discrimination is made, presently no award for compensation can be made – see Hepple and Chaudhury (2001:4-5).

37 In 1998 John Austin MP introduced a Private Member’s Bill in the House of Commons to prohibit religious discrimination in employment and in the provision of goods, services and facilities. More recently, in June 2000, a Race Relations (Religious Discrimination) Bill was introduced by Lord Ahmed and given a second reading in the House of Lords – see Hepple and Chaudhury (2001:5).

38 Indeed, attempts have been made to use the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 to provide protection against some aspect of religious discrimination, e.g. Sardar v McDonalds (1998) where a Muslim female complainant was successful in a claim of indirect sex discrimination after she was dismissed for wearing a scarf to cover her hair.

39 In it there is detailed discussion of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the extent to which this offers protection against religious discrimination as well as an exploration of other avenues/options Britain could follow/adopt in protecting religious groups from discrimination based on their faith.

40 Making ‘reasonable adjustments’ under the DDA means ‘in the case of a person with a disability – he or she can be made capable, competent or available by means of a reasonable adjustment’ (paragraph 4.2). This may mean the changing of hours of work, or meeting in an accessible office (paragraph 14.7, DTI, 2001:18).

41 Although it is recognised that in a way liberalism is also putting forward it’s own notion of the good, that of life, liberty and property – and in this way could be subject to the same criticisms that Republican notions of citizenship are – as Charles Taylor argues, the supposedly neutral set of difference-blind principles of liberalism, are in fact a reflection of one hegemonic culture and as such the notion of universalism is in fact ‘a particularism masquerading as the universal’ (1992).

42 In Western society liberalism has evolved, over time, to include democratic values, although it must be noted that liberalism per se does not necessarily equate with democracy. For instance Locke, who is considered to be the founding father of liberalism was hardly a democrat.

43 These figures have been put together by Operation Black Vote – see http://www.obv.org.uk/ - and it is acknowledged that there is some variation when compared to figures from other sources, e.g. Muhammad Anwar in The Times on Wednesday 2nd May 2001 and Waugh (2001).

44 A point which rings true with the recent election of Khalid Mahmood in Birmingham Perry Barr, which has a non-white population of 38 %.

45 See also Anwar 1998: 166/9 and 176.

46 It is this line of thinking that has influenced the development of a website, in the run up to the 2001 general election, informing Muslims in which marginal constituencies their vote could tip the
balance of power and which MPs have shown concern and stood up for issues such as Palestine, Kashmir, Iraq, section 28, etc. The website is [www.votesmart.org.uk](http://www.votesmart.org.uk) – (informally linked to the Muslim Council of Britain).

47 See abridged version of the debate entitled *Home Office Strategy for Muslims in Britain* that was debated at the Eleventh Session of the Muslim Parliament on March 31st 1996.

48 It must be noted the UKACIA was the forerunner of the MCB – see Khan, 2000:39.

49 Or as Vertovec advocates, the emergence of an organisation like Leicester’s Federation of Muslim Organisations – which is made up to more then 50 local ‘grassroots’ groups – and has managed to ‘function effectively as a single Muslim voice engaged with City and County authorities’ (1996:182-3).

50 This is known as the ‘difference principle’ and taken with the principle that offices and positions are open to all under fair equality of opportunity, defines Rawls’ conception of democratic equality (see Rawls, 1993:282).

51 For the PSI report, although respondents were asked about their religious affiliations, researchers mainly used the categories of the 1991 census in their reporting. So in reporting on their findings I have followed the Runnymede (1997) example of using Pakistani and Bangladeshi as proxies for Muslims, with recognition that this is far from ideal.

52 The term ‘ethnic penalties’ was defined as ‘all the sources of disadvantage that might lead an ethnic group to fare less well in the labour market than do similarly qualified whites...although discrimination is likely to be a major component’ (Heath and McMahom, 1995:1 cited in Modood, 1997b:145).

53 Poor housing is defined as housing that is either unfit, in substantial disrepair or requires essential modernisation.

54 However it must not be ignored that many women may be working in the informal economy and thus not formally recognised. See Ballard who explains how many Muslim women do ‘out-work at home’ receiving ‘minimal wages for long hours of work in atrocious conditions’ (1990:243).

55 As opposed to separate organisations that specialise in catering for supplementary needs as identified by Muslims, e.g. Quranic classes.
CHAPTER THREE

MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT OF MUSLIMS TO BRITAIN

In this chapter I will look at traditional theories of migration which explain the movement and consequent settlement of Muslim migrants of South Asian origin to Britain. Specifically this chapter will look at the relationship between the migratory process and the impact that this has had on notions of citizenship. However before this can be done it is necessary to make clear who are the Muslims of Britain today.

WHO ARE THE MUSLIMS?

It is said that one-fifth of the world’s population is classified as Muslim, and although the majority are concentrated in the developing countries of Africa and Asia, there are significant numbers who reside as minorities in non-Muslim societies (Abedin, 1989). In fact, there are in total about 23 Million Muslims in Europe (Peach and Glebe, 1995:27) of which anything up to 10 million live in the Western half of Europe (Nielson, 1994:2). However, it is widely accepted that estimating the number of Muslims is rendered difficult by the fact that most countries do not include questions of religious affiliation in their national statistics. This fact has to be taken into account when discussing population size.

At the time of writing, it is difficult to estimate the number of Muslims in Britain because, religious classifications were not, until 2001, included in the decennial Census of Population - data which is not yet available to access. As Rex points
out, estimates have therefore varied from three quarters of a million to two million reflecting, in some instances, "the fears and aspirations of interested parties" (1996:218) and in others, the data set that are used to estimate numbers. Hewer basing his figures on the 1991 Census, estimates that there are about 1.5 million Muslims, making up around 3 per cent of the total population of Britain (1994:6). Rex however looks to the 1991 Labour Force Survey and estimates that the number of Muslims in Britain to be about one million, 800,000 being of South Asian Origin (1996:218). However estimates are arrived at, the problem remains that, until very recently, Muslims of Britain have been ascribed identities and classified either by place of birth or ethnic origin. The assumption is that the majority of those who identify themselves as Pakistani or Bangladeshi (and a percentage of Indians) are probably Muslim¹. Although it is widely acknowledged that the vast majority of those who identify themselves as belonging to the Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups are Muslim, this approach is problematic as ethnicity is not always a reliable indicator of religious affiliation (and this is particularly true when estimating the number of Muslims at a local level – see Brown, 2000:98). Just because 87 per cent of Bangladeshis are considered to be Muslim according to the Philips Geographical Digest (or 95 per cent if looking at the PSI, 1997 figures), it does not necessarily follow that 87 per cent of those who identify themselves as Bangladeshi residents in the UK are also Muslim. As Brown explains,

The religious profile of migrants entering Europe may differ from that of their country of origin, either because of geographical selectivity (with
flows from states, districts or even particular villages that may be more or less Muslim than the mean) or individual selectivity (Muslims may be more or less likely than non-Muslims to migrate) (2000:97).

This approach also leaves, unidentified, those Muslims who are not of South Asian origin i.e. those that may have identified themselves as ‘Black’, ‘White’ or ‘Other’ on the census² (for discussion about using census information to determine the number of Muslims in Britain see Nielson, 1999:11-13, Brown, 2000).

Despite the variation in numbers and the problems associated with determining the number of Muslims, what statistics do tell us is that the majority of Muslims in Britain are of South Asian origin, as Vertovec states,

Although the Muslim population of Britain comprises large numbers of Arabs, Malaysians, Iranians, Turks and Turkish Cypriots, Nigerians and others, some 80 per cent of Muslims in Britain trace their origins to Pakistan, Bangladesh and India (albeit, for many of the latter, by way of East Africa). Not surprisingly, it is among this group that developments affecting the public sphere have had their greatest impact (1996:170).

It is because South Asians form the largest group of Muslims in Britain that the focus of research will be on this group. When referring to Muslims therefore, unless otherwise stated, the author is referring to Muslim British citizens of South
Asian origin. Of this group Pakistanis are the largest. Based on the 1991 Census the Pakistanis are the third largest ethnic minority group in the United Kingdom, with a population estimated to comprise of 476,000 people. The Bangladeshi population, according to this census data is estimated to be at least 162,000, with the Indian Muslim population somewhere between 125,000 and 160,000 people. Approximately half of these are born in the United Kingdom. (It must be noted that somewhere in the region of two-thirds of those who are categorised as 'Pakistani' are in actual fact from Azad Kashmir, Ballard, 1991:513-17).

Another important aspect of the Muslim population globally as well as in Britain is the fact that it is a growing population. Abedin in his study of 57 countries, which have a Muslim majority or significant minority population, projected that the total population of these countries would increase by 23.3 per cent, while the Muslim population would increase by 33.3 per cent (1989:376). The age profile of Muslims in the 1991 census indicates that the Muslim population is much younger than the white. As Hewer points out ‘60 per cent of Muslims are under 25, compared to 32 per cent of the white population’ predicting that both the Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic groups are set to at least double in the foreseeable future before they achieve demographic stability (1994:6). Indeed the Runnymede Trust estimate that because of birth rate exceeding death rate (and the under-enumeration of Pakistanis in the 1991 census), the number of Pakistanis in Britain in 2001 will have grown to just over 700,000 (1997:65). However, not only is the Muslim population growing but Islam is already generally recognised as the second religion of Britain. Indeed it can be argued that Muslims and Islam
are becoming an increasingly visible force within Britain and a group whose impact on British society is likely to increase.

With the addition of the religious question in the 2001 census some of the problems with estimating the number of Muslims in Britain will be eased. However there will still exist the problem of homogeneously labelling various groups as ‘Muslim’ without really understanding what this might mean. As Brown argues,

Does Muslim identity presume the profession and practice of the faith of Islam or a much looser attachment to a ‘cultural’ or geographical place of origin? (2000:89)

Before it is possible to look at what it means to be a Muslim in Britain however (see Chapter Four), it is necessary to look at migratory process and why South Asian Muslims came to Britain. This is important because migration and identity are interconnected. Changes in context will inevitably lead to the transfer, construction, consolidation and redefinition of identity through time.

**SOUTH ASIAN MUSLIM EXPERIENCES OF MIGRATION**

Migration to Britain is not a new phenomenon. For a long time Britain has received a large number of peoples from other countries. The Muslim presence in Britain goes as far back as three hundred years ago to the activities of the East India company, when men from the South Asian sub-continent, known as
'lascars', were first recruited into the merchant navy (Lewis, 1994:11). Lewis documents that the lascars formed shifting and impermanent settlements well into the twentieth century. The earliest permanent settlement of Muslims dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century, particularly, in the form of foreign sailors who settled in port cities such as Cardiff, Liverpool, and London (1981:81). However it is only since the Second World War that significant Muslim communities have immigrated, settled and impacted in a variety of ways upon Britain.

There have been four different phases of Muslim migration to Britain after the Second World War. The first has been the labour migration of Muslims from the South Asian Sub-Continent from the late 1940s onwards; the second phase was during the late 1960s and 1970s as about 200,000 East African migrants arrived in Britain – a quarter of whom are estimated to be Muslim; the third phase is that of refugee migration from the Middle East; and the fourth phase is that of Yemeni, Kurdish, Iraqi, Bosnian and Somalian refugees (Peach and Glebe, 1995:27). Therefore Muslim migration to Britain has occurred over time and has developed in different historical contexts. This chapter can not capture the diversity of this experience, nor is this the aim. Instead focus will be on the first two phases, a reflecting the fact that the majority of settled South Asian Muslims in Britain today migrated at this time either as pioneer migrants or as their descendants or dependants (see Peach and Glebe, 1995 to see the migration history of Muslims to other Western European countries).
Migration of South Asian Muslims from the Sub-Continent has been explained in term of colonial links, economic ‘push’ and ‘pull’, and chain migration. Each of these will be discussed in turn.

**Colonial links**

The majority of South Asian Muslims settled in Britain today arrived in Britain during the post war boom, as part of the wider migration of immigrants from the former colonial territories. Expansion of industry during the early 1950s resulted in the need for cheap labour. The ex-colonies, particularly the South Asian subcontinent, provided a ready source of such labour (see Nielsen, 1997:136). Moreover, the 1948 Nationality Act confirmed, for most members of the Commonwealth, the right to enter and live in Britain. In fact the majority of Muslims who were encouraged to come to Britain as immigrants from the commonwealth countries in the post-war boom, held identical citizenship with persons born in Britain. It was in this favourable climate therefore, that migration, in considerable numbers, first occurred.

**Push-Pull Theories**

One of the largest group of Muslims from the South Asian Sub-Continent are the Pakistanis (The third PSI survey estimates that 96 per cent of Muslims in Britain are Pakistani.). Pakistani migration has been explained in terms of economic ‘push’ and ‘pull’.
Push and Pull theories of migration, according to Ravenstein, can be attributed to socio-economic imbalances between regions. He suggests there are certain factors ‘pushing’ people away from the area of origin and others ‘pulling’ them to the area of destination. ‘Push factors’ include demographic growth, low living standards, lack of economic opportunities and political repression, while ‘pull factors’ are demand for labour, availability of land, good economic opportunities and political freedom. The push-pull thesis provides some explanation as to why Pakistanis migrated to Britain.

Much of the literature on Pakistani migration highlights the ‘push’ factors as being the need to look for work, and the ‘pull’ factors being active recruitment due to post war labour shortages. The majority of migration from Pakistan has in actual fact been from Azad Kashmir, notably from the rural districts of Mirpur and Kotli. In these areas, and Mirpur in particular, poor quality of land and high unemployment due to the largely agrarian nature of the economy were the major ‘push’ factors (see Glavanis et al., 1999 and Ballard, 1990). According to Singh another key ‘push’ factor was that, the colonial system had left many of the nations under-developed, ‘devoid of any capital with which to make labour productive. ...throwing up a vast reserve of labour which British industries could draw upon’ (Gurch 1999:169). Set against this context, Britain, as Shaw highlights, was offering wages for labouring jobs over 30 times those offered for similar jobs in Pakistan (1988:9). While the push-pull thesis does explain to some extent the reasons for migration, it is argued it does not explain the whole story.
There are three main problems with this explanation. One is that these accounts are often too individualistic in their approach. Second, they are ahistorical and third, they underplay the importance of non-economic factors. As Ali points out, rarely is a decision to move based on an individual decision, instead, she argues, it is families that are the key unit of decision making. Ballard supports this view, highlighting how 'few left without the active support of their extended families, who often provided the migrant with his ticket, passport and visa' (1994:11).

Second, this model ignores the role of the state in influencing patterns of migration through government restrictions on immigration or emigration. As will be discussed in more detail below, there was a shift in Muslim migration to Britain after the introduction of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act. Immigrants not only felt that they had to bring their dependants to Britain because of the fear of losing their right to entry, but the voucher system introduced by the Act shifted the balance from workers to dependants entering Britain (the latter being allowed to come without vouchers). Therefore whilst those who entered Britain before the 1962 Act were predominantly economically active men, after this time the majority of those who came to Britain were dependants, namely wives and children (See Anwar, 1998, Peach and Glebe, 1995: 38-9).

Finally, by emphasising the economic reasons for migration, the push-pull thesis implies that the poorest people from the least-developed countries would move to the richest countries, and the disparities between the different areas would be sufficient to generate migration flows. However the reality indicates that
migrants did not come from the poorest areas. As Lewis points out in relation to migrants from Pakistan, ‘they did not come from Baluchistan, but from Azad Kashmir, the Northwest Frontier and parts of the Punjab: the latter prosperous farming areas, irrigated by a network of canals.’ (1994:16). Of importance was not only economic status but also whether there existed a tradition of emigration. As Lewis explains, these areas had long provided recruits for the merchant navy and the British army. Ali states that original pioneer migrants from Pakistan and Azad Kashmir had joined allied armies and navies during the first and second world wars. Ali goes on to suggest that ‘The movement of people from one region to another has been a [long] tradition in these areas’. Economic migration, she argues, became established long before British intervention in the area due to largely subsistence agrarian economies and the resultant surplus male labour. This tradition of emigration has continued over time, not least because of political considerations such as the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, and of particular importance in Azad Kashmir, the construction of the Mangla Dam and the constant threat of war between India and Pakistan. (see Ali, 1999). This is important especially when one considers that ‘a person who once migrated and who has broken the bonds which tie him to the place where he has spent his childhood is more likely to migrate than a person who has never previously migrated’ (Lee, 1969). This existence of a migratory culture goes some way in explaining why Muslim migration to Britain has occurred only from selected regions of Pakistan. A more comprehensive picture of why migration has occurred only from certain localities can only be gained if we look at theories of chain migration.
Chain Migration

As Shaw has pointed out in her work on Pakistanis in Oxford ‘in some villages almost every family has sent someone abroad, while in an adjacent village it may be that hardly anyone has emigrated’ (1994:39). This pattern of migration can be attributed to ‘chain migration’. Chain migration is the process by which friends and relatives learned of work opportunities from previous immigrants, and with the encouragement and help of these pioneer migrants, through the provision of initial transport, accommodation and employment, followed them to Britain. This process of chain migration has two main stages. As Ali explains,

The process of chain migration may begin with the arrival of a single immigrant [pioneer migrants] who subsequently becomes successful. News of this reaches home and encourages friends and relatives to join him. This is the first stage of chain migration. The second stage starts when early migrants became well established, sufficiently so that they are able to call their wives, children and in many cases brides-to-be to join them. This process leads to the reuniting and establishment of families, which eventually leads to the recreation of home culture. Traditional ceremonies and social occasions become more numerous and the customs and values of their place of origin become more strongly rooted with greater emphasis being placed on education and religion. Community life becomes well established and once news of this reaches the area of origin it has the effect of enticing the older, younger and
the less enterprising. This completes the chain and the results are a full community life (1999: 188-9)

The importance of pioneer migrants cannot be underestimated in this process (see Arshad, 1988 for stories of migration to High Wycombe). As Ballard points out, 'only the very earliest pioneers lacked prior contact overseas' (1990:234).

The feedback of information and other help given by pioneer migrants was an important factor in stimulating others to join the movement. As stated earlier, original pioneer migrants from Pakistan and Azad Kashmir had joined allied armies and navies during the first and second world wars. After the second world war these men began to settle in Britain and because of the industrial labour shortages during the Second World War, many were recruited to fill the gaps (see Ali, 1999). Also, after 1941 former seamen began to leave ports and settle inland. These 'pioneer migrants' became a source of voluntary chain migration (see Anwar, 1979). Ballard suggests that it is these wartime pioneers that formed the bridgehead to further settlement of kinsmen and fellow villagers, over time unleashing the process of chain migration (1994:11). This process, along with the subsequent influx of South Asian refugees from East Africa in the early 1970s, has added considerably to the number of Muslims living in Britain today (For information about why African Asians came to Britain see Alibhai-Brown, 2000:74-75).
Immigrants, although they held British citizenship, had no intention of settling in Britain. They considered themselves as transients, and came to Britain with the intention of saving as much money as possible before returning to the sub-continent. The ultimate aim was to use this money to benefit their immediate kin at home. However, as Ballard points out,

Although their principal aim was to improve the material welfare of their families, fulfilling that goal simultaneously cut them off from their nearest and dearest; ... despite all the pain of separation, the temptation continually to postpone their return in order to earn and save still more was yet more powerful still. ... their emotional commitment to their families stood in stark contradiction to their growing economic dependence on the British labour market (1990: 222)

Ultimately what this has meant is that over time these sojourners, as Ballard (1994) describes them, have settled, chain migration has brought kinsmen and fellow villagers to Britain, family reunification and the development of community infrastructure have ensued and with this the expectation that they will return home has subsided. Instead of being Muslims in Britain they are now Muslims of Britain.

SETTLEMENT OF MUSLIMS IN BRITAIN

In the main Muslim settlement in Britain reflects the economically driven aspects of migration and consequently the largest settlements are found in the old
industrial centres of Britain, the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, Lancashire, Central Clydeside, and selected areas of Scotland. The old industrial cities such as Bolton, Manchester, Bradford (based on the textile industries) Birmingham (coal industries), Coventry (vehicle manufacture) Luton and London (light manufacturing) and Glasgow (ship building) have been some of the main recipients of Muslim labour migrants.

Settlement of Muslims in Luton and High Wycombe.

Luton has a population of approximately 171,000 people and South Asian Muslims comprise approximately 10 per cent of this total. South Asian Muslims make up approximately 50 per cent of the total ethnic minority population of Luton which stands at approx. 34,000 (20 per cent of the total population of Luton). This places Luton in the top ten boroughs/districts in England and Wales, in terms of the size of its ethnic minority population (Gwillaim, 1994:4).

The majority of the Muslims have settled in the three adjacent wards of Dallow, Biscot and Saints. This area, (and in particular Dallow and Biscot) is commonly referred to as ‘Bury Park’. There is an abundance of Muslim households across these three wards. Unlike many of the larger industrial cities such as Bradford and Birmingham, there is no clear segregation of different ethnic groups in Luton. Kashmiris, Punjabis, Pathans, Bengalis, Sikhs, Hindus and members of the African Caribbean community are all represented within this area. Having said this, out of the three main South Asian groups it is possible to say that Bengalis are the most localised with over half of Luton’s Enumeration Districts (EDs)
having no recorded Bangladeshi population. The next most localised is the Pakistani population while in contrast the Indian population is quite dispersed over Luton. On a town wide level ‘Bury Park’ is well known for being the ethnically segregated area.

The wards of Dallow and Biscot which make up the main area of Bury Park are, according to the Jarman Index, amongst the 5 per cent most disadvantaged wards in the country, with Biscot being the poorest ward in Luton and both Biscot and Dallow suffering from one of the highest rates of overcrowding (population density in Bury Park is 66.3 per ha - Gwillaim, 1994:7). Housing in this area consists of pre-First World War terraced houses, and in general is of low grade. The area in general has experienced industrial decline following the closure of a large number of the major industries over the last twenty years, most recently with the closure of the General Motors Vauxhall plant. The fact that this area has been identified as a priority area by various government initiatives is evidence that it is in need of regeneration.

Wycombe District has a population of approximately 158,000 people and South Asian Muslims comprise approximately 4 per cent of this total. South Asian Muslims make up approximately 48 per cent of the total ethnic minority population of Wycombe District which stands at approx. 13,000 (8 per cent of the total population of Wycombe district). Like Luton however the Muslim population is localised within certain areas of the district, namely in the eight wards which go to make up High Wycombe. In fact 1991 census data shows that
sixty per cent of the Buckinghamshire’s Pakistani residents live in High Wycombe.

High Wycombe is 18 per cent non-white, with almost half of this number being of Pakistani/Muslim origin. However Muslim residents are not only concentrated in High Wycombe but further still, census data show that over a third of the Pakistani residents of High Wycombe live in the ward of Oakridge and Tinkers Wood an area known locally as the Green Street area — a visibly Asian/Muslim area. It is here that the purpose built mosque is situated as well as halal food shops and Asian clothing stores. Apart from being a much smaller area than Bury Park with fewer facilities (a reflection of the smaller population), the other key difference is that this area is not particularly ethnically diverse. Unlike Luton, where there is no clear segregation of different ethnic groups, in the Green Street area by far the largest ethnic minority group are the Pakistanis (making up 61 per cent of the non-white population), of which, it is estimated by the local Race Equality Council, 85 per cent are Kashmiri. Bangladeshi residents, the other main Muslim group, are largely absent altogether with 1991 census data showing only two residents in Oakridge and Tinkers Wood — figures which are typical when extrapolated to other wards making up High Wycombe.

Wycombe District is on the whole a very affluent area, in fact, in 1998 it was the 16th wealthiest district in England and Wales (Henley Centre for Economic Forecasting). However as the local council’s Community Safety Strategy 1999-2002 acknowledges, there are ‘population pockets of where socio/economic
indicators show that the residents are deprived according to DETR Index of Local Conditions’. A deprivation audit carried out in 1996, highlights how three out of the eight wards which constitute High Wycombe, Booker and Castlefield, Marsh and Micklefield, Keep Hill and Hicks Farm, are in fact the most deprived wards in Wycombe District\(^4\) (Stenson et al, 1996:1). Over 20 per cent of the Asian population and over 40 per cent of the Black population of High Wycombe live in these three wards. A conference on equal opportunities in Wycombe also noted that there were 40 per cent unemployment of young black/Asians in some areas (compared with a 3 per cent average\(^5\))\(^6\), and the 1991 census data confirms that Bangladeshi and Pakistani men have the highest unemployment rates in the county (22.1 per cent and 31.1 per cent).

**Patterns of settlement – a reflection of ‘choice’ and ‘constraint’**

As stated above, Luton and High Wycombe’s Muslim population is concentrated within certain locales. This is often seen as evidence that Muslims, despite being British citizens, want to keep their participation in wider society to a minimum, choosing rather to surround themselves with what is familiar and comfortable. However, it is argued that, concentrations of populations needs to be explained in terms of both ‘choice’ and ‘constraint’. As Lakey explains,

Proponents of the choice theory argue that ethnic minorities may prefer to reside within concentrations of their own group, for reasons of social support, and shared linguistic, cultural and religious traditions. Constraint theorists argue that they have been prevented from moving outside these
area by their economic position, by lack of information about housing opportunities elsewhere, and by discriminatory and exclusionary practices on the part of the white community (1997:185)

It is recognised that both the ethnic majority and minority experience the interplay of choices and constraints in their decision of where to live. However it is choices and constraints that affected/affect the settlement of South Asian Muslim groups in particular that will be discussed here.

In the early years, the process of chain migration played a significant role in the segregation of households. It had the effect of clustering migrants together. This is the main reason why Mr Chaudry settled in High Wycombe.

Because I had relatives here, and so I came to them because when I came I needed somewhere to stay, and you could not get that other than staying with a relative. This is why I came straight here.

As these migrant communities grew in size they began to establish their own facilities. This has lead to the eventual establishment of a community infrastructure, which in its place has acted as a magnet to new immigrants. However, this process was not one of complete freedom of choice, but was influenced heavily by economic concerns.

Travel cost and debts, the desire to save money and fulfil obligations by sending remittances to kin ‘back home’ have ultimately meant that migrants have had to opt for cheap housing located near to places of work, i.e. to inner city areas of
toms and cities reflecting the services that Muslims came to provide. In Luton this meant that, early employment taken up by Muslim migrants was unskilled labour in the factories in the inner wards of Luton. Principal manufacturing industries at this time were motor cars. The largest employers in car manufacture were Vauxhall Motors followed by IBC Motors. Other manufacturing industry centred on the manufacture of domestic and bulk meters (Asea Brown Boveri), ball and spherical roller bearings (SKF), domestic electrical appliances (Electrolux), industrial pumps (Hayward Tyler), chemicals (Laporte Industries) and clothing. In the post war period there were considerable numbers of vacancies in these industries. For this reason Luton was also attractive for those migrants that had gone to other industrial towns of Britain.

Inter-urban migration was particularly attractive during the 1970s as industries in the North began to decline. As Mr Sarwar explained when he was asked why he had chosen to settle in High Wycombe,

in 1976, one the work was okay, you could get work compared to up North. In 1976 there wasn't much work going up North, the mills had closed down. ...there was more of a chance of getting a job.

In High Wycombe although the principle industry had always been furniture, the end of the war saw what Mayes has described as the ‘greatest period of industrial development that Wycombe had ever known’ (1960:79). It is at this time that new light and heavy industries came to Wycombe from London. As Mayes highlights,
Chemical, optical glass, instruments of all kinds, rubber, military and civilian clothing, electrical and other light engineering works... added to the ever growing needs of the well established concerns such as heavy engineering represented by Broom and Wade’s, and stamp and other high quality printing represented by Harrison’s (1960:79)

It is to these industries that migrant workers came, as ‘whatever the town’s unemployment problems may have been before and during ...the war when men were still chasing jobs, undoubtedly the situation was rapidly reversed and jobs chased men’ (Mayes, 1960:79).

The fact that Muslim migrants on arrival entered into the lower echelons of this hierarchy due to lack of skills, education and wealth added further to their economic burden. This situation was exacerbated by the discrimination suffered by ethnic minority groups. Ali explains the process and consequences of discriminatory practices,

Discriminatory factors come into play where ethnic groups are perceived as undesirable by the host population. The “blocking” strategy is usually administered by the existing occupants of city neighbourhoods, in an attempt to resist the ‘invasion’ of ethnic groups. This occurs in a variety of ways ranging from social hostility to petty violence and deliberate vandalism, Where this strategy of ‘voicing’ opposition is unsuccessful or where the area in question is occupied by socially and geographically more
mobile households, the host population's strategy becomes that of 'exit' (Knox, 1972). This process eventually leaves the ethnic group spatially isolated (1999:219).

Such practices leading to the spatial concentration of minority populations were exacerbated by discrimination in the housing market, (i.e. the inability to obtain and maintain a mortgage). Continued discriminatory practices by estate agents and the public housing sector have helped in concentrating populations. This is evidenced in a recent report on the housing patterns of South Asians (Bowes et al, 1996). This report emphasises the decisive role played by racism in curtailing the accommodation options available to South Asian settlers.

The net result of the above experiences has been that Muslims have often ended up involuntarily settling in inner city areas which are synonymous with deprivation and cheap housing. Bury Park in Luton is such an area, as is Green Street in High Wycombe.

In time and as a result of improvements in their socio-economic situation, Muslim migrants, it has been argued, will move out of the segregated area. As Lakey states,

We would expect to see changes in housing and residential patterns, as migrants and their children (often born in Britain) learned more about institutions and opportunities within the host country, met residency
qualifications and accumulated educational and financial resources' (1997:185)

It is difficult to say whether this is happening or whether it is still too early in the settlement lifecycle of Muslims in Britain for this to have taken place (taking into consideration it is still a very young population). Ali however, in her research based in Luton, has argued that this change is not taking place yet.

South Asian Muslims are not only marked as religiously different but also ethnically and ‘racially’ different. Segregation it is argued is more likely to occur if the group in question is easily identifiable by colour. This segregation is likely to manifest itself in distinct spatial outcomes. This spatial segregation can be temporary if migrants mix with the indigenous population of wider society. However where internal cohesion is prominent, the decision to live in the area is in part based on choice and in particular preservation. Where external factors such as discriminatory action of the wider population exists, residential clusters are likely to persist over time. In the current climate it is to this latter group that the majority of South Asian Muslims in Luton and, although less so, High Wycombe belong. As Ali says ‘Kashmiris [in Luton] will remain segregated within “Bury Park”’ pointing to the fact that ‘Kashmiri residential segregation in Luton remains high despite the fact that migrants have been settled for nearly thirty years and have structurally assimilated.’ 19(Ali, 1999:228).
The PSI Fourth National Survey (Modood, et al. 1997) has also pointed out how ‘white and ethnic minority populations’ are still on the whole segregated. Some have argued this segregation is a result of choice in relation to Muslim citizens, what Ali has termed as ‘voluntary non-participation’, that is refusing to accept without distinction the cultural norms of wider society. This was evidenced in the comments made by some of the respondents interviewed for this research,

*Our prayers, our eating, drinking, it’s totally different because Indians can eat whatever they want to, they can mix up with the English, and it’s difficult for us [Muslims] to do that* (Shazia)

Family values in particular were seen as a mark of difference:

... when a child is born ... parents bring up that child ...with great effort but when the child grows up, becomes independent, gets married or goes away then he has not gone back to meet his parents, not even after 20 years. In our tradition if we do not see each other at least two or three times a week, our culture is that we can not get peace. And the child as well, so far, the children who have got older they are exactly like this, they will meet the way we do. The gora [white non Muslims] do that though ...and think, okay he has got married now, okay he is independent now, no, this is not what our culture says. (Mr Chaudry)

The implication of the ‘voluntary non-participation’ theory is that Muslims live in concentrated areas because they do not want to fully participate within wider society as this will lead to the deterioration of one’s culture, traditions and religion. Indeed there is now an established community infrastructure in both Luton and, albeit much smaller, in High Wycombe. Over the last thirty to forty years, there has been the development of a wide range of small-scale consumer retail businesses servicing the South Asian Muslim population. This has meant the
emergence of local halal food shops and restaurants, jewellers and clothes shops selling *shalwar kameez*, *duputa* and saris, as well as Islamic book shops and education centres. In Luton there has also been the development of ethnic businesses such as solicitors’ firms, accountants’ firms and international pay-phone exchanges, as well as welfare organisations. (In Luton, these businesses are particularly visible along Dunstable and Leagrave Road). This community environment is not only considered convenient but also conducive to maintaining one’s religion and culture. This is seen as particularly important function in relation to young British Muslims. As Mrs Ali pointed out,

> the thing about my community is that the children learn a lot from it, about their religion, about their culture, about what they should wear, everything. Like our community here, the Pakistanis that live in this area, the children know that if they go out then someone will talk, if we do not wear our duputa on our head then people will talk. So my community is important because it makes a big difference to the children.

This function of the ‘community’ is not only appreciated by parents. Young people interviewed also recognised how living in a certain environment helped in maintaining their ‘roots’. As Zafar said,

> I wouldn’t want to lose my roots. I do not do that, I want to maintain my identity at the core. umm, I mean it helps, the community helps to reinforce that.

Although there is some truth in the voluntary non-participation thesis caution has to be exercised in propounding this thesis, as it could lead to ‘blaming’ Muslims for their self-segregation and hence their physical, economic, political and social marginalisation. It is accepted that most Muslims recognise that, in many
respects, 'cultural norms' of British society are, in many ways, distinguishable from Muslim ways of life (the majority of those interviewed for this research, recognised that Muslims were different to non-Muslims). Also that, as Ballard has commented, there may be traditions amongst South Asian Muslims that mean Muslims are, even in the diaspora, more likely to sustain (and slower to makes changes to) 'tighter and more inward-looking social networks' (1990:228). However, this does not mean that one cannot simultaneously recognise that there are also similarities and indeed good aspects of non-Muslim/non-South Asian 'culture'.

Moreover, there is a tendency for this theory to imply that 'culture' and religion are static and unchanging and that traditions associated with 'culture' and religion are somehow immutable. This thesis will suggest, however, that what are considered to be 'traditional' beliefs and values have been adapted (as a result of both internal and external debate and negotiation, by both young and old) and are continually adapting and being influenced by the British environment (and other more global influences) in which Muslims live. Not only was there recognition of the changing nature of Islam itself but, for many, discussions about 'my culture' could not be limited to 'traditional' Asian or Muslim influences. Instead culture was described as a complex, fluid mixture made up of varied influences from many spheres of an individuals life. As Khalida states,

That's the problem with Asians in Europe or in England is that their culture isn't one thing. Like my culture is not just Urdu and Punjabi, my culture is English, my culture is jeans, my culture is, I don't know, Coca Cola and things like that. Its not just lado and pindi and stuff, it's all sorts of stuff. I
think it would be difficult to say exactly what my culture was. Yeah, but it's everything, everything about me.

Muslims, both young and old, may accept that certain differences exist between 'majority societal norms' and 'norms of a Muslim life' but the fact is these 'norms' do not exist in a vacuum. It is recognised that the individual is influenced (in a negative and positive way) by the wider society in which they are living. This makes sense when it is considered that we now live in a world that is characterised by a process described as 'glocalisation', where, as Dijkstra et al, state, through 'time-space compression, distant localities are linked in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa' ultimately creating such multiple identities as '...a London boy of Asian origin playing for a local Bengali cricket team and at the same time supporting Arsenal football club...' (2001, 58).

Even if the majority of Muslims at present are living in specific localities this does not exclude interaction with wider society. Muslims do participate in other ways within Britain engaging, in the main, in the same discourses as would be expected of other British citizens. Evidence also suggests that because Muslims are beginning to re-evaluate their position vis-à-vis Britain and their country of origin, they are increasingly fighting for a public space but on their own terms. Indeed, over the years, as Muslims have made Britain their home, they have been increasingly visible through their economic, social and political activity.
Finally, 'voluntary non participation' almost suggests that Muslims are culturally/religiously determined (see also Ballard, 1992 for a critique of cultural determinist approaches). As will be discussed in the next chapter, great diversity exists amongst Muslims and there is no reason to suggest that religion or culture is necessarily the primary source of Muslim identity. For some, the decision to continue to live in an area where there are other Muslim/Asian families (without underplaying the continued importance of economic constraints) is one based on personal security and comfort. As Ali has argued,

Even if the actual threat of discrimination disappears the psychological threat remains an important factor in segregation (1999:229).

As Zafar, who lives in the Bury Park area of Luton explains,

... I like the Asian community, ... because you just feel at home, you can buy your masala or whatever .... They just make you feel welcome.

For Amin living amongst other Bengalis means that he is not socially excluded and has, in times of need, people he can turn to,

it [the community in which he lives] sort of builds up your emotional capacity and sometimes helps you to overcome a lot of difficulties which you will not be able to overcome on your own. Because if you have very supportive and very active community living together you will see that the pressure on you as an individual is very, very minimum. Because there are the support network there, ... that people will support you when you are facing particular problems.
Finally as Helena, a hijaban, explains,

I have a brother who lives in ... a village [where] ... there are hardly any Asians ... and when I go there I don't feel I belong because whenever we go out shopping people just stare at you and it's not nice, I don't like it. I feel really relaxed here and I feel I belong, I feel like I can do what I want without people staring at me or giving me funny looks.

It is unsurprising that issues of security and comfort arise, even if the real threat of overt discrimination has been reduced considerably over the years. The context in which Muslims have migrated to Britain has been one where they have been treated (along with other South Asian and African Caribbean migrant workers), as a problem, where despite their status as British citizens, they have been excluded from the national identity of Britain. This becomes obvious when one considers the wider policy context into which post-war migration occurred.

**BRITISH POLICY RESPONSE TO THE MIGRATION AND SETTLEMENT OF MUSLIMS TO BRITAIN**

Over time, the acquisition of citizenship rights has become conditioned by specific rules; that is nationality laws which codify the 'formal requirements individuals must meet to be entitled to become citizens of concrete states' (Stolcke, 1997:61). In this way nationality and citizenship have been subsumed into one indistinct status. As McCrone and Kiely point out,

If someone asked what your nationality was, how would you answer? And your citizenship? Would you treat these questions as identical? Most people living in the United Kingdom today would say they were (2000:19)
This, as Stolcke (1997) points out, means that citizenship rights become the exclusive privilege of those who are recognised as nationals of a particular state. Therefore it is because the 1948 Nationality Act confirmed for most members of the Commonwealth the right to enter and live in Britain, that Muslims who migrated to post-war Britain, not only had legitimate rights of free access but also automatic British citizenship.

However nationality does not only refer to the legal requisites for acquiring state membership but implied is the notion of national identity as a subjective sense of belonging, 'a formula that defines its distinctiveness in a world of competing states, and which is to be internalised by members of the society' (Zolberg, 1997:141). Or as Stolke states,

Nationality and citizenship are taken interchangeably to signify nominal and substantive membership in a state, often thought to be, moreover, grounded in some shared subjective ‘national-ethnic’ feeling of identity' (1997:62)

There is a ‘naturalised association of culture with place’ (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992:7) or as Dijkstra et al state,

 Territory, culture and identity converge in the nation-state concept. The political community coincides with the cultural community. ...[that] each
person naturally belongs to a certain place and possesses a national identity. ...[that] territory, culture and people are connected through natural links ... to form “the country” (2001:59)

However migration has lead to multicultural, multi-faith societies, to a ‘deterritorialisation of identity’ or at least differently territorialised identity (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992:9). The ultimate consequence of this for citizenship, as Dijkstra et al points out, has been that,

Although refugees and migrants have been accepted voluntarily by the country where they have settled and live and work there, these “denizens” (Hammar, 1990) all too often do not have the same rights as “real” autochthonous residents because of their deviating cultural identities (2001:63)

That is, “Migrants may be here, but they do not come from here” (Dijkstra et al, 2001:59). In Britain this ‘distinctiveness’ has been defined in terms of ‘race’ and in the 1970s by the culture of those in power, hence as white and Christian.

Post-war Britain dictated the need for labour but Zolberg states that South Asian and African Caribbean migrants were ‘wanted but not welcome’ (1997). In public the state may have welcomed South Asian and African Caribbean migrants; in private there was considerable hostility towards them. This hostility arose, as Malik (1996) notes, from the supposed threat posed by South Asian and African...
Caribbean migrants to the 'racial' identity of Britain. As the minutes from a Cabinet meeting in 1955 show,

If immigration from the colonies and, for that matter, from India and Pakistan were allowed to continue unchecked, there is a real danger that over the years there would be a significant change in the racial character of the English people... a large coloured community as a noticeable feature of our social life would weaken... the concept of England or Britain to which people of British stock throughout the Commonwealth are attached (quoted in Malik, 1996:20)

There was an assumption that 'Blacks' were irredeemably different and, as such, their assimilation would be difficult if not impossible (it is, in part, for this reason that at this time there were schemes to actively recruit European worker and efforts to discourage 'coloured' immigration – see Layton-Henry, 1992).

These concerns, however, did not immediately lead to the introduction of immigration controls against South Asian and African-Caribbean migrants. Government was, in part, inhibited by the embarrassment of appearing to act in a racist manner, so instead efforts were made to restrict the influx of New Commonwealth immigrants by informal means (Cesarani, 1996:65)

It soon became clear, however, that informal measures were failing to prevent the entry of South Asian and African Caribbean migrants, who after all had the right
of entry. Meanwhile, the 1958 Notting Hill riots turned ‘race’ into a major public issue (for an account of the events leading up to the riots see Pilkington, 1988). As Cesarani points out ‘sections of the press and a phalanx of Conservative MPs demanded immigration controls even though they would compromise the status of British subjects in British colonies’ (1996:65).

South Asian and African-Caribbean migrants were identified by the state to be the cause of the 1958 riots. In fact they were presented to be the cause of many of the social problems being faced by the poor ‘white’ working class. As Paul Gordon points out,

Labour and Conservative governments alike have said since the early 1960s that black people are a problem whose entry must be controlled; only then can we establish and maintain good community relations (1989:2)

There was little acknowledgement of the fact that migration of workers meant that a considerable amount of expenditure was needed on housing, social services and industrial training, expenditure which, as Layton-Henry (1992) notes, was never provided by central government to local authorities. The resultant competition over resources was therefore not seen to be a consequence of state neglect but rather the result of the presence of South Asian and African-Caribbean migrants, a view propounded by the political elite. On this basis, South Asian and African-Caribbean migrants became the targets of hostility and attack. It was in this
climate that the government began openly to air the question of immigration controls as possible solutions to any further disruptions, eventually leading to the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act.

The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act withdrew the right of entry from Commonwealth citizens. British citizens living in Commonwealth countries could only enter Britain if they possessed a Ministry of Labour employment voucher, if they were a dependent of a person already resident in Britain, if they were a student, if they were born in Britain or if they already held a British passport. Although the Act applied to all Commonwealth citizens Miles and Phizacklea (1984) note how in reality it was directed at South Asian and African Caribbean migrants in particular, a point confirmed by William Deedes, a Cabinet Minister at the time of the 1962 Act,

> The Bill’s real purpose was to restrict the influx of coloured immigration. We were reluctant to say as much openly. So the restrictions were applied to coloured and white citizens in all Commonwealth countries – though everybody recognised that immigration from Canada, Australia and New Zealand formed no part of the problem (cited in Solomos, 1989:61)

History has shown that the introduction of the 1962 Act rather then curtailing immigration actually led to the increase of New Commonwealth and Pakistani migrants to Britain. From 1960 to 1961 New Commonwealth and Pakistani migration doubled in an attempt to ‘beat the ban’; after the ban came into force
migrants continued to enter under the voucher system but more importantly many, in the fear that they would lose their right of entry, were joined by their dependants. This continued flow of migrants however kept immigration alive as a political issue in which South Asians and African-Caribbean migrants were identified as the problem and therefore the focus for tighter controls.

'Race' politics reached its high point in 1967-8 when 'Africanization' measures in Kenya led to the economic persecution of Asians, prompting Asians with British passports to settle in the UK. The arrival of Kenyan Asians in Britain did not go uncontested. However, as Singh points out, the basis on which objections were made had slightly changed,

The language of 'race' is now largely missing from Cabinet discussion. Its place seems to have been taken by the public discourse of culture and nation that was being expressed by the Labour Party towards the end of the 1950s. It was a discourse that highlighted the idea of cultural difference, of 'Britishness, of whiteness, embodied in certain political and cultural traditions'. South Asian and African-Caribbean migrants were represented as a problem in the context of numbers and the supposed threat they posed to 'British culture' (1999:230)

This is reflected in the famous 'Rivers of Blood' speech that Enoch Powell made in 1968.
We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation, to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre ... As I look ahead I am filled with foreboding. Like the Roman, I seem to see ‘the River Timber foaming with much blood’! (cited in Alibhai-Brown, 1999:59)

For Powell, the growing presence of South Asian and African-Caribbean migrants and their descendants, with their different cultural and religious beliefs and values, threatened the social and cultural fabric of British society. For Powell, to be English was an ethnic and hereditary identity and in November 1968, he shared his view that a West Indian born in Britain could never become an Englishman.

This ‘New Racism’ based on culture, Cesarani believes, allowed mainstream politicians to ‘inject racism back into debates about nationality and citizenship’ in a climate where Nazism had stigmatised racial-biological thinking (1996:69). This is what Mrs Thatcher did in 1978 when she said,

People are really rather afraid that this country might be rather swamped by people with a different culture ... if there is any fear that it might be swamped people are going to react and be rather hostile to those coming. So, if you want good race relations, you have to allay people’s fears on numbers’ (30th January 1978)
Using the language of this 'New Racism' (Cesarani, 1996) Mrs Thatcher rendered immigrants unassimilable because of their ethnicity, religion, language and customs. She legitimised seeing South Asian and African-Carribbean migrants as the 'other' making it natural and acceptable for those who are thought to share a way of life, a culture to be antagonistic towards 'them'. This ‘New Racism’, or “sanitization of racist discourse” as Phoenix refers to it (1998:862), has had particular implications for Muslims (see Hussain, 2000 to explore the ‘autonomous role’ the media have played in normalising and legitimating a prejudiced discourse, against Muslims, in the public sphere). As Anthias points out,

anti-Muslim racism in Britain relies on notions of the ‘non-civilised’ and the supposedly inferior and undesirable, character of Islamic religion and way of life, rather than an explicit notion of biological inferiority (1992: 226).

It is in this context that notions of nationality became problematic for all those deemed to be ‘different’ (see also Dijkstra et al, 2001). As Stolcke puts it,

whilst it [nationality] does regulate membership, focus the loyalty of inhabitants, and provide the source of expanding civil rights and duties, it also leads to a disdain of all strangers and to excluding many from the
community of nationals, conditioning the acquisition of citizenship rights (Stolcke, 1997).

Further ‘conditioning of citizenship’ is evident in the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act. This Act was passed by the Labour Government by way of a solution to the ‘problem’ of immigration of Kenyan Asians, (who, as British passport holders had a right to enter Britain under the 1962 Act). The Act, which was rushed through its main stages in just three days, removed the automatic right of entry to people with British passports unless they, or at least one of their grandparents, were born, adopted, naturalised or registered as a citizen of Britain and its colonies. In effect what this Act did was to deny Kenyan Asians the right to settle unconditionally in the UK and, more generally, to restrict South Asian and African-Caribbean immigration, creating what Layton-Henry has called ‘two classes of citizens: one subject to immigration controls and the other not’ (1996:53). As Layton Henry goes on to point out,

The Act was a major erosion of the grand expansive ideal of British imperial citizenship subsumed in the phrase ‘Civis Britannicus Sum’, and was a step towards the narrower definition of British citizenship based on those people with a close connection with the territory of the United Kingdom, which was eventually to be embodied in the Nationality Act of 1981. (1992:53)
The 1968 Act not only saw the erosion of Commonwealth citizenship but also implicit was a more exclusive definition of what it meant to be British, as Cesarani states,

The Commonwealth was undergoing a process of bifurcation into white and non-white parts. British national identity, increasingly exclusive, related to the Old, or white, commonwealth only (1996: 66)

It has to be noted that not everyone supported the argument for immigration controls against the Kenyan Asians. In Parliament the Liberals led the opposition to the Bill, which was also opposed by some Conservative and Labour members. Outside Parliament The Times wrote,

The Labour Party has a new ideology. It does not any longer profess to believe in the equality of man. It does not even believe in the equality of British citizens. It believes in the equality of white British citizens (1st March 1968)

Labour was also condemned by the right wing Auberon Waugh who described the new measures as 'the most immoral pieces of legislation ever to have emerged from any British Parliament' (The Spectator, 1 March 1968).

It was partly to rescue its reputation from such accusations that a few months later, the government passed the 1968 Race Relations Act.
It is now recognised that the ‘Race Relations’ legislation of the 1960s was a ‘counter-balance or accompaniment to new legislation restricting immigration’ (an admission by Liberal MP Alan Beith in 1976, cited in Alibhai-Brown, 2000:69). On the one hand immigration legislation would control the entry of South Asian and African-Caribbean migrants, necessary in the context where they are seen to be the cause of social conflict (as opposed to the victims of racism). On the other hand, the ‘Race Relations’ legislation would have the dual role of integrating South Asian and African-Caribbean citizens already residing in Britain and tackling ‘racial’ discrimination. The coupling of ‘race relations’ and immigration policies has, over time, led to a ‘race relations’ justification for immigration control. This justification implies that it is ‘black’ people who are the problem and therefore if ‘black’ immigration is not controlled the result can only be social conflict. This approach, it has been argued, has encouraged rather than discouraged racism. As Colin Brown states,

By turning first to immigration rather than by tackling racialism itself, the government has nourished and given legitimacy to anti-immigrant sentiment; thus the outcome of the appeasement policy may have been only a deepening of the racist currents in British society. (1983: 48-9)

It has been argued by Alibhai-Brown that the 1965 Race Relations Act\textsuperscript{25}, was ‘conciliatory’ urging ‘people to do what was right rather than imposing punitive measures’ (1999:57). Indeed, Alibhai-Brown goes on to point out how a major
study by Political and Economic Planning revealed, how a year on, direct discrimination against South Asian and African Caribbean migrants was still commonplace.

The 1968 Race Relations Act, which sat alongside the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act, made it illegal to discriminate on grounds of colour, race, ethnic or national origins in housing, employment and the provision of services. It gave the Race Relations Board the power to investigate cases if there were grounds to suspect that discrimination had taken place even if no complaint had been received; and it set up the Community Relations Commision (CRC) to promote harmonious community relations, co-ordinate national action to this end and advise the Home Secretary. Like the 1965 Act, the 1968 Act proved to be weak and ineffectual. Emphasis was still on conciliation with legal redress as a last resort and indirect discrimination was not covered, and as the 1972 and 1975 Political and Economic Planning Surveys show, discrimination was still occurring on a large scale (see Layton-Hemy 1992: 53-7 for details of how the impact of 1968 Race Relations Act was minimal in reducing/tackling discrimination). Also as Alex Lyon pointed out to the House of Commons during the second reading of the Bill,

One cannot say to a man who is black 'we shall treat you as an equal member of this society, as a full citizen of this community', and say to him as the same time, 'we shall keep your wife and children waiting seven
years before they can come and live with you' (cited in Layton-Henry, 1992:56).

The 1971 Immigration Act terminated ‘primary’ immigration from the commonwealth, even though in reality the influx of single, job seeking immigrants had been virtually stopped by previous legislation. This Act established that UK citizenship would belong to ‘patrials’ – that is, anyone born in Britain or with a British-born or naturalised parent or grandparent. As Cesarani comments,

The non-white citizens of the Commonwealth lost the right to enter Britain while the white ‘kith and kin’ who populated the Old Commonwealth could still do so. (1996:66)

British national identity was once again being confirmed as white, Anglo-Saxon and Christian by legislation and attempts to define British national identity during the mid-1970s, in this context, not only impacted on aliens but immigrants who had already settled in Britain and were British citizens.

The 1981 Nationality Act exceeded all previous legislation in sweeping away the ancient structure of British nationality and the rights of the British subject by abrogating the principle of *jus soli*. Over time, two contrasting nationality doctrines have been drawn upon to bind the citizenry of particular states, the conservative, exclusive principle of *jus sanguinis* and the more inclusive *jus soli*. 
The former connects ideas of race with nation, making state membership dependent on a shared cultural heritage where nationality is acquired by descent or blood, while the latter makes nationality dependent on place of birth. In Britain the unconditional *jus soli* was maintained up until the 1981 British Nationality Act. This meant all persons born in any British territory, in any part of the world, could claim British citizenship whether or not their parents were British citizens or legally settled. This as Stolcke says ‘created a people open to new comers provided immigrants had children born on British soil.’ (1997:71). However the Conservatives’ with the 1981 Act severely curtailed this unconditional *jus soli* (see Rham, 1990:163) by stipulating that from 1986 only the British-born children of British born or naturalised British people would inherit British citizenship. The racialised character of 1981 Act became most obvious in 1990 (see also McCrone and Kiely, 2000:26).

Under the 1981 Act the people of Hong Kong and those of the Falkland Islands were categorised as British Dependent Territories citizens, which carried no right of entry to the UK. But as Cesarani points out,

In 1983, full British nationality was retrospectively extended to Falkland Islanders, while in 1990 only a privileged and wealthy section of the Hong Kong population was considered for the same status (1996:67).

The 1988 Immigration Act removed the right of certain British citizens to be joined in the UK by their spouse through the introduction of the ‘primary purpose’
marriage rule. This rule meant that British women had to prove that their marriage to a foreign husband had not been entered into primarily for immigration reasons. This hit all those British citizens who as Cesaran states had 'close ties to their countries of origin where for social, ethnic and religious reasons they would be likely to seek a marriage partner' (1996:67). Those hit hardest by this legislation were young men from Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. Indeed by 1990 initial refusal rate for such men had reached 60 per cent of applications while refusals of American, Australian or Swiss spouses were virtually unknown (Runneymede Trust, 2000:209).

The Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 removed the right to appeal for those who have been in the UK for lengthy periods. It is now up to the Home Secretary to decide whether compassionate circumstances, such as length of stay and family and community links, should preclude expulsion. Again, the Runnymede Report on The Future of Multi Ethnic Britain acknowledges about this Act 'it bears particularly heavily on Asian and black people, since they are more likely to be subject to immigration control' (2000:211). The Race Relations Act, even after the amendments made in 2000, does little to address this unfair targeting of particular ethnic or national groups (for details about the Race relations (Amendment) Act 2000 see The Runnymede Trust, 2000:217:222 and 'The immigration exemption' in Connections, Summer 2001: 5).

Current debates around asylum-seekers continue to keep immigration in the headlines. Negative media coverage has meant that in some areas community
tensions have been raised where as with post-war immigration, it is asylum seeker and refugees that are seen to be the cause of many local social problems. These debates, it is recognised are ‘extremely damaging both for individual asylum-seekers and for the security and dignity of Asian and black communities in general’ (The Runnymede Trust, 2000: 212) as they reinforce the perceived need to protect the nation from outsiders (see also Dijkstra et al, 2001:69).

Considering the above, it is easy to see how Yuval Davis concludes that immigration laws are all instances of ‘ideological, often racist constructions of boundaries which allow unrestricted immigration to some and block it completely to others’ (1991: 61). Indeed it has been argued that it is through discussions of nationalism and laws on nationality, namely immigration policy, that ‘imagination of place is politicised’ and state racism is expressed, institutionalised and kept alive; or as Gupta and Ferguson highlight, how it becomes, “clear that states play a crucial role in the popular politics of place making and in the creation of naturalised links between places and peoples” (1992:12).

The overall implication of post war immigration policies is that black people have over time come to be seen as the ‘enemy within’ (Solomas, 1988: 233). As Cook points out,

Regardless of their legal rights and place of birth, black British citizens often find themselves regarded as ‘alien’, formally within, but informally without, citizenship (1993: 142).
This is particularly true in the case of Muslims.

**MUSLIMS AS THE ‘ENEMY WITHIN’**

Nielsen points out that, ‘for a long time it was only from within church circles that immigrant communities were visible in their religious dimension’ (1997:135). As stated earlier, Muslims were instead subsumed under the category Black or identified according to their country of origin. It was during the 1980s that interest began to arise when, as Nielsen goes on to say, ‘the Muslim world and its communities in Western Europe were refusing to comply with the prognoses which experts had assigned to them’ (1997:135).

As Khan notes, for most Muslims of Britain, living in a Christian majority country as a minority was something they had no experience of and it was inevitable that this situation would pose challenges both internally within the communities and externally for wider British society (2000:37). Internally, Muslims faced existential challenges often of a very immediate and practical nature. Nielsen elaborates,

Families had to face an education system and its individualist and often secular assumptions, which challenged traditional conceptions of authority, including religious authority. Women especially found themselves dealing with medical services which had no understanding of
their traditional gender roles and concepts of honour and shame ...

In these circumstances Islam tended to become a reference point and what Neilsen refers to as ‘a discourse of a conscious significance’ to a degree which it had seldom been in the country of origin. Over time, as some of these practical tensions have been worked through, new tensions have arisen. Young British born Muslims have grown up in an environment that has emphasised that they as citizens were ‘participants with a role to play and a contribution to make’ (Nielsen, 1997:137). However as Nielsen explains that for the youth growing up in 1980’s Britain,

An extended...period of multicultural and interreligious education had not prepared the children of the immigrants for the discrimination they were to encounter in a labour market dominated by recession and unemployment (1997:137).

Their expectations as citizens were disappointed. The Rushdie Affair in Britain (and the ‘headscarves affair’ in France) at the end of the 1980s just confirmed in the minds of many Muslims that ‘they were citizens but that did not automatically entail equal opportunity and equal respect’. As noted previously official policy in the domestic field added to a growing sense of marginalisation. However foreign policy also had its part to play. During the 1990s it was events such as those in Bosnia and Chechnya that were highlighted with Palestine, Afghanistan and
Kashmir coming to the fore more recently. It is in this context that Muslims of Britain have asserted their Muslim identity, or as Neilsen puts it 'the distinct religious content of its cultural discourse, even when the religion is not explicitly practised'. However at the same time as the increasing internal consolidation and vocalisation of a Muslim identity there has also been a process at play that has ultimately lead to the demonising of Islam as the 'enemy within'.

If Islam was not visible before, the Rushdie Affair of 1989 'brought home in no uncertain fashion that Islam was a factor to be taken seriously when dealing with the immigrant and ethnic minority communities' (Neilsen, 1997:136). However, it is the events surrounding the publication of the *Satanic Versus* that also ultimately concretised, in the popular imagination, a negative image of Muslims as the 'anti modernist enemy within' (Vertovec & Peach, 1997). The resultant more politically mobilised Muslims encouraged talk of 'Islamic fundamentalism' as a threat to Europe. As Vertovec highlights,

Late 1980s and early 1990s have... been characterised by public concerns, on an international scale, with an undefined global movement called 'Islamic fundamentalism' characterised by terrorist methods, anti-Western rhetoric, and anti-modern, anti-liberal sentiments. (1996: 172).

Indeed, in 1995 Willy Claes as chief of NATO suggested that 'radical Islam was the biggest threat to the West, taking over where communism left off' (cited in Khan, 2000:36).
This type of 'Islamophobia' is it seems, becoming more of an issue especially as manifested in the media (Said, 1981). For Neilsen, Huntington's theory of a 'clash of civilisations', in which he argues that the West and its cultures are under threat from Muslims and Islam, has set the tone of the reporting in both Europe and the Muslim world. As he states,

This sets the background noise against which large and small scale events are measured. Ethnic Turks in Bulgaria, Muslim Bosniaks, Headscarves in France, Qur'an schools in Germany, prestigious mosques in Stockholm and Oslo, Muslim parents demanding their rights in Britain – all are seen in some quarters as a fundamentalist fifth column (1997:142)

Moreover events such as the bombing of the Israeli embassy in London, attributed to Middle East Muslims, and the hijacking of an airplane by Algerian Islamicists, and most recently the bombing of the World Trade Centre in New York, have affected how Muslim migrants and their descendants are regarded (Vertovec & Peach, 1997). The myth of 'The Islamic Threat' (Esposito, 1992) has taken hold of non-Muslim world opinion in a rather monolithic fashion. The media, in the 1990s in particular, failed to recognise that great diversity exists among Muslims instead choosing to exclude the Muslim voice(s) from all but predominantly negative contexts (Richardson, 2001). Instead, as Vertovec and Peach argue, Muslims are portrayed as being steeped in a single unitary Islam, an Islam which
is "stuck in the middle ages" (1997). In fact as Shadid and van Koningsveld argue,

Racist ideologies are now succeeding in conveying political views which would have met with fierce resistance if they has not been propagated under the guise of criticising Islam (1995: 71/2).

According to Miles (1989) anti-Muslim sentiment has a long history. As he points out, in Europe from the 12th to the 17th centuries the image of Islam was based on discourses of the barbarian, the tyrant and the infidel. Indeed it was, in part, this image that was used to construct a national identity or as Miles argues, religion was "the means by which to establish a dialectic between the Self and the Other" (1989:22).

Zolberg (1997) argues how "the national formula always incorporates negative criteria of identity as well: we are who we are by virtue of who we are not". Over time different markers of identity have been used in the construction of the "other". As Zolbeg states,

In the middle Ages to be a Christian was not to be a heretic, a Jew, or a Muslim; in the sixteenth century, to be English meant not to be French...or Irish...or yet a non-white 'native'(1997:142).
As seen earlier, in Britain during the post war years it was 'race' and culture that have been used to construct the 'other'. As Zolberg argues,

Selected according to economic criteria, notably willingness to work for very low wages..., immigrant labour is usually drawn from some less developed country or region which belongs to the world of 'others' in opposition to which the hosts have elaborated their identity' (1997:144).

However, it has been argued by Modood, as in the past, definitions of Europe have been set against Muslims who are emerging as the critical 'other' (1997:2).

Not only have Muslims been excluded because of their 'race' and perceived cultural differences but now this difference has become concretised in the public imagination through the guise of Islam. Islam is seen to represent all that 'we' are not. Islam has been constructed as 'irrational, suppressive to women, anti-Western, anti-modern, anti-democratic, controlled by theocracy, and prone to over-emotionalism and mob-like public outpourings' (Vertovec and Peach, 1997:8). It is no longer South Asians in general who are not willing to integrate, but Muslims in particular. Studies like the PSI survey on Ethnic minorities in Britain (1997) have highlighted how South Asians are not a homogenous group; data consistently illustrates how Bangladeshi and Pakistani experiences of social and economic conditions are worse than those experienced by Indian groups (see Chapter Two). By and large this recognition of diversity is welcome in that services can target those in most need. However this recognition has highlighted
for some how it is Muslims who are the problem. This was highlighted most recently by Nick Griffin, the leader of the BNP, in an interview on the *Newsnight* television programme (on the 26th of June, 2001). Talking about the riots in Oldham, he explicitly stated how ‘it’s a Muslim’ problem. He recognised that although there were Hindus and Sikhs living in these areas, it is was the Muslim presence that had led to the riots. Implicit was the old assumption that it is because they are unwilling to integrate into society.

It is recognised that debates surrounding the recent riots in Oldham and Burnley have to a large extent recognised the social and economic deprivation in the areas concerned, as well as the external right-wing factors that helped ignite a delicate situation. Also in the late nineties there has also been efforts to re-address the negative image of Islam and Muslims both by Muslims themselves, scholars and the media. Over time Muslims have tried to engage with the public sphere, and in more recent years Muslim opinion has been sought, for example over debates about Section 28, relating to the presentation of material that ‘promotes’ homosexuality in schools (see *The Observer*, January 30, 2000, Khan, 2000:32). This, as we shall see in Chapter Four, has led to the formation and mobilisation of numerous national and local Muslim groups (Lewis, 1997), and overall a much more visible and vocal Muslim population in Britain. A population where members are increasingly asserting their right as citizens of Britain and as Muslims, to be heard and represented in their multi-layered diversity, in a fair and equal way to any other citizens of Britain.
However this does not take away the fact that Muslims have settled in Britain in a wider context where a dual strategy of control (through immigration law), and integration (through race relations legislation) has been employed, a context which has constructed their ‘race’, their ethnicity, their culture, their religion, in sum their difference, as a problem. It is through trying to maintain difference that Muslims been accused of not integrating. Little consideration has been given to the fact that, despite their status as British citizens, they have felt they have never been fully accepted, a point made strongly by many of the respondents in the study conducted for this thesis. This, it may be argued, is not only because of the discrimination they have suffered but because there is a recognition that they have been excluded from being part of the national identity of Britain as it has been constructed over the last 40 years.

1 Of the South Asian groups survey in The fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities ninety-six per cent of Pakistanis, ninety-five per cent of Bangladeshis, fifteen percent of African Asians and six per cent of Indians identified themselves as Muslim (Modood, 1997:208)
2 Although it is recognised that the more direct method of self ascription employed by the 2001 British census will help overcome some of these limitations.
3 It must be noted that this study was conducted in 1988 and the projected figures are for the year 2000.
4 A process that Ballard admits was reinforced by the voucher system introduced by the 1962 Immigration Act (1990:238)
5 See Ballard, 1990 who explores why family reunification amongst Muslims from Mirpur (which he admits, is the common experience of most other Muslims of Britain) did not occur until the 1970s.
6 Although it must be noted that like migration, settlement trajectories of Muslims in Britain has varied.
7 A recent report on ‘Defining Luton’s Neighbourhoods’ identified that definitions of Bury Park were most closely associated with Dallow and Biscot although in some people’s view included Saints (Owens et al, 1999:2)
8 Enumeration Districts are the spatial units used for collection of the Census and they are the smallest unit at which data is available as Small Area Statistics. They average 200 households in size and are a subdivision of Wards (Owens et al, 1999:12)
9 For example Luton was awarded Health Action Zone status in 1998; it has also got Sport Action Zone status; it is part of the Sure Start initiative; and Marsh Farm in Luton was awarded £50 million as part of the New Deal for Communities initiative in 2000.
10 This is according to the 1991 census data. However a more recent report published by Wycombe District Council, Community Safety Strategy 1999-2002, cites the population to be 164,000.
The eight wards are Marsh and Micklefield, Keep Hill and Hicks Farm, Cressex and Frogmoor, Booker and Castlefield, West Wycombe and Sands, Bowerdean and Daws Hill, Greenhill and Totteridge, and Oakridge and Tinkers wood. Although it has to be acknowledged that 80 per cent of Wycombe Districts population live in the urban areas of High Wycombe, Marlow and Princess Risborough while only 20 per cent live in the rural areas which cover 86 per cent of the land area of the District.

Less than a third of the Pakistani population of Oakridge and Tinkers Wood were born outside the UK.

Census data reveal that three quarters of the Bangladeshi residents in Buckinghamshire live in Milton Keynes, with the majority concentrated in only two wards.

Marsh and Micklefield is the most deprived ward in Wycombe district (third in Buckinghamshire); Booker and Castlefield is the second most deprived ward in the District (fifth in Bucks); and Keep Hill and Hicks Farm is the third most deprived in the District (eighth in Bucks). Oakridge and Tinkers Wood ward on the Index of Local Conditions was placed as being only marginally 'non-deprived'. Stenson et al conclude from this that 'It is extremely likely that parts of this ward are deprived on one or more indicators' (1996:3).

See summary of findings and conclusions to the Wycombe conference on equal opportunities held as part of the 1997 European Year against racism, anti-semitism and xenophobia.

40 per cent of young Asian Males are unemployed in Booker and Castlefield (Stenson et al, 1996:4)

Vauxhall Motors was until the announcement of its closure, the largest single employer in Luton.

Migrants, as mentioned earlier, were predominantly from rural backgrounds and lacked formal qualifications. They had very little knowledge of the English language and spoke only their local dialects.

Structural assimilation refers to assimilation within the economic, political and educational structures of the majority white community.

This must be understood in relation to the fact that, for the most part ethnic minorities remained 'minorities' in majority white areas, in contrast to the American model where most black people live in areas where the majority of the residents are also black (Lakey, 1997:188)

The traditions that Ballard is referring to are marriage rules that impact the construction of kinship networks, gender rules and mortuary rules of South Asian Muslims.

Commonwealth immigrants were only seen to be a problem if they were black, as 'despite the scale of white immigration at the time, popular common sense perceived all immigrants as black' (Miles & Solomas, 1987:91). The problematisation of different cultures and religion has however followed.

Wycombe for instance, had during the war been declared a reception area for evacuees. Some of these evacuees returned to London after the war but sufficient numbers remained to ensure that all the problems caused by overcrowding continued. Therefore accommodation for workers of the new industries, which set up after the war in Wycombe, was always limited (see Mayes, 1960)

This was made clear by William Whitelaw the Home Affairs spokesman in 1978 who said about the Conservatives immigration policy that the aim was to introduce 'certainty and finality' to end the 'constant and widespread preoccupation with levels of immigration and so the anxieties of our people about them'.

This Act outlawed discrimination in specified public places and made it illegal for anyone to publish or distribute written matter which deliberately stirred up racial hatred

Although the new government in 1997 abolished the primary purpose rule it is reported by the Runnymede Trust that 'the marriage rules are still leading to disproportionate refusals of black and Asian spouses.' (2000: 210)

The Audit Commission in their analysis of 161 local press articles collated by the Refugee council in October/November 1999 found that only 6 per cent cited the positive contributions made by Asylum seekers and refugees; 28 per cent focussed on housing and/or unemployment difficulties attributed to this group, and 15 per cent concerned crimes and offences committed by Asylum seekers (2000: 33).

For an example of this see Hussain, 2000. He explores the media's role in popularising a neo-racist discourse in the public imagination that positions the Muslim identity as a direct negation of the 'danishness'.

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CHAPTER FOUR

IDENTITY AND CITIZENSHIP

As seen in Chapter Three, constructions of [national] identity have been intrinsic to notions of citizenship in the British context. From these debates, what becomes apparent is that a more realistic and dynamic definition of identity needs to be articulated if notions of citizenship are to be more inclusive, promoting not only the rights and duties of a citizen but engendering a real sense of belonging. How identity is conceptualised will reflect on how the limits of citizenship are understood. This chapter will argue that identity needs to be constructed as multidimensional, as simultaneously universal, group centred and individual. As such it is not an exclusive definition of citizenship, tightly bounded by the nation state, that should be aspired to, but multiple forms of citizenship that recognise that Muslims, like many other diasporic communities, have multiple attachments and identifications.

IDENTITY AS UNIVERSAL

At one level it is argued that as humans we do have several universally shared values, which cross boundaries of ethnicity, class, gender, culture, nationality, and religious belief. Parekh identifies these universal values as stemming from 'universal human constants' which he believes characterise human life everywhere and as such provide us with a 'human identity' (1996: 5), or put another way, the 'social glue' with which societies 'prevent the transformation of the cosmos into chaos' (Sayyid, 1997:140). Indeed, as Essed points out,
The more comfortable one feels with one another due to overlapping identifications, no matter how apolitical or superficial, the more space there can be for dealing elegantly with differences of opinions, differences in cultural beliefs and customs" (2001:504)

Universal values, Parekh believes, fall into three categories, personal values, social values and moral values pertaining to political life. In the same vein Doyle and Gough (1991) base their theorisation of human need on a universalistic understanding of basic human need. Miller, in his theorisation of the liberal nation state, argues there are certain basic rights, (e.g. personal freedom, bodily integrity...) to which all humans hold (1995b:64), while for Taylor (1989) it is 'recognition' that is the human universal. In the discourse of citizenship, it is argued, what is being articulated here falls in the broader realm of 'personhood' (Soysal, 2000) or 'human rights'.

In the West 'universally' shared values have, over time, been enshrined within various international 'human rights' documents, key being the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations in 1948 and, more recently in Britain, the Human Rights Act 1998. Essentially these and other (formally1) internationally binding human rights standards are secular legal standards, however over time the values enshrined within these documents have come to be seen 'as a result of the Occidental-Christian tradition at large' (Bielefeldt, 1996) and more generally, as part of the Western project, where
through eurocentrism, described as ‘the invisible empire which keeps the ‘Rest’ in its place’, the West is subsumed with universality and, in this case, Islam with particularism (Sayyid, 1997:129). Indeed, as the Runnymede Report on Islamophobia states, one of the ‘closed’ views about Islam is that it is seen as the “other” with few or no similarities between itself and other civilisations and cultures, and with few or no shared concepts and moral values’ (1997:6). In particular, it is often portrayed as not only opposing equal freedom and participation as enshrined within notions of human rights, but also as anti-democratic and uncivilised. As Sadowski points out, Islam is presented as incompatible with democracy, as

... a social entity whose ‘essential’ core is immune to change by historical influences...as a kind of family curse that lives on, crippling the lives of innocent generations after the ‘original sin that created it. ...that Muslim efforts to build durable states ...have not, and never can, bring about a change in the essential antistate and therefore antimodern core of Islamic dogma (Sadowski, 1997:42).

As such, it is thought that, only when Muslims emancipate themselves from Islam (passing through stages of enlightenment and secularisation) can they hope to advance on the road to liberty and democracy, or as Daniel Lerner put it, make a choice between ‘Mecca or mechanisation’ (cited in Kramer, 1997:71). Little attention is paid to the importance of imperialism and factors, other then internal ‘essences’ of Islam and the culture it supposedly promotes, that may promote of
retard democratisation (see El-din Hassan (1996) and Keane, (1993) to see how it is not Islam that is not conducive to human rights and democracy but social, economic and political factors of the country in question). The consequence of the one-sided appropriation of human rights by Christianity and the West, at the expense of their universality, has been that

People of a belief other than Christianity cannot legitimately claim human rights unless they adopt at least some basic ‘Western values’ which themselves purportedly are inextricably linked to the normative and cultural background of Christianity (Bielefeldt, 1996: 317).

However, as argued above, as humans we do have some universally shared values, a ‘supercultural platform’ (Rorty cited in Sayyid, 1997), providing us with a ‘human identity’ and Muslims and Islam are no exception to this. The universal human constant, is the respect for human dignity (see Bielefeldt, 1996:318-319 to see how Islam promotes respect for human dignity). The safeguards (human rights) needed to protect human dignity have evolved over time, as Bielefeldt points,

Human rights did not develop as a “natural unfolding” of humanitarian ideas deeply rooted in the cultural and religious traditions of Europe. ...people in the West, too, had (and still have) to fight to have their rights respected. ...they faced resistance ... from traditionally privileged groups such as the aristocracy and from advocates of an authoritarian state. ...churches...
feared that the emancipatory spirit of human rights would undermine the moral fabric of Christian society and the hierarchical structure of the clergy. (2000:97)

Human rights have developed in response to the experiences of repression and discrimination or as Bielefeld states ‘structural injustices culminating in those “barbarous acts” that, as the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” of 1948 emphasises in its preamble, ‘have outraged the conscience of mankind.’ (2000:102). These rights will continue to evolve dependent on the experiences of injustice in the world. This is the case in the West (see Bielefeldt, 1996) and there is no reason to believe this is not the case and will not continue to be the case within the Muslim world. Islam is open to internal criticism and hence subject to change.

As pointed out in Chapter Two, liberal Muslim reformers are calling for a critical re-evaluation of the shariah in the light of modern normative ideas, in particular through the revitalisation of ijtihad (personal interpretation or reinterpretation). As Bielefeldt states, since human dignity is ... a deeply anchored concern of Islam, the modern way of understanding and protecting human dignity in terms of equal rights of freedom must have a bearing on Islam too. That is, the idea of human rights both poses a challenge and, at the same time, offers an occasion to undertake a new scrutiny of the sources of Islamic tradition in order to

It is in these debates that some of the basic elements for a pluralist democracy, (i.e. the protection of human rights, political participation, rule of law, government control and accountability), are being discussed. It is just that ‘the terms and concepts used are rather vague or deliberately chosen so as to avoid non-Islamic notions’ (Kramer, 1997:71). Indeed Iqbal talked of democracy as the most important political ideal of Islam, while Mawdudi referred to a ‘theodemocracy’ reflecting the twin principles of the sovereignty of God and caliphate of man (see Esposito, 1991, 1983). Asad in his book *The principles of State and Government in Islam* (1980) talks about ‘Government subject to people’s consent’ as an ‘essential prerequisite of an Islamic State’ based on *ijma* (consensus of the whole community) through the *majlis ash-shura*, the idealised Islamic concept of participation-qua-consultation. A point supported by Khalid M. Khalid, an al-Azhar shaikh and Sardar,

rejection of democracy as an ideology, where sovereignty is handed over to the people, does not mean the rejection of democracy as a principle for the participation of people in the political process. The principles of *shura* and *ijma* dictate that the people must be allowed to participate fully in the shaping of a political structure and selection of the leadership of a community (1985: 153)
In this way there have been attempts at the 'Islamisation of democracy' (see also, Al-Alkim, 1993), or to make people aware of what Keane (1993) calls 'cosmopolitan Islam'. Human rights, as Kramer points out, although generally founded on duties towards God, are nevertheless widely seen as part of the common heritage of all human kind. As he states

The protection of individual rights and civil liberties from government supervision and interference, repression and torture figures prominently on the Islamist agenda (1997:79)

Key is that this is 'thought in progress' and for most of the Muslim world 'not abstract but political, even activist, ... shaped and influenced by a political environment that in virtually all cases neither liberal not genuinely pluralist, let alone democratic' (Kramer, 1997:80). Despite Islam being seen 'as hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world, with no common roots and no borrowing or mixing in either direction' (Runnymede, 1997:6) there is no reason to think that change will not occur (see chapters by Al-Akailah, Sani and Ali in Tamini (ed), 1993 *Power Sharing Islam* for successful examples of Islamic groups engaging in the power-sharing process in Jordan, Kuwait and Malaysia), not so that Islam fits into the Western model of human rights (which is largely predicated on preserving the rights on the individual), but so that human dignity is protected in a way that reflects the society and world in which it is developing, and in keeping with values that Islam proposes, values which promote the ideal of social justice⁶ (see also Sayyid, 1997: 143-150).
For Muslims living in Britain, the ‘universalistic’ language of human rights is indeed something to which they have turned. As Soysal points out,

When they make demands for the teaching of Islam in state schools, the Pakistani immigrants in Britain mobilise around a Muslim identity, but they appeal to a universalistic language of ‘human rights’ to justify their claims. And they not only mobilise to affect the local school authorities, but also pressure national government, and take their case to the European Court of Human Rights. (2000:4)

By acknowledging that as humans it is valid to talk of some universally shared values, what is being argued in this study is that South Asian Muslims, like any other minority group, want to have the protection and rights that are afforded to the majority indigenous population of Britain. Failure to extend these rights to Muslims in a substantive manner (as seen in Chapter Two) can lead to a feeling of being an ‘outsider’ (see Chapter Seven) who can only enjoy a second class citizenship. However, by acknowledging that it is valid to talk of some universally shared values it is not being suggested that it is also valid to talk of universal citizenship. As Young (1998) points out, the ideal of universal citizenship as well as meaning the extension of citizenship to everyone implies, generality and equal treatment. Generality in that it focuses on what people have universally in common rather than their particular differences, and equal treatment in that laws and rules are blind to individual and group differences and so in
theory, should apply equally to all (1998:263); a view made famous by Rawls in his book *A Theory of Justice* (1971). It is recognised that the liberal promise of universal inclusion and citizenship as equal rights for all however, is a fallacy. People always have and always will be excluded.

By ignoring divisions such as gender, ethnicity, class, disability, sexuality and age, universal theories of citizenship fail to recognise the political relevance of difference and diversity, and as Dean (1999) states, render, in the liberal case, the formal contract 'a sham'. As such universal theories are not only exclusive but discourage the promotion of full citizenship, while exacerbating multiply-disadvantaged social groups (Castles, 1997, see also Chapter Two). This view is supported by Kymlicka (1995) who highlights how the liberal state is not culturally neutral, and favours some groups over others. He argues that there are certain issues on which the state cannot avoid making decisions that have a significant impact on culture, and, if the polity contains people from different cultures, that advantage some and disadvantage others. The most obvious and important example, he argues, is that of language. A state will have to choose what language(s) to use for official business, and it is almost always aligned in many ways with the majority culture in its jurisdiction. Other culturally laden examples he points to are public holidays and state symbols, arguing those who constitute the majority can promote and protect their cultural interests impinging (whether intentionally or not) on minority cultural groups. Indeed in the case of Britain it is quite clear that the state is not neutral. Taking religion as an example, it would be hard to argue the Britain does not favour one conception of good over
others. As Rex (1994, 1996) points out Britain is not a secular state as religion is not totally divorced from the public domain. Britain has an Established Church whose Archbishop crowns the monarch. The Queen is declared to be the ‘Supreme Governor’ of that church, and Christianity has a privileged place in schools and all national ceremonies. Although it is recognised that the position of the Anglican Church is in the main a theoretical one, the privilege can not be ignored. There are instances when this privilege can have real consequences for minority faiths, as became obvious in the discussions surrounding the Rushdie Affair when the law of blasphemy was seen uniquely to defend the Church of England, leaving other faiths (in this case Islam) unprotected. This, as Young points out, highlights how norms of behaviour are not objective but based on the experience of the groups who have the power to set them. The danger is that, as a consequence, seemingly fair and objective standards may discriminate against those who are excluded and can serve as an ideological legitimisation for that exclusion. (Young cited in Castles, 1997: 123).

For the above reason while it is recognised that humans share some universal values, it is acknowledged that this does not translate into universal notions of citizenship or as Parekh puts it,

Although some values are universal, no specific balance of them, no single mode of their prioritisation, and no specific practices and institutional embodiment of them can claim universal validity (1996: 17).
Differences do exist amongst human beings. They are subject to different historical experiences, heirs to different traditions, think different thoughts, speak different languages and create different 'cultural communities'. Identity therefore is 'fundamentally both similar and different' (Parekh, 1996: 2). Similar in the sense that, humans do share several features in common (universal values), and different, because we all belong to distinct 'cultural communities' hence articulating each of the universal human constants differently. Therefore identity whilst being universal at one level can also be group centred at another.

IDENTITY AS GROUP CENTRED

Identity is group centred in the sense that each 'cultural community' has a more or less distinct identity which it endeavours with varying degrees of success to reproduce. On a broad level, one such 'cultural community', it is argued here, is the South Asian Muslim community of Britain. This is not to say that British Muslims are not influenced by the national society in which they live (which is not only a cultural community in itself – the United Kingdom - but is made up of several cultural communities - Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and England) nor that this group itself it not made up of several complex and at times overlapping 'cultural communities', but rather that identity is shaped by all these varying attachments and identifications.

Muslim Communities

The 'Islamic identity' and the 'Muslim identity' is a complex one. At one level it can be argued that Muslims around the world are united by a common faith, that
of Islam, and in particular by the Islamic concepts of the Shahada and the ummah. Believing in the shahada, which is testifying that ‘There is no god but God and Muhammad is His Messenger’ (‘Laillah Ill Lallah Mohammad Ur Rasulullah’) is the ultimate test of faith in Islam. Anyone who recites and sincerely identifies to the shahada is a Muslim irrespective of colour, ethnicity, class, gender, or any other difference. Those who have this common belief in the Shahada, collectively make up the ummah, that is the community of all believers. The ummah, as Dean and Khan point out is,

the cornerstone of Islamic ideology since it envisages a community of the faithful which is not dependent upon kinship, ethnicity or territorial boundaries (1998:401).

In this sense, a common Islamic identity is a powerful one and it is this identity that may in certain contexts and at certain times be the primary focus of a Muslim’s ‘cultural community’. To put it in Sayyid’s words, it is in certain contexts and for some Muslims that Islam becomes the ‘master signifier’, that is ‘the unique point of symbolic authority that guarantees and sustains the coherence of the whole ensemble’ (1997:45). Indeed Ramadan (1999) argues, to be concerned with what is happening within the ummah should be of interest to every Muslim as it is a part of his/her identity. He points to the Prophet’s analogy of the ummah to the human body, ‘The umma is one body, if one part is ill the whole body feels it...’ (1999:158). This concern with the fate of other Muslim
communities abroad is increasingly in evidence amongst British Muslims. As Nielsen states,

The fate of Muslim communities in Bosnia and Palestine, are today of much more direct political concern to Muslim community organisation and self-perception in Western Europe then were similar situations a decade or so ago (1994:2).

This solidarity and interest with global Islam is evident by looking at the Muslim press, in particular Q-News, which has Britain and Europe as its main points of focus within a world-wide overview of the ummah. Even amongst younger Muslims, although further layers (i.e. ‘generations’) are being added to the divisions that already exist amongst Muslims (ethnic, linguistic, cultural, national), a new British Muslim identity is being forged where there is a strength of belief in unity (Scantlebury, 1995: 433, see also Chapter Three). In fact, a growing awareness and importance of being a Muslim has led a significant number of Muslim youth to engage with Islamic concepts by returning to the original Arabic sources, giving Islam new relevance and vibrancy. This vibrancy is reflected in the abundance of organisations that have developed over the years that make it easier for Muslims to learn more about their faith and how it can be managed within a British context. Ahl-i-Hadith and Jamaat-i-Islami, originating from the South Asian subcontinent, are two such movements that have gone down this path (although it must me noted both these organisations, along with tabligh-
we refer to as a 'neo-orthodox scriptualist interpretation of Islam).

Apart from providing the common services expected of mosques, that of hosting daily prayers and Arabic instruction of the Qur'an for the young, have made themselves particularly noted for their distribution of literature and audio- and video tapes propagating a policy of separation from non-Muslim society. The Jamaat-i-Islami, which exists more as a movement than an organisation, bases its work around perceived needs of the Muslim diaspora. In Britain it is represented by four main organisations, The Islamic Foundation (a centre of research and publishing), The Muslim Educational Trust (which organises Islamic instruction for children in school), UK Islamic Mission and Dawatul-Islam (which provides Qur'anic instruction for children and has links with local authority structures - see Nielsen, 1992:46 for details of the work these organisations do). Although the focus of work for each of these organisations is slightly different, central to all their work is the promotion of Islam with an awareness of the Western context in which they are working. For example, the Islamic Foundation only publish books in English that, not only explain the principles of Islam, but also explain how Muslims can practice Islam while living in the West. Titles include *The Role and Responsibilities of Muslims in the West* (1993) and *To be a European Muslim* (1999). This is, as Nielsen notes, in keeping with their roots.

It was seldom realised among teachers, community workers, and even race relations researchers in the mid-1980s how these movements are in an
Islamic ‘revival’ which predates by at least a century the one which currently monopolises the headlines’ (1999:16).

Information about Islam is also more readily available for individual Muslims to access, through Islamic bookshops, Islamic press and the internet. Indeed there has been a visible increase in the number of Islamic bookshops, also known as education or information centres. The Islamic Foundation estimates that there are approximately fifty such bookshops in Britain today. In terms of printed press, there are a number of Muslim magazines such as Q-News, Impact International⁹, and al Madaris¹⁰. Bunt has written about the abundance of Islamic websites online explaining how they facilitate Islam in a number of different ways. He explains how the internet facilitates the propagation of Islam, with dawah organisations publishing materials in a variety of languages onto the web; how individuals can visit a wide range of sites which represent diverse perspectives, and search archives of questions and answers relating to significant interpretative questions and concerns; how Muslims can form networks between each other and galvanise debate on issues of shared concern forming new ‘communities’ (1999)¹¹.

Even where such a pro-active engagement with Islam is not being sought most Muslims, it is argued, still attach importance to being Muslim. Hewer for instance, whilst acknowledging that Muslims growing up in Britain have several identities, argues that many are choosing to stick to ‘Muslim’ as their essential mark of belonging. He points out how some, in the 1991 census, wrote ‘Muslim’ rather

Modood in the PSI survey highlights how religion is central in the self-definition of the majority of South Asian people, with only five percent of Indians, two percent of African Asians and Pakistanis and one percent of Bangladeshi not identifying themselves with a religion (compared to 31 percent on non Irish white respondents). In addition nine out of ten Muslims said religion was important to the way they led their lives, with nearly three-quarters of Muslims saying religion was ‘very important’ (more than any other religious group surveyed by the report). Therefore whilst it must be acknowledged that Islam is far from homogenous and that it is nearly impossible to talk about one unitary ‘Muslim voice’ or ‘the Muslim community’ (as will be demonstrated below), this does not negate talking about Muslim perspectives in the public sphere. In this context, despite variations, Muslims can be seen as part of a world-wide ummah united by their faith in the shahada and Islam. As such, a specifically trans-ethnic and trans-national Muslim identity mediated through a ‘cultural community’ based on Islam is evident. As Sayyid puts it, Islam can operate as a ‘master signifier’ despite ‘diverse and multiple discourses’ because ‘it has something “that makes people feel that there’s something in it.”’ That “something” is its “itness”...the “thing”, the relationship which holds a community together’ (1997:45-6).
However, as stated earlier, South Asian Muslims are made up of several complex cultural communities one of which, as seen above, is based on Islam, which it has to be noted is itself made up of several ‘cultural communities’. For instance there are numerous denominations within Islam, the two main being between Sunni Muslims (accounting for 90 per cent of the Muslim world population) and Shi’a Muslims (who make up 10 per cent) (see Ahmed, 1999, Sabini, 1983). This picture is further complicated by the several distinct doctrinal divisions and religious schools of thought that have emerged from within Sunni and Shi’a branches of Islam. For example, the majority of South Asian Sunnis Muslims belong to the Barelwi tradition, a strand of Islam attributed to the influence of Sufism – which itself is divided, for example, between those who follow the Qadriya, as opposed to, the Naqshbandi orders (see Lewis, 1994, Geaves 1996:95). Deobandis, the other main doctrinal influence on South Asian British Muslims, are critical of Barelvis for ‘adopting what they see as non-Muslim ideas through their cult of pirs, in particular through the belief that pirs can intercede with Allah on behalf of their followers..., they are more concerned with purging Islam of such traditions’ (Rex, 1996:221). It is because the prophet is regarded as semi-divine that the insult of *The Satanic Verses* was, it is suggested, more deeply felt amongst the Barelvis Muslims in Britain. As Ahmed points out,

This explains why Kalim Siddiqui in the UK, demanding the implementation of the fatwa against Salman Rushdie for insulting the Prophet, found his most sympathetic audience among the Barelvis (1999:174).
Any grouping of people that is formed because they follow the ideas of a particular teacher and his disciples is known as a firqa (sect). The above are the more well known, established and accepted. What must be noted here however is that there are many firqah within Islam which claim to present the definitive interpretation of Islamic doctrine. Of these Hodgeson comments,

> The Muslim historians of doctrine always tried to show that all other schools of thought than their own were not only false but, if possible, less than truly Muslim (1974:66)

Historically firqa are often set against each other or at the very least are often contested amongst Muslims. There are too many firqah to be mentioned here but other then the above, the main one to be noted should be wahabbisism as followers of this are also present amongst South Asian Muslims in Britain. Wahabbis or wahabbism is a puritanical firqa which emerged in the Najid region of hijaz (Saudi Arabia) in the mid-18th century (see Sabini, 1983:50). In the South Asian context, Jamaat-i-Islami and Ahl-i-Hadith are considered close to the wahabbi doctrines or approach. All Sunni Muslims, also follow four schools of thought or Jurisprudence (fiqh), the most enduring of which have been Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'I and Hanabali schools of thought (for more information about these see Ramadan, 1999:30-36).
The many different doctrinal influences and *firqah* within Islam affect the way Islam is implemented in the life of a Muslim. There is the potential for the 'cultural community' of Muslims to be based on these specific beliefs. The main doctrinal beliefs, highlighted above, are reflected most visibly in Britain in the development and establishment of Mosques in Britain (see Nielsen, 1992). Added to this picture however, is that for South Asian British Muslims, Islam has developed within a 'cultural' context that has primarily been a South Asian context (and more recently a British context). As such, at times the Muslim 'cultural community' is focused more specifically around dimensions of ethnic identity (Although religion can be a component of ethnic identity, say for Sikhs or Hindus, Islam is trans-ethnic because the *ummah* encompasses many ethnic groups that are united by Islam).

Whilst it is recognised that ethnicity is difficult to define (see Glazer and Moynihan, 1975:55-83) here it is understood as the process whereby one group constructs its distinctiveness, in terms of language, culture and history, from another with the understanding that the,

processes of boundary construction, maintenance and dissolution vary over time. They are subject to the forces of socio-economic and political change. Since they are historical products, bonds of ethnicity may shift in meaning, may be strengthened, weakened or dissolved, and they will have varied salience at different points in an individual’s or a group’s biography. (Brah, 1996:163-4)
For South Asian Muslims, at one level, ethnic boundaries have been maintained through caste like systems of *biradari* (Alavi, 1972:2) and *zat*. The *biradari*, analogous to the clan system as a form of social organisation, functions as an institution of mutual aid and emotional support. In the British context this is evidenced in two ways. One is in the form of ‘transnational *biraderis* where although members live thousands of miles away they remain in close contact, attending important functions back in their villages’ (Ali, 1999:234). Secondly as Muslims become part of settled communities in Britain, fellow Muslims become almost like an adopted *biraderi*. It is this sort of supportive network that can form the basis of community structures. As Mrs Kazmi, one of the respondents in this study explained,

> we have none of our own families here, we have no blood relatives here, and so the people living here in the community we have kept our relationship with them so that it feels like they are our blood relatives, like my brothers, sisters, aunties, uncles. We have left our parents in Pakistan and so the elders in our community we meet them and we feel as if we are meeting our mother or father. They are very empathetic (humdurd) if we are having a hard time then the people in the community help each other out. Like if someone falls ill and they need looking after, or someone needs to go to the hospital...

Most commonly notions of *biraderi* are based around ethnic lines, as Mrs Kazmi illustrated when she told of how she only visits other Pakistani women or *upnia* as she calls them, which means ‘our own’ women. In this way *biraderi* can reaffirm social organisation on essentially familial/ethnic lines. Notions of *zat* further strengthen this diversity.
In Islam there is a strong commitment to social egalitarianism. Despite this, there does exist a caste-like social structure amongst those South Asian Muslims who migrated to Britain. As Khan states,

Although the caste system is rejected in Islam there are clear vestiges of the pre-partition social structure. Notions of purity and pollution, restricted commonality and certain other features of the caste system are less evident... but there is a general hierarchy of castes (1977a:60)\textsuperscript{16}.

This is known as \textit{zat}, a largely endogamous group based on hereditarily ascribed occupational roles. All \textit{biraderi} members belong to a \textit{zat}, and as such have a \textit{zat} name, i.e. \textit{Rajput, Malik, Gujar}. It is these names that are used as surnames to identify \textit{biraderis} (see Ali, 1999: 234-241)\textsuperscript{17}. The tendency for closure of \textit{zats} is further reinforced by a widespread preference for cousin marriages\textsuperscript{18}.

What has to be noted however is that these ethnic boundaries are being played out in the British context and as stated earlier will 'be strengthened, weakened or dissolved' according to time and space. As Brah points out,

At any given time a group will inherit certain cultural institutions and traditions, but its acts of reiteration or repudiation, its everyday interactions and its ritual practices will serve to select, modify, and transform these institutions (1996: 18)
‘Culture’ in this way evolves through history, and every time the reproduction of ‘culture’ takes place, it is in part also a process of cultural transformation, a view supported by Hall who argues that identity is a product of its time in that it is ‘historically constructed. ...never in the same place but always positional’ (2000:152). As such the importance placed on internal group organisation such as biraderi and zat or various doctrinal beliefs, is not only subject to ‘generational’ shifts but will be subject to change because it is developing in a diasporic context, in this case Britain.

Indeed within a diasporic context cultural group identity, according to Hall, has been used as an ‘organising category of a new politics of resistance’ (1992:252); resistance against experiences of racism and marginalisation created, in part, by the construction of an exclusionary British or, more accurately, English ethnicity (an ethnic identity which has equivalence with nationalism, imperialism, racism and the state, Hall, 1992:257). In the past, in reaction to a discourse based on the politics of ‘race’ it was to a common black group identity that Asians were subsumed. As seen in Chapter Two however, this politics of ‘race’ has been replaced by issues of ethnicity, ‘culture’ and a recognition ‘of the extraordinary diversity of subjective positions, social experiences and cultural identities which compose the category “black”’, and a move to ‘a new cultural politics which engages rather then suppresses difference’ (Hall, 1992). According to Hall, this has meant a shift from identifying with a primary group identity based on a single ‘cultural community’ to the process of ‘cultural diaspora-ization’ where group identity has been subject to ‘unsettling, recombination, hybridization and ‘cut-
"and-mix" (1992, 258). In the context that Britain is now home for many Muslims (replacing the original view that Muslims like other post war immigrants would eventually return 'home') what Hall describes as 'old ethnicities' (which propose static notions of ethnicity and culture stipulating that people have a 'fixed location') have been replaced by hybrid identities (see also Hall, 1992:310). According to this view, a specifically trans-ethnic and trans-national British Muslim identity (as described above) is being forged as a culture of resistance (Anthias, 2001:626); an identity which is encouraged by the fact that we are now living in an era of 'glocalisation' where,

Globalisation has been seen as a challenge to the nation-state, while concomitantly generating ethnic and cultural parochialisms and localisms (Anthias, 2001:621)

According to this view it would be easy to understand how at a political level British Muslims may be motivated by the local predicaments they may face in the British context as well as the politics of their country of origin or, as seen earlier, by issues affecting Muslim world wide, especially where these politics are disputed as with the 'Kashmir issue' and Palestine.

From the above it can be seen that Muslims are not a homogenous group, diversity exists not only amongst Muslims but also within Islam, a diversity which has in fact been present throughout the history of Islam, including within the British context. A point supported by Nielsen,
Islamic history has for fourteen centuries been characterised, at one level, by a continuing complementarity of dividing and integrating trends, of conflicting assertions of the specific and the common. ... There is no reason why the story should be different in what might be considered the recent British phase of Islamic history (1999:11).

This (vertically and horizontally) multi-layered group identity becomes significant for issues of citizenship when Muslims assert what they have in common (e.g. Islam) over and above the specific, or put another way, when they use identity as a 'culture of resistance' and engage in what Bauman refers to as the 'dominant discourse'. This is, when culture comes to be a,

reified entity that has a definite substantive content and assumes the status of a 'thing' that people 'have', 'belong' to or 'are members of' (1997:212).

Rather than culture being conceptualised as a process of meaning-making it is seen to be a reified possession of 'ethnic' groups or 'cultural communities'. Baumann argues that although this conceptualisation of culture is prone to arguments of biological reductionism whereby cultural differences become seen as natural differences between people, it is because minority groups, at times, engage in this dominant discourse that it can not be dismissed out of hand.
Baumann argues reification of culture ‘forms part of the discursive competence of citizens from ‘ethnic’ minorities themselves, and continues to function as one element in the negotiation of difference’ (1997: 209). Minority groups engage in the ‘dominant discourse’ to fight for a new kind of rights, a category of rights more collective in conception than the traditionally individualist civil rights, but far more exclusive in character than universal human rights. For British Muslims it is issues such as Muslim burial practices, state funded Muslim schools, and the availability of halal food in schools that have been claimed in this way and it can be postulated that much has been achieved through the collective engagements of Muslim groups.

It is because minority groups in society do in certain situations engage in the ‘dominant discourse’ and act as if they belong to a ‘cultural community’ with shared norms and values that discussions have ultimately led to developing the idea of multicultural citizenship. A notion of citizenship that has grown in recognition of the fact that we are now living in societies which contain many different ‘cultures’ – ‘cultures’ that want to be respected in their own right, and regard some sort of ‘group’ rights as one means of offsetting historically produced conditions of exclusion and discrimination, and achieving full citizenship.

**Multiculturalism**

A central aim of multiculturalism, as an approach to eradicating racism, has been “to present the cultures of people who are subjected to racism to those who are in groups likely to be the perpetrators of racism” (based on the assumption that
prejudice results from individual ignorance about other groups of people, Phoenix, 1998:868). Policies supporting this aim have been developed in various ways with different consequences across the Western world (see Wievioka, 1998). In Britain, a multiculturalist discourse was adopted, to accommodate the settlement of immigrants and refugees from its ‘ex-colonial projects’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997c:197). As Rex points out, the ‘ideological charter for multiculturalism’ (1994:80) was proposed in the 1960s by the then Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins, who defined integration as ‘not as a process of flattening uniformity’ but one of ‘cultural diversity coupled with equal opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ (Patterson, 1968). Inherent in notions of multiculturalism therefore, as advocated in Britain, was a need not just to accept difference and cultural diversity but also to affirm it as something that is here to stay, and as such, something that should be given positive recognition and equality of respect. Coupled to this was an insistence on equality of opportunity.

Multiculturalism grew out of the realisation that policies of assimilation19 and pluralism, traditionally adopted by Britain, as a way of incorporating diverse groups of people into its society, were inadequate. The assimilationist model, adopted in the areas of economics or social policy (Castles, 1997:115), proposes that migrants are incorporated into society through a one-sided process of adaptation. As Castles points out,
Immigrants are expected to give up their distinctive linguistic, cultural or social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population (1997:117).

In this case immigrants can become citizens, but only if they give up their group identity and become absorbed into the dominant culture (an approach adopted most comprehensively in France). However, as noted earlier and in Chapter Two, difference will always exist and to assume individuals have equal rights (whatever their actual economic and social positions) only serves to disguise differences to the inclusion of some and exclusion of others.

The pluralist model, exercised in areas such as cultural policy (Castles, 1997:115), is where immigrant populations are accepted as ethnic communities and thus any claims to remain distinguishable from the majority population with regard to language, culture and social organisation are seen as legitimate. As Castles explains,

Pluralism implies that immigrants should be granted equal rights in all spheres of society, without being expected to give up their diversity (1997:119).

In this case anyone allowed to be permanently resident on the territory should be offered citizenship and all the benefits this confers. Britain however may be tolerant of cultural differences and quite relaxed about the formation of ethnic
minority communities, but as illustrated in Chapter Two and Three, its commitment to equality of membership in the national community is poor (see also Melotti, 1997: 80). Castles describes how Britain has adopted a ‘laissez-faire approach’ to pluralism where difference is tolerated, but where it is not seen as the state’s role to assist with settlement, or to support the maintenance of ethnic culture (1997:119). Indeed for Flores and Benmayor pluralism has ‘too often assumed a stable and basically unchanging country where immigrants add colour and spice’ (1997:9). As they go on to state,

Pluralism implies in our private lives we can possess and exhibit different cultural identities, but that in the public sphere, except in these [publicly] sanctioned displays of ethnicity [i.e. special holidays, parades and social events], we must put aside those identities and interact instead in a culturally neutral space .... By taking for granted that public space can be and is culturally neutral, pluralism endorses the dominant culture as normative. More serious is pluralism’s silence on inequality and power relations in the country. While expression of difference is permitted, challenges to power relations are suppressed (1997:9).

For others, this ‘noninterventionist’ approach has also meant that where ‘a violation of citizenship rights occurs within an identity group, then the violation is categorised as a “private affair”’ (Shachar, 2000:79). It is for this reason there have been numerous attempts to re-evaluate how traditional models of incorporation can be extended to reflect the needs of the multicultural, multi-faith
societies we live in today. For many the answer lies in some form of 'accommodationist policy' (Shachar, 2000), or more specifically a multicultural model of citizenship.

Multiculturalism moves away from seeing citizens as simply equal individuals. Instead it recognises that citizens can simultaneously be both individuals and members of groups with specific characteristics, values and interests (as illustrated above). Multicultural citizenship recognises that citizens have 'equal rights as individuals and different needs and wants as members of groups' (Castles, 1997: 125). Policies based on these principles therefore combine 'the principle of universality of rights with the demand for differential treatment for groups' recognising that collective provisions and positive action, based on group membership, are the only effective measures to be taken (Castles, 1994: 10). According to Lister,

rights can be particularised to take account of the situation of specific groups both in the 'reactive' sense of counteracting past and present disadvantages which may undermine their position as citizens, and in the 'proactive' sense of affirming diversity, particularly with regard to cultural and linguistic rights (1997b: 41).

Rather then merely tolerating cultural difference or ensuring that individual members of cultural groups are not discriminated against, multiculturalist policies, actually 'require a political society to recognise the equal standing of all the
stable and viable cultural communities existing in that society' (Raz 1994: 69),
recognising different cultural groups, not just within the private sphere such as the
family, but also in the more public domain of politics, labour, welfare and
education. According to this approach, only by doing this will the practical affects
of discriminatory practices such as racism be overcome (Caren, 1997) and
ontological security (Turner, 2001) and a sense of belonging (Kymlicka, 1995) be
enhanced. Indeed as Synowich points out,

The idea that the state has a duty to protect minority cultures has become so
influential that cultural rights might seem a logical extension of T. H.
Marshall’s idea of citizenship rights; that is, the most recent set of rights to
enable the citizens to be a fully participating member of the political

The notion of cultural rights or ‘identity politics’ (Hall, 2000) has been variously
expressed. Vertovec and Peach (1997) describe this phenomenon as a ‘politics of
religion and community’ whereby minority groups, and in particular Muslims,
have come to advocate a ‘politics of difference’ or as Taylor (1992) would argue a
refers to ‘group differentiated rights’, making the distinction between polyethnic
rights and some special representational rights for ethnic groups, and self-
government rights for national minorities. While Flores and Benmayor (1997) and
Pakulski, (1997) explore notions of cultural citizenship, and Carens (1997),
borrowing from Taylor, speaks of ‘recognition rights’.

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Whatever the specifics of the arguments, the multicultural paradigm has been heavily criticised stemming from the fact that a tension exists between the principle of public acknowledgement of minority cultures and that of recognition of the differences within them. The problem with multiculturalism is that although it aims to do the former, there is a danger that in the process it might ignore the latter and instead treat minority cultural groups as homogenous – as speaking with a unified cultural or ‘racial’ voice, ignoring internal power conflicts and interests, as well as differences such as gender, sexuality, age, class and as Lister points out, the fluid nature of boundaries between collectivities (1997a). Templeman for instance, criticises Taylor for falling into a number of what she calls ‘primordialist pitfalls’; she argues,

Taylor uncritically assumes (a) that cultural membership has a natural priority for individual identity; (b) that cultures are objectively ‘shared’ by their members; and (c) that cultural criticism is only external (1996: 12).

While Parekh states of Kymlicka,

While rightly insisting that human beings are culturally embedded, Kymlicka only stresses the value of their culture, itself a problematic concept especially in an age in which cultural boundaries are porous and permeable and in which each culture both absorbs the influences of and defines itself in relation to others (1997:61).
Kymlicka by emphasising the value of culture does so at the expense of cultural diversity, valuing our culture rather than a plurality of interacting cultures.

Multiculturalist approaches, it is argued, fail to acknowledge that cultural collectivities are not given entities with an evident cultural content but rather a result of active processes of construction and re-construction and hence change. As Yuval Davis puts it,

There seems to be an inherent assumption, by the multiculturalist approach, that all members of a specific cultural group are equally committed to that culture, a culture which has fixed, static, ahistorical boundaries, with no space for growth and change (1997c: 200).

Such perspectives therefore encourage the labelling of those who are seen to share similar characteristics as the same. As Frosh (1997) highlights, if religion or culture is seen by the outsider to be a central component of your identity then you are labelled as similar in kind, holding the same opinions and viewpoint on life. Although Frosh (1997) uses Judaism as his example, his argument can be extended to Islam and Muslims. Just because many Muslim men attend a mosque (where strict gender separation is practised) and support beards, it is assumed ‘they must have bought into the whole “holy order”. What is ignored is the fact that there is no such thing as ‘the whole holy order’. As seen in Chapter Six and Seven, religious prescriptions are interpreted and implemented in a variety of
ways, and the reality is that Muslims are more likely than not to hold a variety of views on religion and the nature of society. As Frosh points out,

Membership of a minority religious community is not the same thing as adherence to all the views and values propagated by the religious leaders of that community, however strongly stated those might be (1997:419).

By essentialising and freezing cultural difference, multiculturalism rather than extending choice, as Kymlikca (1995) argues, limits choice (see Templeman, 1996), supporting cultural communities has led to their marginalisation. By constructing cultures ‘as distinct as possible (within the boundaries of multiculturalism) from the majority culture, they are presented as different’ (Yuval Davis, 1997c:200), as ‘exotic, strange and inadequate’ and as the ‘Other’ (Phoenix, 1998:868-9). This, as Templeman points out, has not only led to the exclusion of immigrants but has also legitimised being fearful of them, because they will threaten to ‘swamp’ us with their alien cultures, and if allowed in large numbers, they will destroy the ‘homogeneity of the nation’ (1996: 9). Constructing cultures as wholly different deems any consequent relations between cultures as hostile (because it is human nature to trust one’s own and be afraid of strangers). This, Tempelman argues, not only deems enthocentric and xenophobic reactions as natural human behaviour but justifies this behaviour. The inherent assumption is that outsiders themselves are likely to be unloyal and inimical to a community that is not really theirs. It is for this reason that Yuval-Davis believes it would be a mistake to assume that those who favour multiculturalism advocate
a civil and political society in which all cultural identities would have the same legitimacy. As she states,

In multiculturalist policies the naturalisation of a Western hegemonic culture continues, while the minority cultures become reified and differentiated from what is regarded by the majority as normative human behaviour (1997c: 198).

Not only are minority groups presented as the same as each other, reduced to “sarís, somosas and steelbands” (Phoenix, 1998:868), and different from everyone else, but it has also been argued that multicultural policies can lead to what Shachar (2000) defines as the ‘paradox of multicultural vulnerability’. That is, by constructing the views of specific individuals within a group, as representing the interests of the whole group, they can ‘tacitly sanction the maltreatment of certain categories of group members, such as women, within their own identity group’. This view is supported by Flores and Benmayor who point out that cultural claims can result in social conservatism as well as social change (1997:13), (see also Yuval-Davis, 1997b:18, Castles, 1997:123). In particular reference to religiously defined communities Frosh (1997) argues that ‘liberal secularists have recognised religious orthodoxy as the defining characteristic of ‘other’ cultures’. This he believes has resulted in the presentation of such cultural and religious communities as homogenous, where internal difference of opinion or dissenting voices are at best obscured if not totally ignored. This is illustrated well by Sahgal and Yuval Davis in their book *Refusing Holy Orders: Women and*
**Fundamentalism in Britain** (1992). They point out how Southall Black Sisters, during the time of the Rushdie Affair, came out in defence of Salman Rushdie’s right to free speech. This view according to Frosh ‘was not just sidelined but constructed as illegitimate by the discourse of multiculturalism, because it seemed to be attacking the right of Muslims to defend their religious heritage’ (1997:419). This has led Yuval-Davis to conclude that,

Multiculturalist policies are aimed at simultaneously including and excluding the minorities, locating them in marginal spaces and secondary markets, while reifying their boundaries (1997b: 17).

Phoenix, even goes as far to argue that multiculturalism, by focusing on ‘individualised notions of prejudice’ has failed in its ‘central aim’ of eradicating racism. As she states,

Since cultural comparisons are generally made with no commitment to eradicating racism, the focus adopted is sometimes that of interested observers of the incomprehensibly strange. ...help[ing] to reproduce negatively racialised notions of the ‘Other’ (1998:869).

It becomes apparent that it is right to be suspicious about discourses of culture since they can homogenise group identity, marginalise dissenting voices, empower only those with the loudest voice and present people as culturally determined. As Modood explains,
In talking about other people’s cultures we often assume that a culture has just the kind of features that anti-essentialists identify. ...that it has a coherence, sameness over centuries and a reified quality. ...[and] one is particularly prone to this when one is producing a systematic summary or ideological justification for those traditions. Hence, rich, complex histories become collapsed into a ... unified ideological construct called French culture... or the Muslim way of life’ (1998:381).

However, as Modood goes on to point out, in order to avoid such pitfalls, to conclude that there is no such thing as a coherent self would also be wrong, a point supported by Gupta and Ferguson. As they argue,

Deterritorialisation has destabilised the fixity of “ourselves” and “others”...it has not thereby created subjects who are free-floating monads, despite what is sometimes implied by those eager to celebrate the freedom and playfulness of the postmodern condition (1992:19).

Whilst it is acknowledged that these identities are complex and inter-related, it does not mean that they do not exist and should not be spoken about. As seen earlier, identity can be group centred, it can ‘despite its polysemy, ...retain it’s singularity’ (Sayyid, 1997:40). The intention here is not to suggest that essentialism is inevitable and thus acceptable, far from it. However, just because it is argued that people have in certain circumstances a coherence, and a group
identity, it should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that everyone in that group will experience that identity in the same way. What needs to be understood as Modood puts it, is that 'one does not have to believe that a culture, or for that matter an ethnic group as the agent of culture, has a primordial existence' (1998:382) In terms of citizenship, one needs to view identity as multidimensional: as simultaneously universal, group centred and individual. Only then can the very real concerns of anti-essentialist (or in the case of Islam, anti-orientalist) thinkers be addressed, without ignoring the empirical reality of group identification and the consequences of this for citizenship.

IDENTITY AS INDIVIDUAL

Whilst acknowledging that minority groups will engage in the ‘dominant discourse’ at times, it is not being suggested that all the members of a ‘cultural community’ will develop their identity in the same manner and thus form a homogenous group. As stated earlier, Muslims may have a group identity but this identity is multi-layered in complex ways. A point supported by Baumann who found that ‘the local “Muslim community” was divided into a variety of contending “cultures”, categorised according to languages, regions and national loyalties’ (1997: 215). What must not be forgotten is that the ‘dominant discourse’ is used alongside what Baumann refers to as the ‘demotic discourse’ dependent on the context. This recognises that ‘ideas of “culture” and “community” are… negotiable in the social process’ (1997:215); that identity is fluid.
Far from being prisoners of a reified culture, humans can adapt as well as draw from the numerous cultural resources around them, reflect on their experiences, try out different ways of life, and develop themselves in their own unique way. This means different spheres of a person's life - their socio-economic position in society, their gender, their sexuality, whether they are able-bodied or disabled, their faith, their ethnicity - as well as the historical conditions of the time, will inform an individual's identity. In relationship to the former it has to be recognised that the reality of 'being a Muslim' will be experienced in varying ways. Just as diversity is inherent within Islam, diversity also exists in the importance placed on Islam by Muslims. In relation to the latter, this identity will be constructed and re-constructed according to the historical conditions in which it is being played out.

For South Asian Muslims Islam has developed within a South Asian context. Ballard has noted how from within this context (and the Punjabi experience in particular) there has emerged a local manifestation of Islam. He explains how in the Punjab there is an emphasis on the spiritual and mystical dimensions of religious ideas and practice, what he refers to as the 'panthic' and 'kismetic', dimensions of religion (2000). This includes, amongst other things, the belief in jinns, bhuts (forms of 'disembodied spirits') and jadoo (deliberately executed magical practices) to explain personal adversity; and an importance placed on spiritual guides, such as pirs, in providing remedies (see Ballard, 2000). Many, including those who follow the deobandi tradition, dismiss this 'popular Islam' (Ballard, 2001) as superstition, unorthodox and a misguided form of religious
practice (even if, as Ballard points out, 'to dismiss these activities is such a way is 'most unhelpful' 2001:7). There is not the space to go into detailed discussion about the Islamic or unIslamic nature of these practices. Of importance here, is that the practice of Islam has been influenced by the context in which it has developed. In the diasporic context what has occurred is that there has, to some degree, been a reconstruction of Islam as it is practised in the Punjab (see Ballard, 2001), particularly amongst those who spent the formative years of their life in the Punjab. However, what has also occurred, especially amongst those who have had the formative years of their lives in Britain is, in part, a reaction against this spiritual emphasis on Islam. As Ballard notes of British born and educated Muslims,

Having been comprehensively exposed to English attitudes and assumptions throughout the course of their intellectual development, as well as to commonplace denigration of all aspects of their religious and cultural heritage, most have become deeply critical of many aspects of their parents' lifestyles ...especially of what almost all of them view as being irrational.... ...‘backward’, ‘primitive’ and ‘obscurantist’ (2001:27).

Although the findings from the empirical investigation for this thesis do not support a 'backlash' in the way that Ballard seems to suggest, what is reflected is that the British context has made younger Muslims in particular, re-think what it means to be a Muslim. As Ballard suggests, some have chosen to favour a more
behaviouralist (marked by the wearing of the hijab, supporting a beard, etc.) and political adoption of Islam. In this way identity will be constructed, deconstructed and re-constructed according to the historical conditions in which it is being played out. What this means is that any notion of group rights or cultural citizenship needs to be articulated in a way that does not essentialise the Muslim identity but recognises that it is individual and subject to change and differing articulation.

Whilst it is recognised that Muslims may unite under the banner of Islam and claim rights accordingly, what also has to be recognised, is that identity will be variously expressed by different Muslims. Importance placed on Islam will vary according to time and space despite the fact that Islam is largely a prescribed faith. At the very minimum ‘to be a Muslim’ means to believe in the shahada (see above). However to nourish this faith (iman), it has to be strengthened through acts of worship (ibadat). These in themselves are codified into prayers (Salat) performed five times a day (for purification of the self); supplemented by fasting (Sawm) during the month of Ramadan; and by Zakat which commits wealth, that is a Muslims worldly resources, to the achievement of divine purposes in the socio-economic realm (for spiritual discipline); and finally haj (pilgrimage) to visit the Ka‘ba in Makkah at least once in a lifetime. These five pillars of Islam, as Ramadan points out, are ‘the first and essential principles of a life of faith’ (1999:20). At its most comprehensive, however, Islam can be understood as a concept and a way of life (din), as surrendering one’s will to the Will of God. Islam provides reference points in order to guide Muslims. Translated into reality,
this means that there is no single unitary definition of what it actually means ‘to be a Muslim’. Just as diversity is inherent within Islam, diversity also exists in the practice of Islam by Muslims.

The Runnymede report of Islamophobia notes that, the term ‘Muslim’ refers to ‘people who describe themselves as Muslims’ and that this does not assume that all Muslims are observant in their religious practice to the same extent and in the same ways. On the contrary, it acknowledges that Muslims vary in the ways they interpret and practise their faith and that Islam has non-observant adherents just as do all other religion. An analogy may be drawn with the situation in Northern Ireland, where to refer to someone as Protestant or Catholic is to refer to their identity within a broad cultural tradition and community, not necessarily to their personal religious beliefs and practice (1997:1).

As such, implementing Islam as a way of life for some women may mean, amongst other things, they wear the hijab (head covering), for others it may simply mean they dress modestly; for someone else it may mean proselytising to Muslims in the form of dawah to ‘revert’ Muslims back to Islam, while for others still, it may mean making sure their food contains only halal ingredients. This is not to say that when talking of Muslims they need to be distinguished as ‘practising’, ‘nominal’ or ‘cultural’, ‘modernist’ or ‘traditional’ as this is often more of a reflection on the author’s assumptions about what it means to be a
Muslim. However what does need to be understood is that for many, 'being a Muslim' will not be the primary source of their identity or more specifically their political identity (and even if it is, as seen above, it will not be homogeneously expressed).

In trying to avoid the essentialist notions of identity, that can be promoted through the multiculturalist discourse, anti-essentialist theorists, as seen above, have articulated the notion of hybrid social identities. They recognise that identity may be trans-ethnic and trans-national, or in other words, that it may not always be possible to distinguish a single unitary primary group identity. However like multicultural discourses, debates around 'new ethnicities' continue to do place importance on the role of culture and identity in constituting ethnic belonging. What has to be understood, according to Anthias, is that 'narratives of belongingness...do not depend solely on cultural practices or beliefs' (2001). Also to be taken into consideration is the political and power dimensions of social relations and how these can lead to materialist, as opposed to culturalist, subordination, inequality and exclusion (as seen in Chapter Two). Struggles around resource allocation may focus around identity and culture, but not to the exclusion of struggle along the lines of gender, 'race' and class. Muslims may fight for rights as women, as mothers, as professionals, as business owners, as individuals, regardless of whether they are Muslims or not. Whilst recognising that identity is at one level universal and group centred, this perspective also argues that identity is also individual. As Parekh argues,
Our nature is articulated in at least three different though interrelated levels. First, the nature that we share as members of a common species; second, the nature we derive from and share as members of a specific cultural community; and third, the nature we succeed in giving ourselves as reflective individuals (1996: 11).

As reflective individuals, ‘confronted by a range of different identities, ... each appealing... to different parts of ourselves’ (Hall, 1992:303), people are able to present themselves in different ways depending on the context in which they find themselves.

Who it is we are, is complex. To summarise, at one level it is possible to talk of a common human identity at another of ‘cultural communities’ - communities (based on place, interest and/or identity) that may, at times, be recognisable as a distinct group with a dominant collective identity, but still do not form a monolithic homogenous group (as seen earlier there can exist communities within communities as well as cultures across communities). While, for some, a primary identity will be obvious (although which aspect of an individual’s identity is emphasised to form the basis of their ‘cultural community’, for example, will be dependent on the context in which they are placed at any one moment in time), more probably a combination of identities will manifest themselves in varying importance according to time and space (that is life experiences and circumstances). In this way identity remains individual. As Brown concludes, ‘Muslim identity is in effect a highly fluid concept without hard edges’ (2000:90).
From these debates two important points need to be emphasised. One is the implication it has for any notion of citizenship, and secondly, it is how the above influences strategies employed by Muslims in ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship.

CONCLUSION

Any notion of citizenship needs to consider the complexity of identity, the fact that human beings are both alike and different, that our human identity is both shared and unique. It needs to understand that just as an essentialist Black identity can silence the Asian experience (Hall, 2000), an essentialist Muslim identity (as can be promoted through the multiculturalist discourse) will silence internal group differences while concretising difference in the wider imagination, to the detriment of full citizenship and a sense of belonging. Citizenship, whilst not affirming essentialist notions of identity needs to be able to recognise difference (but not to the point that one ends up denying any sense of self, see Gilroy, 2000); a difference which means that citizens will have multiple attachments and identifications. A broader notion of citizenship is required if it is to be inclusive, one that is not bounded to nationality in a way that refuses to recognise the multiple attachments Muslims, and other diasporic trans-national communities, may have as legitimate; a notion of citizenship that will not automatically assume disloyalty when people disagree with a state action but recognise that people will have multiple sites of attachment.

Such an understanding of identity also helps in explaining the various strategies that might be employed by Muslims in ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship. At some
points, of greatest importance to South Asian Muslim minorities living in a Non-Muslim country (a country from which they feel holds different values to their own and/or from which they feel excluded because of issues of racism and discrimination), may be a group identity articulated through, as Bauman described, a ‘dominant discourse’. At these times, some may argue for ‘group rights’ to address some of their ‘culturalist’ concerns whilst others may appeal to their individual rights which enable them to hold fast ‘to their roots’ or as Hall puts it ‘to reconstruct purified identities, to restore coherence, “closure” and tradition, in the face of hybridity and diversity’ (1992:311). At other times, identity may be recognised as fluid and Britain as ‘home’. At these times Muslims may recognise how they are variously influenced. In this context ‘group rights’ or for that matter individual rights, may be more important to address the poor material conditions to which some Muslims are subject. The strategy (or strategies) employed will depend on the context and how the individual concerned sees their position in that context. It is this dynamic that will be explored in Chapters Six and Seven, which contain the results of the empirical study conducted for this thesis.

1 It is recognised that although formally binding, procedures for enforcement are weak (in the case of civil and political rights) or non-existent (in the case of economic, social and/or cultural rights).
2 See Al-Awa (1993) who criticises taqlid, that is the unquestioning adoption of ancient writings. Instead he argues for the examination of Islamic fundamentals, by exercising ‘political ijtihad’.
3 This is a point supported by the Egyptian writer Ahmad Shawqi al-Fanjari who says that every age adopts a different terminology to convey concepts of democracy and freedom. What is called freedom in Europe is exactly what in Islam is called justice (‘adl), truth (haqq), consultation (Shura) and equality (Masawat). The equivalent of freedom in Islam is kindness or mercy (rahmah) and that of democracy is mutual kindness (tarahum) (cited in Keane, 1993: 19).
4 Khalid favoured tajdid (renewal, improvisation, innovation) and believed shura is mandatory in Islam and is exactly equivalent to the concept of ‘democracy’ in its current usage (see Ayubi, 1991:202).
5 See Chapter Two for an explanation of tawhid as the principle which states the sovereignty of God.
6 Over and above living your life according to the five pillars of Islam, the genuine Muslim, according to the Qu’ran, is one who ‘attains to faith and does good works’. This solidaristic aspect of Islam can be found in many hadiths of the prophet the essential message of which is to be involved in the affairs of the community as a way of bearing witness of one’s God-consciousness, and respecting the ideal of justice (see Ramadan, 1999:21).

7 Although it is ‘cultural communities’ that are being referred to, it is recognised that experiences of inclusion/exclusion are also mediated by other social factors, (i.e. gender, class, age, sexuality and disability) (Lister, 1997).

8 According to their literature the Muslims Educational Trust (MET) publishes a range of books and posters on Islam for use by Pupils and Teachers primarily in Britain but also worldwide. Among their titles are Islam, Beliefs and Teachings, Islam for Young People, Sex Education – the Muslim Perspective and British Muslims and Schools. MET also meets regularly with the Department for Education (DFE), the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA) and local education authorities (LEAs) and members of MET are representative on SACRES (Standing Advisory Council on Religious Education) around the country.

9 This is a monthly international journal that presents the news and analysis from a Muslim perspective.

10 Produced by the Association of Muslim Schools of United Kingdom and Eire. Deals broadly with issues around Islamic education of Muslims in Britain.

11 To see Gary Bunt’s on-line guide to 100 Islamic sites on the internet go to http://www.lamp.ac.uk/cis/pathways.

12 See Ballard (2001) for a fuller explanation of the importance of pirs, in the South Asian and diasporic context, in articulating the spiritual (as opposed to the ‘behaviouralist or political) dimension of Islam.

13 Although Wahabbism does refer to a particular doctrine of thought it must be recognised that Barelvis, who make up the majority of Muslims in Britain, often refer to other Muslims who deviate from their belief system as whahabbis.

14 Other Muslims such as Arabs have parallels to the biradiri system such as tribal connections

15 One way of cementing relationships with biraderi members is through the exchange of gifts. The older women of the biraderi ordinarily administer this at births, deaths, marriages, visiting family and biraderi members, a child’s first completed Qu’ran reading, arrivals from or departures for abroad, and at religious occasions such as Eid-ul-Fitar and Eid-ul-Haj. Both Alavi (1972) and Anwar (1979) refer to this as vatan bhanji while Shaw calls it ‘lena-dena’ which literally means to get and to give (1994:46). This gift giving can be observed in many Muslims communities in Britain between older women of Muslim households. It is this sort of relationship that Ali has argued ‘ensures that assimilation does not take place in the new British context in which they are now settled’ (1999:238).

16 Alavi disagrees with the notions of caste as he points out that: ‘Not simply because the religion of Islam does not sanction it, that is an ideological view [shared by many Pakistanis] because it is based not upon the observation of society, but upon the interpretations of ideas and ideals without reference to social realities. The central criteria of caste-orientated behaviour, namely that of ritual pollution and associated purificatory rites, do not exist. No dietary restrictions differentiate people with different zat names nor are there any restrictions on commensality. There is no hierarchy of castes. High status is accorded to the Sayyids who claim descent from the sons of Fatima the Daughter of the Prophet Mohammed. But such status is accorded to them in Arab society also: but that society is not organised on the basis of caste (1972:26).

17 It is, however, important to point out that surnames and zat cognomens are not always mutually exclusive and intimate details of biradiri organisation within specific locations are often necessary before making associations (Ali, 1999).

18 Although Islamically a Muslim woman/man can marry any other Muslim man/woman the ideal amongst South Asian Muslim parents is to first turn to the offspring of their brothers and sisters to choose a marriage partner for their son or daughter. As Ballard points out ‘brothers and sisters expect to be given the right of first refusal in offers of marriage for each other’s children, so much so that rejection causes great offence. It is often regarded as a repudiation of the obligation of siblingship itself’ (1990:231). However where family members are not available, or if children do not agree to this arrangement then as a second choice suitable matches will be sought within the biradiri.
This approach was in evidence in Britain in the mid-1960s when decisions had to be made about the education of immigrant children with the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council declaring that immigrant communities should not expect that their cultures would be perpetuated in British schools (Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council, 1964).

See Sayyid, 1997:36-40 for the debate between orientalist and anti-orientalis - a debate that mirrors some of the arguments of essentialist and anti-essentialist.

Punjabis are identified by Ballard as those originating from the Punjab, which is defined as 'the fertile plain bounded by the Indus to the west and Yamuna to the east, rising into the foothills of the Himalayas to the north and tailing off equally fuzzily into the desiccated deserts of Rajasthan to the south' (2000:4).

By using the term panth, Ballard is referring to 'a body of people drawn together by their commitment to the teachings of a specific spiritual master, be he living or (more usually) dead' (2000:8).

The kismetic dimension of religion is defined as 'those ideas, practices and behavioural strategies which are used to explain the otherwise inexplicable, and having done so to turn adversity in its track' (Ballard, 2000:9).

It is recognised that the reasons for the attraction to a more political Islam are manifold and complex (see Sayyid, 1997 and Ballard, 2001).

Zakat literally mean purification, growth, righteousness and blessing. It is defined in the shariah as a specific amount due from the property of Muslims to be distributed to the deserving.
CHAPTER FIVE

RESEARCHING CITIZENSHIP

The act of 'doing research' is a constant learning process. Through reflective practice it is possible to learn, for example, how data can be generated more effectively, how access can be gained more easily and data analysed most fruitfully. This chapter is a reflection of the learning that has taken place in the course of the author’s empirical investigations for this thesis.

A MULTI-METHOD APPROACH

This research, although based solely on qualitative data, employed a multi-method approach to generate data. Focus Groups were conducted to inform the initial exploratory work and inform the construction of an interview schedule; semi structured one to one interviews formed the main part of the fieldwork and observation continued throughout the research.

Focus Groups

Although not traditionally used by social scientists, focus groups have been used since the late 1980s. They are basically group interviews. However rather than relying on an alternation between a researcher's questions and the research participants' responses, they rely on interaction within the group. As Morgan states,
The hallmark of focus groups is their explicit use of group interaction to produce data and insights that would be less accessible without interaction found in a group (1997: 2).

This interaction is based on topics that are supplied by the researcher who typically takes the role of a moderator.

Morgan (1997) highlights how focus groups can be used as either a self-contained research method, that is as the principal source of data, or in conjunction with other methods. In this study focus groups were combined with other qualitative methods so that each method contributed ‘something unique to the researcher’s understanding of the phenomenon under study’. However the focus groups were not given equal waiting but were used primarily as a source of initial data to inform the development of the interview schedule that would be used to conduct the individual interviews. As such their use was essentially supplementary. Indeed, Morgan acknowledges that the single most important way that focus groups can contribute to a study built around individual interviews is in devising the interview schedule (to find out other ways focus groups can be used in conjunction with individual interviews see Morgan, 1997: 22/3). As he states,

The basic idea is to use ... exploratory focus groups to reveal the range of the future informants’ thoughts and experiences prior to the first individual interview (1997:22).
The primary aim was to use focus group to give an insight into the relevant issues enabling the construction of an interview schedule that measured important dimensions that were of the highest value in the minds of the respondents, rather than one which reflected the researcher's preconceptions and biases. The focus group situation ensured that a bottom-up approach to the overall study was undertaken because it allowed respondents, rather than the researcher (as is often the case in interviews) some control over the direction of the interview. In this study unstructured discussion, where topics discussed reflected the views of the participants rather than the moderator, was ensured by keeping moderator involvement at a low-level.

It is acknowledged that focus groups, used at the beginning of a project, can also be used to familiarise and orientate the researcher to a new field, (e.g. What is it like to be a Muslim living in Britain?) In this study the focus group situation also allowed the researcher to gain first hand information about some of the issues and tensions experienced by the group. In particular, they proved helpful in orienting the researcher to the language in which the group articulated their discussion. For instance, it was through the focus group situation that it became apparent that asking some of the respondents about citizenship (mainly those who had spent the formative years of their life in their country of origin, but also those who were less likely to have English as a first language) directly would not generate rich data as often citizenship would be equated simply with having a British passport. These participants were more likely to talk of 'facilities', 'conveniences' and 'benefits' instead.
One-to-one Interviews

Burgess calls qualitative interviewing 'conversations with a purpose' (1984: 102) and indeed these types of interviews are characterised by a relatively informal style, for example with the appearance of a conversation rather than a formal question and answer format. In this study this informal style was maintained in the one-to-one interviews by constructing an interview schedule, which was semi-structured and based largely on open-ended questions (see Appendix Two).

A semi-structured interview schedule allowed for a thematic, topic-centred approach, which made it possible to focus on a specific range of topics/issues that were most relevant to the research, but with a flexibility which allowed the researcher to take cues from the respondent about what to ask them. In this way attempts were made to follow the conversation as opposed to the schedule, following up specific responses which could not have been anticipated in advance (see Seale, 1998). For instance if the respondent began talking about what their community meant to them when discussing what they liked about living in High Wycombe, then wherever possible, that line of conversation would be acknowledged and the next question would be one about community. By following the narrative provided by the respondent and making connections between issues, it is hoped that the respondent was made largely unaware of the interview schedule and as far as they could determine the researcher was having a 'conversation' with them.
Open-ended questions ensured the respondent had something concrete to think about and answer as well as giving them the freedom to interpret the question and explore the issue in a way that was most relevant to them. In this way it is hoped that the researcher avoided imposing their ideas on the respondent, giving the respondent more freedom in, and control of, the interview situation so that a fairer and fuller representation of their perspectives was produced. It was this dual function of the qualitative interview that made it particularly appropriate to this research process, providing a balance between the researcher's and respondent's agenda.

Moreover, interviews were deemed the most appropriate way of generating data, as only by talking to people was it realistically possible to generate data, especially when considering the sample in the study. It is argued that for a large number of the sample, consigning their thoughts and ideas to paper would have been very difficult. It is necessary to understand that some would not be able to read and write while for others the general act of 'form filling' would still be difficult. As Ali found in her research of Kashmiris living in Luton, many were just not used to putting pen to paper (1999). Furthermore, the research questions this study was looking to explore were rather complex and it was assumed that answers would not be clearly formulated in the respondents' mind in a way which they could simply articulate. It was suspected that many of the respondents would never really have sat down and thought about some of the issues before. The interview situation would not only allow such occurrences to reveal themselves, an important finding in itself, but would also allow the interaction process that
Observations

Little systematic observation work was carried out in this study, that is, the process of ‘registering, interpreting and recording’ observations (Gans, 1989:54). Put more precisely, observation has not been a self-conscious method of generating data in this study. On reflection this was an oversight, as it is recognised that participant observation, could have been useful in creating a more holistic picture of how Muslims were ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship (by exploring what people say as well as what they do). However this does not mean that no observation occurred and indeed it is argued that despite this, observation was a key element in making sense of the data generated.

Observation, it is argued, occurred whilst in the interview situation, which most often was the interviewee’s home, as well as in many other social contexts – for example, whilst out shopping in ‘Bury Park’, at religious gatherings, at dinner parties, funerals and weddings. In these situations observations were registered, interpreted and on occasion recorded in a ‘reflective diary’. It is recognised that a more rigorous approach to recording would have allowed observations to form an integral part of the data generating process. However, these observations still have an important role to play in the interpretation of data generated through the interview process. Observation has been possible, because of the researcher’s ‘insider’ status.
I, as the researcher, am a British born Muslim of Pakistani origin. As such I have a religious background that is shared by the people in the sample and many commonalities of culture, dress and language. This has enabled me on many occasions to be what Gans defines as a total participant, where the fieldworker is completely involved emotionally in a social situation and who only after it is over becomes a researcher again and writes down what has happened (1989:54). My participation was ‘approved’ because I was seen as ‘one of them’. It is because I did not have to be resocialised with another society substituted for my own (see Frankenberg, 1989) that this process was made easier and, in hindsight, a less structured process to participant observation occurred. If I had felt I did not understand the custom and traditions of South Asian Muslims and was coming into this study from the outside - say as a White, non-Muslim researcher - there may have been a more urgent need for more recorded observations. As a South Asian Muslim myself, this need became less obvious. What was more important was to find out the reasoning behind certain actions and feelings, which the interview allowed me to do.5

Qualitative methods and ethnography in general have long been viewed with some scepticism by those who subscribe to a more positivist, ‘objective’ form of social science research. As Rengert states,

Ethnographic research is the least scientific of the research approaches since, by definition, it involves a small sample size, is difficult to replicate,
and contains a great deal of subjectivity and interpretation on the part of the researcher. Ethnographic research needs to be supplemented with carefully designed research projects in which the ideas developed are subjected to scientific rigour (1997:465).

The nature of ethnographic research, often conducted in faraway settings by individuals and producing nonduplicable results, has lent the approach, in the eyes of some, a certain lack of validity.

Indeed, in interviews, both individual and group, there is a risk of biasing the data generated. In both cases, every opportunity was given for respondents to direct the discussion and explore issues in a way that was most relevant to them (see above). However, this did not mean that the researcher’s interests were not represented at all. Indeed they obviously have to be to produce data that are relevant to the study. Researcher involvement in the interview situation in this way has led some to question the reliability of the data generated. As Morgan explains in reference to focus groups,

The fact that the researcher creates and directs the groups makes them distinctly less naturalistic than participant observation so there is always some residual uncertainty about the accuracy of what the participants say. In particular, there is a very real concern that the moderator, in the name of maintaining the interview’s focus, will influence the group’s interactions (1997: 14).
It cannot be denied that the researcher’s typically close involvement in ethnographic work does raise questions about his/her influence on the events and persons involved. However, this does not mean that the researcher should, or can, be detached in the process of data generation since, as Sherif says, ‘the days of producing value-free, “objective” research seem to be over’ (2001:436). Instead it must be recognised that what data are generated are not only a result of what the respondents say but also the result of interaction between the interviewer and interviewee (Mason, 1996) or as Scott points out,

"The qualitative interview is a socially constructed encounter, and the data produced are as much a product of the social relations characterising the process as the research methods used (1999:87)."

As Hammersley and Gomm point out ‘bias is an inevitable feature of any account’ (1997: 1.4)

To ensure validity, that is ‘gaining an accurate or true impression of the phenomenon under study’ (Shaffir and Stebbins, 1991:12), consideration needs to be given to instances of (1) ‘subject error’, that is catching the respondent on a bad day. For instance one of the women that was interviewed for this study was pregnant and was also having to entertain her 2 year old child intermittently while doing the interview. At times this meant she was distracted and as the interview went on she became tired. In this instance the interview continued because,
despite the distraction, she welcomed the company as it was ‘making time pass’;
(2) ‘Subject bias’, where the respondent tries to give the answers he/she thinks the
researcher is looking for. For example it became obvious that, despite efforts to
get people to relax and be comfortable, in a couple of the interviews the
interviewee often responded with what they thought was the ‘correct answer’ to
the question. This was the case for one woman because she did not really believe
she had anything valuable to say:- what could I, an educated woman want to know
from her, an uneducated woman? She was not used to being asked her opinion
and was, at least in the beginning, wary of saying the wrong thing; (3) ‘Observer
error’, the researcher having a bad day. The interviews in the study lasted from 2-3
hours. Listening for those periods of time was on occasion quite draining. In
recognition of this no more then one interview a day was conducted (although it is
recognised that having an interview schedule did help focus the interviews, both
for the respondent and researcher); (4) ‘observer bias’, the researcher interpreting
something wrongly. This is always a danger in any interpretative methodology
and therefore through the interviews a technique of paraphrasing and reflecting
what had been said was employed. This gave respondents the opportunity to
correct the researcher if she had misunderstood what was being said (see Robson,
1993:67).

In addition to the above, it is argued, the ‘insider’ status of the researcher (see
above) impacted on the data that were generated. Not only does this need further
exploration but the ambiguity of this status and the implications of this on the
research process, need to be highlighted.
METHODOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

The Partial Insider

In some way the fieldwork stage of this study was the most emotionally demanding. This was primarily because of my ‘insider/outsider’ status. As stated above I was an ‘insider’ because of my common faith. Where appropriate I made my introductions in the Islamic way. As another Muslim I was asked to make a presentation at a local religious event that was being organised by one of the respondents for local children. I was an ‘insider’ because I shared a South Asian cultural tradition with many of the respondents. This meant, where appropriate I wore a shalwar kameez when interviewing. Primarily this was the case when interviews were being conducted in someone’s home, particularly when the interview was with those who’d had the formative years of their life in their country of origin - in recognition of the fact that self-presentation can influence ‘field relations’ (see Neuman, 2000:354 for the importance of the presentation of self in the field). In High Wycombe (one of the sites of study) I was an ‘insider’ because I was born and brought up there and because my parents had lived in the area for some 35 years, becoming well known in the ‘community’. This ‘insider’ status holds with it a number of advantages. Key is the advantage of easier access to the field and enhanced rapport with the respondents in the study.

According to Shaffir and Stebbins,
Access will be shaped by the cultural and ascriptive differences between the field researcher and the researched. Where these differences are minimal, access and even acceptance are likely to be enhanced, but where the differences are large participation opportunities may be constrained severely and even eliminated (1991:26).

With regards to researching minority ethnic communities there is evidence to suggest that there is distrust of researchers who are seen as ‘outsiders’. John Gwaltney, a Black anthropologist, has written about the mistrust of white social scientists expressed by black men and women. They reported, ‘I wouldn’t want to talk to any anthropologists or sociologist or any of those others if they were white because whatever I said they would write down what they felt like, so I might just as well save my breath’. Another said ‘We know white folks but they do not know us, and that’s just how the Lord planned the thing.... Now they are great ones for begging you to tell them what you really think. But you know, only a fool would do that’ (cited in Anderson, 1993:41). In contrast to this, Andersen writes, minority scholars doing research on minority groups are ‘less likely to experience distrust hostility, and exclusion within minority communities’ (1999:41). Penelope Scott, a Caribbean researcher, found this to be the case in her interviews with Caribbean diabetes patients. As she writes,

I would certainly argue that there is evidence suggesting that my own Caribbean background was a distinct advantage in facilitating the interview process with the Caribbean interviewees. Rapport with the
Caribbeans developed spontaneously. ... We traded stories about how we ended up in England what part of Jamaica or the Caribbean we are from. The ensuing discussions were punctuated with heartening stories of loneliness and isolation as well as details of the trials of family demands... encounters with racism and love triangles (1999:87).

These stories Scott argues were an important marker of trust and rapport, and facilitated an understanding and interpretation of the issues of the research as 'the data are contextualised by rich personal histories'. Indeed in this study it was often expressed how the fact that it was 'one of our own' doing the research was a welcome change.

Rapport is built by getting along with members in the field, it means forging friendly relationships, sharing the same language, laughs, and cries with members ‘moving beyond understanding to empathy – that is, seeing and feeling events from another’s perspective’ (Neuman, 2000:356). It is because the white interviewer is seen as not having the language or the cultural equipment to elicit or understand the black experience in this way that communication can be inhibited. As Blauner and Wellman state,

There are certain aspects of racial phenomena, however, that are particularly difficult, if not impossible, for a member of the oppressing group to grasp empirically and formulate conceptually. ... We refer here to the nuances of
Minority scholars, on the other hand may generate questions that are different from those asked by majority group researchers, questions that gather information others could not. For instance would Jinaid, one of the respondents in this study, have revealed to a white researcher that he believed Christians and Jews ‘can never be your friends’. By matching interviewers and respondents by a series of social characteristics it is argued more inclusive research that incorporates the experiences and perspectives of minority groups can be produced (see also Douglas, 1998).

It became apparent very early on that my ‘insider’ status was important to those I interviewed. This was exemplified by the fact that upon entering the interview situation respondents would ask me about my background: ‘Are you from Luton?’, ‘Are you a Muslim?’, followed by questions about my family background, where my parents were from in Pakistan, where they lived in England, how many siblings I had, and what they did for a living. Only once I had been ‘researched’ could I begin with the interview. To expect respondents to reveal important and personal information about themselves if I was unwilling to do so myself would have been untenable (see also Oakley, 1990). In this way a feminist approach to interviewing was adopted, instead of what Stanley and Wise (1983) call a ‘textbook’ interview, where the interview is a one-way process of gaining answers from people but not answering their questions.
As stated there are many advantages to being an ‘insider’ in the way described above. However it has been argued that respondents aware of the researcher’s knowledge of the subject matter may withhold information they see as too obvious, or too deviant, in the light of a ‘shared reality’. As Bhopal states,

*When the research and the researched operate from shared realities, there may be a tendency to take too much for granted.... Familiarity with the phenomena under study... risks blindness to certain details that may be important (2000:74).*

‘Over-rapport’ in this context can be a problem so that the researcher becomes blinded by the familiar. In this context it is looking at the ordinary through the eyes of a stranger that can help overcome the boredom of observing ordinary detail (Neuman, 2000:355).

First, it must be acknowledged that it is not being argued that White researchers cannot research into minority communities but that in doing so, ‘white scholars must work in ways that acknowledge and challenge white privilege and question how such privilege may shape research experiences’ (Andersen, 1993:51, see also McLaren, 1993 and Scott, 1999:89). In addition, as an ‘insider’ who is perceived to share a reality and understand the ‘norms of behaviour’ of the respondents, there were instances when respondents would begin to say something but finish with ‘...but you know how it is’. In these instances it was presumed because I was
a Muslim, or because I was a Muslim woman, or a daughter brought up in a Muslim household, I had a greater insight into what was being said. As such it was felt there was no need to articulate what was meant any further. With regard to sharing information which was ‘too deviant’ in light of a shared reality, what is meant is that as one Muslim to another there may be behaviours and actions that are difficult to reveal. As discussed in previous chapters Islam as a prescribed religion states what is allowed (halal) and what is forbidden (haram). One Islamically forbidden activity is drinking alcohol. By implication this means ‘good’ Muslims don’t go to pubs, nightclubs or other places where there may be alcohol present. In the British context this has wider implications with regards socialising, friendships and general issues of social ‘integration’. Indeed, as one Muslim interviewing another, there was one obvious instance (and perhaps others that I was unaware of) where it was felt the respondent did not feel comfortable in revealing instances of where he did partake in non-Islamic activities for fear of being judged. Where such revelation was forthcoming there were times it was ‘justified’ to the researcher as an exception to the rule: it was ‘...someone’s leaving do at work’.

While recognising how being an ‘insider’ can affect the research process, it is argued there are techniques that can be employed to overcome some of these issues. Issues, which it is argued could occur in any social research, not just when it is a minority interviewer, interviewing minority communities. For instance, there is no reason to think that a young person would be honest about all aspects of her/his life to an adult interviewer in their 50s for instance. It would be up to
the researcher to acknowledge what impact their characteristics had on the research process, as well as to think of techniques to overcome any barriers. In this study all the interviews, with permission of the respondents, were tape recorded. Often if people did say ‘...but you know how it is’ I would ask them to expand on their answer anyway ‘...for the sake of the tape’. Moreover in all of the interviews I made it clear that I was there to learn from them. I presented myself as ‘an acceptable incompetent’, that is as ‘someone who is partially competent (skilled and knowledgeable) in the setting but who is accepted as a non-threatening person who needs to be taught’ (Neuman, 2000:359-60). For those who were older (in particular the men) the fact that I was young helped in this process (at the time of the interviews I was 24); for those who were particularly religious, imparting their knowledge to someone they saw as less knowledgeable about Islam encouraged ‘conversation’ and ensured detail emerged (in one instance where this was the case the interview lasted for almost 4 hours).

The fear of being judged is a very real one, for both the researcher and the researched. For the researched this fear is linked into issues of confidentiality. It is also linked to, ‘norms of behaviour’ expected of Muslims by Muslims. With regards confidentiality it was recognised (particularly for those interviewed in High Wycombe – my ‘home town’) that respondents may have been wary about what they said for fear of it ‘getting out’ into the public domain. I was very aware of the fact that some of those I interviewed had friends and relatives that my family or I knew. For this reason, particular attention was given to explaining the
research ethics under which the study was being conducted, of which confidentiality was a major part. On reflection the fact that far more respondents than not, were happy to talk to me about the fact that they went to nightclubs, or drank alcohol or even smoked hash indicated to me that this was enough to put them at ease (as Shaffir (1991) notes concern, apprehensions and anxiety about the fieldwork can sometimes be unfounded in practice). However it is recognised that another way to put people at ease is to show respondents that you know the realities of living as a Muslim in a British context, about revealing something of yourself and engaging in the interview in a way that tells the respondent that you will not be judgmental, but rather understand. Although good in theory, in practice this can be quite difficult.

As stated earlier the fear of being judged is not exclusive to respondents. I, as a female Muslim researcher was very wary of being judged and labelled. Unlike the respondents, who could be reassured their confidentiality would not be betrayed, no such reassurance could be extended to me as the researcher. Also a judgement had to be made: in some situations active engagement through the interview process was necessary as explained earlier; in other situations it may be desirable, such as when you know the respondent is perhaps trying to tell you something but is not quite sure how you will react; however in other situations it may be wholly inappropriate. As a Muslim, and more specifically as a Muslim woman, there are certain norms of behaviour that would be expected of me, and in certain situations revealing that I do not adhere to those norms could be detrimental to the interview process, as how could respondents feel comfortable
talking about their lives to someone who they felt had little respect for her own
culture and religion. It is for this reason, I would argue, that although a certain
amount of engagement in the interview process in necessary and desirable, it is
not always appropriate.

Criticisms of 'over-rapport' fail to recognise that the 'insider' status is not a fixed
identity as there were times and contexts in which I was considered to be an
'outsider'. As Phoenix states,

One person can simultaneously be an insider on one social category and an

In Luton I was an outsider because my family were not local to the area and such I
was not local to the area (despite having lived in Luton for almost 3 years at this
stage). It is for this reason, for example, that it was in Luton that I was asked
about my personal and family background more often then in High Wycombe. For
these respondents I was primarily a student from the University of Luton who
happened to be a South Asian Muslim. At times I was an 'outsider' because I did
not share the national origin and/or ethnicity of the respondent. I am Pakistani in
origin, from the Punjab whereas many of those that I interviewed were of
Bangladeshi, Indian or Kashmiri origin. This in itself did not cause too many
issues except perhaps linguistically. I speak Punjabi and Urdu and interviews,
where requested, were conducted in these languages. However I do not speak
Sylethi, the language spoken by the majority of Bengalis or Pahari, a dialect of
Punjabi spoken by the majority of Kashmiri's. Because Pahari is a dialect of Punjabi, a language I speak, interviews with Pahari speakers were not too difficult – besides in all instances accommodation was made by the respondent to the fact that I was a British born Punjabi speaker, in that they would tailor their language to a way that they knew I would be able to understand. With regards to interviews with Bangladeshi Muslims, this did have to be limited to English speakers only. I was an 'outsider' or at least different because I am an unmarried Muslim woman who lives away from home. To a large extent Muslim women, do not leave their parental home until they go to their marital home (with the exception of perhaps living away from home to go to university, and even in this case, where possible it is preferred if daughters commute or go to home universities). Moreover I was of marriageable age yet unmarried. Insider/Outsider status therefore was to an extent a negotiated identity. Where it was felt distance was required, distance was maintained, where it was felt closer contact was necessary this was negotiated. This leads to discussions of power relations.

Experiences of Power Relations

By negotiating my 'insider/outside' status I as the researcher was taking control of the relationships that would develop with the respondents. Essentially this meant, initially making contact, doing the interview, and then leaving the interview situation. I did not attempt to keep in contact with the people I interviewed other then if they knew other people I could interview (see sampling section below). The exploitative nature of this relationship was always at the
forefront of my mind, in particular with some of the women that were interviewed, who wanted to ‘become my friend’. As Stebbins acknowledges,

Semi-structured interviews... tend toward the development of interpersonal relationships as the interviews unfold (1993:250).

This was very true for the interviews conducted for this study. Even before entering the interview situation, I may have met or spoken to the respondents on a number of different occasions – at a health fair or a college where I had initially made contact; this would be followed up with a ’phone call where I would have talked about the research in a bit more detail telling them what I was asking of them. With each contact made a relationship, to some degree, was formed. Beginning the interview we would chat, exchanging experiences and understanding of our commonalties; during the interview I would ask many personal questions about their background, their family, their feelings, hopes and fears (see Box 5.1 for more details of the interview schedule); once the interview was over, we would again resume conversation, about ‘what now?’ both for myself and for the respondent. Where interviews were conducted in people’s homes, it wasn’t unusual for the respondents to say ‘now that you know where we are you mustn’t hesitate in visiting us, we are like your own family’, particularly in Luton when respondents found out I was living away from home, with no relatives close by. These offers were genuine and heart-felt and I believe that if I had taken them up, they would have welcomed me into their families without hesitation. So why wasn’t contact of this nature maintained, when I did feel that I
owed something to the people that had helped me out and were so generous with their time and hospitality?

**Box 5.1: Themes covered by the interview schedule**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant History</th>
<th>Religious Education</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Connections to Country of origin</td>
<td>Multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim/non-Muslim Boundary</td>
<td>Level of education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship</td>
<td>British schooling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Society</td>
<td>Discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Views wider society holds of Muslims</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation/representation</td>
<td>The Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This is where the power balance shifts into the hands of the respondents. I was afraid that I could never live up to the expectations that some of the (older or more religious) respondents had of me. As Shaffir points out,

> By its very nature, field research requires some measure of role-playing and acting. In order to be granted access to the research setting and to secure cooperation of his or her hosts, the researcher learns to present a particular image of himself or herself (1993:77).

What some of the respondents saw was a young Muslim woman, wearing a *shalwar kameez*, respecting the norms of a Muslim household, studying Muslims and asking questions about Islam. None of this was untrue, but what they took away from this image was a whole set of other assumptions about what my life was like and what my values would be. I as a Muslim woman did not want to
disappoint them, for them to find out at some later stage that I was not who they thought I was, to feel betrayed that they had shared their life with someone who was not who they thought she was. High Wycombe will always be my home town, a town I visit weekly, Luton is a town I live in – in this way I will never ‘leave the field’, and precisely for this reason I could not maintain contact with individuals – for there is always the chance of them bumping into you doing something they would not ‘approve’ of. Besides, as Taylor states,

The better the rapport and closer the relationships, the more likely people will feel used when the researcher starts to leave the scene or disappears altogether (1993:244).

If close contact is not maintained hopefully that feeling of being used can be kept to a minimum. Therefore in this context it was felt, despite theoretical objections (particularly form feminist researchers), that a certain level of ‘detachment’ was necessary (see also Melrose, 1999).

The fact that I am a woman left me feeling ‘powerless’ in some of the interviews. I remember one instant while conducting an evening interview in the home of a male respondent, mid-conversation him telling me he thinks I am pretty. This, along with the fact that we were alone in his house, made me very aware of my own vulnerability and ‘powerlessness’ as a woman. The fact that interviewees asked me questions about my personal background, at times, left me feeling
exposed, the 'power' inherent in the relative anonymity of the interviewer in the
'textbook' interview being stripped away.

Other ways in which power was in the hands of the respondents was by the fact
that they could pull out of the research as and when they pleased. Before
beginning the interview, all respondents were told that their involvement was
voluntary; that if at any stage they did not want to continue or if they were
uncomfortable with any specific questions, they were free to pull out or not to
answer. Although no respondents 'pulled out' in the sense that half way through
they decided they no longer wanted to continue, there was one very memorable
occasion when 30 minutes into the interview the respondent got bored and said
'right, you have interviewed me, now it is time for me to interview you'. For her
the interview was over. She went out, made tea, brought in some food, and then
we were joined by one of her neighbours who had popped round for a chat. At the
time I remember being incredibly frustrated, as I had explained the interview
would take at least 2 hours and asked if she would have this time to spare. In
retrospect, she had every right to 'turn the tables' on me and it was a good sign
that she felt she had the power to do so.

Power relations exist in any given situation. In the interview situation this was
recognised from the outset. Key in trying to ensure that respondents felt they had
some power within the interview situation was to ensure respondents were
informed about what they were letting themselves in for. Therefore considerable
effort was made to ensure respondents were aware of what the research was about and how the information would be used. As Shaffir acknowledges, however,

Presentation of self as well as the research are not organised in a vacuum but are shaped by the people in the setting with whom the researcher interacts (1993:78).

Therefore, depending on the respondents' general understanding of research, an appropriate explanation of the research was given. For some this meant a very broad statement about the research, that it was about Muslims who lived in Britain, trying to explore how they felt about living here and the tensions and problems they may experience. For others who were more familiar with the process of research a more in-depth explanation was given. What was most important was to offer a meaningful explanation that reassured the respondents and did not overwhelm them. For some respondents this meant offering reassurance that there were no 'right' or 'wrong' answers, and that they had no reason to be apprehensive about the interview. They were told that if something did not make sense they should feel free to say so and, as stated earlier, if they felt uncomfortable responding to something that it was perfectly fine for them to refuse to answer. In this way, it is hoped, consent was truly informed.

Cotterill points out how interviews are 'fluid encounters where balances [of power] shift between and during different interview situations' (1992:604). Therefore there were other times when power lay with the researcher. It is
recognised that I had the power because I, to a large extent, had control of the questions that were asked, I was the ‘educated’ one\textsuperscript{10}, and I was the one doing a PhD. As stated earlier, far from presenting myself as the ‘expert’ I presented myself as someone who was there to learn from them. Part of this meant downplaying my academic status. I was merely a student doing research and only when pushed did I say I was doing a PhD. This was in part a learned response. I found that, in some cases, the fact that I was doing a PhD, would erect a barrier between the respondent and myself. An assumption would be made that I must think I am special or extra clever. For instance, I remember one respondent (himself very well educated) being quite aggressive towards me, as if testing me. By the end of the interview, when I had proved myself, he made a point of telling me he had been impressed by my attitude – almost as if he was telling me, he did think I was ‘normal’ after all.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it has to be recognised that power is always disproportionately placed in the hands of the researcher, as ultimately they have the role of ‘official narrator’, in this case, of the lives of South Asian Muslims in Britain. As Bhopal points out,

\begin{quote}
Our status as researchers often gives us the power to initiate research: to define the reality of the ‘other’, to translate the social lives and language of the ‘other’ in terms that may not be their own…. The researcher, by virtue of having the data, has the power as to what to present’ (2000:76).
\end{quote}
The responsibility of presenting the findings in a way that does justice to those that I spoke to throughout this study has weighed heavily on me. I have spent weeks agonising over how I can represent the data in a way that does justice to the lives of the respondents. Can I make generalisations when each individual is the product of similar yet a unique set of experiences, and life chances? Are there not always exceptions to the rule? Do I know enough to say what I am saying? After all, as Taylor states

our understanding of the social world is necessarily incomplete and imperfect, representing an approximation and oversimplification, .... There are always deeper levels of understanding (1993: 242).

THE RESEARCH PROCESS

Sampling

The population under study was South Asian Muslims living in Britain, or more specifically South Asian Muslims who are British nationals, living in the locality of High Wycombe, Buckinghamshire and Luton, Bedfordshire. In order to select a manageable number of respondents, non probability sampling was undertaken. A combination of quota, purposive and snowball sampling techniques were used.

In quota sampling, categories of people must first be identified. In this instance it was decided to interview both men and women and those who had spent the formative years of their life in Britain, and those who had spent the formative
years of their life in their country of origin (see Chapter One). Once categories of people are chosen then a decision must be made as to how many to include in each category. In this instance it was decided to have an equal number of each.

The sampling plan therefore looked as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1 – The Sampling plan</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Formative years in</td>
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<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Formative years in</td>
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<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
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</table>

Quota sampling as Robson points out however is ‘representative only in numbers, not in terms of the type of persons actually selected’ (1993:140). Thus the quota sampling technique was used only as a framework to focus the sample, ensuring significant population differences that were important for the study were incorporated.

It is recognised that with this form of sampling it is difficult to represent all the population characteristics accurately. However, it must be noted that this was never the aim of the research. The nature of the research was exploratory and rather than to generalise to the larger population, the aim was to gain a deeper understanding of types through discourse analysis. Also Tonkiss points out,
As the primary interest which the discourse analyst has in personal accounts is not so much the views being expressed, but how different views are established and warranted, questions of representativeness are not so crucial (1998:253).

However, this does not mean that issues of representativeness should be ignored completely. A major criticism of quota sampling is that ‘once the quota sampler fixes the categories and number of cases in each category, he/she then uses haphazard sampling’ (Neuman, 2000: 197). Haphazard sampling, it is argued, is when a researcher selects cases that are convenient or easily accessible, so for instance interviewing the first five men brought up in Britain, that are encountered. Nothing prevents the researcher from selecting people who ‘act friendly’ or who want to be interviewed, often running the risk of neglecting people who are inarticulate, very old, or difficult to reach. This as Neuman points out, can seriously misrepresent the population under investigation. It is to avoid these pitfalls of quota sampling that purposive sampling techniques were also employed.

Purposive sampling, or ‘judgement sampling’ as Honigmann (1989) refers to it, uses the judgement of an ‘expert’ in selecting cases. A sample is built up which enables the researcher to satisfy his/her specific needs in a project. It is through purposive sampling that as many different respondents as possible were targeted, which also sat neatly within the broader sampling plan above. Neuman explains how purposive sampling is appropriate in three situations. First, a researcher uses
this technique to select unique cases that are especially informative. Second, it may be used to select members of a difficult-to-reach population. Third, purposive sampling is employed when a researcher wants to identify particular types of cases for in depth investigation (2000: 198). It could be argued that all three reasons for using purposive sampling are appropriate to this study. Purposive sampling was used to select unique cases that were especially informative. In this instance a few cases were selected because the respondents were very active within their respective ‘communities’. Although they were asked to conduct the interview from a personal perspective, it was felt that they would have a more informed opinion on many of the subjects and would be able to draw from a wider experience base. This was important taking into consideration the relatively small number of interviews conducted in this study. Secondly purposive sampling was also used to target what would ordinarily be difficult-to-reach populations. The researcher was not interested in targeting only groups who were eloquent, well educated and informed. It was necessary, in order to address the balance, to also target cases who would have had no reason to think about many of the areas of investigation or who were not so forthcoming with their opinions. In order to access such groups, help was enlisted from local youth groups, women’s groups, and educational establishments like schools, colleges and adult learning centres. It is through ESOL classes for instance that access was gained to people whose voices are often unheard because they do not speak English and do not have much contact with mainstream society. Therefore purposive sampling was used to identify as many different types of cases as possible. Not only was this sampling technique used to target specific cases, but
this technique also allowed a range of characteristics that could have been important in the population under investigation to be kept in mind. Some of the factors kept in mind when selecting respondents (other than those already included in the sampling plan) were as follows:

**Marital status** – the aim was to interview both those who were single and those who were married. However, also taken into account was if they had children and what age the children were, (i.e. were they of school age, or grown up adults). This was deemed important as an indication of life cycle which in itself could be an influencing variable on opinion and experience.

**Level of religiosity** – It is recognised that determining how religious a person is, is a very subjective task. However because a main aspect of this study was looking at how religious belief affects ideas of citizenship and living in Britain, this had to be kept in mind. (In practice both ends of the spectrum from very religious to not at all religious it could be argued were targeted, with the former being identified by their clothing and Islamic discourse and the latter admitting they were not religious at all.)

**Employment** – attempts were made to interview those who were in employment, those who had retired or were unemployed or had never worked in this country.
Age – It was important that the age group be as wide as possible. However it was decided the minimum age would be 18 – a reflection of the voting age\textsuperscript{11}.

Finally snowball sampling methods were also used mainly to gain access into the ‘community’ networks. Robson argues that this method of sampling can be seen as a particular type of purposive sample whereby those that have been interviewed are used as informants to identity other members of the population. This technique was employed due to the ease with which access to certain respondents could be gained. In this research it was generally found that though the informant was not interviewed themselves, because of their position within the ‘community’, they were able to recommend others who would be suitable candidates to interview. This method tended to be employed in particular when looking for suitable male respondents.

Because of the nature of this technique, however, it is very easy to end up interviewing a group of friends or a close network of people, who because of similar life experiences share many views in common. Also it was found that often those recommended were educated, eloquent and well informed individuals who had a lot to say. For this reason, snowballing was limited in its use and was only used in conjunction with the other methods outlined above.

Analysing Talk

From the tape recorded interviews full transcripts were typed up – although laborious, this process does allow the researcher to gain a much closer
appreciation of what might be emerging out of the data. This was also important, if the way people articulated their ideas was going to be explored. Each transcript was then coded.

Initial coding of transcripts was done with the aim of developing a coding frame which could be inputted into SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social Sciences) to provide a basic description of the data, and explore if any patterns were emerging, highlighting where further analysis would be most fruitful. In this way it was a form of content analysis (see Slater, 1998) that was done at this stage of the analysis.

It is recognised that decisions taken at this stage in a research project have important consequences in that the

quality of a coding scheme influences the eventual quality of data analysis, for it is in coding schemes that a researcher becomes committed to particular ways of categorising the world. Coding schemes can be narrow, artificial devices that hinder thought, or they can contain the seeds of creative new insights (Seale and Kelly, 1998:146-147).

In the hope of doing the latter, the coding frame was devised from reading and re-reading of the transcripts, with codes emerging from the data, and as such the coding frame was not finalised until the last transcript had been coded (see Appendix three for the coding frame devised for this part of the analysis).
This analysis did provide a way into the mass of data that had been generated by the interviews and it gave a flavour of what was coming out of the data [see Chapter Six]. However, it was also very restrictive in that it did not allow for an exploration of the complex and multiple ways in which respondents answered questions or the fact that many responses could only properly be understood in the context in which they were articulated (see Box 5:2 below).

The next stage of the data analysis, aided by the use of ATLAS.ti, allowed for an exploration of these complexities. ATLAS.ti, through the coding process, has allowed lengthy transcripts to be broken down into manageable chunks. It has allowed for definitions of codes to be captured easily, as Seale and Kelly point out,

> The meaning of particular code words can develop as new segments of data prove hard to fit into existing coding categories. It is, therefore, important to record definitions of code words, [and] any changes to these (1998:154).

It has allowed for complexities in the data to be explored in context, as you are only ever a couple of mouse clicks away from the full transcript. This is important when one considers that it was discourse analysis that was embarked on, an approach which recognises that people modify their discourse to suit the context in which it takes place. As Tonkiss points out,
For the discourse analyst, this means it is necessary to be sensitive to the small scale interpretative context of the data, including the type of interaction, the relations between the actors, and the immediate discursive aims of the speaker (1988:249)

Box 5:2 – Illustrations of the difficulties encountered during initial coding

**Example one:** A response that is not neatly assigned to one category. When asked, “what makes you a citizen?” this could not be pinpointed to any one particular thing. Instead it was a combination of factors:
- Duties
- Rights
- Residence
- Passport
- Security
- Birth
- Identity

Also ‘duties’ for instance, meant different things to different people. For example:
- Working
- Obeying laws (as long as they don’t contradict Islam)
- Paying taxes
- Loyalty to state
- Bringing up children to be good citizens
- Exercising rights given

**Example two:** The ‘true’ meaning of a response can only be engaged with by understanding the context in which it is articulated.

When discussing issues of culture, seven respondents felt they were not influenced by other cultures. However this response can only be made sense of in the context in which it was articulated, and more specifically in this case, how respondents defined ‘other cultures’. Therefore, it is because most of these respondents defined ‘other cultures’ in opposition to their ‘own culture’ that they could say categorically that they were not influenced by ‘other cultures’.

Also by telling ATLAS.ti basic descriptive/demographic information about the respondent, (i.e. whether they are a man or woman, have had their formative years in Britain or country of origin....) it is possible to explore data accordingly. Most importantly however ATLAS.ti has allowed for the rapid retrieval of information.
from a mass of otherwise unwieldy transcripts (see also Coffey et al, 1996, Kelle 1997, and Lee and Fielding, 1996). It has not done the analysis but has aided it, as Barry states,

CAQDAS [computer assisted qualitative data analysis software] does some tasks for the researcher: data administration and data archiving, but only provides assistance in the theoretical thinking and analysis itself, which is as it has always been, the job of the researcher themselves (1998: 2.9).

In combination with the SPSS aided analysis, which essentially counts the number of times something occurred, it is hoped that analysis has not only been thorough but also ‘truthful’ in that the researcher has not simply trawled through a mass of data and selected anecdotes to report that support her particular bias.

Essentially when analysing, the interviews have been used as a topic ‘Where the accomplishments of participants are investigated through a detailed examination of the language people deploy’ (Seale, 1998: 215). Key has been to investigate the linguistic repertoire that is employed, thus describing the resources, (i.e. the words, phrases and ideas) upon which people draw in constructing accounts. The aim has been to determine what are the characteristics of certain popular discourses and to what effect are they used. This does not mean that the analysis has been trying to look for one ‘true’ account; as stated earlier it is the complexity of the data that is trying to be captured, thus recognising that people will say contradictory things and present themselves differently, and present different
explanations at different moments depending on the context in which the conversation is placed. As Tonkiss states,

Meaning, for the discourse analyst, is contestable, and specific texts are always open to alternative readings. The discourse analyst, like other social actors, aims to provide a persuasive account, which in this case offers an insightful, useful and critical interpretation of a research problem” (1988:259).

The idea is to examine the way language is used to present different ‘pictures’ of reality, ‘pictures’ which the analysis of this data has tried to capture by way of a typology. Thus attempts have been made to categorise the sorts of experiences South Asian Muslims in Britain can have with regards to adapting to citizenship (see Seale and Kelly, 1998). In this way an inductive approach to the analysis has been taken, in that ‘one moves from the particular case (the study) to the general social theory’ (Kellehear, 1993:21). However, what is important to point out is that, in reality the theory and data have had a dialectic relationship, in that although it is true to say that the data has informed the theory, it is just as true to say that the theory has informed the analysis. Concepts that have been constructed to explain what is coming out of the data have been informed by the theory (for example concepts such as ‘modernists’, ‘insider’, ‘outsider’), and by the data (for example, the claims by some respondents to be ‘cultureless’).
The scope of the research

Focus Groups

Five exploratory focus groups were conducted as preliminary research in the larger research programme. The groups were organized so that each population subgroup required was covered. Men and women were interviewed separately to respect Muslim sentiments about mixed gender relations and ensure participants felt comfortable. Homogeneity of the participants' backgrounds was maintained as far as was possible, to ensure willingness to discuss a topic was not hindered.

The groups were as follows:

Group 1 Men who had spent the formative years of their life in their country of origin;

Group 2 Women who had spent the formative years of their life in their country of origin;

Group 3 Men who had spent the formative years of their life in Britain – all still within the education system;

Group 4 Women who had spent the formative years of their life in Britain;

Group 5 Men who had spent the formative years of their life in Britain - who had entered the world of work.

The majority of the participants in Groups 3-5 were British born South Asian Muslims.
The groups varied in size, from 7 participants in two of the groups, to 5 and 3 in the other three groups. Ideally a focus group should consist of about 8 people if the group dynamics are to generate data that are, as stated earlier, a product of group interaction, rather than a question and answer session. Thus it has to be recognised that some of the groups were too small and as such lost some validity as focus groups. However, this did not mean that the data generated were entirely invalid, especially when considering their exploratory use.

The groups were conducted in the language chosen by the participants, i.e. Punjabi or English. All groups were put together by first getting in touch with a key contact of that age group. The contact then got in touch with others they felt fitted the criteria stated to them. The moderator then got in touch with all those who had shown an interest to explain the nature of the study and what it was that was required. A date and time was then set. Each group discussion lasted one and a half to two hours.

Focus groups although a good forum for discussing and articulating ideas, were not very practical for all the sample population under study. They were difficult to set up. This was particularly the case for groups 3-5. A high level of co-operation was required from the respondents. Groups 1 and 2 were conducted in High Wycombe and participants were from the community to which the researcher is considered an ‘insider’. These two groups were therefore the easiest to organise and greater co-operation was shown by the participants. Furthermore, the participants had time on their hands as most were retired or did not work.
Groups 3 and 5 were conducted in Luton. The small number of participants (3 in each group) was due to a number of factors. Most importantly, the participants of these groups were working and were therefore harder to get into contact with because of their busy schedules. Many could not turn up on the day and also had less of an obligation to turn up as they did not know me through the community networks. Group 4 had five participants and again those who worked or had child minding problems were unable to turn up or had to leave early.

**Interviews**

In total twenty-three interviews were conducted, producing approximately a thousand pages of transcript. Nine interviews were held in High Wycombe and fourteen in Luton. Eleven were conducted with men, 12 with women. The age of the respondents varied from 19 to 60. Sixteen respondents were Pakistani, 5 Bangladeshi and one Indian. One considered himself to be both Indian and Pakistani. As with the focus groups, all the interviews were conducted in the language respondents felt most comfortable in. This meant the majority of the interviews were conducted in English (15) with the remaining 8 conducted in Urdu and Punjabi (including two which were a mixture of Punjabi and English). Eight of the respondents were single, fourteen married and one widowed. Fourteen respondents were British nationals and nine had dual nationality, of those that had not been born in Britain, the number of years they had been living in Britain ranged from 5 to 40 years. The sample fitted into the original sampling plan as follows:
Table 5.2 – Achieved sample structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MALE</th>
<th>FEMALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formative years in</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country of origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formative years in</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The original sampling plan (Table 5:1 above) provided a framework on which to base how many people should be interviewed. As seen above, in Table 5:2, two extra participants who had the formative years in their country of origin have been included to the original plan. This was to ensure the sample also fitted the purposive sampling that was aimed for (see above). In addition, it must be noted that the twenty-third respondent did not fit neatly into this sampling plan because she was born in India but educated and brought up in Nigeria, with her higher education split between India and Britain. However she was the only Indian Muslim in the sample and as such her representation was important.

In the next two chapters the thesis moves on to consider the specific findings from my empirical investigation.

1 The term ‘generating’ rather than ‘collecting’ data is used because, as Mason points out, ‘most qualitative perspectives would reject the idea that a researcher can be a completely neutral collector of information about the social world.’ (1996: 36). Thus by speaking of generating data rather than collecting data it is acknowledged that the researcher actively constructs knowledge about the world ‘according to certain principles and using certain methods derived from their epistemological position... it implies also a data generation process involving activities which are intellectual, analytical and interpretative’ (Mason, 1996: 36)

2 Focus groups, as a technique, have over the last ten years been borrowed and adapted from the established set of practices in marketing research, in which they have been the dominant from of qualitative data generation.

3 Morgan and Krueger, in 1988 were the first to attempt to broaden the scope of focus group research into the social sciences

4 On a more practical note, having an interview schedule allowed the researcher to keep a note of what had been covered and what issues had yet to be explored.
Although as a more experienced researcher now, I would always recommend keeping a reflective diary, as however obvious something is at the time of carrying out your fieldwork, your memory often fails to re-call the observations and feelings at a later date. As Kleinman states, ‘We must be sure to keep extensive notes on what we feel (including how we feel about others’ reactions to our study), especially at the start of the project. We must write about why we chose the setting, who we are at the moment, and how our identity affects our reactions to the setting and its participants’ (1993:194)

In the focus group situation this meant that an topic guide was used to ensure all topic areas that were not brought up by the participants themselves, could be introduced to the discussion. This ensured that certain topics were more or less always covered.

For instance questions allowed the researcher to focus those who were garrulous in ways which were not entirely relevant.

The interviewee in this case was asked if she wanted to stop and finish at a later date, but she insisted we carry on. This is in part a reflection of the fact that she saw it as part of her duty talk about Islam (dawah) and as such was used to talking at length.

Although difficult to determine what is the average marriageable age the idealized age seems to be between 18-21. This meant there were at least three different occasions where conversations went on to respondents knowing potential suitable partners...if I was interested.

I have put ‘educated’ in inverted commas to denote the fact that although in some cases I had the formal education and the respondents did not (although many of those I interviewed were formally educated to degree level and beyond), it was still recognised they were educated in many other ways. Education through their lived experiences is in the interview situation, just as, if not more, important. It is those experiences that the researcher is trying to capture and learn from.

The decision not to interview anyone under the age of 18 was partly a practical one as well – in terms of issues of parental consent.
CHAPTER SIX

TALKING CITIZENSHIP

In the main, this Chapter will describe what came out of the interviews that were conducted to inform this thesis. However, what must be understood is that an inductive approach to the analysis (see Chapter Five) has meant that in reality the data have informed the theory (as explored in Chapters Two and Four) as much as the theory has informed the data analysis. What follows, therefore, is an analysis of the data as it relates to the previous Chapters, while a synthesis of what this means for Muslim ‘adjustments’ to British citizenship will appear in Chapter Seven.

The sample was made up of 12 women and 11 men. Five were of Bangladeshi origin, one of Indian, 16 of Pakistani, with one respondent identifying himself as both Indian and Pakistani. Ten of these respondents had spent the formative years of their lives in Britain, while 12 had spent the formative years of their life in their country of origin, with one respondent having lived in a number of different countries during her childhood. The ages of the respondents ranged from 19 to 60, with all of those who had spent the formative years of their lives in Britain being under 40, while the majority (8) of those who had lived the formative years of their life in their country of origin were over 40. Eight of the respondents were single, 14 married (all but one of the married couples had children) and one widowed. Of those who were born in their country of origin and migrated to Britain (16 of the sample) the majority (11) had lived in Britain for over 16 years.
Four main reasons were cited for migrating to Britain, namely, work (economic), family reunification, education and marriage to a British born spouse (see Chapter Three, and Box 6:1 below). All of the sample held British nationality (although nine of the sample had dual nationality) and thus were British citizens. All identified themselves as Muslim.

Box 6:1 Reason for migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>The main reason was that in our country there were no job sources or a standard of living, these things you could say are equivalent to not existing at all. So this is the reason I came from there to here (Mr Chaudry)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Family reunification</td>
<td>My father was living over in Britain. And we were living in Bangladesh, it wasn’t my wish to come to Britain, it was basically my father’s wish. But we came over here (Amin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>My reason for coming here was to study further, for further education. I thought either I will do a PhD or I will become a medical doctor (Mr Syed).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marriage</td>
<td>The main thing was my marriage. Once I got married, she couldn’t live there but I can live here. This is why (Jinaid)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

THE INTERNALISATION OF WESTERN NOTIONS OF CITIZENSHIP

In Chapter Two it is argued, ‘There is little evidence to suggest that people speak the language of citizenship – except in the formal passport-holding sense – in their everyday lives’. And indeed, when asked what makes you a citizen of Britain, having a British passport, was a primary response. However, when asked to define citizenship it was to a notion of ontological security that most respondents referred to. By this what is meant is that respondents talked much more about having a sense of belonging, about having their identity accepted and being protected as equal citizens, through rights owed to them as citizens. In this way it was to a much ‘thicker’ definition of citizenship to which they referred. The next
two chapters will explore in what way this 'thicker' definition of citizenship was articulated by reference to strategies. The concept of strategies therefore is used as a way of describing the discursive formulations by which respondents engage with or appropriate concepts relating to citizenship.

For some respondents and in some contexts the guarantee of individual rights (and a commitment from them to fulfil their citizenry duties in respect of those rights) was enough to make them feel secure. In these instances respondents adopted the strategies of equal freedoms and having the same rights as other British citizens. The strategy of equal freedoms essentially referred to the individual’s right to be left alone. This desire for freedom was expressed most often in three main contexts, in reference to freedom of speech, freedom of belief or in particular, the freedom to practice Islam and freedom of movement/association (See Box 6:2 below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 6:2 Discursive strategies relating to concepts of freedom</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Freedom of speech</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>I want everybody to have right to freedom of expression, opinion...</em> (Masoud)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>...have the freedom of say and opinion</em> (Parveen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Freedom of speech, right to demonstrate...right to express their views</em> (Naveed)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key to this strategy was the right of the individual to be free from restriction or as Amin put it, having ‘independence and no string attached... on your culture... identity... religion... language....

Participants also expressed how to be an equal citizen meant also to have the same social, political and civil rights as any other citizen of Britain.

As a citizen, I should be given equality in the market of employment, equality in terms of welfare, what welfare I can receive, equality in terms of civil rights, to vote, to have a say in the judicial system, that kind of thing, or to have use of the judicial system if need be, those kind of things (Natasha).

Some felt this was the case,

our rights are the same as the rights the gora get... we are equal to them (Mrs Khan).

I think we have as many right as their own local people have... that just as they have free education for their children so do we; ... we have the same rights as getting a job as people from other communities have. If there is any discrimination then you can go to court. Because in this country there are not these things, everybody gets equal opportunities; then obviously a person gets it into his brain that we have the same rights to everything as other people have. (Mrs Kazmi)

As the quote by Mrs Kazmi illustrates, for most it was important that both formal (e.g. the freedom from discrimination) and substantive (e.g. education) rights be protected. Unlike Mrs Kazmi however, while understanding citizenship as the right to have the same rights as other citizens, most felt this was not the case in
reality (or in some contexts), procedural equality did not necessarily translate into substantive equality. As Amin illustrates below,

*Do I have any rights as a citizen? ... in terms of paper legislation that is there. But in reality how far one is able to enjoy that is a different matter altogether. And I don’t think we do, I don’t think we are enjoying the full rights in this country at all*

Having the same rights therefore did not mean you were being treated equally to others. Substantive rights, it was felt, were often denied because of prejudice and discrimination.

Although many stated they had not had any direct experiences themselves, most still believed prejudice and discrimination were still prevalent in Britain. Most comments were about the existence and consequences of ‘racial’ prejudice. However there were a few in the sample who felt the prejudice they experienced was first and foremost because they were Muslim.

*... no I haven’t come across anything racist. .... Now there’s a shift towards the Muslims, you fundamentalist, you activist. But from ... high school era, I don’t think racism is as much a problem as it used to be because you’ve got a new threat which is our real identity of Islam. (Sanah)*

While views such as Sanah’s were in the minority, the data do show that the issue of religious discrimination, and discrimination against Muslims in particular, was still of great concern with only four respondents stating that religious discrimination did not exist.
between a black person or an Asian. They will first prefer the black person because he is a Christian.... it [discrimination] does happen more to Muslims (Mrs Ali)

Discrimination and prejudice against Muslims was seen to be a particular problem for those who were easily identified as Muslim,

...when you’re wearing hijab and you go somewhere and they just stare. ...It’s not just happened to me, it happens to other girls as well, and they go for a job and they don’t want to give you it, they think oh no these are too religious people, we don’t want them here. ... one place they did say that you know, oh no we don’t want Islam, fundamentalists and this and that. (Shazia)

Muslim woman wearing a hijab is now more likely to be attacked because she is wearing the hijab, than a black woman or something. So you know there is something specific called Islamophobia, there is something called religious discrimination that goes on in this society that we are not addressing at the moment and I think these issues need to be addressed (Masoud)

Having said this the majority recognised the prejudice of wider society was probably multi-layered, as Mr Syed explains in reference to applying for jobs,

for a start they don’t know who is Muslim and who is not Muslim, when they see they see black or brown. The first prejudice starts from there. ... Second when we write down our name they know that’s a foreign name, maybe a PhD or MA ..., but that’s foreign, so you’re out from there ... Third one you see, in the column you say what religion or whatever you belong to, you say Islam, and third thing starts from there.

In part, it is this belief that often left participants feeling like ‘outsiders’, feeling that they were not really equal citizens with equal rights as these rights were not practised in a fair way by others in society. For these respondents, true equality meant more than the liberal notion of individual rights and duties. It was more
about being treated in a just and fair way (see argument about 'just treatment' below), a large part of which was to be respected and recognised both as individuals and as members of distinct communities; communities which may have needs and obligations. For this reason equality was more about positive substantive rights that afforded recognition and respect (as opposed to merely negative formal rights and duties).

For these participants, to be recognised for who you are meant, in part, not expediting rights in a colour blind fashion but recognising difference and what this difference means in relation to rights. As Amin points out in reference to the education system,

Everyone should have the right to, you know their own culture, their own religion, their own history and so on. But if you go on to the education system which is an important institute in people's lives as individuals, does not accommodate those. I mean ...where do you see talks about, British history ...from a sub-continent perspective... the history about Bangladesh the history about Pakistan, the history about India it should have been taught here, because it is a multi-cultural society and you have a couple of million people who are from that part of the world, in this country. Therefore I mean as an individual I'm not given my individual right you know, to access those kind of facilities.

From this it is possible to see how on one level children of South Asian parents are getting the same rights as their white counterparts because both are getting the same history lessons. However, while one group is learning about their heritage through these lessons the other group Amin feels is not only being denied this privilege (as the education is not fully representing their heritage) but is potentially being harmed by such education which can often be presented in
Eurocentric ways. In this context it important that substantive rights actually recognise difference in relevant ways if they are to be meaningful.

Unlike those who felt that just because Muslims got the same rights as other citizens they were equal, those who adopted this more solidaristic discourse felt that you couldn't treat everyone the same because Muslims were not the same. As Amin explains,

"you cannot treat everyone the same, I cannot treat you the same as another man, because you are different, you are a woman. ... We cannot say as black people we want to be treated like white people, we cannot say as Muslim we want to be treated like Christian. We cannot, no one should be treating us like Christian, we are Muslim which we should be treated like Muslim therefore we have to treat people differently, with respect to their own background and identity."

Recognition of difference, it was believed by some, would foster a greater sense of inclusion in wider society as was shown by comments made when participants felt their needs had been recognised.

"X Council they're getting to be very understanding, like for instance, I was on the team for the new community centre which is going to be hopefully opening up in X. ... they asked the community what do you want, ...we said we'd like a prayer room and it will be going ahead now. (Parveen)"

"They're trying and least now they have in mind, yes they should recognise the Muslim's tradition, at least, I'm very pleased, well quite for a long time I think for a couple of years, they have introduced halal meat in X hospital. So halal meat is available there, and very recently I have received some communication from the Health Authority, they're arranging training for cultural, social awareness, of the Muslim people... For their staff. (Mr Qureshi)"
Lack of acknowledgement and recognition often left participants feeling that they were not accepted by wider society. Asma, talking of the lack of recognition of Eid at her daughters' school shows, in contrast to the above, demonstrates how even small gestures of recognition would mean so much,

... I mean even in school, the one that my daughter goes to it's ... got quite a sizeable majority I think of Muslim children ... And it's very sad that she came home on Wednesday, Eid was on Thursday, that they didn't send her, ... a card or anything, .... We'd taken in chocolates, we'd taken in cards and it would have been really nice for her to get something from the class...

Recognition in relevant respects, therefore, was not seen as a way of increasing social isolation in respect of wider society and in no way was it felt that by focussing on difference, citizens would be prevented from thinking about the common good. In fact quite the opposite was found to be the case. It was those who argued for recognition rights who accepted the more communitarian element of citizenship.

Unlike the minimal rights and duties expressed by those who adopted a more liberal individualistic idea of citizenship, those who adopted a more solidaristic notion emphasised a more comprehensive notion of duties, and understood these to be as important, if not more important than their rights. As is evidenced in the quotes below, many of the Muslims interviewed did have a shared civic purpose and solidarity with wider society

*I think living in this country you have a duty to protect this country .... We are living in a multi-cultural and multi-racial society, we have duty of making sure that that is going to work. So there are duties in every respect,
you know. If you're living in a certain area you have obligations to make sure that area is safe, secure, not for only yourself, but for the other people living in that particular area (Amin)

Well first of all when you feel yourself, you are a citizen then you have to be very much involved, with the community and the socio-economy life of this country, and you should be, because you are part and parcel of the community, ... (Mr Qureshi)

To have difference recognised and needs which stem from this difference addressed and respected was seen as evidence that Muslims were finally being accepted as part of British society. The solidaristic discourse of recognition was most evident when the discursive strategies of 'reasonable treatment' and/or 'just treatment' were adopted towards rights and citizenship.

As stated above, for some (or in some contexts), to be an equal citizen meant to have equal freedoms or the same rights as other British citizens. For others however the issue of greater importance was just treatment, to be treated fairly. The idea of equality as justice, where justice meant 'even-handedness' was articulated by all the participants (with the exception of some of the engaged Muslims – see Chapter Seven). This 'justice argument', stipulates that if one person or group is given a certain right then this should be extended to other individuals and groups. Some participants concluded from this that because the rights that some Muslims were arguing for were not extended to other citizens in equivalent ways, they should also not be given to Muslims. In relation to providing Muslim children Islamic education in school Mr Sarwar said,
Because if you say that they should give Islamic knowledge and you try then it will happen, fine. Tomorrow Jews will say that we should give our children our knowledge about Moses, and so they will give that education. Then Hindus will want them to learn about Ram, this is what knowledge should be given and then they will teach about Ram. Then the true education is gone, then all is left is religious education. Then this is what will happen, if you demand then obviously Sikhs can demand as well that there should be our education about Guru Nanak. There should be this education but not that it has to be in school.

As can be seen from the quote above, Mr Sarwar felt if you were going to provide one group with a certain facility then it was only fair that other groups could also ask for the same facility. However this will, he believed, put pressure on existing services that already survive under limited resources. Where resources are limited Mr Sarwar believed cultural and or religious rights had to be curtailed if basic social rights such as education were to be maintained adequately. This was a sentiment also supported by Naveed,

*if you want to set up schools teaching Islamic values and provide halal meat and the communities can finance that, that’s fine, you can’t get tax payers to finance that, that’s difficult because what about if the Jewish community wanted to do that or whatever. I mean, you know, there are all sort of various communities, will be vying for their interests, to support it.*

Again it was felt that current resources did not allow for cultural/religious rights and as Naveed later goes on to say ‘on a general principle of fairness’ if communities could fund themselves, be able to exercise equal freedom, then that was enough to ensure equal citizenship (illustrating how the strategies of individuals need not draw exclusively from one discourse). In contrast to this, where it was felt that certain groups in society were getting rights which were not being extended to Muslims, the ‘justice argument’ led to the conclusion that it
would only be fair to extend these rights to Muslims as well. As Mrs Ali commented,

*We want our children to learn ... in school as well, that they [the school] should tell them ...you are Muslim, you have these rights, these needs, you should know. Like they [Christians] tell about their own religion, our children should also know.*

In contrast to Mr Sarwar above, Mrs Ali engages in the same justice discourse to argue that Muslim children should be taught about Islam in School. This in itself highlights how notions of rights, and what it means to be an equal citizen, cannot be discussed out of context. It is because Mrs Ali’s perception of what is the current situation is different to Mr Sarwars’ that both, using the same argument, come to different conclusions.

The justice argument is quite a powerful one. For example, although the majority of participants (but not all) were not in favour or were, at the very least, cautious of Muslim schools, some argued in favour of them on the basis that this was only fair. As Naveed explains,

*the government has to be seen to be even handed, so if the Jewish community gets state funding for schools ..., then there is a case for saying, right, what about the Muslims’ kids, ... I think it’s the importance of seeing fair play, in, you know the mixed society, that’s important.*

When Naveed was asked if he would send his own children to a Muslim school, although saying he would ultimately leave the decision to his children, he also said 'I’d strongly suggest that, what do you want to do with your life, if you want
to work in this country, then it will probably work against you’. Despite this, he could see that with current state support of non-Muslim denominational schools it was unfair if the same support was not offered to Muslim schools as well (see Box 6:3 to see in what other contexts the strategy of justice was adopted to argue Muslims were not being treated fairly because rights afforded to others were not being extended to them).

Box 6:3  Contexts in which it is felt Muslims are being treated unfairly

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘If things fairer we would have Muslim schools...legal protection’ (Masoud)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Well we should be a part of the religious discrimination act, not as ethnic group but as a religion as a whole. ...they do it for other religions, they do it for the Jewish and the Sikh people, but then they are classified as an ethnic group, and we’re not really an ethnic group because we’re so diverse aren’t we. So it’s got to be under religion (Asma)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity is protected by the law...but Islam isn’t...I think the other religions should be covered by it. (Amin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Blasphemy...protect the other religions...(Mr Qureshi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are not expected to work on Christmas, they get that opportunity, why should we do that, why shouldn’t we have an opportunity [for time off at Eid]. (Parveen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘we observe the holidays of the Christian religion...but...Eid...is not observed...think it should...regard ourselves as British...are... citizens like another Christian person in this country’ (Amin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘If providing service to everyone,...got to cater for all their needs (Noor) – [NHS cater for all the different traditions surrounding death]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Everybody in going their own things, we never stop them, so why should they stop us’ (Mrs Ashraf)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

However, in relation to just treatment some of the sample did think that it was only fair that Muslims be reasonable in their expectations. In the context of work this meant understanding how employers may not be willing to employ someone
who was overtly a Muslim, (i.e. someone who supported a beard or wore a hijab).

As Zafar points out, in relation to his friend who is 'not willing to change his beard, his look',

I can understand ... from an employer's point of view, I can really understand it. It's difficult for them to do that [employ his friend], ... especially if this person is devout, if he wants to pray five times a day ..., if he's refusing to shave his beard off and he has to represent the company, you have to dress within a certain way when you're representing the company anyway, professional, aggressive, whatever....

Pragmatism suggested to those who adopted this strategy that it was only fair that Muslims adapt their needs, based on their Islamic beliefs, to reflect the society in which they were living. The strategy of reasonable treatment highlighted how religious and cultural rights had to be curtailed especially when services were over stretched as it was. This argument came out in particular around discussions about the health service. For instance Mrs Ali whilst recognising that Muslims did have religious needs also felt that,

if we think about it then by coming to this country they have given us quite a lot of rights, we do not say that they are bad, that they have not given us rights, they have given us lots of rights, but just our religion is separate, then that does make a difference to us doesn't it. ... it makes a difference in factories, in hospitals, in schools. By the budgets being tightened it has made a difference everywhere. So in that way it affects religions as well. It affects blacks and gora as well.

In adopting this pragmatic approach, some of the participants renegotiated Islamic principles to fit the context in which they were living, as is illustrated by Parveen,
if you’re working in a ... factory ... they’re not going to stop the track just for you to go off and pray, and it’s understanding, because Islam doesn’t say you sit on your backside and just do your prayers and things like that, go out and do that, earn your living .... And if this is what you’re doing, you’ve got children you got to support and things like that, and you’re earning a living for them, that’s the way of Islam, your not doing anything wrong there. And there is no other way of you getting out of, they won’t allow you time for prayers, then that’s fine, you can’t do anything about it.

For these respondents there was a need to recognise their current position in British society and negotiate their rights in relationship to this.

At the end of the day this isn’t a Muslim country, we cannot have everything our way (Noor).

In this country, as it is a non-Muslim country the expectations should be limited (Mr Qureshi).

We can’t have all our needs catered for (Mrs Khan).

However the strategy of reasonable treatment did not only put the onus on Muslims to be reasonable. It was recognised that this was very much a two-way relationship where reasonable treatment was expected in return. Here equality meant to be treated with understanding and consideration, meaning rights afforded as British citizens should be open to negotiation. This narrative emerged, in particular, in the context of exercising religious duties in the workplace. It was felt that employers, whilst not being forced to allow Muslims to exercise such duties, should be willing to show some flexibility towards such needs, show a ‘willingness to learn’ about Islam (Noor), ‘recognise and respect the Muslim religion’ (Mr Qureshi), ‘be sensitive’ (Mr Chaudry), illustrating ‘an attitude of
understanding’ (Asma), or as Danial states, ‘they should accommodate us, as we would accommodate them’.

Many participants did feel that this ‘attitude of understanding’ was increasingly being afforded to Muslims (see Box 6:4)

Box 6:4 – How understanding of Muslims is on the increase

Now I think most of the English people, they do understand as well, and I think they respect you as well (Mrs Ashraf).

If goras know, that this is their religion then they do accommodate (Mrs Anwar)

If I did go off and did my prayers, and I have done as well, it’s been fine and also I try not to, for instance Friday prayers which are special, I always make sure that I am at home at that time and my job allows this. (Parveen)

I think most people would try and let you do it [pray]. I don’t think anybody would say no you can’t. From my experience they are quite happy to find somewhere for you to pray. There is no problem at all. (Asma)

‘I’m sure that colleagues will accommodate it – ‘with creativity you can [pray]...it’s just depending on how strong your conviction is (Naveed)

‘even in factories they have given space where you can pray (Mrs Ali)

[NHS] ‘ward...pray. No one said anything – ‘no one stops you (Mrs Kazmi)

[NHS] – already sensitive (Mr Chaudry)

From the above, it is evident that South Asian Muslims of Britain in trying to secure ontological security engage in both liberal and solidaristic discourses of citizenship. These discourses are evident in the strategies employed, that of equal freedoms, same rights, reasonable treatment, and just treatment, which vary depending on the context in which they are being employed.
BRITISH MUSLIM IDENTITY

Reflecting on Chapter Four this section will explore how the Muslims in this sample expressed their identity. This will be done by exploring, in particular, how faith and culture were conceptualised and how important they were deemed in their everyday lives. It is important to highlight here that this section is not setting out to determine how religious Muslims in the sample were, for instance by counting up how often they pray, read the Qu’ran or whether they fast (i.e. whether they adhere to the codified aspects of Islam), as these indicators, it is argued are insufficient indicators of faith. As highlighted in Chapter Four, identity, despite being universal and group centred at one level, is also individual. This is backed up by the empirical findings which illustrate that how often someone prayed or read the Qu’ran for instance, was incredibly varied and did not necessarily correspond with self-ascribed notions of religiousness. For example, it was often the case that despite praying every week, fasting and abiding by Islamic norms of behaviour a respondent would identify themselves as not religious.

Moreover, considering the fact that religious expression was diverse raised the question of how ethical it would be for the researcher to judge how religious someone was? As highlighted in Chapter Four, such a task would run the risk of only reflecting the researcher’s own presumptions about what it means to be religious. For instance how would it be best to categorise someone who does pray five times a day, fasts and reads the Qu’ran but does so without questioning, while bringing into the religion what may seem to an observer as ethnic/cultural traditions? It would be just as easy to argue that this person is not really religious.
(because they limit Islam to the private sphere, confuse Islam with ethnic traditions, etc.) as it would be to state they are religious (because although much of their culture is made up of 'ethnic traditions', these traditions are constructed with Islam as their reference point and are therefore Islamic).

For the above reasons it was decided to explore the nature of Muslim identity by identifying the dominant discourses around Islam and strategies adopted in relation to these discourses (that is, what were the approaches adopted in relating to Islam by members of the sample), and not to determining religiosity. As highlighted in Chapter Five, this was done by analysing statements made about the self in relation to Islam and how it influences life in order to give preference to self-definition as opposed to one imposed by the researcher. The more codified aspects of Islamic behaviour were not ignored, but were considered important as part of the picture of what it means to be a Muslim of Britain instead of the defining feature. This recognised the fact that Muslims as individuals express their faith in a number of different ways despite the fact that Islam is a prescribed faith.

Before proceeding, it must be noted that when referring to the term dominant discourse in relation to the strategic repertoires in the following chapters, I am recognising the fact that individuals will, more often than not, draw from multiple discourses. By reference to a dominant discourse what is being recognised is that in some contexts, or for particular individuals, one discourse may be more dominant than others. As such (in the following chapters), when referring to the
dominant discourse I am using this term in the above sense, and (unless otherwise specified) not as articulated by Bauman (1997) as detailed in Chapter Four.

In relating my analysis of the data to what was coming out of the literature (see Chapter Two), I specifically noted (a) to what extent/in what contexts sovereignty of God was placed in its importance above the sovereignty of the individual and with what consequence; (b) to what extent the notion of tawhid was adhered to, or in other words, in what way did Islam influence both the private and public realms of life; and (c) to what extent was it evident that Muslims felt united by a political and religious ideals, that is, to what extent they related to any notion of the ummah.

The influence of Islam

For Muslims in the sample, two main discourses were articulated in relation to Islam, or more specifically, to the way it was perceived - discourses recognising individual 'I' expressions of Islam and discourses recognising the communitarian 'we' element of Islam.

An individual discourse, was typified by Masoud when he spoke of 'the way I express my Islam....' and Danial when he admitted,

"it's up to me as an individual whether I accept it [Islam] or not, and I tend to just take what I, basically what we do these days is just pick what we want, and what we don't want we just kind of put aside, what it is, is pick and choose, if I'd be honest."
For those for whom this was the dominant discourse, if Islam was considered important it was so because of ‘personal choice’ as opposed to a duty. For example Noor admits how she doesn’t drink, how she wears a headscarf in public and dresses modestly but how all these aspects of her lifestyle are a matter of personal choice. As she explains,

*I wouldn’t say that the other things that I do is influenced by religion, it’s more my personal choice. So I mean I’m not like, really heavily influenced by my religion. ... ‘cause like if I wanted to, you know it’s my personal choice, I could go out and do all of those things [drink alcohol, wear short mini-skirts], if I wanted to, but it’s just something, I’ve never done, and it doesn’t attract me.*

Islam was only important in that it provided the basis/foundation for life, a ‘moral code’ by which to structure life. For others, who adopted this discourse however, Islam did not affect their life in any substantive way at all, as Khalida admits,

*I would say it [Islam] does not affect my daily life at all actually, no. ...Because I don’t do my namaz anymore ... It doesn’t have any direct affect on my day to day life, no, not at all.*

Or as Mr Sarwar said, Islam ‘just influences my thoughts’. Some (despite still being proud to be called Muslims) even identified themselves as not being religious at all. As Zafar says,

*... To be honest with you I don’t really believe in religion....., Well I don’t want to be struck down by lightening (laughs). But I tell you..... (pause) deep down I don’t really, to be honest with you, I really don’t.*
In contrast, a communitarian discourse of Islam regarded Muslims not as individuals but very much part of the wider imagined Muslim community as Masoud explains,

*However secular or religious we are, I think we can broadly define ourselves as belonging to or having, an Islamic culture. A universal Islamic culture.*

The fact that Masoud draws from both the individual and more solidaristic discourse around Islam illustrates how the discourses identified in this Chapter, are not exclusive, and the complexity of what it means to be a Muslim.

Whilst acknowledging the diversity present amongst Muslims, this more solidaristic discourse recognised that Muslims were united by a belief that they all share (recognising the nature and strength of this belief to be considerably variable and complex), that is the belief in one God and the Prophet Muhammad as His Messenger.

No matter which angle your coming from... at the end of the day you pray in the same line... to the same Allah... there's that bond... that's your brother... sister... united from their aqida' (Sanah)

*I don’t think practically it will ... ever be possible at all, to say that it's one Muslim community. Because, when we come from different parts of the world, say Bangladesh, Pakistan, for example we will see ourselves as Bangladeshis, it's quite natural for us to see that. But at the same time we are Muslim, and you know, although by the very fact of you being Pakistani and I being Bangladeshi, we have that if you want to call that our nationality, or the cultural differences or the language differences. But what is uniting us is that Islam, the religion.* (Amin)
In everyday life this translated into quite a strong bond as Asma illustrates,

*If I see somebody Muslim, I talk to them simply because they’re Muslim, even if I didn’t have anything else in common.*

Therefore, despite the fact that only one member of the sample directly referred to the notion of the *ummah*, it was evident that Muslims did believe that, as a group, Muslims had a common bond which united them to the exclusion of non-Muslims. For two respondents this was highlighted when asked whether they had British nationality. Both (British born) respondents were uncomfortable with this question clearly stating that nationality was not of importance to them but a mere consequence of holding a British passport. Of importance was that they were Muslims, and in this context, this meant to the exclusion of any ethnic/national identity.

What the data also suggest is that this discourse is becoming increasingly influential amongst Muslims. In other words Muslims are increasingly (albeit in much more subtle ways) relating to other Muslims as Muslims as opposed to the fact that they are also from the same country of origin, or because they are from the same *biraderi/zat*. This was evident when questions were asked about marriage and how respondents would feel is a close member of their family were to marry a non Asian Muslim, i.e. someone who was definitely not in their close family network or wider *biraderi*. There were a number of responses. Some felt they would not mind as long as they were Muslim but recognising others may object,
As far as I can see there's nothing wrong with it, because at the end of the day, it's the religion that matters more than, the culture... [but] other people within our culture, they wouldn't accept it, because they'd see me as an outcast, because I'm going with a non-Bengali person (Noor).

Personally I wouldn't have all that much of a problem. But because of the influence of society that we live in for example if we take Bangladeshi society, the expectations of this society is for someone to get married to someone from their own society. Because of that influence, that pressure, I would think about it, but I personally wouldn't have any problem... because we are all Muslim, and we should be united by that identity (Amin).

Others admitted this is something that would sit uncomfortably with them.

*We do not like it culture-wise. Because our Islam does not prohibit it, ...But because our culture does not accept this, that a Muslim boy or a Muslim girl, that they are Muslim but that they are of different countries, different nationalities, the culture does not accept this. For this reason we also do not like this thing (Mrs Kazmi).*

However, there were a large number of surprising responses from those Muslims who are traditionally presented as being entrenched in biraderi/zat systems. There were a number of Muslims who had the majority of their upbringing in their country of origin who said their minimum requirement was that their children marry another Muslim and it did not matter to them what their ethnic origin was.

*with my children I will advise them to marry a Muslim, no matter what nationality (Shazia).*

*If they are Muslim then there is no harm in marrying. As long as they are Muslim. Just our religion should not marry into a different religion, so long as they are Muslim then they can marry (Mrs Anwar).*
Whatever Muslim it is, If a gora becomes a Muslim then you can marry him, it is totally jaiz (allowed), it is right, totally right (Mr Chaudry).

There is the possibility that respondents felt obliged in some way to give an Islamically correct answer. Also the sample is a relatively educated one, (out of the above it is Mrs Anwar who has had the least amount of formal education, and although she has very little English, she is literate in Urdu) and this can lead to less conservative opinions. Therefore whilst acknowledging the social systems such as those based on biraderi and zat are still strong in Britain, this is by no means to the exclusion of an overarching Muslim identity.

In fact it is argued that as Muslims live and grow up in Britain, attitudes may slowly be changing, both of parents and children (in some cases because of children). This is also evidenced if we look at the matrimonial columns of the Muslim press. Here, as Hewer points out,

> It is common for people to advertise for a marriage partner who is ‘an observant Muslim’ rather then belonging to any national or ethnic group. In this way the sense of belonging to one worldwide ummah is held to be much more important than colour, race, nationality or extended family (1994: 9-10).

Over time it is argued whether a prospective partner is a cousin or from the wider biraderi will not matter as much as it has done in the past. This can already be
seen to be the case as the number of Muslim couples from different ethnic/cultural backgrounds become more visible in the British landscape.

Being open to change was most likely amongst those who regarded Islam as *negotiable*, as opposed to *fixed and immutable*. To an extent it can be argued that even some of those who engaged in a negotiable discourse around Islam perceived Islam as immutable. This stems from the fact that Islam to a large extent is fixed and immutable and makes no apologies for being so. It is a prescribed, revealed faith and so does state what is allowed (*halal*) and what is not (*haram*) (primarily through the *shariah*, see Chapter Two). In many instances those who did view Islam as negotiable did so only in that their expression did not cross the fixed and immutable boundaries laid down by Islam. The key difference between these two discourses is that while those who viewed Islam as negotiable could see the potential in Islam to be adapted and interpreted, those who engaged in the discourse of Islam as fixed and immutable regarded Islam almost in essentialist terms, understanding it as a given faith.

With the former there was an awareness that Islam, over time, had been interpreted and adapted in different ways (although this did not necessarily mean they themselves interpreted Islam). As Helena and Amin explain of their parents,

*What they [parents] do is like culture is more important, the Bangladeshi culture, that's more important than practising Islam. ....they cling to culture and the traditional Islam, you know praying and stuff like that. ... its very spiritual without anything else, without any intellect in it. Because there are two sides of Islam, there is the emotional, spiritual one and there's the intellectual. You need it 50, 50. If you have just emotional, because*
emotions go up and down so your Islam is going up and down all the time, and if you have just intellectual without the emotional understanding then it's also not good, so you need both. ....our parents haven't got that, it's all emotional. So if something bad happens you know if something goes wrong, it's like whoosh all the way down and then, I am not saying everyone does but you know it is difficult, they find it difficult sometimes. (Helena)

I think with my parents it's more restricted in terms of they see Islam religion as much more private thing for themselves. And to an extent they see it as there is a moral duty towards the society and towards the community and so on. And they will give much more importance to doing the five times prayer, and paying the zakaat and doing the haj and all the five pillars of Islam, than the other side which is very fundamental, that to maintain an Islamic society and in order to maybe even create an Islamic society. The social side, in terms of the system, the political system, the economic system, the economic structure and the economics in Islam and the political system in Islam, the state system and things like that. (Amin)

This is not to say that those who engaged in the discourse of Islam as fixed and immutable were not aware that Islam had been implemented, interpreted and adapted in different ways over time, it is just that they did not engage in this type of self-development in relation to Islam. This has led to many of the participants, when asked if the expression of their faith differed in any way to that of their parents, to reply no, (See Box 6:5)

Box 6:5 Fixed/immutable discourse of Islam.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>What ever my parent learnt that is what we learnt</strong> (Mrs Ali)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mine is the same [as parents] ... absolutely, 100% (Mr Sarwar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don't think it's much different [from parents time]... still going on like this (Mr Qureshi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The way I learnt from them [parents] I'm doing the same thing (Mrs Ashraf)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parents 'did the same as us' (Mrs Kazmi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'The way I practised in Pakistan that's how I do it here – 'Parents used to practice</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The influence of culture

Religious and cultural identity are interlinked in complicated ways – these links however will be explored in greater detail is Chapter Seven. The aim of this section is to understand how notions of culture were understood by the Muslims in the sample, and what importance was placed upon culture.

Through analysis it emerged that participants were drawing from two broad discourses around culture. Culture was envisioned either as having set boundaries, that is being received as a given or as constructed. The latter discourse regarded culture as prone to change whereas the former, although recognised culture was not static, more often then not, deemed change to be a negative and unwelcome phenomenon.

Indicative of when culture was seen as a given was when participants held reified notions of culture, where culture was often reduced to South Asian practices and to some vague notion of a national culture based on country of origin.

Western style skirt... diverted from your own culture... has to be presented by either sari or shalwar kameez (Mr Qureshi).

In this way culture was often objectified into something that you can ‘carry on’ or ‘pass on’ (Parveen). Also present within this discourse was the idea of the ‘other’, hence differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ were highlighted in the sense...
that 'we are different to them' and 'us' having our 'own cultural background' (Mr Qureshi), as such terms of opposition were taken as received. As Jinaid exemplifies,

we don't share one culture. I have grown up in a different society, they have grown up in a different one. The work that I do they would not like it, for example if they talk about alcohol, it is not a topic for me, I don't even know what is it, I couldn't talk about it. Or if you go out with them, to a club or a pub - these are the things they enjoy most, that are totally not mine, I have no interest in them at all. So for me to go with them or fit in with them is very difficult. We follow totally different lines.

Implied in this 'outsiders' discourse (see below) was also the fact that culture was to a greater or lesser extent given, in that having bounded notions of culture necessarily implies the existence of ideas about what sits within those boundaries (see Box 6:6). For example Jinaid, in relation to culture, not only adopted an 'outsider's' discourse but also held set ideas about what he felt made up 'our' culture as opposed to 'theirs'.

What I mean by culture is that a mother and father look after their children, ... doesn't matter whether they are 18, 20, whatever age, ... Rather than living on rent they will keep them at home and support them. ... In return that child will look after his parents and do as they say when they are old. If you compare this to ... the white culture or others where they say to their child once he is 16 that you should earn yourself now, do your own work. And so they leave. In return when the parents are old they die in some alley and no one asks after them. ... After that in our culture if someone is in trouble or in difficulties then all the people come together and support them, whether this be financial support or other type of support. In other cultures no one even asks after each other, they don't even know who lives next door to them, whether they are alive or dead...

Those who held this more essentialised notion of culture were more likely to perceive change negatively.
### Box 6:6 Bounded notions of culture

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>'Our culture'</th>
<th>'their culture'</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani culture</td>
<td>Hindu culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Food</em>...<em>roti</em></td>
<td>White community <em>(Zafar)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Family/traditional values</em></td>
<td>Wider ‘British/American’ Culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistani culture</td>
<td><em>Music, Food</em> <em>(pizzas)</em> <em>(Natasha)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dress, lang</em></td>
<td><em>Pub, clubs, dress sense, way of life</em> <em>(Noot)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Traditional values</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our Bangladeshi culture</td>
<td>British culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Culture you’re born into</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our culture</td>
<td>Their culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Take care of parents</em></td>
<td><em>Gora...own children leave them freedom</em> <em>(Mr Chaudry)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>restrictions</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Respect other</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Khidmat to guests</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our culture</td>
<td>another culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Respect for elders</em></td>
<td><em>Queue system</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Look down</em></td>
<td><em>Look at cards</em> <em>(Mr Sarwar)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Give money when child born</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our culture</td>
<td>‘theirs’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Family values</em></td>
<td><em>Pub and clubs</em> <em>(Mrs Khan)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Own culture</td>
<td>This culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My culture</td>
<td><em>Western style skirt</em>(Mr Qureshi)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Sari/shalwar kameez</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Restrictive</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Following religion</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Don’t mix with strangers</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>No alcohol</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic culture</td>
<td>Kafir culture <em>(Sanah)</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast there were others who, in the main regarded culture as *constructed*. This meant that culture was perceived to be negotiable and subject to change. There was a realisation that people don’t live in a vacuum and as such can’t help...
but be influenced by their social surroundings. As Natasha points out when she was asked if she felt she was influenced by other cultures,

Yeah, obviously there is that, the media impact, you know having friends from that culture, and you know, noticing what they're doing, what they're into, that kind of thing, peer pressure as well, you know, in predominantly, I mean I went to a C of E school when I was 6, 7 up to the age 10, so, yeah, it's all been there.

Those who adopted this discourse realised that culture was 'a mixture of everything' (Mr Sarwar), it was about 'accumulating on your own knowledge' (Natasha) or as Masoud explains,

I could learn something tomorrow... and my culture would necessarily change because I would appreciate another aspect of... life.

Those who adopted this discourse believed culture could be subject to change, that it should be subject to change and that it inevitably is subject to change (see Box 6:7). This change was deemed primarily as positive and good.
Within these two broad discourses, four strategies around culture also emerged. Each was a reflection of participants’ self-identified cultural identity, in other words, how they felt culture impacted on their lives. Those who regarded culture
as constructed felt culture to be *self defining*, 'a way of life', others who, in the main, regarded culture as given and bounded drew on a reified discourse around culture, being concerned primarily with *preserving their group identity* talking about 'our' culture’, or as taking things from ‘other’ cultures. For those who drew on both discourses identified in relation to culture, that is perceived culture as both constructed and given, culture was either socially contextualised or respondents came to the conclusion they were ‘cultureless’ (see Figure 6.1).

**Figure 6.1 Summary of the discursive strategies adopted in relation to culture**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CULTURE</th>
<th>Given</th>
<th>Constructed</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CULTURAL IDENTITY</th>
<th>Preserved</th>
<th>Self-defining</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Group Identity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Those who were concerned with *preserving their group identity*, in the main, regarded culture as given and bounded. These participants therefore drew on a reified discourse around culture,

*my children keep their own culture* (Mrs Khan)
I want to keep my own cultural background...want my children to maintain that (Mr Qureshi)

It was those who adopted this strategy that were most likely to argue they had not been influenced by other cultures as is illustrated by Mrs Kazmi when asked if she felt she had been influenced by a different culture,

I don’t think so, this has not happened in my house (laughs), my children are just as they were when they came from Pakistan.

Others echoed this sort of statement,

I am not [influenced], not by anyone else’s culture (Mrs Khan)

I have my own culture (Mrs Anwar)

This is not to argue that they viewed culture as static but rather, like those who viewed culture as self-defining, they recognised that living in the context in which they did, change was inevitable. The key difference however, as mentioned above, was that this change was deemed to be a negative phenomenon and thus to be resisted.

In contrast, for others culture was regarded as self-defining, as ‘all pervasive...helps in forming who you are...helps us define ourselves’ (Masoud).

culture is my dress..., what I eat ... every single thing that is part of my life, the way I see it, is my culture. And that maybe defined by my particular
traditional background, religious background, or where I am at the moment in Britain, that may determine how I live my life and that also have an impact on me (Amin).

Culture is really huge, it’s so many things, so many many things from my inheritance and my history right through to my language and my looks, everything about me (Khalida).

the way you socialise and the way you live and the clothes you wear and the languages you speak and that sort of thing, food you eat, people you mix with, people you’re more comfortable with, that sort of thing (Asma).

These participants were willing to exercise their autonomy and as Masoud explains ‘take [the] best of other cultures... [and] use it in my personal life’ These participants therefore were quite flexible in their definition of culture and open to the idea that culture was in a constant state of adaptation.

Discourses around culture (as seen above) were not adopted in an exclusive way. A further two strategies were identified that engaged in both the discourses identified in relation to culture, that is understanding culture as constructed and fluid on the one hand, yet bounded and given on the other. For example, there were a small number of participants (three) who described themselves as ‘cultureless’,

I’m probably not very cultured, you know, I’m not sure what culture means (Naveed).

But culture’s like a weird word. I’m not really sure what it means or what you are trying to say that it means. But from my culture I’d say that I have a non descript culture because I have two sort of sources for my culture and they are both really really different (Khalida).
As is illustrated by Khalida particularly well, these participants although experiencing culture in a very fluid way, thought of it as given and bounded. Culture referred to all things Asian or, as Asad describes, 'the culture set by my parents'. Culture, in the minds of these respondents, referred to things like, 

Wearing traditional clothes, cooking, just general things really. ...You know the music they [parents] listen to, and things like that. But thinking about it from my point of view, I suppose I do eat food, like Indian, Pakistani food or whatever. I don't really wear shalwar kameez. I don't really listen to Indian music. Not a lot really more comes into culture, I'd say. I don't really visit home, well India, Bhopal and that. That's about it really, yeah (Asad).

As illustrated by Asad, because respondents felt the knowledge on which they based their social behaviour was more than that which came from their Asian heritage they had no/little culture.

The second of the two strategies which engaged in both the discourses was those who negotiated culture but from within a socially contextualised and socially acceptable arena. Many of these participants accepted that culture was constructed and subject to change, but deemed this change to be desirable only if it occurred within set boundaries. These boundaries were in the main either set by Islamic prescriptions, and/or negotiated from within the social norms of the 'community'.

In this way culture whilst being perceived as constructed was, at the same time, also perceived as bounded (though not immutable). For example, Amin admitted he wouldn't mind if his children learnt from other cultures ... 'As long as it doesn't contradict with my religion'. These participants therefore were more then willing to 'take a little bit of what works'.
Like others who engaged in a bounded and given discourse, culture was defined primarily in terms of South Asian practices, and participants accepted the idea of the ‘other’, in that culture was essentialised and reified ‘I think I'm divided between... two or three cultures...’ (Amin). Although culture was bounded in this way what was of importance was that these participants also regarded culture as constructed, in that adaptation and change were deemed to be acceptable. Change was not necessarily seen as a negative phenomenon (as with those who sought to preserve their group identity) nor always as positive (as with those who deemed culture to be self-defining); instead the context in which change occurred and the implications this had for Muslims were considered. This is illustrated by Asma as she explains in what way she was influenced by, what she termed as, ‘English culture’,

*I mean ... Muslims ... I know we’re not meant to celebrate birthdays but, you know you still have parties for your children. I mean that’s not Islamic culture but you do it because you’re living here and you’ve got to fit in with the rest of the culture here, you can’t just opt out in a way. I don’t think it’s harmful, I don’t think it’s doing anything that is detrimental so it’s fine with me. That sort of thing, ... Things like when we eat sometimes, we don’t always eat Indian food, we eat English food as well, whatever. And sometimes you eat with a fork, sometimes you eat with a spoon, that sort of thing.*

Also as Parveen says,

*I can dress Westernised, you know that’s no problem, for instance skirts, jeans, trousers, but then it’s got to be within limits. Again you go back to your culture. It is that mix and match sort of thing.*
To summarise two main discourses around culture emerged, culture as *constructed* and culture as *given*. Within these discourse four main strategies were employed by Muslims living in Britain. In some contexts, and for some people, preserving their group identity was of primary importance. For others negotiation of cultural identity, so long as those changes did not deviate outside of (Muslim) social norms of behaviour, were of concern. For others still the hybrid nature of their attachments led them to feel they were 'cultureless', whilst others recognised culture as self-defining. The key was that for all those that adopted the latter two strategies little trouble was experienced in acculturating into wider society.

**CONCLUSION**

The Chapter began by emphasising the importance of ontological security for the Muslims in this sample. For some, and in some contexts, having the same rights and/or equal freedoms as other British citizens is key. For others, and in other contexts, recognition of difference and just treatment are of greater importance. All findings imply that Muslims want parity of treatment and rights, a few believing negative rights are sufficient whilst the majority argue for more substantive equality. From within this debate, Muslims do recognise that they do in some ways form a distinctive group. For some this group identity needs preserving, whilst for others it is negotiable. A spectrum of views and opinions exist and which discourse is articulated and what strategy employed will, in large part, be dependent on the time and space in which it is being engaged. In Chapter
Seven a synthesis of the above will highlight what strategies South Asian Muslims are adopting to adjust to British citizenship.

1 Sixteen of the sample felt ‘racial’ prejudice was the problem in British society - over and above any prejudice they experienced as Muslims.

2 Reflecting the Shahada, that is the profession of faith 'I bear witness that there is no god but God and Muhammad is His Messenger' - As Ramadan reflects 'It is the foundation, the axis and the determination of “being a Muslim”' (1999:257)
CHAPTER SEVEN

'ADJUSTING' TO CITIZENSHIP

The aim of this chapter is to understand how Muslims living in Britain are adjusting to British citizenship. In doing so this chapter will see how the discourses and strategies identified in Chapter Six inter-relate to each other, articulating what strategy is adopted towards Islam and with what consequence for Muslim's lives in Britain. It is recognised however that the production of ideal-typical strategies that appear to be neat and comprehensive is problematic. Indeed as seen in Chapter Two, the labelling of Muslims into modernist, traditionalist, fundamentalist, Islamist, neo-revivalist, idealist, pragmatist, etc. is all too common, and in many ways too simplistic, especially when considering the diversity amongst Muslims as illustrated in Chapter Four. Furthermore, such labelling often encourages judgements of what type of person that is, with a traditionalist often seen as not forward looking, stuck within cultural practices; fundamentalists as those who translate the Qu’ran literally and thus out of context, leading to extremist, uncivilized behaviour; and modernists as the acceptable face of Islam in the West. Crude judgements are made and Muslims often end up having to prove their loyalty and commitment to living as Muslims of Britain. It is easy to see how extrapolating ideal-types falls into these traps and is potentially a problematic way of making sense of the data.

In endeavouring to make sense of the data in a way that is informative, however, it almost becomes necessary to collapse diversity and difference, not so that it's
existence isn’t recognised and deemed important, but so that it can be made sense of in a way that is informative. As Modood would argue (see discussion in Chapter Four above), in trying to produce a systematic summary of traditions, often rich and complex histories become collapsed into unified ideological constructs. This does not mean, however, that one should imply from this that everyone in a particular group will experience their identity in the same way. By talking of ideal-typical strategies, all that is being implied is that there is a range of strategies employed by British Muslims in making sense of their faith and culture in the British context or, to put it another way, Muslims make sense of their beliefs and practices in different ways and this is just one way of understanding the spectrum on which these beliefs and practices are interpreted. Therefore, the aim of this chapter is to understand the different strategies adopted by individual Muslims and how they impact on ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship, in other words on public engagement. This is done with the recognition that what strategy is adopted will ultimately depend on time and place, and the context and position in which people find themselves (and, as these change, their strategy towards Islam may change). What is articulated below are ideal-typical constructs and must be taken as such and nothing more.

Through analysis of the findings, four overarching ideal-typical discursive strategies have been identified: those of ‘Lapsed’/ambivalent Muslims, typified by ‘What do I personally believe and what I...do is different..., [I] don’t follow through....’ (Naveed); Engaged Muslims typified by ‘[Islam] affects everything I do’ (Amin); Selective Muslims typified by ‘I don’t pay much attention to my religion’...[but] I
respect it,... I’d never say anything bad against it’ (Khalida); and ‘Traditional’ Muslims typified by ‘[Islam] when it does affect then a person will do no wrong things’. Each ideal strategy reflects how Muslims perceive themselves in relation to their faith and culture, their personal ontology. In trying to understand what consequence this has for ‘adjusting’ to British citizenship, analysis has sought to explore how their personal ontology impacts on public engagement. Whether Muslims fully engage with wider society, separate themselves from it, or follow some middle pathway of engagement in some spheres of life but not others.

Taking each ideal-typical strategy in turn, this chapter will now explore the way in which South Asian Muslims ‘adjust’ to British citizenship in reference to both their personal ontology and their public engagement.

‘LAPSED’/AMBIVALENT MUSLIMS

‘Lapsed’/ambivalent Muslims (seven of the sample) draw mainly from an individual discourse of Islam, where Islam is regarded as negotiable. It is an individual discourse in that Muslims ‘pick and choose’ aspects of the Islamic faith that they adhere to. This was evident amongst the Muslims in the sample in that their narrative, regarding how their faith influenced their daily life was often contradictory. Some aspects suggest that they had a weak faith while others suggest that being a Muslim was very important to them (see Box 7:1)
## Box 7.1 ‘Lapsed’/Ambivalent Muslims

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weak faith</th>
<th>Strong faith</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| **Noor** | **If I didn’t believe in my religion or if I didn’t have strong beliefs towards it... then I’ll choose to do what I want, whenever**  
I’m not really like heavily influenced by religion  
I wouldn’t say I’m very strict religious person  
I’ve been known to go to bars as well, all sorts, a mixture  
I don’t pray as much as I should take care of my health  
I used to wear headscarf but have lost that habit  
I don’t wear - or wear it minimally  
I don’t fast during Ramadan  
**[Prays 2-3 times a day]** |

| **Naveed** | During month of Ramadan...religion gets strongest  
My faith is not...strong’  
I’m not practising very much at all  
I have different views about religion  
I’m not very active religiously  
I’m not very strict religious person  
I don’t pray as much as I should take care of my health  
I don’t wear - or wear it minimally  
I don’t fast during Ramadan  
**[Prays once or twice a month]** |

On the one hand, those who adopt this strategy have a relatively strong belief in the value of Islam. Islam provides the basis/foundation for life, always at the back of their mind and therefore ‘prevents them doing wrong’, providing a ‘moral code’ by which to live life. As Natasha points out,

> It [Islam] restricts it within the home, cause that’s what Islam tends to do, girls in any case, outside the home, in terms of socialising it’s a no, no in the Islamic kind of way, that’s with members of the opposite sex, so yep, I’m still abiding by those rules, (laughs) that’s my moral code, part of the moral code kind of thing, associated with Islam.
On the other hand however, their expression of Islam does not live up to their own expectations.

*I think if I did follow to the full extent of my knowledge then I may become a reasonable Muslim* (Jinaid)

For this reason those who adopt this strategy are very self conscious about these contradictions and feel guilty about not ‘doing more’. As Naveed and Noor admit,

*I’d like to practice my religion more...but because of our busy life in this Western society...sometimes it’s impossible to carry out all our duties...sometimes you can get distracted as well, like, sort of, so many things happening around your town, or friends might invite you here or there or you know, things happening and you get distracted.’* (Naveed)

‘*Definitely think I should do it more... ’* (Noor)

Islam is relegated to the personal sphere, important enough to pass on to their children but not so important that they would ‘preach’ it to others.

Britain is, to a large extent, accepted as home, either because those who adopt this strategy were born in Britain or because, Britain it is felt offers economic security that is difficult to find in the country of origin. (see Box 7:2).
Box 7:2 Britain as home – ‘Lapsed’/ambivalent Muslims

I’ve spent most of lifetime in England. So, I mean, the total amount of exposure I’ve had to Bangladesh is probably about two months I think. ... when you’re used to this country, and you’re not getting things like running water, toilets and sanitation, and like food, and that sort of thing, which makes an impression on you when you’re a kid, and you don’t understand a lot of the things, when you’re older you appreciate the things that you’ve got now (Naveed)

because I’ve been born and brought up here, my house is here, and I’ve done all my education here, then I feel, you know, my home is in England, because I’ve lived all my life here (Noor)

What makes this [Britain] home? (pause) ... having the opportunity to have a job, to make money, that kind of thing, because the opportunity is here, back in Britain. Just to have the community that we’ve built up over the years, that is our family and friends, be they Muslim, non-Muslim, those kind of things, and you’ve grown up with these people, you know these people, you’ve lived with them for so many years, that sense of belonging, you know to this group, just makes this home, as opposed to back in Pakistan, abroad (Natasha)

I have settled down over here, now, and there is no option for me to live in Bangladesh. There’s no option because I have a job here, I have a house here, I have my family, my family’s over here .... [although] I would feel more comfortable in Bangladesh than over here. In certain respect yes. ... [because] ... I wouldn’t feel threatened living in Bangladesh in terms of my religion and my culture and my language. Whereas I would feel threatened over here but you know, my language is at threat and my culture is at threat and my religion is at threat over in this country. (Amin)

Indeed ontological security is of importance and, in the British context, this is secured through ethno-religious ties they have with others. In particular, ‘the community’ is deemed important because of its role in keeping in touch with cultural norms; as Noor explains,

you never forget who you are, and things for example when you have like festivals, it’s nice because you’ve got a gathering of people from the same background as you and you can share food and gifts and it’s a nice feeling of, you’re, you know part of this community. And also like, when religious events
occur, you can be part of it, and it’s really nice you know, sharing, and teaching others as well, and keeping the community spirit alive, and you can pass it down to other generations as well.

‘The community’ is seen to provide mutual support as it is believed members of the community have a ‘shared sense of responsibility’ towards each other, a duty to ‘help each other out’. This was demonstrated particularly well by Jinaid who explains how he helped in the burial of a man that he did not know purely because he was a fellow Muslim and he felt, under the circumstances, it was his responsibility to get involved.

As he explains,

_During Friday prayer it was announced that a man had died. ... Now the man had been married to a white woman and they had two girls and they also had married white men. So his grandchildren were white as were his son-in-laws. Now it was in his will that he have his funeral in a mosque (jinaza). His wife sorted this out and when we heard we thought even though he had joined a different community he is a man from our area and so a few of us went with the body to the graveyard. When we got there there were a few men from some Islamic organisation who happened to be there on that day, so 10 of them and 4 of us. The 2 or 3 white families did go but that day it was bitterly cold, and then it started to rain. As soon as it started to rain, his wife, his daughters, his English son-in-laws got into their car and drove off. The grave is yet being dug up, the body is still there but they have gone. The soil got so hard that those of us that were there, I don’t think we’ve ever worked so hard, we were freezing, and for two or three days after I got a fever myself – but we dug up the soil and completed the grave. At that time we realised that if that person had married in his own community then, at the end his own came in handy in completing the final rituals, if even we had not gone then they would have left him in the rain for the undertaker, and in the end no one would have even prayed for him. So that day we realised that if we used to say people from our community are not good but today who came in handy for this man, our own community. If he had some links with our own men then this situation would never have occurred, where the (matlabi) selfish people left. I think this example is enough to keep links with your community so that they are able to help you in your time of need._
Others, again around the issue of death, commented on the way that if there was a death in the community (even if the person who had died actually lived in Pakistan and you had never met them, for example), how it was customary to go and visit the relative you were acquainted with. This is seen to provide great comfort and security at a very difficult time,

*When someone close to you die, you will not be able to cope on your own, you’d probably go mental to be honest ... if you don’t have that community’s support, community don’t come and see you and give you this comfort and sense of security. ... But by someone coming to your house it gives you that sense of security a sense of okay I lost someone very close to me, but I’ve got this community, it’s there. So it gives you that sense of security. (Amin)*

Observation has shown that such support is more often than not acted out with Muslims, in particular amongst women, identified as ‘traditional’ Muslims (see below). However what is important to note is that this does not mean this is not an aspect of community life that is not appreciated by other younger Muslims who have had the formative years of their life in Britain.

Along with some of the engaged Muslims (see below), ‘lapsed’/ambivalent Muslims draw on an insiders discourse, in that they feel they are accepted by wider society. However this does not necessarily mean that they feel completely accepted by wider society. When discussing issues of prejudice and discrimination it was felt by some that this was still a problem,
I’ll give you an example, walk through the immigration desk in Heathrow, ... Crossing the border to France, you know I had this direct experiences, I’ve seen people in front of me because you are white your passport don’t get checked, but if you’re Asian you’re examined thoroughly (Amin)

Look every person is against Muslims. Look at Bosnia, it is Muslims that they are throwing out, they are doing cleansing there, cleansing against the Muslim religion. So it [religious discrimination] does exist...it exists internationally and here. Like the other day we went to the park and there were 3 or 4 children passing and they said to us, ‘pig in a mosque, pig in a mosque’ so then you do feel that this attack is aimed only at Muslims. So you feel that you are Muslims and then you feel sad, you feel angry as well and feel like saying something but then you think that they are children, what can we say to children. But you feel it, feel it a lot. (Jinaid)

It also does not mean that they do not engage in an outsider’s discourse as despite feeling accepted as British there is still a recognition by some that (cultural) differences between ‘us’ and ‘them’ still exist.

SELECTIVE MUSLIMS

Four respondents in the sample adopted a ‘selective’ approach to their Muslim identity. Like ‘lapsed’/ambivalent Muslims, they draw on an individual discourse of Islam in that they ‘pick and choose’ certain aspects of Islam over others. However unlike ‘lapsed’/ambivalent Muslims, Islam does not necessarily provide the basis.foundation for life, or indeed a ‘moral code’ by which to live life. For some selective Muslims Islam does not affect their life in any substantive way, as Khalida admits,

I would say it does not affect my daily life at all actually, no. I know it sounds daft, but except for when I speak to God. Because I don’t do my namaz anymore which is bad
but, except when I do speak to God I always think of him as being a Muslim God (chuckles to herself) for some reason, I don’t know why. Yeah but that would be about it. It doesn’t have any direct affect on my day to day life, no, not at all.

However they still identify themselves as Muslim and are proud to be called Muslim. As Zafar demonstrates when he, in reference to how his children should practice Islam, says, ‘If they don’t practice it, that’s another thing, but.. [to denounce it]... That’d be going a bit too far.’ To a large extent those who adopt this strategy are content with the way Islam impacts on their lives; as Mr Sarwar say, ‘However much I am doing, this amount is enough’.

Adherence to certain aspects of Islam, in the most part, is motivated by unacceptability of breaking certain social norms (of which many are based on Islam) and/or as a consequence of being born a Muslim. As Zafar says,

although I’m not religious, and (laughs) I don’t really believe in it, but it does, because I’ve been grown up that way, I’ve been grown up to believe in, in you know, in Islam and the teaching of Islam, all the way through, in some ways it has brain-washed me.

In a sense to identify themselves as Muslims is more of a reflection of their ethnic identity.

In keeping with a more relaxed approach to Islam those who adopt this strategy are most likely to adopt the ‘cultureless’ strategy towards culture. Indeed there is some confusion expressed about what the notion of culture actually refers to, arising from
the fact that culture is thought about in a very essentialist and reified way. In the sample this was indicated by reference to culture as coming from ‘two sources’ (Khalida) or in the case of Asad, as coming from two ‘worlds’. This is not to say that confusion over what culture means necessarily translates into tensions in everyday life. For Asad, there was an ease with which he accepted that he didn’t ‘carry on the culture set by my parents’, acknowledging that change was

just part of growing up really ... can't really carry on the culture now can you? Set by your parents, can't just wear shalwar kameez all the time, listen to Indian music and act like you’re back in India or Pakistan, 'cause it's not possible. You have to basically go with the flow, do what everyone else is doing.

Out of the four ideal-typical strategies identified, those for whom this was their dominant strategy, were most likely to do things which actually went against Islamic prescriptions but were seen as the norm in wider British society, (i.e. drink alcohol, eat non-halal meat). In this way they were engaged with wider society and advocated an ‘integrated society’ where Muslims participated fully in the social, political and economic life of Britain (see Box 7.3)

Box 7:3 Views on ‘integration’ – Selective Muslims

People just feel too cut off from Asians. You need to associate, you need to integrate, not segregate each other. (Khalida)

being integrated means, you're at work, its somebody's birthday, let's go to the pub, right, it happens all the time, you go to the pub, whatever, you have a drink, have a chat, all the other colleagues are there, you fit in, ... you're relaxed, you can have a laugh, you need that. All right you can say to me, oh I just go to work, I just go there do my bit, I won't talk to anybody, I don't give a damn about everybody else, I'll stick by myself, I'll come home. ..... they are going to lose out there, ... (Zafar)
The belief that Muslims should take part in the fullest way with wider society is reflected in the fact that selective Muslims adopt aspects of all the strategies identified according to rights (dependent on context). However, in keeping with their philosophy of ‘integration’, the dominant strategy from which they draw is reasonable treatment. Three out of the four respondents in the sample advocate how it is Muslims who should be reasonable in their demands.

In this country if you want to build a mosque then you have got rights, within limitation you do have, if you insist too much, then they will not, but those that are allowed (jaiz), up to that limit (madood), those rights you do get. That is fine, whether they be religious or socially, you do get your rights. (Mr Sarwar)

Talking of practising Muslims in the workplace, Zafar for example, understood if employer reaction was negative. As he said about one of his friends who had what he described as a ‘Muslim Fundamentalist’s beard’

.... lots of people have beards, there’s nothing wrong with beards. Neaten it, to make it like a proper beard, like a professional would be able to wear, not like a Muslim Fundamentalist’s beard... [but] he’s not willing to do that you see, ... I’m not changing myself for anybody. Now, that’s why he’s still not on a
professional level, ... Of course he’s a Muslim, and he’s a really devout Muslim and he’s happy in himself. ...[but] the job role requires him to represent the company, he has to go out to visit customer sites, or other companies, world-wide as well, there’s no way that they’re gonna give him that job. I can’t, I just can’t see it. ...But, like I said, being realistic, mm, I can understand their point of view, from an employer’s point of view, I can really understand it. It’s difficult for them to do that, because, especially if this person is devout, if he wants to pray 5 times a day whatever, if he’s refusing to shave his beard off and he has to represent the company, you have to dress within a certain way when you’re representing the company anyway, professional, aggressive, whatever.

Holding a very inclusive notion of society does not necessarily mean that selective Muslims engage in an insider’s discourse. Indeed three out of four in the sample identified as selective Muslims had an outsider’s discourse of rights, in the main, a reflection of the fact that they felt they were not accepted by wider society. For Asad this was evidenced by the fact,

they [government] allow us [to practice Islam] but they would do their most to just get on your nerves ... Like obviously they let us build a mosque and everything, but they might discourage us by not letting us park outside, putting double yellow lines on purpose. Sending about ten traffic wardens there on jumma namaz, or Eid namaz. Or by not allowing them to say break the house next door down and extend the mosque, or things like that.

For most, this was understandably problematic. Zafar explains,

'I've got my rights here whatever, but, okay there are a lot of decent people out there and they say fair enough you are one of us but not everybody. Whereas an English person, or should I say a white person is accepted.

fair enough you’re British but are you still accepted? Legally I’ve got the right here to belong to mix in or whatever, okay I’ve got that right, ... I think as much as a white [person] I’m British, I’m English. Have you ever seen Goodness Gracious Me. Well yesterday in a scene they were four Asian people who were going for a
tennis club membership, that is what it's like you see. [Asian people trying to be Anglicised, changed names and acting very 'white' but still refused membership because were still seen to be 'Pakis']. You can be as British as you want but at the end of the day you're still brown. (Zafar)

‘TRADITIONAL’ MUSLIMS

This was identified as the dominant strategy for the most members (eight) of the sample. Before explaining the detail of this strategy, it is important to be clear about why this strategy has been labelled as ‘traditional’, especially in light of the criticisms made earlier. It is recognised that the term ‘traditional’, as denoted by the speechmarks, is not necessarily about traditions that are historically rooted but indeed can, and often does, refer to relatively recent phenomena that have been ‘invented’ as tradition, ‘a set of practices, …of a ritual or symbolic nature which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviours by repetition which automatically implies continuity with a suitable historical past’ (Hobsbawm and Ranger cited by Hall, 1992:294). In this case, ‘tradition’ is referred to more as an attempt to ‘reconstruct purified identities, to restore coherence, “closure” and tradition, in the face of hybridity and diversity’ (Hall, 1992:311), or in other words, in the face of the challenges faced by Muslims when they are living as a minority in a country that does not create an atmosphere/environment in which Islamic norms and values are easily pursued. It is because this strategy regards change (in the British context) as negative and as such seeks to preserve identity, that it has been identified as one adopted by ‘traditional’ Muslims.
Like engaged Muslims, in the main, those who adopt this strategy draw from a communitarian discourse of Islam. However this is not in the self-conscious manner in which engaged Muslims do. Instead ‘traditional’ Muslims recognise that Muslims are united but this has as much, if not more, to do with the fact that they share a common ethno-cultural heritage (baring in mind I was only interviewing South Asian Muslims who to a large extent do share a common heritage). As such much expression of Islam draws from how it developed in South Asia, about wearing a *duputa* (scarf) on your head and having Qu’ran *khuani’s* (communal recitation of the Qu’ran) with an emphasis on the more codified aspects of Islam. This is understandable, especially when one takes into consideration that this strategy is adopted particularly by those Muslims who have spent the formative years of their life in their country of origin, and as such learnt about Islam in their country of origin - picking it up through the environment in which they lived, through informal teaching in the home and some basic teaching at school (the majority of this teaching would have been rote learning of the Qur’an). Some of these Muslims may have gone on to learn about Islamic history but have not developed this learning to a great extent (see Box 7:4 below).

**Box 7:4 How did you learn about Islam? – ‘Traditional’ Muslims**

*At school, some at home from my mother and father, when we were children we used to get told in the home, my mother used to tell me, my grandparents told me, and then when we used to go to school, right from the beginning we used to get taught deenyat, the teacher taught us.* (Mrs Khan)

*Mostly at home, after 10th class I used to go to this teacher to learn the Qu’ran and he also used to tell me about Islam. Then there was my cousin, she also used to tell me about Islam.*
Then because I had learnt Urdu myself, then I used to read books about Islam, I have mostly read about Muslims. (Mrs Anwar)

the mohole in Pakistan is Islamic, Islamyat is compulsory there so we learnt through that. Then in the home, because in Pakistan there is only one culture, ... So you get the same culture there, in the home and outside, in college, school and university. So children get their knowledge about Islam automatically. (Mrs Kazmi)

I was born Muslim you see into a Muslim family, so everyday when you are brought up in a family if your father, mother pray, then comes mahuram, then comes Eid, so you see what ever they do, so if they do fatia, you’re sitting there you watch them, if they go to pir you go along with them, you know he is a pir. So you become a part of this system, and you learn that way. (Mr Syed)

whatever I learnt right from the beginning, about namaz, rosa, this is what we did, what ever my father did and my grandfather before him. Some people say sit with this person and learn, I have never sat with anyone and have never learnt anything, whatever I have learnt from my parents that is what we do. (Mrs Ali)

Those who adopt this strategy use culture and religion interchangeably in their narrative.

**Box 7:5 Culture and religion, one of the same thing – ‘Traditional’ Muslims**

Culture is a big part of my life, it is part of my religion because I follow an Islamic culture. Without this culture the religion is halved, you are taking an important part of the religion away. (Mr Syed)

Our culture is linked to the religion a lot....Our culture is that we can’t become free with (ghurr) strange men, even if they are from our community, Muslims, Pakistanis. Even if we do meet them, then we will act with respect, that I am a woman. If our daughters meet a boy from another family then it is not how people from other cultures meet, we will remain in respect. In other cultures the thing is it is not deemed bad. (Mrs Kazmi).

Interviewer: Okay, when you think about culture, what makes up your culture?  
Mrs Anwar: (laughingly) It is just the religion, what else.
Switching between the two concepts is, in large part, unconscious. For example when asked to think about what he defined as culture, Mr Qureshi started to talk about the role of women, ending his argument by referring to Islam,

"our way of life... bit restrictive... our girls... cannot go to club.... Accordance with sunna, something following the religion."

Culture becomes indistinguishable from issues of moral conduct, values, and religion. Any deviation from culture (and by association, morals and/or religion) is deemed as undesirable. It is as though Muslims would lose a part of their identity if they allowed their culture to change,

"culture should not become so advanced that we don't even look like Muslims (Mrs Kazmi)."

"however many of their habits we pick up that is what we will become (Mrs Ali)."

It is for this reason that traditional Muslims adopt the strategy of preserving their group identity with regards to culture. This was most obvious in narratives about children and how parents felt about them being influenced by ‘other’ cultures. To do so would risk losing your ‘own culture’. This was expressed by Mrs Anwar who, when asked if she would be bothered if her children learnt from other cultures replied,

"I would not like it if my children go into a different culture... to leave your own religion to go to another and learn from it, the children cannot do this. This is the reason I do not like it."
For Mrs Anwar, religion and culture were indistinguishable and therefore any change in culture was tantamount to conversion of faith. Some of the more reflexive respondents made the distinction between learning, and being influenced by, explicit. The former was deemed unavoidable and acceptable so long as the latter did not occur.

*Yes okay you learn but not go along, no I wouldn't agree with it.* (Mrs Ashraf)

No matter how reflective, key in uniting ‘traditional’ Muslims is how ‘Our’ culture and religion are very different from ‘theirs’, the ‘other’ in this case being the ‘gora’ (white people). This ‘outsiders’ discourse is reflected in behaviour, especially in reference to how much contact those who adopt this strategy have with non-Muslims.

‘Mixing’ (the word used to refer to integration by some) is seen, in the main, in a negative light. For example, when Mrs Chaudry was asked if she felt she belonged to British society, she felt she couldn’t because ‘if we belong to it then this [their faults] will affect us’. Mrs Sarwar and Mrs Ali were better able to articulate their ‘fears’.

> these people there is that women walk around naked, like they do, or they have boyfriends. That is their culture, but our children, they spend time with them, like in education they spend all day with them, but we, God forbid, will never accept these things that our children live like they do. These things can not mix (Mrs Sarwar).
the generation now has changed a lot, they are all like gora. You must have seen it yourself in town, our girls standing around meeting boys, smoking, I have seen it with my own eyes, I had never seen it in my time but I see everything now. So there is a difference and they have been influenced. The children have picked it up and changed. However many of their habits we pick up that is what we will become. If we keep to ourselves then we will only catch our own religion (Mrs Ali).

In part, because of these ‘fears’, ‘traditional’ Muslims have limited contact with non-Muslims, preferring to ‘mix’ with their own community. A community made up of other Asians who share their ethnic background/country of origin and who live in the area. Indeed for Mr Qureshi the people he was most comfortable being around were other Bangladeshis

First of all the social cultural is no different, is same as me, and we understand very easily each other, and we’re comfortable to live together you know, this [Bangladeshi] community.

Living in such a community is particularly important because of the safety factor. There is almost the idea of ‘safety in numbers’ in the context of being a minority,

you feel a bit safer, rather then if you were living in a gora area, then you may have problems because there are some that will not let you live there (Mrs Ali).

We feel it [community] is very important, it is our safety, our unity. From it we can develop our unity, (Mr Chaudry).

Having said that, like ‘lapsed’/ambivalent Muslims, ‘the community’ is also deemed important because it is felt that cultural norms are perpetuated and kept alive by community dynamics. For Mrs Ashraf for example, the community was deemed
important because you got to know about 'your own culture and everything' or as Mrs Ali says,

_the thing about my community is that the children learn a lot from it, about their religion, about their culture, about what they should wear, everything. Like our community here, the Pakistanis that live in this area, the children know that if they go out then someone will talk, if we do not wear our duputa on our head then people will talk. So my community is important because it makes a big difference to the children._

As well as perpetuating cultural norms amongst the young, ‘the community’ allows supportive norms (particularly amongst the women) to be sustained. For instance observation has shown during a death, how close neighbours and friends take it upon themselves to take round food so that the bereaved family does not have to think about cooking, how everyone gathers for three days, keeping the bereaved company whilst praying and fulfilling religious rituals surrounding death. This sense of responsibility is also manifested in the giving of gifts.

Gift giving is usually administered on specific occasions. This _lena-dena_ (receiving-giving) is of course part of celebrating in someone’s joy, but more then this it is about reinforcing relationships through reciprocity. Through the giving and receiving of gifts the community is made more real, whilst the reciprocal element ensures that if you give, you will get in return. In this way (female) members of the community do look out for and help each other. To take marriage as an example, it is customary to give money (_salami_) to the bride and groom. The money, as well as helping them in starting out, also ensures that this gift will be reciprocated when your children get
married. It is not the intention to go into detail due to the complex nature of gift-giving. Key here is that those who engage in this more solidaristic discourse are more likely see gift-giving as a responsibility they have towards others in their community.

In reflection, it is not surprising to find that traditional Muslims have limited contact with non-Muslims. Contact is either non-existent (with the exception of those people who are encountered through daily activities like shopping) or limited to formal relationships through organisations, rather then friendships (See box 7:6)

**Box 7:6 Do you have much contact with those who are not Muslim? – ‘Traditional’ Muslims**

*like our neighbours, those who live near us. I have never worked since I have come to this country, ...[but] where-ever I have lived I have always had dealings with my neighbours, with those who lived in my mohala [neighbourhood]. Those who came to the house or those people that my husband knew obviously I had some contact with them, just to say hello to though.* (Mrs Khan)

*Well if you go out then you meet quite a lot of goria that are friends, just to say hello and ask how are you, yes I am [fine]. This is it. ...It is just ... these people, their language is different, I do not know English so much that I can speak to them too much, so this could be a reason.* (Mrs Anwar)

*I have very much contact, well through organisations, through agencies, through meetings, yes I am quite familiar with many members from other communities, I mean all different communities.* (Mr Qureshi)

*Neighbours or like my GP or if you go to the hospital. ...because generally you don’t socialise, our women do not go out that much, you stay at home most of the time. Perhaps if we went out more then we may know some, but I have not gone out much, since I left school I have got busy with the children and after that I have not had any time to sit with anyone. So I stay at home most of the time.* (Mrs Ali)

*we participate, again depends if there is any need. You don’t go and keep on knocking the*
doors and say I want to participate in your sort of thing. ...like we have Pakistan day or some function or something. We invite say. councillors, mayors, other English people and friends. (Mr Syed)

This belief that it is important to preserve your group identity is further strengthened by the fact that those who adopt this strategy hold very reified notions about what constitutes Islam and what does not. In this way the majority of those who adopt this strategy engage in the discourse of religion being fixed/immutable, recognising that Islam has been implemented, interpreted and adapted in different ways over time but not endeavouring to adapt Islam themselves.

For some, like 'lapsed'/ambivalent Muslims, this is because they lack time or are too caught up with worldly duties of earning a living and paying the bills. Others, as seen above, deem change, especially that which is influenced by the Western context in which they live, as negative. For a few however, and particularly women who have had little formal education, this is because they feel they lack the learning skills necessary to engage in this process themselves. For example, Mrs Ali recognised that she did not 'practice [Islam] the way some people do'. At the same time she recognised that 'our knowledge gets greater when you learn new things'. However she felt she did not know enough to participate in arenas (dars) where greater Islamic knowledge could be gained, as she explained,

... Mrs XXX she does dars and she reads the Qu'ran and tell others the aytan [verses from the Qu'ran] and the women there talk. And the thing is the person
who does not know a lot of things about the religion, they do not speak, and I do not know that much that I can participate.

This is not to say that all those who adopt this strategy do not seek to improve or add to their knowledge about Islam, as there was evidence that two did go to the library to seek out books on Islam. Also observation has shown that over the last few years there has been increased activity, especially amongst women, in learning about Islam through women’s Islamic circles. Here women gather in someone’s home where a more learned, educated woman will come and discuss Islamic issues with them. There seems to be increasing recognition and openness to be able to admit that many Muslims, even, and perhaps especially, those who migrated to Britain, have limited Islamic knowledge. A problem, when, as Mr Chaudry points out,

*a child is born they say the azaan into his ear, he becomes a Muslim like this but then to flourish it is the parents main duty to give knowledge.*

Despite what some would consider to be an insular attitude towards wider society, ‘traditional’ Muslims very much recognise themselves as British citizens. Most accept Britain as their home, some without condition, others more so because their children are now settled in Britain.

**Box 7:7 Britain as home – ‘Traditional’ Muslims**

Now, ... we live here so obviously this is our home. Because we live here, our children live here, we live here. That [Pakistan] is our homeland (vataan), ...that is where I was born, where all my brothers and sisters are. But we live here, we live in this country, they have given us certain conveniences, they look after us in all sorts of ways, so obviously we consider this to be our home too. (Mrs Khan)
we prefer it here, because all the children, all the family, all the relatives are here. And we have also said that if someone dies then we will be buried here, the whole family has decided this because there is no close relative over there so there is no benefit of taking the body there. (Mr Chaudry)

When I came here, since 1962, I always say I want to go back, I don’t want to settle in Britain. But still I am living here for the last 30 years (laughs). ... Actually as time goes by I’m getting more and more settled, got my family here and all the organisations and things you see, (Mr Syed)

For the moment we consider this place where we are living [home]. ... [as] Home is where the children are looked after properly, that the children are made into such citizens that they useful to this culture and country, not just for us. (Mrs Kazmi)

At the moment it is this, until they throw us out it is this. Interviewer: And what sort of things makes this home, what sort of things do you think about when you think about home? Mrs Ali: It is just that we are living here, we have got used to it, the children have been born, we have got a house, all our spending has been here. We have not made anything in our own country yet have we so for this reason we will have to live here until the children say to go back or my husband says or someone does not call us from there. Until then we will have to live here. (Mrs Ali)

Pakistan more. ... Just because I was born there, I was educated there, all the family and friends are there. My mother’s house is there. ... So it is mostly where a person is born and grew up and everything. So I like it better there. (Mrs Anwar)

In addition, all ‘traditional’ Muslims engage with the discourse of rights in general, drawing in various contexts on all the strategies identified. However, like selective Muslims, the one strategy on rights on which all ‘traditional Muslims’ draw is that of reasonable treatment. However, this is not in the same vein in which selective Muslims engaged in this strategy. Rather then arguing that Muslims need to be reasonable in the demands that they make, traditional Muslims feel they are not reasonably treated at all times. This sentiment stems from the fact that despite having spent the majority of their lives in Britain, they still do not feel fully accepted. As Mrs Ali and Mr Qureshi explain,
in one way a person feels like you are one of them, you feel like a gorā, although they do not accept you but you live here don't you, this is why. We know that gorā don't accept us like that (Mrs Ali).

even I am a British citizen, I won't get the privileges or advantages comparing with the white, British citizen, so that's the differences (Mr Qureshi).

Of primary importance, (as for most of the Muslims in the sample) is the issue of 'racial' discrimination over and above any prejudice experienced as Muslims; a feeling that a 'gorā' would always be preferred over an Asian.

There is also a sense of powerlessness amongst this group and hence an acceptance of the rights 'they' concede to 'us'. It is the belief that although Muslims are British citizens with equal rights and responsibilities, these rights and responsibilities rather then being open to active agency and negotiation are actually bestowed upon 'us' by 'them'. In effect the citizen becomes the passive recipient (as opposed to the active claimant) of rights, expecting, if nothing else, to be treated reasonably. This is not to say that 'traditional' Muslims necessarily see the rights 'given to us' as a privilege, as they are aware that as citizens they have a legitimate right to expect these rights. What it does mean is that there is an overall satisfaction with the rights they enjoy but, in some cases, there is a feeling that they lack power to improve the situation. For example, Mrs Ali whilst stating that 'they have given us quite a lot of rights' also was in admiration of a woman she knew who fought for her right to pray and wear the hijab at work,
Now there is Mrs X who told me that when she used to go to the factory to work, she said I need to read my namaz, and all the goria used to walk past with their noses in the air. Many times when I was reading my namaz, I would feel really bad, that they would not talk to me and this and that. She said I told them that this is not your problem, it is my problem, what I do I do for myself. I do not do it for you. This is my religion and I am going to follow it no matter what. She said that now when they found out, there was this one nice lady who gave me a space, that at teatime you can pray here.

The key is that she did not feel, that she herself would have had the confidence to do this.

**ENGAGED MUSLIMS**

Engaging with Islam was the dominant strategy for four of the sample. Like ‘traditional’ Muslims this strategy draws heavily from the communitarian discourse. However, unlike ‘traditional’ Muslims who feel Muslims are united by a common cultural heritage based on ethnic traditions (which includes Islam), engaged Muslims are most likely to internalise and passionately articulate the idea of a solidaristic wider imagined community united first and foremost by Islam. Therefore, while ‘traditional’ Muslims refer to a Pakistani community as their community for example, engaged Muslims are more likely to articulate how they belong to a Muslim community. A Sanah exemplifies,

... what bonds us is the belief in Allah and the belief in the messenger, and the revelation, it’s the ideology that bonds us. ...it’s not an issue that you have to live next door to a Muslim, you can be surrounded by non-Muslims but still understand you belong, because it’s our identity and it’s very strong.
They are also most likely to go out of their way to express their faith and as such, most likely to believe their faith has a rightful place within the public arena. In other words, their faith is not restricted to within the four walls of the home or to the mosque. Those who engage in Islam feel it is very important to practice your faith no matter what circumstances you are in. In this way Islam is experienced as ‘a way of life’. As Sanah explains,

\[ \text{Allah has given us three relationships, one of ibadat, one of worship, which is between me and Allah, what I do, pray, fast, and so on. Number two is me myself, my morals, my manners, my iqhlaq, how I eat, how I sit, how I drink, how I dress myself, things like this. And the third thing is ma-maulat which is society, how we rule.} \]

In reference to ibadat and iqhlaq what is meant is that participants go out of their way to practice their religious obligations (see Box 7:8).

**Box 7:8 Islam experienced as ‘a way of life’ - Engaged Muslim**

*There are times when you find yourself praying in very awkward situations (smiles), but you do. Changing rooms, trains, buses, you do it. Because a faraz, you can not substitute one farad for another.* (Sanah)

*You know Islam has set a very defined basis where you can go. For instance you can't go into a place where alcohol is being sold, like night-clubs, pubs, things like that, it's not permitted for us to go there, yeah. ...another example a Muslim woman or a Muslim man can't enter a room, a closed space, yeah like this office, say you were a man and I'll be sitting here and I was a female, I wouldn't be able to be here unless the door was open. And anyone can walk in at any time, ... So every action is defined by Islam, ...* (Sanah)

*I mean even when I go pick up my children in the car, I'm sitting there, and if I want to read the Qu'ran, I'll just take my Qu'ran with me, I'll just read it there, I don't care if somebody is looking at me. If they're looking, they're looking, what I'm doing is fine with me. Even if I want to do namaz, I'll do it while there are lots of people looking, I'll do the namaz, it's my religion, I'm going to do it. If they're looking, let them look.* (Mrs Ashraf)
Islam dominates my life, so yes it does, it affects everything I do. Before, if I went out I wouldn't cover but now I would. If I was watching TV I wouldn't watch things like Baywatch. If I am feeding my baby I would watch what I am feed him and how I feed him. Everything really. Whatever I do Islam will guide my actions. (Helena)

If something is not according to Islam then I don't go there for example a pub, I wouldn't go there because they sell alcohol there, people are free mixing there. (Helena)

In reference to ma-maulat two of the participants for whom this was their dominant strategy interpreted this duty to mean the re-establishment of the Islamic state ‘where all the rules and regulations would come from Allah so there would be no doubt that I was pleasing him, I was worshipping him the right way’ (Helena). For Helena this pursuit of an Islamic state was in keeping with the Prophet’s actions, as she explains:

Looking at the Prophet’s life, how the non-Muslims offered to give him women and money and anything he wanted just to forget about Islam and live the way they used to live before. But he said ‘no, there is no compromise, Allah has sent me to spread the word of Islam and I’m going to do it whether you like it or not.’ They also said to him ‘what about if you let people live by your system for a year and then live by our system the next year, and then they can decide what they want.’ But the Prophet said ‘no, there’s no way. This system is from Allah and whether you like it or not I’m going to establish it’.

In contrast to Sanah and Helena, the other two participants for whom this was their dominant strategy did not advocate the re-establishment of the Islamic state. Mrs Ashraf did not even mention this aspect of Islam, while all Asma had to say on the subject was,
um... I don't know, some Muslims probably here, there are quite a few people who think you should work towards a Muslim state, I don't quite agree with that part of it.

Key however is that engaged Muslims regard Islam to be a comprehensive system and as such understand that Islam cannot be restricted to the private realm (see box 7:9).

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<td><em>Islam because it covers all aspects of life, it's political and you know it's social and economic, it's everything isn't it, a way of life so it's very difficult to separate it from what you do. So I think it's... I don't think you can [restrict it to private life] frankly</em> (Asma)</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>religion stays in the home and ideology doesn't (smiles), do you understand. Religion has got no business being in the public arena because it doesn't want to be there, the nature of religion, because religion is a set of ritual worship. An ideology, by its very nature, is going to be there, you can't keep it out. And Islam is an ideology</em> (Sanah)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>all religions they are circular, they separate life from their state affairs, it's a separation between the individual and the state which Islam isn't, it's everything</em> (Helena)</td>
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Out of the four strategies identified, those who engaged with Islam are the most informed and influenced by Islam. They are most likely to adopt Islam as a ‘master signifier’, constructing Islam as the ‘point to which all other discourses must refer’ (Sayyid, 1997:47). Although the majority try to the best of their ability to implement their knowledge in their daily life, most do not go on to interpret Islam. Recognising that interpretation requires great knowledge of Quranic text and hadiths, only those who are able to spend a lot of their time in the intellectual pursuit of Islam are able to do this, and I would argue that applied only to Sanah and Helena within the sample.
As seen above, Helena interpreted the Prophet’s actions in fixing her opinion about the pursuit of an Islamic state. Sanah also tried to interpret her understanding of Islam, to learn what this meant for her as a Muslim in Britain. On the issue of voting for example, her interpretation led her to believe that it was wrong to vote in the British context, as she explains,

\[\text{it’s haram to vote, because you’re voting for a system that is non-Islamic. You’re voting for a capitalist system and you can’t vote for a capitalist system. In Islam we’ve got a right to vote, every Muslim has a right to vote, to be more accurate it’s called to give, baya, to give the pledge of allegiance which removes the sin off the neck that Islam is not being implemented, and the pledge of allegiance is only given to the caliph, to the man that is going to rule by Islam. That is how we vote,}\]

Also, as seen from the quote below, it is through her knowledge of Islam that she justifies why learning about Islam has to be a life-long experience,

\[\text{You know as a Muslim you can never be happy, as Muslims, never ever, ever can we be happy. It’s only when we look at the sahaba, may Allah be pleased with them, and we look at how they used to cry. Abdullah-ibn-umer he was reported to have two indented tracks running down his face because he cried so much for the fear of Allah, because he didn’t know whether he would go to paradise. He was a man who people, he was a scholar, he had knowledge yet still they were so scared. The sahaba, they were promised paradise, so many of them yet still Umer-bin-khataab or Abu bakr used to say I wish I was a tree because they wanted to do more. ... gaining extra reward, they have extra prayers or, this is the only way we can increase our taqwa, increase our closeness to Allah and if we don’t do these things then, I mean as a Muslim you should never be happy. Because there are different degrees of junnah aren’t there, we shouldn’t say I’ll just skim into junnah, I’ll get in by the skin of my teeth, that’s not the attitude for a Muslim. Muslims want the best and inshahallah we should all do as much as we can.}\]
Like 'lapsed'/ambivalent Muslims those who adopted this strategy also feel they could 'do more’. However this sentiment does not stem from guilt of not doing enough, but the fact that Islam is so vast that there is always more that can be learnt. Self-improvement, and not guilt, is the over-riding motivation.

In contrast to 'traditional' Muslims, engaged Muslims critically reflect on the relationship between culture and religion. For all four of these participants, their faith was deemed to be more important than culture. As Helena says 'I do like Bangladeshi culture but it comes second to Islam'. In this way engaged Muslims make clearer distinctions between what is culture and what is religion. Having said that, culture it is believed, is ultimately guided by religion. This is considered to be the case because religion, as Sanah explained, informs the development of culture,

_The predominant thing that makes up my culture is how Islam defines life yeah, from the criteria of halal and haram, that is what makes up culture. So if something is allowed from Islam then I implement that, if something is not allowed from Islam then I stay away from that, that is my culture...._

For Sanah, culture was to be distinguished from what she called traditions, as she explains,

... from Islamic culture, what is the viewpoint on dress? Viewpoint on dress is khimar and gilbab, from Pakistani tradition, from their tradition they dress in a manner of shalwar kameez. Now we can’t call Pakistani tradition a culture because it's not complete, it's not comprehensive
In this way culture and religion are considered to be the same. It is because of this one way relationship between culture and religion that leads to the conclusion that culture is socially contextualised (see Chapter Six), the context in this case being set by Islam. As such culture is deemed to be constructed but only within acceptable confines of Islam or as Helena said ‘as long as it doesn’t contradict Islam’.

Diversity does exist within this strategy stemming from the fact that two of the sample also drew on the discourse of Islam as negotiable, while two, in addition to this, drew from the discourse of Islam as fixed and immutable. Each had consequences for the way they adapted to citizenship.

Engaged Muslims recognise that Islam has been interpreted and adapted to make it relevant to modern living, and two of the participants pro-actively engaged in this process of interpretation. However an important distinction to be made is that between those engaged Muslims who only draw from the discourse of Islam as negotiable, as opposed to those who whilst recognising Islam is adapting to reflect the modern conditions in which Muslims live also see Islam to be fixed and immutable. The former, it is argued, adopt an insider’s discourse whilst the latter draw from an outsider’s discourse.

Engaged Muslims who only drew from the Islam as negotiable discourse are willing to learn from others, as Asma highlights,
If you want people to see Islam as something that you can learn from then you've also got to show you are ready to learn from other religions.

A sentiment shared by Mrs Ashraf,

if you're living somewhere you have to change with the flow, a little bit, otherwise you can't mix up with anybody, you can't mix with others. ... I think we should try to improve it [our culture] a bit.

Whilst there is a recognition that Islam distinguishes Muslims from other citizens of Britain, there is not disengagement from wider society,

Well I think it's really difficult to be a Muslim and not be different but I don't think that should stop you from being world participant really in society, obviously to say I can't do this because I'm a Muslim. ...you've got to to a certain extent to be part of society, you've got to integrate with other people but you don't lose sight of the fact that you're Muslim or that your religion is important to you. You've got to keep that in mind I think. That doesn't mean that you cannot be part of this society as a whole. (Asma)

These 'engaged' Muslims have no problems with engaging with their citizenry rights and duties, both their individual and more group based recognition rights.

In contrast to this, engaged Muslims who also draw from the discourse of Islam as fixed and immutable, articulate Islam in more essentialist terms, experiencing it to a large extent as a given faith where no compromises are to be made. In stark contrast to Asma's quote above, these Muslims believe Muslims should not try 'to be part of society' as Asma thought. Instead they believe,
it's haram for us to integrate into kufir. Because from Islam, our prophet, peace be upon him never integrated, never compromised, he had the opportunity, many, many, where they tried to bribe him, they tried to bribe him, he always gave very hard answer back, very harsh answer, very clear cut answer. So it's not issue, we're not here to reform, no (Sanah).

In reference to learning from others, although considered acceptable it is only in the context of pointing out right from wrong, as Sanah explains,

learning and adopting are two different things. If you said now, if your kids adopted it, or any Muslim adopted it, I would say that would be haram, but learning it for the objective of refuting is fine.

To a large extent what this means is disengagement from British society, typified by a refusal to vote. There is no engagement with rights, expect in their purely individualistic sense. In the main it is the strategy of equal freedoms which Sanah and Helena adopted in that they wanted the freedom to practice Islam as they saw fit without any external restrictions (to the inclusion, to an extent, of rights which defended these freedoms, namely legal rights). In reference to more positive rights it is felt they would only distract from the pursuance of Islam, as Sanah explains,

we’re not looking to settle down here, Islam doesn’t permit us to do this. So if Islam doesn’t permit the ummah to do this, then it’s pointless to go looking for, you don’t have a drive or a motivation to look for your rights do you? Or to find out how your life can be better here because if Islam doesn’t permit this, then you can’t.

Like others, Sanah did not see herself as an active agent in the citizenry process but rather wanted to be left alone. However, unlike the other strategies where rights are
passively accepted as being ‘bestowed upon us’, those who adopt Islam in this way are very vocal in actively disengaging with the process of negotiating rights, as she states,

*I'm not here to reform and fight for equal rights, I'm here just as a temporary measure... I'm here because I was born here...but I don't say hey let's go march around the Town Hall and demand equal rights... (Sanah)*

Therefore, unlike others, who draw from an outsider’s discourse because they feel they are (for various reasons) made to feel like outsiders, for these Muslims an outsiders status is seen as acceptable in that they are not bothered if they are or are not accepted by wider society. Engaged Muslims, to an extent, voluntarily impose the outsider status upon themselves (despite the fact that both of these participants were British born and had had the formative years of their upbringing in Britain). In keeping with an outsider’s discourse an ‘us’ and ‘them’ divide is expressed, but in this case the divide is not based around national or ‘racial’ boundaries but between Muslims and non-Muslims (*kufr*) specifically. In keeping with this line of thought, home is defined as anywhere where there is security to practice Islam, as such Britain may be home because that is the current abode of residence but ultimately it can never be home,

*I'm living here because I have been living here all my life. I feel at home but when it comes to practising Islam I don't feel at home (Helena).*
CONCLUSION

Husain and O'Brien in their study entitled *Muslim Families in Europe: Social Existence and Social Care* (1999) recognise that, when talking about identity, Muslims negotiate between three broad dimensions of their life, (1) Spiritual - Muslims who abide by the principal religious dictates without a political expression; (2) Cultural/secular – Muslims who originate from a Muslim family but do not ‘practice’ or express their beliefs in any form and; (3) Political – Muslims whose faith is embedded in a political agenda, at a national or international level. All three elements are evident in the above, but more importantly the above articulates in greater detail how these elements are negotiated and with what consequence for living in Britain.

To summarise, four broad ideal-typical strategies have been identified.

- That of ‘Lapsed’/ambivalent Muslims where Islam is deemed important in that it provides a ‘moral code’ by which to live life but is, in the main, relegated to the private sphere. For those for whom this is their dominant strategy Britain is accepted as home, and on the whole it is felt that wider British society has accepted Muslims although issues of prejudice and discrimination can at time make them feel like ‘outsiders’.

- That of Selective Muslims where being a Muslim is of importance but for whom Islam does not impact on their lives in any substantive way. For those for whom this is their dominant strategy, taking a full part in the economic,
political and social life of Britain is seen to be unproblematic and a necessary part of living in Britain. Despite a willingness to participate in all aspects of life in Britain there is still a feeling of being an outsider, of not being fully accepted by wider British society.

- That of ‘Traditional’ Muslims where being a Muslim is very important but of equal importance is the ethno-cultural similarities they have with other Muslims. For these Muslims, Islam also provides a moral code by which to live life, which is expressed through the (varying) practice of codified aspects of Islam. Of great importance is trying to preserve the group identity and therefore ‘mixing’ socially with non-Muslims or in non-Islamic environments is seen in a negative light. However, this is in the backdrop of where Britain is seen as home and where rights and duties as a British citizen are deemed, in the main, unproblematic. However again there is a feeling not quite being accepted by wider society at large.

- That of Engaged Muslims where there is an active engagement with Islam and a conscientious effort to implement Islam in all aspects of life. It is those who adopt this as their dominant strategy that are most likely to bring Islam outside of their home and into public spaces. The sovereignty of God is placed over and above the sovereignty of the individual in that some of those who adopt this strategy will follow the law of the land (and in the same vein, traditional practices) as long as they do not contradict Islam. Islamic duties, in this way, are given priority. This means exercising the right to be different
but for some this is not to the exclusion of their citizenry rights and duties. For others, however, who engage in Islam, Islam can make no compromises. For these Muslims there is an unwillingness to accept duties beyond those which are laid down by Islam and there is an apparent disengagement with all that is identified as the secular West, other than protectionism over individual rights – as these are the rights that secure freedom of belief.

From the above, it is apparent that while four main ideal-typical strategies can be identified in relation to the way Islam is implemented in the lives of Muslims of Britain, when it comes to the strategies by which Muslims accommodate themselves to the rights and duties of British citizenship, just three accommodationist strategies are adopted. ‘Engagement’ (adopted by selective Muslims), ‘partial engagement’ (adopted by ‘lapsed’/ambivalent, ‘traditional’ and some engaged Muslims) and ‘disengagement’ (the main strategy adopted by some of the engaged Muslims). Engagement refers to the fact that Muslims engage in all spheres of life in Britain; partial engagement that they engage in their citizenry right and duties but recognise their lives are governed by a set of rules set down by Islam and as such their social interaction with wider society is set within boundaries broadly permissible in Islam; and disengagement, that is accepting that Muslims are different and that a Muslim’s duty is first and foremost to Islam and as such not about making life better within a secular environment but doing all that is necessary to create an ‘Islamic state’. The study conducted for this thesis, although it has been small-scale and qualitative in
nature, strongly suggests that the majority of South Asian Muslims of Britain adopt the strategy of ‘partial engagement’.
CHAPTER EIGHT

The permanent settlement of Muslims in Britain is relatively new (less than 50 years) and Britain and its Muslim minorities are at the initial stage of a long journey towards establishing enduring social relationships. This journey may not be a comfortable one, however, its purpose and destination need to be mutually acceptable (Khan, 2000:41).

CONCLUSION

Common to all the strategies identified in the previous chapter is the importance of being a Muslim. In this way it can be said that, amongst those interviewed for this thesis, Islam played an important, but varied, part in establishing group and individual identity (in combination with regional ties, social class, religious differences, sexuality, gender, etc.) and shaping attitudes in relation to the secular state. As the literature suggests (as explored in Chapter Two), there are a number of different perspectives and strategies that can be adopted by Muslims when living as a minority in a non-Muslim country. This wide spectrum of belief and practice was evident amongst the 23 Muslims interviewed to inform this thesis

In the literature, this spectrum of belief has commentators such as Qutb and Mawdudi at one end, arguing for separation from the West and Iqbal at the other, proposing engagement with the West through the process of Ijtihad, with a whole range of opinions in between. This does, to some degree, reflect the diversity of strategies adopted by South Asian Muslims of Britain and indeed these debates are evident in the discourse of Muslims, in particular amongst those who engage with Islam. For
those for whom this is their dominant strategy, attempts are made at re-reading the Qur’anic text and, to the best of their abilities, to re-interpret it. For some this has meant creating an Islamic environment within the British environment in which they are able to practise their faith, in the way that Iqbal would propose (those engaged Muslims who adopt the strategy of partial engagement). For others this re-interpretation has led to the conclusion that they cannot co-exist with another system of government and hence the ultimate pursuit of an Islamic state, which itself is variously defined (those engaged Muslims who adopt the strategy of disengagement). However in some ways this literature does not, and one could argue can not, recognise the full diversity of the way Islam is adopted by Muslims living in Britain.

When looking at what Islam and Islamic scholars (and to a large extent Islamic/Muslim organisations) have to say about Muslims living in a non-Muslim society, they are drawing from the Qur’an and the sunnah. What they can not give consideration to is the fact the Muslims may ‘pick and choose’ aspects of Islam depending on the context in which they are placed (‘traditional’/lapsed/ambivalent Muslims) or indeed that for some, whilst being a Muslim is important, Islam does not impact on their lives in any substantive way (selective Muslims). Therefore, in reality, the diversity of belief and practice is far greater then the literature suggests, ranging from those for whom Islam is central to their being (hence adopting the strategies of partial engagement/disengagement) to those for whom, other then identifying themselves as Muslim, Islam has no/very little impact of their lives (thus being most likely to adopt the strategy of engagement).
This is not to say that Muslims are not aware of the diversity. It is precisely because Muslims are aware of it that such importance is placed on Islamic education for children (i.e. Qur'anic classes and increasingly sunday school type events where children are taught about the prophet and Islamic history in English) and increasingly for adults (through Islamic circles, *dars*). There is an increasing openness which, as the findings confirm, allows recognition of the fact that those who had the formative years of their life in their country of origin (in the main ‘traditional’ Muslims) have in many cases a limited knowledge of Islam. Whilst the data suggest this self-development is still limited, it is observed to be on the increase especially amongst women².

Whilst recognising that people are not necessarily consistent or even entirely coherent in their discourse and may draw on different discursive repertoires reflecting more than one ‘strategy’ some general patterns can be commented upon. All respondents in the sample had, to some extent, accepted Britain as their home. Although some felt it to be a duty upon them to move to an Islamic state when one was established (i.e. some of those for whom disengagement was their dominant strategy), under current political and economic circumstances all the respondents stated a preference to live in Britain. Thus the one ‘option’ not considered by any of those interviewed was that of taking ‘exit’ to it’s logical conclusion by leaving Britain. Those who had spent the formative years of their lives in their country of origin were most likely to adopt the discursive repertoire of ‘traditional’ Muslims and least likely to adopt that
of selective Muslims. While no clear dominant strategy towards Islam could be
discerned for those who were British born or had spent the formative years of their
life in Britain, what was clear was that it was those from this group that were most
likely either to engage with Islam or, in stark contrast, adopt the discursive repertoire
of selective Muslims. From this one could argue that it is difficult to conclude if
Islam is becoming more or less important among communities of South Asian
descent. However, bearing in mind that even for selective Muslims, being a Muslim
was considered of importance, along with the fact that for the majority, Islam was
‘imagined’ (to varying degrees) as providing a uniting bond, it is argued here that
there is little prospect that Islam will die out in Britain. This is particularly so under
the current political climate (post- September the 11th 2001 which saw Al-Qaeda
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington), which has kept Islam in the forefront
of public attention. It is in this context, where Muslims are increasingly questioned
about their faith and how it impacts on their duties as citizens, that affinity with the
global Muslim diaspora, or in other words, the ummah, can only increase.

Islam and Muslims are a permanent fixture of the British landscape and despite the
varying expressions of Islam, key is that most Muslims with regard to ‘public’
engagement with Western society, adopt the strategy of partial engagement. What
this means is that Islam provides reference points which set the boundaries of
acceptable behaviour. These reference points, and hence the boundaries, are
perceived in slightly different ways (but one could argue falling along a continuum)
by those adopting the strategy of partial engagement (as reflected by the different,
albeit over-lapping, discursive repertoires identified). Key is that the fluidity of this boundary allows for an expression of Islam that has few problems in engaging in wider secular society, both in terms of rights and duties. However engagement is only 'partial' because despite perceiving economic and political engagement with wider society to be (Islamically) unproblematic (recognising that there may be other factors preventing full participation), there is still a strong feeling of being different. This difference varies between individuals (depending on where the reference point/boundaries are placed in any given context) but common to all is that as a result Muslims cannot participate in certain aspects of British (social) life. For some this will mean they can enter premises where alcohol is consumed so long as they do not consume it, for others it will mean they cannot even go into such an establishment. For others it may mean non-Muslims cannot be your friends, merely colleagues or acquaintances, for others friendship may be permissible but only with non-Muslims of the same gender. It cannot be denied that the ‘choice’ to participate in what has been described as the social sphere of British life is conditioned by a number of other factors, such as cultural norms of South Asian Muslim communities, experiences of prejudice and discrimination, language, etc., but underlying this are also principles laid down by Islam which state what is deemed as permissible (halal) behaviour.

The desire to retain difference, however, must not be misunderstood as the desire not to participate as British citizens. As seen in previous chapters, the expression of Islam by those who adopt the strategy of partial engagement does not take on a political form and is, to a large extent, limited to the individual and private sphere.
Difference may be maintained, but not so that it prevents Muslims from taking part in the political and economic life of Britain as citizens. For those whose religious needs are expressed in public spaces such as at work (in the main engaged Muslims), there is to a large extent, the desire to be respected for their difference. In many ways there is little call for special/separate rights, just equality of treatment, justice and even-handed treatment of individual and substantive rights as they are afforded to the indigenous population (although it is recognised that with social rights many of the indigenous population also miss out).

Difficulties experienced in participating fully in the political and economic spheres of British life, as highlighted in Chapter Two, are, in the main, the result of years of (institutional) racism and prejudice. The fact that Muslims have settled and continue to live in concentrated locales is more to do with neglect, poverty and segregationist housing and education policy then to do with ‘choice’ (see Chapter Three). As Kundnani confirms about those living in Oldham, Burnley and Bradford, the sites of violent confrontations between the police and Asian (mainly Muslim) youth from April to July 2001,

With its [the textile industry] collapse...the depressed inner-city areas, ... were abandoned by those whites that could afford to move out to the suburbs. Those that could not afford to buy themselves out took advantage of discriminatory council housing policies which allocated whites to new housing estates cut off from Asian Areas.... Those Asians that did get council accommodation on
predominantly white estates soon found their homes targeted, bricks thrown through windows.... The fear of racial harassment meant that most Asians sought safety in their own areas. ...It was 'white flight' backed by the local state.... Segregation in housing led to segregation in education. What resulted were Asian ghetto schools in which expectation of failure were common: poor results could be explained away by 'cultural problems' (2001)

This set the scene in which ‘regular racist violence against Asians was marginalised, while Asian crime on whites was sensationalised and misinterpreted as racially motivated’. It is in this context that,

The segregation of communities, the roots of which lay in institutional racism, came to be perceived as 'self-segregation’ – the attempt by Asians to create their own exclusive areas or ‘no-go areas’ because they did not want to mix with whites (Kundnani, 2001).

The experience of those living in the Northern towns of England has resonance with those living in the South. Although the detail of experience may be different, the consequences are the same, a feeling of being an ‘outsider’.

In the sample the majority of those interviewed felt like ‘outsiders’. Key was that this was irrespective of their adopted strategy towards ‘public’ engagement. Most significant however was the fact that even those who adopt the discursive repertoire
of selective Muslims most comprehensively still felt like ‘outsiders’. Put another way, even when Muslims work in Britain, have English as their first language, have non-Muslim friends, and participate in many of the social activities of the indigenous population, they still in important ways feel like ‘outsiders’. This feeling of being an outsider, largely, stemmed from the belief that no matter what Muslims did, they would never be accepted as full or equal members of wider society – colour (and increasingly, being Muslim) would always be a barrier to first class citizenship. As Honneth explains,

The only way in which individuals are constituted as persons is by learning to refer to themselves, from the perspective of an approving or encouraging other, as beings with certain positive traits and abilities. The scope of such traits – and hence the extent of one’s positive relation to self – increases with each new form of recognition that individuals are able to apply to themselves as subjects. In this way, the prospect of basic self-confidence is inherent in the experience of love; the prospect of self-respect, in the experience of legal recognition; and finally the prospect of self-esteem, in the experience of solidarity (1995:173).

For most in the sample, unsurprisingly therefore, the feeling of being an ‘outsider’ was considered to be a problem, especially in so far that, to have a sense of belonging (whilst retaining and being respected for difference) was deemed important.
Feelings of being an ‘outsider’ it is argued, within the British context, are exacerbated by a government that claims to oppose racism, but introduces policies that have only served to revive fears of ‘alien invasion’. Recent comments by the Home Secretary David Blunkett have not helped alleviate this sense of exclusion. At the time of the publication of the Cantle report (December, 2001), *Community Cohesion*, one of the official responses to the riots in the summer of 2001, the Home Secretary announced that he was considering an oath of allegiance for immigrants and that English language tests would be introduced. The need for the former can be drawn from the first recommendation of the Cantle report which states, ‘the rights - and in particular – the responsibilities of citizenship need to be more clearly established’ (2001:46) based on the assumption that ‘the present problems seem to owe a great deal to the failure to communicate and agree a set of clear values that can govern behaviour’ (2001:18). However, as this research argues, as humans we already do have shared values, and as the empirical findings support, these values can and do lead to civic pride. In the context of responding to the riots, what such government announcements serve to do is to once again ‘blame the victim’ rather than attempt to deal with the real issues. As Kundnani argues,

How could a lack of ability in the English language be a factor in causing the riots when the participants were born and bred here? Blunkett argued that, if their first-generation mothers could not speak English, this might, in some way, have contributed to deprivation in the second generation....Blunkett ... was attempting to use immigration policy as a way of disciplining black
communities, thereby explicitly reconnecting the issues of race and immigration
(2001)

Little consideration is given to the fact that it may not be a lack of shared values that
is the problem, but, in part, the fact that there exists in Britain a national identity
which deliberately excludes minority groups. As Solomos points out,

A key process in play in contemporary British cultural life is one in which a
romantically sanitised version of the English/British past is being busily
recreated: a quite reactionary vision of pastoral England/Albion... around a
tradition that is unproblematically white, a tradition which tends towards
morbid celebration of England and Englishness from which black and other
minorities are systematically excluded (2001:204)

From the above it can be said, other then for those who willingly adopt the strategy of
disengagement, that for most of the Muslims in the sample Islam is not the
determining factor in the perceived engagement or disengagement in British life.
Instead a number of factors come into play about which strategy is adopted - issues of
gender, age, level of education, socio-economic status, context and the minutiae of
personal biography as well as Britain's prevailing political and popular culture.

For the majority of Muslims in this study, feeling like an 'outsider' was undesirable,
largely because Britain is accepted as home and there is a desire to prosper and be
accepted as an integral part of British economic and political life. To follow Hirschman’s (1970) argument as highlighted at the end of Chapter Two, for those who adopt the strategy of engagement and partial engagement but still feel like ‘outsiders’, because they ‘refuse to exit’ and in certain contexts are willing to get their ‘voice’ heard to change the status quo, they can be viewed as ‘loyal’ citizens, their voice increasing with their degree of loyalty. From this perspective, those (young) Muslims who rioted over the summer, or came out protesting against Salman Rushdie after the publication of the *Satanic Versus*, do so (in part) because they care about living in Britain and do not wish to be treated like second class citizens, where they are threatened by racists or where considerations for their feelings are ignored.

From the perspective of the small minority of Muslims who adopt the strategy of disengagement most comprehensively, having the status of an ‘outsider’ is only to be expected. This ‘status’ is deemed unproblematic in a Western secular state. This stems from the fact that Britain is not considered home in any meaningful way - it just happens to be where they are living. For these Muslims Islam is, in many respects, the defining influence on their lives. Islam is transformed from what Sayyid calls a ‘nodal point in a variety of discourses into a master signifier’ (1997:46). However, this is done so in such a way as to place ‘her or his Muslim identity at the centre of her or his political practice.’ According to Sayyid, those who practice Islam in such a way can be identified as Islamists; that is ‘people who use the language of Islamic metaphors to think through their political destinies, those who see in Islam their political future’ (1997:17)⁶. It is those who adopt this strategy that can be most
closely associated with the ideas of Qutb and Mawdudi (as outlined in Chapter Two) self-imposing a separation from the prevailing social order. For these Muslims, Islam defines their duties, of the greatest importance being, implementing God's will on earth (primarily) through the act of *dawah*. What is interesting, however, is that these Muslims don't want group rights in the sense of separate Islamic systems (i.e., Muslim schools, Islamic laws governing marriage or inheritance for instance). They believe one cannot establish subsystems within the prevailing capitalist system. neither do they claim to be interested in securing their rights as British citizens.

Despite the discursive repertoire of 'disengaged' Muslims, amongst Sanah and Helena for whom this was their dominant strategy, it was apparent that they did engage with society, and it could be argued it is near impossible not to. Sanah for instance worked and Helena, although not engaging in paid work because of her young child, did engage in voluntary activities with socially excluded Bangladeshi women. Both contributed to wider society in their own way and both were law-abiding citizens. Moreover, despite claiming that they had no interest in securing their rights in this country, both were very keen that their individual freedoms not be violated and in some contexts, were willing to seek recourse to the law to ensure these rights were not violated. It is because freedom of belief is protected by individual liberties (i.e., civil rights), that the latter were considered of great importance. Moreover, as with others, when discussing the right to welfare (i.e., social rights), this again was seen to be unproblematic.
Welfare system doesn’t contradict Islam. For the Muslims who are living in this land and they can’t find jobs and so on, and they’re on welfare, it’s not a problem, it’s allowed from Islam... ‘cause it comes down to the issue of risiq. When Allah is the provider, then Allah is the one that gives you the wealth that you have in the first place, the source that it comes from is irrelevant (Sanah)

Even those Muslims who adopt the strategy of ‘disengagement’ as their dominant strategy, to some extent fulfil their duties and value the rights afforded to them.

From the above summary of results and how they relate to the preceding chapters, what is missing is any recognition of the Muslims who seek group rights, those Muslims who fight for Muslim schools or advocate the establishment of (or aspects of) sharia law within British legal systems for instance. The reason for this is that there was little evidence from my data of Muslims wanting ‘separate’ facilities. The emphasis, as stated earlier, lay on justice and equal treatment, not ‘special rights’. It is acknowledged however, that the sample on which this thesis is based is not necessarily representative of Muslims in Britain and clearly, on the basis that there are Muslim schools in Britain, there must be British Muslims who do favour group rights. However what it is possible to say is that such demands had little purchase with the respondents in this study. Though being guided by Islam in their everyday actions to various extents, it did not necessarily impact on their ‘public’ life, or at least not to the extent that legislative protection was needed – more a greater understanding and respect of difference. Therefore, whilst recognising that Islam is not considered by many to be a private faith, there seems to be little appetite to make
it into a public faith in the British context, i.e. not endorsed by the state, but a faith private individuals can practice without prejudice.

It is in the above context, in particular, that proposals as laid down by the EU Employment Directive to outlaw religious discrimination, as discussed in Chapter Two, fall short. It is recognised that such measures do protect individuals against unequal treatment, in a way that promotes equal rights (positive action) over ‘special rights’ (positive discrimination), even if not as comprehensively as those who are covered by the RRA. However this Directive, by emphasising that differences of treatment based directly on one of the grounds covered by the Directive are not allowed (except in ‘limited circumstances’), without any recourse to any ‘reasonable adjustments’ in the case of ‘religion or belief’, may in reality make it harder for employers to recognise difference and make adjustments accordingly. At worst, this legislation could be used as an excuse to avoid making adjustments on the basis that by doing so, they would be ‘applying rules...which particularly disadvantage some groups in comparison with others’ (DTI, 2001: 41).

For Muslim organisations/individuals that claim to represent Muslims, the results suggest they need to concentrate their efforts in making Britain more of an equal playing field for Muslims, where Muslims are not discriminated against for wanting to practice their faith or for just being different. More importantly these organisations and interested individuals need to try and redress the current disadvantages that Muslims face in term of their civil, political and social rights (as outlined in Chapter
Two), recognising the existence of what have been labelled in this work as 'selective Muslims'. Put another way, organisations claiming to represent Muslims need to acknowledge the fact that an increasing number of Muslims living in Britain, whilst enjoying all that British life has to offer, also fall prey to the social problems that are experienced by other British citizens, (for example alcohol/drug abuse, ill health related to smoking, issues related to sexual health). There is not enough organised emphasis coming from Muslims themselves to address the fact that Muslims living in Britain do not necessarily live their lives within the boundaries set down by Islam (something not unique to Britain). This effort however can only be effective if co-ordinated and reflected amongst statutory, voluntary and charitable agencies that are in place to deal with such social issues. Efforts to address the needs of Muslims need to brought into the mainstream of service delivery as just another aspect of the diversity of Britain.

These agencies need to recognise that despite an overarching Islamic ethos, there are in reality many different expressions of Islam, as broadly reflected by the strategies outlined above. When looking for 'representative' voices consideration needs to be given to the breadth of the Muslim voices and levels of engagement, both at an organisational and individual level. Recent events following the tragedy of September the 11th have shown the British government to rely upon one or two groups (namely the Union of Muslim Organisations and The Muslim Council of Britain) and individual parliamentary figures (Baroness Uddin and Lord Sarwar) to represent Muslims of Britain. Whilst as a short-term emergency measure this may be
the most pragmatic approach, it must not be seen as the only approach in the longer term.

What has been obvious in this work, is that current political practice – whether expressing individual or solidaristic positions on citizenship - treat society as a whole, ignoring difference and thus perpetuating inequality. The challenge for citizenship (and hence education for citizenship, which is to become part of the national curriculum from November 2002), is how this difference can be meaningfully acknowledged and not just reduced to the celebration of diversity in the way that multiculturalism has perpetuated, (such as the celebration of cultural dress and chicken tikka masala). What is needed are measures that get away from exoticising the ‘Other’ in this way, to ‘normalising’ (not ignoring) difference, making it an integral part of a civic (as opposed to an ethnic) national identity while at the same time seeking ways to ensuring substantive rights that result in treatment that are equitable and fair. There needs to be recognition and an acceptance of the fact that people will have multiple (and very often over-lapping) identities and as such multiple loyalties. Identities and associated loyalties that will come to the fore and subside according to time and context. In many ways it is very simplistic to talk of fair and equitable treatment, however at a minimum this means a recognition that for the vast majority of Muslims, it is not only cultural difference and [limited] social networks that leads to social exclusion, marginalisation and isolation, but poverty, inequality and lack of power. Addressing one set of issues without the other will always result in limited impact (see Gupta and Ferguson, 1992:16-18). Although this
thesis does not examine, in it's primary data, the impact of historic, social and economic deprivations on Muslims, as highlighted in chapter two this context must not be ignored and is of considerable importance when discussing Muslim 'adjustment' to British citizenship.

For those who have been identified as adopting the strategy of 'disengagement', it is recognised that their uncompromising stance can lead to questioning of 'loyalty' and subsequent vilification. It has also been suggested that the 'barrenness' of their position, created by their emphasise on the political at the expense of the spiritual, cultural and social aspects of Islam, will in the long run mean it is unsustainable (Ballard, 2001:29). However to marginalise Islamists, that is those who 'articulate Islam as the master signifier of their political discourse' (Sayyid, 1997:159), in such a way would be to misconstrue the implications of their stance. Despite their minority status, the challenges that 'Islamists' pose for wider Western society and citizenship need to be considered. In one respect, it could be argued that the challenge that they pose to the notion of citizenship is parallel with that which is posed by globalisation and the (alleged) decline of the nation state. From this perspective it could be argued that what Sanah and Helena do is challenge the link between citizenship and the nation state in society today (a society in which people’s attachments and identifications are multiple and often trans-national). They do this by prioritising Islam, or specifically the ummah, as the space in which to exercise their 'global citizenship'. In other words Islam, as a global entity, provides the vehicle with which to challenge the concept of the nation-state and it’s associated loyalties. At a more
fundamental level, but associated to this, the wider implications of the Islamist movement is the challenge it poses to the hegemony of the West. As Sayyid argues,

The logic of Islamism is not threatening because of the way in which Islamist forces are able to threaten mutually assured destruction, rather the logic of Islamism is threatening because it fails to recognise the universalism of the western project (1997:129).

The challenge the Islamist movement, of which Sanah and Helena are a representative of (albeit at a micro diasporic level), pose is that of recognising that the end of the cold was not the final triumph of the West, as Fukuyama predicted, but in fact ‘Europe in just one culture among many’ (Sayyid, 1997).

To conclude, for the South Asian Muslims of Britain assimilation is impossible (however ‘integrated’ one may be, it is recognised that one can never assimilate because of colour) and largely undesirable. However, this does not mean that Muslims do not want to be an integral part of British life. Integration does not mean ‘the same as’. There is a strong recognition that Muslims are different and there is a desire for this difference to be maintained. A multiculturalist paradigm has, however, encouraged this difference to be seen as static and unchanging rather then as fluid and dynamic as it is in reality. In this context Muslims’ desire to keep to their faith (even if it is variously expressed), and retain (certain) social differences is misunderstood by wider British society as an unwillingness to ‘integrate’. Too much emphasis is put
on Islam and a lack of shared values as the root of the problems and not enough to the historically rooted social and economic deprivation and continuing (albeit not as obvious) prejudice and discrimination many Muslim communities are experiencing. What is needed therefore is a re-evaluation of this situation.

For the majority of Muslims, the importance of the duties they have as citizens is evident. Muslims recognise they have a duty to abide by the laws of the land and a responsibility to look out for country and community. Responsibilities, like identity are however multi-layered. There is a sense of Muslim loyalty at a global level, most recently evident with the Palestinian issue and President Bush’s attack of what he as recently called the ‘Axis of evil’. At a national level, shared purpose may be limited because of the way national identity has been constructed over time, so closely linked with an ethnic identity and culture which excludes those who are not white (and not Christian), but not to the exclusion of fulfilling citizenry duties of working, paying taxes, obeying the law. At a more local/neighbourhood level there is a sense of responsibility towards those who are perceived to share a ‘cultural community’, about the need to help out at times of need. Which ‘community, which identity and which loyalty (if indeed they can be disentangled) is dominant at any one time is dependent on time and space. However what cannot be denied is that Muslim self-awareness is increasing – in reaction to media, state and political climate.

In the above context, citizenship cannot be minimally defined as merely a status that allows civil, political and social rights and obligations in a polity. Citizenship needs
also to foster a sense of belonging by not treating difference as an oddity; by recognising that people will have social identities that are expressive of many forms of collective life; by acknowledging that a sense of responsibility to one group does not mean to the exclusion of another (that identity and associated responsibilities are multi-layered); by bringing Muslims into the mainstream so that they are seen as one aspect of the diversity of opinion in Britain, and not keeping Muslims in marginal matrix of society who need separate special rights. Key is that citizenship transcend essentialist views of identity and adopt a conception that recognises the fluidity and multiplicity of identity, whilst permitting a sense of self/group. It needs to recognise that many voices make up the Muslim ‘voice’. Most of all these elements need to converge to address the social, political and civil marginalisation that many Muslim communities are experiencing. By addressing ‘adjustments’ to British citizenship there needs to be a recognition that this adjustment needs to take place amongst Muslims but also by society, and, in particular, by government. This is not to deny that there are tensions faced by Muslims living in Britain but recognising that for most these tensions are negotiable, in a way that allows the desired practice of Islam whilst living as British citizens. The fact that many Muslims are still seen to be reluctant to ‘integrate’, living within their own communities, in this context, suggests that it is not Islam that prevents Muslims from being a more ‘integrated’ part of Britain but socio-economic factors and a feeling of being an ‘outsider’ perpetuated by prejudice and discrimination and an exclusionary national identity that questions loyalty as soon as Muslims assert their difference.
Although it has to be noted a very small number in the sample had what could be described as an Islamic discourse – where reference was made to the *shariah*, or to Islamic concepts like *ijtihad*, *dawah* and *tawhid* for instance – those that did make reference to these concepts were most likely to adopt the discursive repertoire of engaged Muslims.

A number of inter-related reasons can be cited for this phenomenon, two of the most important being opportunity (there are women with the education, time and support structure to hold these Islamic gatherings), and need (in the face of challenges faced by the children who question ‘why’ and a political environment that challenges Islam).

British Muslims are unlikely to disown Islam as a result of the attacks on America on September the 11th because they a perceived as less to do with Islam then a result of political foreign policy which has ignored the plight of Muslims.

The policies to which reference is being made are those affecting asylum seekers in particular – policies of dispersal, detention and the voucher system.

Whether the person has ever worked or lived away from home, for instance

Those who Sayyid refers to as Islamists, others may refer to as Islamic fundamentalists. See Sayyid, 1997:8-22, for a critic of the use of the term Islamic fundamentalist.

This was a term coined by President Bush at his first State of the Union address, delivered to Congress in January 2002. In this speech President Bush singled out Iran, Iraq and North Korea as states that form an "axis of evil" and threaten America and the rest of the world by developing weapons of mass destruction and sponsoring terrorism. To see a full transcript of this speech, go to http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/index.html
Glossary

aman, safety

‘aqida, faith and all the matters related to the six pillars of Iman (God – His names, His attributes, the angels, the books, the prophets, the Day of Judgement and predestination). In general, it studies what is beyond sensory perception.

biradari, literally brotherhood.

dar al-harb, the domain of the enemy, war-zone.

dar al-Islam, ‘House/domain of Islam’ – lands under Muslim rule

dar al-kufr, non Muslim lands

da’wah, ‘invitation’ to Islam

dawlah, state

deen (din), religion

dhimmis, non Muslims citizens of an Islamic state

fard, obligatory

fatwa (pl. fatawa), specific legal ruling: it can be a mere reminder of a prescription explicitly stated by the sources, or a scholar’s elaboration on the basis of a non-explicit text or in the case of a specific situation for which there is not scriptural source.

fiqh, Islamic law and jurisprudence. It comprises two general sections which are based on different and opposed methodological approaches: ibadat, worship, where only what is prescribed is permitted; and mu’amalat, social affairs, where everything is permitted except what is explicitly forbidden.
firqah, sect

gora, white person – in some contexts can have pejorative connotations.

hadith (pl. ahadith), reported and authenticated traditions about what the Prophet said, did or approved.

Haj, pilgrimage to the ka'aba in Makkah – stretches between the 7th and 10th of the month Dhul Hijra. Acknowledges one point in space and time where-in the whole Islamic world acknowledges the might and oneness of God.

haram, actions forbidden by Islamic law

hijab, head covering of Muslim women. A women wearing such a covering can be referred to as a hijaban.

hijra, emigration of the Prophet Muhammed (pnbh) and his followers from Makkah to Medina in 622 C.E. Marks the beginning of the Muslim calendar.

ijma, ‘consensus’, in the sense of unanimous or majority decision.

ijtihad, literally ‘effort’, it has become a technical term meaning the effort exercised by a jurist to extract a law or a ruling from non-explicit scriptural sources or to formulate a specific legal opinion in the absence of texts of reference.

imam (pl. a’imma), (1) leader of the ritual prayers; (2) the leader of the Muslim community; (3) an honorific for a great scholar; (4) in the Shi’ah (q.v), tradition the leader of their community in the line of ‘Ali and Fatima, the Prophet’s daughter.

Islam, submission to God

istislah, public interest

jahiliyya, the time of ‘ignorance’, pre-Islamic paganism
**jihad**, war against non-Muslims; in the sufi tradition the struggle against one’s baser instincts.

**khalifa(h)**, in political theory the successor of the Prophet; in religious life the accredited successor of a pir (q.v.).

**kufir**, a non believer – has a pejorative meaning

**madrasa(h)**, institute for teaching ‘ulama.

**mubah**, permitted

**nusus** (singular: nass) parts of the shariah that are not subject to conflicting interpretation.

**pir**, Persian for ‘elder’ – refers to a sufi able to lead devotees on the mystical path

**Qur’an**, word of God. Consists of 6,236 verses and 114 surahs (chapters).

**salat**, prayer

**sawm**, fasting for the whole month of Ramadan. Teaches discipline to the soul and recalls, for the believer, the month in which the first verses of the Qur’an were revealed. End of fasting is celebrated by *Eid al-Fitr*

**shahada**, the profession of faith and its testimony through the formulation with the heart and intelligence of “I bear witness that there is no god but God and that Muhammad is His Messenger”.

**sharia(h)**, the totality of rules guiding the individual and corporate lives of Muslims, covering law, ethics and etiquette.

**shi’a(h)**, shorthand for shi’at ‘Ali, ‘the faction of ‘Ali’, the minority tradition within Islam which considered ‘Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law, should have been his rightful successor. This trajectory of Islam developed variant understandings of authority, political and religious, compared with the sunni (q.v.) majority.
**shumul**, comprehensive

**shura**, consultation.

**sunna(h)**, the tradition of the Prophet, the customs and norms which Muslims should emulate.

**sunni**, shorthand for *ahl al-sunnah wa'l-jama'ah*, ‘the people of the custom and the community’, the majority of the Muslims who accept the *sunna* and the authority of the first generation of Muslims which underwrites the integrity of the *sunna*, in contrast to the *Shi'ah*

**tafsir**, commentary on the Qur’an.

**tawhid (tauhid)**, unity of God

**ulama** (singular: ‘*alim*’), a learned man, particularly in one of the religious sciences. Also known as *mulla, maulvi, maulana*

**umma(h)**, community of faith, spiritual community, uniting all Muslim women and men throughout the world in their attachment to Islam, the transnational world of Muslims.

**wajib**, obligation, often used as synonym of *fard* except by Hanafi jurists

**zakat**, alms
Appendix one

Summary details of respondents
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Formative years in a South Asian/British country</th>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Town of residence</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Age</th>
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Appendix two

Interview Schedule
INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. MIGRATION HISTORY – formative years of life in country of origin

1.1 Why did you come to Britain?
Trace history – where did you first live?…present.

1.2 Why did you decide to settle in H/W-Luton?

1.3 How many years have you lived in H/W-Luton?

1.4 Is there anything you don’t like about living here?

1.5 What impact has coming to this country had on you?

1. MIGRATION HISTORY – formative years of life in Britain

1.1 Why did you family come to Britain?
Probe for year

1.2 Do you still live at home?
If no: Why did you leave?

1.3 What do you like about living in H/W-Luton?

1.4 What do you dislike about living in H/W-Luton?

2. CONNECTIONS TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

2.1 What is your country of origin?
Probe for: Region
City/town/village

2.2 Do you go back very often?
If yes: How often
When was the last time?
Main reasons for going back
If no: Why not? Would you want to?

2.3 Have you got property over there?

2.4 Would you like to go back and live there one day?
Why? Probe for: Which country they consider to be home.
2.5 What sort of things do you think of when thinking of home? What makes it home?

3. MUSLIM/NON MUSLIM BOUNDARY

3.1 What have you got in common with the people who you spend most of your time with on a social basis?

3.2 How much contact do you have with those who aren’t Muslims?
   If none/Ltd: Any reason for this?
   If a lot: In what situation?

3.3 What about non Asian Muslims, i.e. Arabs/Brith white Muslims. Do you have much contact with them?
   If none/Ltd: Any reason for this?
   If a lot: In what situation?

3.4 What about those who are Asian but are not Muslim, i.e. Hindus and Sikhs. Do you have much contact with them?
   If none/Ltd: Any reason for this?
   If a lot: In what situation?

3.5 Who are you more comfortable with, those that are Muslim but not Asian or those that are Asian but not Muslim?
   Probe for: Why feel more comfortable with one and not the other?
   How would you feel if a close member of your family married a Bangladeshi/Kashmiri/Arab/white Muslim?

3.6 When you go out on a social basis where do you go?

3.7 Is there anywhere you wouldn’t go? Why?

4. CITIZENSHIP

4.1 How would you define citizenship?

4.2 Do you think of yourself as a citizen?
   Probe: Of what?
4.3 What makes you a citizen?
   **Prompt if Ltd response:** what does being a citizen mean to you?

4.4 What does it mean to be a good citizen?

4.5 Do you have rights as a citizen?
   What are they?

4.6 Are there any rights that you can think of that you have not got but you think you should have?

4.7 Do you think you have religious/cultural rights?
   **If yes:** What are they?
   **If no:** Do you want to have? **If yes:** Why & what?
   **If no:** Why not?

4.8 Do you have a right to claim welfare benefits and state pension?
   How do you feel about claiming these?

4.9 Do you have any duties as a citizen?
   What are they?

4.10 Do you think whether you are a man/woman affects how you are treated like a citizen?
   **Probe if following make a difference as well:** Race/colour Religion

4.11 So if I said some people have argued that Muslims are treated like second class citizens, what would you think?
   **If agree:** Do you think this is true just for Muslims?

4.12 Thinking about what you have said, who do you think is a first class citizen?

4.13 Do you vote?
   **If not:** why not?
   **If yes:** who for?

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5. BRITISH SOCIETY

5.1 What do you think of when thinking of British society?

5.2 Do you feel you belong to British society?
6. COMMUNITY

6.1 How important is your community to you?
   **If don’t understand:** What makes up a community?

6.2 What is your community, who belongs to it?

6.3 How important is it for you to live in this community?
   Why?

6.4 Do you belong to more than one community?

6.5 Would you say you live in a Muslim community?

6.6 Do you think it is important to keep a sense of community?
   **Probe for:** What is meant by ‘sense of community’.

6.7 Is there just on Muslim community in H/W-Luton?

6.8 Sects exist in Islamic thought
   What Islamic sects are you aware of?
   What do you think of them?
   Do you follow any particular one?

6.9 We have been talking about your thoughts on your community and on wider
   British society. Who would you say you would do more for?
   Why? (two strangers).

7. PARTICIPATION/REPRESENTATION

7.1 Are you a member of or involved with any organisations?
   **Probe for:** Their position in organisation
   What it does-aims
   How successful
   Demographics of members – gender/age
   How many members
   Who funds it

7.2 Have you heard of any groups, locally or nationally that are seen to represent the
   views of Muslims?
   **If none:** E.g. Muslim Parliament
7.3 What do you think of the work these groups do?

7.4 How adequately do you think they represent the views of Muslims, or cater for the needs of Muslims?

7.5 Do you think Muslims should be represented as a separate religious group, as opposed to being represented along with other Asians? Why?

7.6 How would you like your views to be represented in this country?

7.7 Do you think your local councillor/M.P represents your views?

8. CULTURE

8.1 For many people culture plays a big part in their lives. How does your culture fit into your life?

8.2 What kinds of things were you thinking of when talking about your culture? What makes up your culture?

8.3 Would you say you are influenced by other cultures?

8.4 Are you (would you be) bothered if your children learnt from other cultures?

9. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

9.1 How did you learn about Islam?
   **Probe for:** What exactly they were taught and by whom

9.2 Are you still learning about Islam?
   - **If yes:** When and why did you begin to learn more about Islam?
   - **If no:** Any reason for this?

9.3 How do you think Islam affects or influences your daily life?

   *I would like to ask you a few questions about how you practice your religion. Feel free to be frank with your answers as I fully accept people have different ways of
expressing and understanding their faith. And let me remind you again how anything you say will kept confidential.

9.4 How often do you pray?

9.5 How often do you read the Qu’ran?

9.6 How often do you go to the mosque?

9.7 Do you fast during Ramadan?

9.8 What does Eid mean to you?

9.9 What do you think about zakaat?
   For those who pay it: How do you pay it?
   For those who don’t: Will you pay zakaat? If yes: how?
   If no: Why not?

9.10 Are you happy with the way you observe your religion, or do you feel you should do it more or less?
   If more: what stops you?
   If less: Why do you practice so much then?

9.11 Do you think you are given the space in this country to practise your faith the way you want to?
   If no: In an ideal situation how would you like to be able to practice your faith in this country?

9.12 At the moment how does Islam affect your life outside the home?

9.13 Do you think your faith would have played the same part in your life if you had been living in a Muslim country?

9.14 Some people say religion in a personal, private matter and that you should not bring it into public affairs, e.g. politics/work. What do you think?

9.15 How do you think your expression of Islam differs from that of your parent/children?

9.16 Considering what you have said which would you say influences your life more, your faith or your culture?

10. MULTICULTURALISM
10.1 Do you think Muslims should have a right to expect their employer to be sensitive to their religious needs?

10.2 Is there anywhere where it is inappropriate that religious needs be recognised and responded to?

10.3 What about in the NHS?

10.4 Do you accept that other people will have different views and beliefs from you, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and that is their right?

11. LEVEL OF EDUCATION

11.1 To what level did your schooling extend?

11.2 Have you had any further education/training?
   - **If yes:** Where & what
   - **If no:** Is there any particular reason you did not pursue your education?

11.3 What level of education have your parents had?

11.4 Do you work at the moment?
   - **Probe for details:** Employed/self/un/retired/student/housewife
   - **If working:** position held & F/T or P/T
   - **If not working:** Any particular reason? Probe: Previous jobs? Spouses job Occupation in country of origin

12. BRITISH SCHOOLING

12.1 If you had the choice what type of school would you send your children to? Why?

12.2 What do you think of separate Muslims schools?

12.3 What do you think is the main purpose of education?

12.4 Do you think the British education system provides this?

12.5 What do you see as the main problems for Muslim children at school?
12.6 How important is it to pass on Islamic knowledge?

12.7 Some people have said that the state has no responsibility to pass on Islamic knowledge to Muslim school children, do you agree?
   **If no:** What should be taught in RE at school?

12.8 Is there anything in the curriculum that you think should be changed?

12.9 What about the structure of the school e.g. school holidays/uniform/food.

12.10 What RE do you/would you give your children?

12.11 How do you feel the teaching of Islamic education could be improved?

12.12 Would you ever bring these issues up with the school?
   **If no:** Why not?

12.13 Do you think the education system succeeds in providing equality of opportunity for Muslim children when they leave school?

13. DISCRIMINATION

13.1 Have you ever experienced any form of prejudice/discrimination against you?
   **Probe:** What happened?
   What was it against – colour/religion/culture?
   What did you do about it?

13.2 Do you think religious discrimination exists?
   **Probe:** Any experience of it?
   Why do you think it happens?
   What do you think can be done to make things better?
   (Muslims change/educate wider soc/change law)

14. VIEWS WIDER SOCIETY HOLDS ABOUT MUSLIMS

14.1 How do you think the majority non-Muslim English people in this country view Muslims?

14.2 How do you think the Government views their Muslim citizens?
Does Gov. encourage, allow or discourage?

14.3 What do you think about the way Muslims are portrayed in the media, i.e. in the papers & on TV?
   **If bad:** How does that make you feel as a Muslim living here?

14.4 Do you think things will get better or worse for Muslims in this country?

14.5 What about internationally. What for you is the biggest issue facing Muslims/Islam in the world at the moment?

15. **THE FUTURE**

15.1 How do you think Islam will develop in the future in Britain?

15.2 In future do you think differences should be kept between Muslims and non-Muslims in this country?
   **If yes:** Why?
   **What differences?**
Appendix Three

Coding Frame
# South Asian Muslims: Adjustments to British Citizenship – Coding Frame.

**Interview number (INTNO)** ........... **Year came to Britain (YEAR)** ............

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age (AGE)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>19–25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26–30</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>31–40</td>
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<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>41–50</td>
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<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>50 plus</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender (GENDER)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Female</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Education (EDUCTION)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 British education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 South Asian education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth (COFBIRTH)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 England</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Other</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Town (TOWN)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 High Wycombe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Luton</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality (NATIONTY)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 British</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Dual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Country of origin</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First language of respondent (FLANGAGE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 English</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Punjabi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Urdu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Language(s) interview conducted in (INTLANG)
1 English
2 Punjabi
3 Urdu
4 Combination of 1 & 2
5 Combination of 1 & 3

Marital status (MARITALS)
1 Single
2 Married
3 Widowed

Children (CHILDREN)
1 None
2 Boy(s)
3 Girl(s)
4 Combination of 2 & 3 above

1a Migration History (South Asian educated/born)
Why did you come to Britain? (COMBRIT)
0 Not put/no response
1 Marriage - Join husband/wife
2 Join parent(s)/relative(s)
3 Earn money/job prospects
4 Higher education
5 Travel experience
6 Higher standard of living
7 Other

1. Why did you decide to settle in H/W - Luton? (SETTLE)
0 Not put/no response
1 Already had family/friends here
2 Aesthetic appeal - qualified
3 Employment
4 Other
2. How many years have you lived in H/W – Luton? (RESIDENT)
0  Not put/no response
1  5 – 15 years
2  16 – 30 years
3  31 – 40 years
4  41 + years
5  Other

3. What impact has coming to this country had on you? (IMPACT)
0  Not put/no response
1  Created distance from Islam/culture
2  Economic pressure to maintain decent standard of living
3  Lack of opportunities to progress in work
4  Set back in educational achievement
5  Good prospects in employment/education (for children)
6  Found it quite easy to settle here
7  Came as sojourners, stayed for children’s education
8  Other

1b  Migration History (British educated/born)
1. Why did your family come to Britain? (FAMCOME)
0  Not put/no response
1  Father - Economic migrant
2  Father – Education
3  Father/mother sponsored by relative
4  “Bandwagon” effect
5  Other

2. Do you still live at home? (LIVHOME)
0  Not put/no response
1  Yes
2  No, moved out to go to university
3  No, moved out when got married
4  No
5  Other

(Both)
3. What do you like about living in H/W – Luton? (LIKELIV)
0  Not put/no response
1  Don’t like it
2  Sense of community
3  Large population of Muslims/Asians
4  Multicultural/not racist
5  Facilities – cultural/religious/social/employment/near London
6  Friends and family live here
7. Got used to it so it is okay
8. Familiarity with environment (people/shops/atmosphere)
9. Other

4. What do you dislike about living in H/W – Luton? (DISLIKE)
0. Not put/no response
1. Nothing
2. Crime
3. Reputation
4. Boring/nothing to do
5. Other

2. Connections to country of origin
1. What is your country of origin? (ORIGIN)
0. Not put/no response
1. Pakistan
2. Bangladesh
3. India
4. Pakistan/India
5. Other

2. Do you go back very often? (GOBACK)
0. Not put/no response
1. Once every two years approx.
2. Once every five years approx.
3. Once every ten years approx.
4. Only once
5. Other

2b. Main reason for going back (WHYBACK)
0. Not put/no response
1. Visit family and friends
2. Weddings and funerals
3. Holiday
4. Work
5. Other

2c. Why don’t you go back more often? (MOROFTEN)
0. Not put/no response
1. Not recommended by family
2. Expense
3. Majority of family in England therefore no reason to
4. Britain/England is home
5. Not bothered
3. **Have you got property over there? (PROP)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Not put/no response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Yes, a house &amp; land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Yes, land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes business property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>No, unqualified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>No, but parents have a house &amp; land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>No, but parents have land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. **Would you like to go back and live there one day? (LIVBACK)**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Not put/no response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Not permanently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Probably not but wouldn’t rule it out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes, once children are settled/older</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Combination of 2 &amp; 5</td>
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<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
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</table>

4b. **Which country do you consider to be your home? (COHOME)**

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<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Not put/no response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>England/Britain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Both England/Britain and country of origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>No-where</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Other</td>
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</table>

5. **What sort of things do you think of when thinking of home? BRIT (HOMEA)**

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>Not put/no response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Country of birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Spending formative years of life there</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Family/friends (children born here)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Country of origin of parents - roots</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Security – (rights/house/work/ed.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Country of residence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Familiarity with culture/infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sense of belonging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5b **What sort of things do you think of when thinking of home? CO. OF ORIGIN (HOMEB)**
0 Not put/no response
1 Country of birth
2 Spending formative years of life there
3 Family/friends (siblings/parents)
4 Country of origin of parents – roots
5 Security – (rights/house/work/ed.)
6 Country of residence
7 Familiarity with culture/infrastructure
8 Sense of belonging
9 Other

3 Muslims/non Muslim boundary
1. *What have you got in common with the people who you spend most of your time with on a social basis?* (INCOMON)
0 Not put/no response
1 All/most of country of origin/south Asian Muslims
2 All/most Muslims
3 All/most Asian
4 All/most English/white
5 All human beings
6 Share common interests/ideas
7 Work colleagues
8 Other

2. *How much contact do you have with those who aren't Muslims?* (NONMUS)
0 Not put/no response
1 Have close friends
2 Through work – and social
3 Through work – not social
4 Know/meet on an occasional basis
5 Neighbours/only when go shopping
6 None
7 Other

2b. *Reason for limited contact* (WHYLIMT)
0 Not put/no response
1 Don’t share common interests
2 Never worked/gone out much therefore not met many
3 Non Muslims can never be your friends
4 Language barrier
5 Religious & cultural differences
6 Combination of 4&5
7 Other

3. *How much contact do you have with non Asian Muslims?* (NONASMUS)
4. How much contact do you have with those who are Asian but not Muslim? 
(MONMUSAS)
0 Not put/no response
1 Have close friend(s)
2 Through work – and social
3 Through work – not social
4 Know/meet on an occasional basis
5 None, don’t know any
6 Non Muslims can never be your friends
7 Other

5. Who are you more comfortable with, those that are Muslim but not Asian or 
those that are Asian but not Muslim? (MORCOMF)
0 Not put/no response
1 Both/depends on the individual
2 Muslims
3 Non Muslims
4 Asians
5 Country of origin/South Asian Muslims
6 Other

5b. How would you feel if a close member of your family married a 
Bangladeshi/Kashmiri/Arab/white Muslim? (MARRYOUT)
0 Not put/no response
1 Prefer they married Muslim from south Asian cultural background
2 No problem so long as Muslim but recognise cultural differences/social 
expectations would make it difficult
3 No problem so long as Muslim
4 Initially state no problem so long as Muslim but later admit would be difficult
5 Prefer Muslim but would not rule out non Muslim partner
6 Other

6. When you go out on a social basis where do you go? (SOCIAL)
0 Not put/no response
1 Non alcohol centred leisure places (restaurants/cinema/bowling)
2 Non alcohol centred places - shopping & homes of friends and family
3 Pub/clubs/bars
4 Combination of 1 & 2
5 All of above
6 Other

7. *Is there anywhere you wouldn't go?* (NOGO)
0 Not put/no response
1 Pubs/clubs
2 Anywhere prohibited by Islam
3 Combination of 1 & 2
4 No
5 Other

4 Citizenship
1. *How would you define citizenship?* (CITDEF)
0 Not put/no response
1 Passport
2 Freedom to travel
3 Country of birth
4 Country of residence
5 Obeying laws
6 Security/protection (getting rights/freedoms)
7 Belonging to a country/identity being accepted
8 Other

2. *Do you think of yourself as a citizen?* (THINKCIT)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes
3 Yes, but doesn’t mean anything
4 Other

2b. *What are you a citizen of?* (CITOF)
0 Not put/no response
1 Britain/UK
2 Britain & country of origin
3 Europe
4 Other

3. *What makes you a citizen?* BRIT. (MAKCITA)
0 Not put/no response
1 Passport
2 Birth in a country
3 Residence in a country
4 Security/protection (getting rights/freedoms)
5 Fulfilling duties/contributing to country – working/obeying laws/paying taxes/investing money/loyalty to state
6 Identity/freedom of expression
7 Other

3b. What makes you a citizen? CO. OF ORIGIN. (MAKCITB)
0 Not put/no response
1 Passport
2 Birth in a country
3 Residence in a country
4 Security/protection (getting rights/freedoms)
5 Fulfilling duties/contributing to country – working/obeying laws/paying taxes/investing money/loyalty to state
6 Identity/freedom of expression
7 Other

4. What does it mean to be a good citizen? (GOODCIT)
0 Not put/no response
1 Obeying laws
2 Getting rights
3 Getting/exercising rights/being pro active
4 Contributing to country - working/obeying laws/paying taxes/investing money/loyalty to state
5 Integrating
6 Respecting difference/being accepted
7 Don’t know, (don’t know any)
8 Other

5. Do you have any rights as a citizen? (CITRIGHT)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes, if give should get back
3 Yes, unqualified
4 Yes, but don’t have any substantive reality
5 Don’t know/not sure
6 Other

5b. What are your rights? (WHTRITE)
0 Not put/no response
1 Same rights as everyone else/no discrimination
2 Civil rights - freedom of speech/belief/ownership/assoc.
3 Political rights - vote
4 Social rights - education/welfare benefits/rubbish collected
5 Legal rights - British passport/judicial
6. Are there any rights that you can think of that you have not got but you think you should have? (MISRIT)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 No
   2 Protect Islam as a religion (blasphemy)
   3 Protection against religious discrimination
   4 Non eurocentric curricular
   5 Islamic education
   6 Equality of opportunity
   7 Being accepted in society
   8 Don't know/not sure
   9 Other

7. Do you think you have religious/cultural rights? (CULRIT)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Yes, (and they are sufficient)
   2 Yes, but is necessary to protect against extremism/infringement of the rights of others
   3 Yes, but not enough/no substantive reality
   4 No, but cannot expect to have
   5 Can't think of any
   6 Should have
   7 Other

7b. What religious/cultural rights? (DEFCUL)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Don't know/not sure
   2 Freedom of belief/association
   3 Respect/accommodation of religious festivals/Muslim belief
   4 Legal protection against religious discrimination
   5 Mosque – build/azaan
   6 Other

8. Do you have a right to claim welfare benefits and state pension? (BENRIT)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Yes, and don’t have a problem doing so (if have no job)
   2 Yes, but would not claim
   3 Yes, because have paid in therefore should get back
   4 Do not approve of benefit fraud
   5 Other
9. Do you have any duties as a citizen? (CITDUT)
0. Not put/no response
1. No
2. Yes but can’t think of any
3. Yes, obey laws
4. Yes, obey laws as long as they do not contradict Islam
5. Yes, help to maintain/protect/contribute to country – work/study/pay taxes
6. Bring up children to be good citizens
7. Exercise rights given
8. Don’t know/not sure
9. Other

10. Do you think whether you are a man/woman affects how you are treated as a citizens? (GENRITE)
0. Not put/no response
1. No (treated equally)
2. Yes
3. Depends on the context
4. Other

10b. In what context are men/women treated differently? (GENDIF)
0. Not put/no response
1. In employment – men disadvantaged
2. In employment – women disadvantaged
3. When religion/culture and gender combined – women disadvantaged,
4. Because Muslim women dress differently – women disadvantaged
5. Women generally disadvantaged in society but Muslim/black women more so
6. Men treated better - universal
7. Other

10c. Do you think what race/colour you are affects how you are treated as a citizen? (CITRACE)
0. Not put/no response
1. No,(not so much now-a-days/judged on ability)
2. Yes (sometimes)
3. Other

10d. Do you think what religion you are affects how you are treated as a citizen? (RELIGCIT)
0. Not put/no response
1. No (never come across this)
2. Yes (sometimes)
3. Don’t know
4. Other
11. Some people have argued Muslims are treated like 2nd class citizens, what do you think? (SECND CIT)
0 Not put/no response
1 No, unqualified
2 No, treated as such because of colour of their skin
3 Yes
4 Sometimes, but not as often as is suggested
5 Don’t know
6 Other

11b. If yes, why do you think Muslims are treated like second class citizens? (WHY2ND)
0 Not put/no response
1 Needs not accommodated for enough/marginalised by services
2 Because others are scared of Islam
3 Only if you let others treat you as such
4 Bring it upon themselves sometimes
5 Because of we are different, i.e. lang/dress/not accepted as part of Brit. Soc.
6 Other

12. Thinking about what you have said, who do you think is a first class citizen? (ISTCIT)
0 Not put/no response
1 The white indigenous (Christian/English) population
2 Upper classes, royalty etc.
3 Someone who gets all their rights/treated same as everyone else
4 Someone who fits it – in terms of their ideas
5 Someone who is doing their best for the country
6 Everyone
7 Other

13. Do you vote? (DOVOTE)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes
3 Other

13b. If yes: who do you vote for? (HOWVOTE)
0 Not put/no response
1 Labour
2 Conservatives
3 Who ever appeals at the time
4 Other
13c. If no: Any reason why you do not vote? (NOVOTE)
0 Not put/no response
1 To get out of paying council tax
2 No interest/not bothered
3 Because it’s haram
4 Other

5 British society
1. What do you think of when thinking of British society? (BRITSOC)
0 Not put/no response
1 Christianity as dominant faith
2 Tolerant/helpful
3 Too much freedom/immoral
4 Diversity - multicultural/multifaith
5 Difference in cultural/social activities, ie.clubs/discos etc V’s family
6 Discriminating
7 Other

2. Do you feel you belong to British society? (BLONGSOC)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes
3 Yes & no (belong to more than one society)
4 Other

5 Community
1. How important is your community to you? (IMPCOM)
0 Not put/no response
1 Not sure belong to/have a community
2 Questions whether they belong to one community
3 Vital
4 Very important
5 Important
6 Not important
7 Other

2. What is your community, who belongs to it? (WHATCOM)
0 Not put/no response
1 Asians
2 Muslims/ummah
3 Family
4 Those from country of origin/region (South Asian Muslims)
5. Those from Luton/High Wycombe
6. Talk of communities
7. Don’t have a community here.
8. Other

3. How important is it for you to live in this community? (LIVECOM)
   0. Not put/no response
   1. Unity
   2. Security/support
   3. Children learn accepted social behaviour.
   4. Identity/roots (sense of belonging)
   5. Facilities, cultural/religious
   6. Community, negative as well
   7. Not important
   8. Don’t live in any specific community
   9. Other

4. Do you belong to more then one community? (MULTICOM)
   0. Not put/no response
   1. No
   2. Yes
   3. Other

5. Would you say you live in a Muslim community? (MUSCOM)
   0. Not put/no response
   1. No
   2. No, but does exist a sense of a Muslim community
   3. Yes
   4. Other

6. Do you think it is important to keep a sense of community? (SENSCOM)
   0. Not put/no response
   1. No
   2. Yes
   3. Other

6b. Why is it important to keep a sense of community? (WHYCOM)
   0. Not put/no response
   1. For support/security
   2. Sense of belonging
   3. Keep you in touch with your roots/identity
   4. Pass down religion/culture/traditions – morals/ethics
   5. To maintain sense of shared responsibility/respect
   6. Other
7. Is there just one Muslim community in H/W – Luton? (IMUCOM)
   0  Not put/no response
   1  Split by country of origin/region/mosque
   2  Split by physical location in Luton or H/W
   3  Split by Islamic sects
   4  Different thoughts exist but still make up one community because one belief
   5  Other

8. What Islamic sects are you aware of? (AWRESCT)
   0  Not put/no response
   1  Islam does not create factions
   2  Sunni/Shia/Whabbi (inc. schools of thought – hanifi, shafi...)
   3  Islamic movements – Al Mahajaroun, HT, etc.
   4  Quadians/Mirzia
   5  Other

8b. What do you think of them? SUNNISHIA ETC. (THINKSTA)
   0  Not put/no response
   1  Think they are wrong, (against Islam)
   2  All give Muslims a voice so okay
   3  Matter of interpretation/all Muslims at the end of the day
   4  Can give Muslims a bad name/be too extreme
   5  Politically motivated
   6  Don’t know/don’t get involved
   7  Other

8c. What do you think of them? ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS (THINKSTB)
   8  Not put/no response
   9  Think they are wrong, (against Islam)
  10  All give Muslims a voice so okay
  11  Matter of interpretation/all Muslims at the end of the day
  12  Can give Muslims a bad name/be too extreme
  13  Politically motivated
  14  Don’t know/don’t get involved
  15  Other

8d. What do you think of them? QUADIANI ETC. (THINKSTC)
  16  Not put/no response
  17  Think they are wrong, (against Islam)
  18  All give Muslims a voice so okay
  19  Matter of interpretation/all Muslims at the end of the day
  20  Can give Muslims a bad name/be too extreme
  21  Politically motivated
  22  Don’t know/don’t get involved
  23  Other
8e. Do you follow any particular one? (FOLLSCT)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 No, but then go on to state a sect.
3 Yes
4 Yes but doesn’t mean anything, all are Muslims
5 Other

9. Who would you do more for, your community or British society? (DOMORE)
0 Not put/no response
1 Asians because others can take care of themselves
2 Muslims/ummah
3 British society
4 Whoever is in more need.
5 My community (because don’t have equal rights)
6 Both/everyone
7 Other

6 Participation/Representation
1. Are you a member or involved with any organisations? (INVORG)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes, religious
3 Yes, country of origin
4 Yes, youth
5 Yes, Asian/minority ethnic groups and/or gender
6 Yes, professional or sports
7 Other

2. Have you heard of any groups, locally or nationally that are seen to represent the views of Muslims? (MUSORG)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes
3 Other

3. What do you think of the work these groups do? (THNKORG)
0 Not put/no response
1 Can be/come across as extremist/isolationist
2 Only after individual personal gain
3 Give Muslims a voice
4 Promoting Islam/ keep people in touch with their religion
5  Good but too fragmented
6  Mostly good/positive
7  Not sure/don’t know what they do
8  Other

4. **How adequately do you think they represent the views of Muslims, or cater for the needs of Muslims? (REPMUS)**
   0  Not put/no response
   1  Doing best they can
   2  Concentrate too much on political Islam/too extremist
   3  Not very well, (too fragmented/unrealistic)
   4  Not sure/don’t know what they do
   5  Other

5. **Do you think Muslims should be represented as a separate religious group? (SEPREP)**
   0  Not put/no response
   1  No, being represented as Asians is sufficient
   2  No, individual representation sufficient – according to need
   3  No, Muslims can not be represented
   4  Yes
   5  Yes & no, depends on the issue
   6  Don’t know/not sure
   7  Other

6. **How would you like your views to be represented in this country? (LIKEREP)**
   0  Not put/no response
   1  Don’t want representation because Muslims can’t be accommodated
   2  As a Muslim but have one unified voice
   3  In local politics, councillors
   4  Current representation is adequate
   5  Equally but respecting difference is culture & religion
   6  Muslims representatives at local and national level.
   7  Don’t know/not bothered
   8  Other

7. **Do you think your local councillor/M.P represents your views? (CLLRMP)**
   0  Not put/no response
   1  Poor in house of commons – good locally
   2  Some counties better then others
   3  Yes
   4  No
   5  Sometimes
   6  Don’t know
   7  Other
Culture
1. How does culture fit into your life? (FITCULT)
0 Not put/no response
1 Second to religion
2 Big part, culture and religion inseparable – Islamic culture
3 Big part, forms identity – Pakistani culture
4 Everyday behaviour/way of life
5 Small part
6 Don’t know what my culture is
7 Other

2. What makes up your culture? (MAKECUL)
0 Not put/no response
1 Food/clothes/lang./festivals - of country of origin
2 Food/clothes/lang./festivals
3 Religion (Islamic moral code)
4 Morals & ethics (family values)
5 Sense of solidarity/support
6 Changeable – country of origin/residence
7 Don’t know/not sure
8 Other

3. Would you say you are influenced by other cultures? (INFLCUL)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes, take on aspects of other cultures so long as don’t contradict Islam
3 Yes, take on positive aspects of other culture (part of integration/adapting)
99 Other

4. Are you bothered if your children learn from other cultures? (OTHCUA)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes
3 Inevitable
4 Don’t know/not sure
5 Other

4b. Other comments. (OTHCULB)
0 Not put/no response
1 Only serves to enrich the personality
2 So long as don’t adopt aspects which contradict Islam
3 So long as keep within boundaries of culture/tradition
4 Will lose their culture/values
Religious Education

1. How did you learn about Islam?  (HOWISL)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 By being born into a Muslim family/environment (Through parents/family)
   2 Mosque - school, prayers & Imam
   3 School – Islamyat/deenyat
   4 Alim/religious circles
   5 Independent reading
   6 Private tuition
   7 Other

1b. What did you learn?  (WHATISL)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Basics – namaz, Qu’ran, rosa, kalma, rights & wrongs according to Islam
   2 Islamic history
   3 Other

2. Are you still learning about Islam?  (STILLISL)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Not really, occasionally pick up Qu’ran/new information
   2 No
   3 Yes (can never stop learning)
   4 Other

2b. How do you learn about Islam?  (HOWSTIL)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Parents/family
   2 By practising it – e.g reading namaz/keeping rosa
   3 Books/literature
   4 Islamic circles
   5 Mosque
   6 Tafsir/hadith/Qu’ran
   7 Other

3. How do you think Islam affects of influences your daily life?  (INFLISL)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Not at all
   2 Start and end the day with namaz
   3 Dress code
   4 Not as much as it could if followed properly
   5 Always at the back of your mind (way of life)
   6 Dominates, guides every action
4. *How often do you pray? (PRAY)*
0 Not put/no response
1 Five times a day
2 Every day – as many as I can manage
3 Occasionally/as often as I can manage
4 Try to do Friday prayers/try not to miss morning prayers if nothing else
5 Rarely/never
6 Other

5. *How often do you read the Qu’ran? (QURAN)*
0 Not put/no response
1 Everyday
2 Occasionally/as often as I can manage
3 On special occasions, e.g. shabaraat/rosa
4 Rarely/never
5 Other

6. *How often do you go to the Mosque? (MOSQUE)*
0 Not put/no response
1 Rarely/never, would go more often if more facilities for women
2 Regularly for Islamic circles
3 As often as I can manage for Friday prayer
4 Occasionally/as often as I can manage
5 Rarely/never
6 Other

7. *Do you fast during ramadan? (FAST)*
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes
3 Other

8. *What does Eid mean to you? (EID)*
0 Not put/no response
1 Day for friends and family (especially children)
2 More social then religious
3 Dressing up & enjoyment/food/Eidi
4 Celebrate end of Ramadan/Haj
5 Sense of Muslim community
6 Other
9. What do you think about zakaat? (ZAKAAT)
0 Not put/no response
1 Compulsory
2 Important/good
3 Not bothered about it
4 Should be more regulated
5 Other

9b. Would/do you pay zakaat? (PAYZAK)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 No, not officially but do give money to poor
3 Yes, send to poor/family in country/village of origin
4 Yes, give to organised Muslim charities
5 Yes, give to mosque
6 Yes, give to non Muslim charities as well
7 Other

10. Are you happy with the way you observe your religion? (HAPPYOBS)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes
3 Yes & no
4 Other

10b. What stops you from observing your religion more? (STOPOBS)
0 Not put/no response
1 People's interpretation of Islam
2 Laziness
3 Lack of time/worldly pressures
4 Other

11. Do you think you are given the space in this country to practise your faith the way you want to? (SPCEOBS)
0 Not put/no response
1 At home yes, outside too many restrictions
2 Greater understanding is arising
3 Yes, more then enough/no one will stop you
4 Yes, more then enough - but can understand how others may not have enough space
5 No
6 Other
11b. If no: in what way do you think you are restricted from practising your faith the way you want to? (RSTROBS)
0 Not put/no response
1 Working hours/conditions inflexible for prayers & fasting
2 Student – exams scheduled during Eid
3 Eid still not an automatic day off
4 Not sure but obstacles put in your way so is difficult to practice
5 Other

12. At the moment how does Islam affect your life outside the home? (OUTHOME)
0 Not put/no response
1 It doesn’t (probably doesn’t)
2 It doesn’t (probably does)
3 Praying
4 Behaviour towards others
5 Dress code
6 Fasting
7 Constant reminder of what I should/shouldn’t be doing
8 Other

13. Do you think your faith would have played the same part in your life if you had been living in a Muslim country? (MUSCO)
0 Not put/no response
1 No, faith would have been weaker
2 No, faith would have been stronger
3 No, would have practised more – rituals
4 Yes
5 Other

14. Some people say religion is a personal, private matter and that you should not bring it into public affairs. What do you think? (MUSPRIA)
0 Not put/no response
1 No (not private)
2 Yes (should keep it private)
3 Depends on the context
4 Other

14b. Other comments (MUSPRIB)
0 Not put/no response
1 Islam is a comprehensive system, so can’t be private
2 Other religions are not private, so why expect Islam to be
3 Most people accept/accommodate peoples religious needs now/basic right
4 Expect to be penalised if bring Islam into public.
5 Should be freedom of expression for all
6 A religious person can not keep religion private
15. How does your expression of Islam differ from that of your Parents?  
(DIFPART)  
0 Not put/no response  
1 Doesn't  
2 Parents emphasise ritual aspects/five pillars of Islam more (personal religion)  
3 Parents don't distinguish between culture and religion  
4 Parents more religious – (age)  
5 Father not religious, mother religious  
6 Other  

15b. How do you think your expression of Islam will differ from that of your children?  
(DIFCHLD)  
0 Not put/no response  
1 Will be the same/similar  
2 Religion not as important as cultural values/being good people  
3 Religion important but not a top priority  
4 Be more religiously informed  
5 Not sure/don't know  
6 Other  

16. Which influences your life more, faith or culture?  
(FAITCULT)  
0 Not put/no response  
1 Faith  
2 Faith, follow an Islamic culture  
3 Culture  
4 Culture, faith part of culture  
5 Both, (equally)  
6 Not sure  
7 Other  

10 Multiculturalism  
1. Do you think Muslims should have a right to expect their employer to be sensitive to their religious needs?  
(EMPSENS)  
0 Not put/no response  
1 No  
2 Yes (not a duty to know but an attitude of understanding)  
3 Depends on the context  
4 Other  

1b. What are/would be your needs at work?  
(EMPNEED)  
0 Not put/no response  
1 Nothing
2. State nothing but probably do have needs
3. To cover
4. Prayer/ Friday prayers
5. Somewhere to do vuzu
6. Day off on Eid
7. Ramadhan
8. Other

2. Is there anywhere where it is inappropriate that religious needs be recognised and responded to? (RELINAP)
   0. Not put/no response
   1. No/can’t think of anywhere
   2. Yes, shouldn’t make religion an excuse for time off
   3. Desire for single sex schools
   4. Probably but can’t think of any examples
   5. Other

3. What ideally would be your needs in the NHS? (NHSNEED)
   0. Not put/no response
   1. None
   2. Lady doctor/halal food and halal procedures in preparing the food – rehearsed response
   3. Lady doctor/halal food and halal procedures in preparing the food – pragmatic response
   4. Be sensitive to different traditions followed after someone dies
   5. Staff assume less
   6. Situation improving all the time
   7. Provision already sufficient
   8. Other

4. Do you accept that other people will have different views and beliefs from you, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, and that is their right? (DIFBEL)
   0. Not put/no response
   1. No
   2. Yes
   3. Other

11 Level of Education
1. To what level did your schooling extend? (EDLEVEL)
   0. Not put/no response
   1. No formal qualifications
   2. GCSE/Metric
   3. A level/equivalent/FA (2years)
   4. Degree/BA(4years)
5 Other

2. Have you had any further education/training? (FUTRAIN)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 No
   2 Yes
   3 Other

2b. Is there any reason you didn’t pursue your education? (WHYNOED)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Bring up children
   2 Earn living/provide for family
   3 Not expected for girls to be more educated at that time
   4 Lost interest – Islam given priority
   5 Other

3. What level of education have your parents had? (EDPARNT)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Father educated, mother not
   2 Mother educated, father not
   3 Both educated
   4 Both have no formal qualifications
   5 Other

4. Do you work at the moment? (WORK)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Yes, full time
   2 Yes, part time
   3 Yes, volunteer
   4 No, housewife
   5 No, unemployed
   6 No, student/just graduated
   7 No, retired
   8 Other

4b. What does your partner do? (PARTNER)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Works, full time
   2 Works, part time
   3 Unemployed
   4 Housewife
   5 Retired
   6 Other
11 British schooling

1. If you had the choice what type of school would you send your children to? (TYPSCHL)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Grammar
   2 One with high level of achievement
   3 Islamic
   4 Single sex
   5 Private
   6 State/their current schools
   7 Multicultural
   8 Not sure/don’t know
   9 Other

2. What do you think of separate Muslim schools? (MUSSCHL)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Good/must be okay
   2 Provides a solid Muslim identity
   3 Child wouldn’t learn social skills necessary to live in a multi faith, multi cultural society
   4 Will create greater tension/racism between different faiths
   5 Quality of education is poor and contradictory
   6 Good in principle (equalise rights)
   7 Don’t know, have no experience of them
   8 Other

2b. Would you send your child to a Muslim school? (SENMUSSC)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 No
   2 Yes
   3 Would depend on the individual school
   4 Not sure/don’t know
   5 Other

3. What do you think is the main purpose of education? (PURPED)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Pass on worldly knowledge
   2 Promote freedom without moral boundaries
   3 Independence & security (good job)
   4 Learn, develop socially & independent thinking
   5 Learn right from wrong
   6 Respect difference/gain self respect
   7 Other
4. Do you think the British education system provides this? (BRITED)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 Yes (what you make of it)
3 Trying to but need more parental input
4 Other

5. What do you see as the main problems for Muslim children at school? (PROBSCH)
0 Not put/no response
1 Were problems in the past but now they have worked themselves out
2 Segregate themselves too much
3 Bombarded with too many ideas at too young an age/balancing what is taught at school with what is taught at home
4 Low teacher expectations/stereotypes held/Islamophobia/discrimination/racism
5 Balancing their worldly/religious/cultural education
6 Should be allowed to express their religious/cultural identity
7 Don’t know haven’t come across any
8 Other

6. How important is it to pass on Islamic knowledge? (PASSONIS)
0 Not put/no response
1 Number one priority
2 One of a number of priorities
3 Low on the priority list
4 Other

6b. Why do you feel it is important to pass on Islamic education? (WHYPASS)
0 Not put/no response
1 So (s)he can go to jinna
2 Duty of every parent
3 If (s)he is to be a Muslim
4 So can learn right from wrong/cultural values
5 Because these are my religious convictions
6 Provides basic foundation to life/identity
7 Other

7. Some people have said that the state has no responsibility to pass on Islamic knowledge to Muslim school children, do you agree? (STATREA)
0 Not put/no response
1 No, state does have responsibility
2 Yes, state does not have responsibility
3 Depends on the make-up of the school
4 Not sure/don’t know
5 Other
7b. Other comments (STATREB)
0 Not put/no response
1 But also don’t have the right to impose their own ideas.
2 Should give over view of all religions and culture (treat Islam in an equal way to other faiths)
3 Religious education provision is fine as it is – main emphasis on Christianity
4 Majority of Islamic education should be outside school
5 Should give basic Islamic knowledge to children – 5 pillars
6 Should recognise Islam exists and integrate it into existing classes where appropriate.
7 Should be given option to do GCSE in Islam
8 Should be given a world view/history of Islam
9 Other

8. Is there anything in the curriculum that you think should be changed? (CURRIC)
0 Not put/no response
1 No
2 No – contradicts later
3 Yes
4 Don’t know/not sure
5 Other

8b. What would you like to see changed? (WHTCURR)
0 Not put/no response
1 Sex education should not be taught
2 Evolution theory should not be taught as a fact
3 History should be less eurocentric
4 Should exclude Muslim children from non Islamic RE lessons
5 Other

9. What about the structure of the school? (STRCSCH)
0 Not put/no response
1 Should recognise Muslim sensibilities and accommodate them
2 A lot is accommodated for now – uniform/food/Eid
3 Uniform – hijab/PE/Skirt alternative
4 Halal food (& preparation)
5 Prayer should be allowed/washing facilities in toilets
6 Respect & acknowledge ramadhan/Eid
7 Assembly, should not always be Christian based
8 Don’t know
9 Other
9a What about Art or Drama? (ARTDRAMA)
0 Not put/no response
1 Acceptable
2 Not acceptable/respectable
3 Other

10. What RE do you/would you give your children? (HMTEACH)
0 Not put/no response
1 The basics – kalma/namaz/rosa/haj/zakaat/Qu’ran – five pillars at home
2 Information about events – maharam/minaj-a-sharif
3 Qu’ran recitation
4 Qu’ran with interpretation
5 Islamic history/worldview of Islam
6 Difference between right & wrong
7 Learn Arabic language
8 Other

10b. How will/did you teach your children about Islam? (HWTEACH)
0 Not put/no response
1 My parents will teach them/I will teach them – through his home environment
2 Books
3 CD ROM/videos/audio cassettes
4 Send them to (Qu’ranic) classes/private tuition
5 Mosque
6 Don’t know/not sure
7 Other

11. How do you feel the teaching of Islamic education could be improved? (ISIMPRV)
0 Not put/no response
1 Make formal tuition classes/information/books more available
2 By integrating more with non Muslims and talking about Islam
3 More Muslim schools
4 Parents teach by example/as much as they can
5 Improve mosque facilities- less strict on discipline/teach with meaning
6 Teach in school
7 Current provision sufficient
8 Other

12. Do you think the education system succeeds in providing equality of opportunity for Muslim children when they leave school? (EQUALOP)
0 Not put/no response
1 No, don’t get equal opportunities in employment (Race/religion)
2 No, equal opportunity not a reality (natural for people to favour their own)
3 No, institutional disadvantages in place
12 Discrimination

1. Have you ever experienced any form of prejudice/discrimination against you? (EXPPREJ)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 No
   2 No, but do think racism exists/go on to talk of experiences
   3 Yes
   4 Other

2. Do you think religious discrimination exists? (RELDISA)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 No
   2 Yes, covert
   3 Yes, overt
   4 Don’t know
   5 Other

2b. Other comments (RELDISB)
   0 None
   1 Cited Rushdie
   2 Never experienced personally though
   3 Especially in employment
   4 Especially in school
   5 especially within different Asian groups
   6 Especially if you look like a Muslim
   7 Other

2c. Why do you think religious discrimination exists? (RELDISC)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Because of negative media representation of Islam as extremist/promoting hatred
   2 Historical legacy of the crusades etc.
   3 Fear of Islam because offers an alternative ideology after fall of communism
   4 International events having affects at home
   5 Muslims to blame for their negative image
   6 Feel displaced
   7 Other

2d. What can be done to make things better? (RELDISD)
Views wider society holds of Muslims

1. How do you think the majority non-Muslim English people in this country view Muslims? (VIEWMUS)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Majority okay
   2 Negatively
   3 Immigrants/Asians
   4 No one image of Muslims
   5 Don’t know/not sure
   6 Other

1b. Why do you think Muslims are viewed like this? (WHYVIEW)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Asians done a lot to harm their own image
   2 Against Islam, irritated by it
   3 Because of the media
   4 Because feel displaced
   5 Lack of knowledge
   6 Other

2. How do you think the Government views their Muslim citizens? (GOVVIEW)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Allowed to practice faith
   2 Discouraged from practising faith
   3 As a problem/threat
   4 Doesn’t hold a (fixed) opinion
   5 Trying to engage with Muslim opinion
   6 Don’t know
   7 Other

3. What do you think about the way Muslims are portrayed in the media? (MEDVIEW)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 News about Asians hits the headlines more
   2 Negatively (as fundamentalists/extremist/violent terrorists)
3. Biased reporting - don't give Muslim perspective on events
4. Stereotypical reporting e.g. high achievers/cornershop owners
5. Don't know/not sure
6. Other

3b. How does this make you feel? (MEDFEEL)
0. Not put/no response
1. Others take on these images as a reflection of Muslims generally
2. Might as well support extremist groups
3. Be careful what you say – fear of misinterpretation
4. Sad/bad/annoyed
5. Reflect of why came to this country
6. Other

4. Do you think things will get better or worse for Muslims in this country? (BETWOSA)
0. Not put/no response
1. Better
2. Worse
3. Short term worse but long term better
4. Don’t know/not sure
5. Other

4b. Other comments. (BETWOSB)
0. Not put/no response
1. As numbers increase understanding growing
2. More restriction will be placed on Muslims (as hatred for Muslims increases)
3. Worse, because of reporting of international events involving Muslims
4. Muslims themselves to blame (for their bad image)
5. Muslims can’t adapt to British society
6. Other

5. What about internationally. What for you is the biggest issue facing Muslims/Islam in the world at the moment? (BIGISUE)
0. Not put/no response
1. Disunity amongst Muslims
2. Negative media reporting/images
3. Wars involving Muslims (Israel/Palestine issue & Iran/Afghanistan)
4. Western obsession with power
5. To be able to practice Islam
6. Don’t know/not sure
7. Other
14 The Future
1. *How do you think Islam will develop in the future in Britain?* (FUTISLM)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 Become stronger
   2 More Muslims from diverse ethnic backgrounds
   3 Islam expanding - fasting spreading religion in world
   4 More practising Muslims
   5 More Muslim in name only
   6 Not sure
   7 Other

2. *In the future do you think differences should be kept between Muslims and non Muslims in this country?* (KEE PDIF)
   0 Not put/no response
   1 No
   2 Differences will become less over time
   3 Yes, if we are to maintain identity
   4 To be a Muslim means to be different – make compromises/participate/integrate
   5 To be a Muslim means to be different – no compromise/participation/integration
   6 Difference is inherent in society amongst everyone & is good
   7 Other

15 *Feel are better off in this country than would be in any other.* (BETTEROF)
0 Not put
1 Yes
2 No

Q. 6.2 - Muslim groups

**Lobbyists** - Muslim Parliament/UMO/UKACIA/Al-khoei Foundation/Association of Muslim Lawyers

**Charities** – Muslim Aid-Islamic Relief/

**Islamic movements** - Khalifa/UK Mission/HT/Al-Mahajaroun/Young Muslims/

**Muslim media** – Q-News, Trends, Dialogue, Muslim News

‘*Unislamic*’ movements - Quadiani/Anmayydi/Nation of Islam

**Islamic sects** - Whabbi/Shia/Sunni/tabligh-i-jamaat/sunnat-a-jamaat/Naqsbandi/Deobandi
Local groups – Multi Racial centre

Q. 13.1 – Views of Muslims held by wider society

Something to fear/extremists/violent terrorists/crazy
Hate Muslims/seen as the enemy
As different/not fitting in/alien
Backwards/illiterate/narrow minded
Fundamentalists
Impulsive
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